

Tantra and Pramāṇa
A Study of the *Sāramañjarī*

Series Minor

XCVIII

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Tantra and Pramāṇa
A Study of the *Sāramañjarī*

by

Margherita Serena Saccone and Péter-Dániel Szántó



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For Haru and Fra

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In compliance with the Italian requirements for the validity of a publication for public competitions, we hereby specify the paternity and maternity of single chapters of the book, with the understanding that many parts were written and edited thanks to mutual collaboration. Saccone is responsible for: 1.4. Notes on the Use of Designations, Terms, and Translations (pp. 27–28); 2. Introduction (pp. 29–90); 7. English Translation pp. (187–237); B. Parallels (second half, pp. 251–258); and the Bibliography for the chapters corresponding (even pages). Szántó is responsible for the rest, including the typesetting in X_YL^AT_EX.



Figure 1: Modern *siddham* rendering of the seed-syllable *maṃ*. Calligraphy by Kodama Giryu.

I

Introduction

General Introduction

1.1 *The Life of Jñānapāda*

Jñānapāda (or Buddhaśrījñāna) was one of the most distinguished and influential figures in the roughly half-millennium history of mature esoteric Buddhism in South Asia. His activity can be assigned with some confidence to the last decades of the 8th century and the first two of the 9th century. By the standards of the time, we know a considerable amount about his life, and these pieces of data are all the more remarkable because they come from the author himself. There are quite a few studies on this subject,¹ so here we will only repeat the essential points of his biography.

At an unknown point in his mature life, Jñānapāda set out from Magadha, first heading west to begin his studies with one of the most important exegetes of the period, Haribhadra, author of the *Abhisamayālaṅkā-rālokā*, in Takṣaśilā (i.e., Taxila).

After a while, he relocated to Nālandā, but then headed back north-north-west, this time to Oḍḍiyāna (i.e., the Swat Valley) to study with the early tantric commentator Vilāsavajra, author of the *Nāmamantrārthāvalokinī* commentary.

After an obscure journey further north and then back to Jālandhara, he headed southwest to the Konkan coast—for reasons unknown, perhaps driven by the desire for more knowledge—where he met a guru of

¹To mention only the latest studies: Davidson 2002, 309–316; Szántó 2015; Dalton and Szántó 2019; Dalton 2019.

the *Guhyasamājantra*,² an individual known as Pālitapāda. After having spent some time with this teacher and the community around him, Jñānapāda grew dissatisfied with his and his master's lack of understanding of the *Guhyasamājantra*, so he set out on the long road back to Magadha.

Here, not far from the Vajrāsana (i.e., Bodh Gaya), he met an unusual, defrocked monk, who eventually turned out to be an emanation of the deity Mañjuśrī. Having received teachings from him in a vision-like experience, Jñānapāda settled down in the vicinity of the Rajgir Hills, where he began heading his own community of followers.

At one point, he decided to visit his erstwhile master, Pālitapāda. Several sources suggest that it was at this time and upon the Konkani master's request that he wrote the meditation manual called the *Samantabhadrasādhana*.

After this second trip, he returned to his hermitage and continued his career of teaching and composing. Some evidence points to his intimate connection with two Pāla emperors (Dharmapāla and Devapāla, father and son), but he probably did not act as royal chaplain.

1.2 The *Samantabhadrasādhana*

The *Samantabhadrasādhana*, also known simply as the *Samantabhadra* or the *Caturāṅgasādhana*, proved to be an influential work. It is short, consisting of only 164 verses (mostly in the *āryā* metre), but pithy and sometimes rather difficult.³ While it survives in Sanskrit, the complete text is at present inaccessible.⁴ The text is essentially a guidebook to the initiate's daily practice centered on deity yoga.

²For the *Guhyasamājantra* in general, see Tanemura 2015.

³The peculiar structure of the *āryā* metre demands a certain variety in vocabulary (for example, not entirely straightforward synonyms for the more usual technical terms), compounds that require some pondering over, and elliptical statements, to name but a few. It was probably also more difficult to memorize than the *anuṣṭubh*. On near-contemporary critiques of Jñānapāda's difficult rhetoric from the viewpoint of the rival, and therefore not entirely unbiased, Ārya School, see Tomabechi 2008.

⁴This now-notorious multiple-text manuscript, a bound volume of birch bark leaves from mid-11th century Kashmir and now in the Tibet Museum in Lhasa, was first noticed by Kawasaki (2004). A partial edition (vv. 19d–55a) from a photograph of facing pages of the *Samantabhadrasādhana* was published by Kano (2014). Further pages from this manuscript have been published by Kano and Szántó (2020).

General Introduction

There are two Tibetan translations of this work: the first⁵ is an almost word-for-word rendering at the expense of Tibetan syntax, perhaps a first draft, by Smṛtījñānakīrti (ca. mid-11th cent.), whereas the second⁶ is a more polished effort by Rin chen bzang po (958–1055) and Śraddhākaravarman.

A major channel for the *Samantabhadrasādhana*'s influence was an initiation manual by one of Jñānapāda's direct students, Dīpaṃkarabhadra or Bhadrāpāda. This *Maṇḍalavidhi*,⁷ also known as the *Sārdhatrisatikā*, is in many parts an *anuṣṭubh* paraphrase of the *āryās* of the meditation manual. As for the source for the rest of the *Maṇḍalavidhi*, we know from the testimony of Jñānapāda's main exegete, *Vītapāda, that the master also wrote an initiation manual, but this was not available to him as it had been taken to Kashmir.⁸ Thus, while there is a possibility that Dīpaṃkarabhadra's work contains little that is original, it is clear that it was deeply influential on authors such as Abhayākara Gupta (ca. 1075–1135) and his followers: for example, Jagaddarpaṇa's (ca. 13th cent.) *Kṛiyāsamuccaya*, a massive compendium of rituals used in Nepal to this day. The *Maṇḍalavidhi* was influential even before this, as it received exegetical attention from *Vītapāda⁹ and Ratnākaraśānti¹⁰ (ca. 970–1045¹¹), which made it even more prominent.

Another proof of the *Samantabhadrasādhana*'s influence is the sheer number of commentaries on it. We are aware of at least five such texts. The first is by the above-mentioned *Vītapāda.¹² While this man was undoubtedly the chief commentator of Jñānapāda's oeuvre, his relationship to the master is still not clear: he may have been a late direct disciple or a grand-disciple. There are two lesser known commentaries, by one *Thagana¹³ and one *Śrīphalavajra,¹⁴ respectively. None of these three

⁵D 1856, P 2719. This text was garbled in transmission, as shown in Kikuya 2012.

⁶D 1855, P 2718.

⁷Bahulka 2010, missing final verses in Szántó 2015; D 1865, P 2728.

⁸See D 1866, 134r: *dkyil 'khor cho ga ni shlo ka nyis brgya lnga bcu pa de Kha che'i yul du khyer zhes grags te | bdag cag gis ma mthong ngo |*.

⁹D 1873, P 2736.

¹⁰D 1871, P 2734.

¹¹On these dates and Ratnākaraśānti's scholarly activity in general, see Seton 2019 and 2022.

¹²D 1873, P 2735.

¹³D 1868, P 2731.

¹⁴D 1867, P 2730.

texts survive in the original Sanskrit. The accessible photographs of the previously mentioned birch bark manuscript (see n. 4) contain five pages of a commentary on the *Samantabhadrasādhana*, which is very similar to but not the same as *Śrīphalavajra's.¹⁵ Finally, we have a commentary called *Sāramañjarī*, by Samantabhadra.

1.3 The *Sāramañjarī* of Samantabhadra

The Tibetan translation of the *Sāramañjarī*,¹⁶ while a fairly skilful one, had not received much attention by modern scholarship, until Kimiaki Tanaka discovered a fragment of the original Sanskrit in Nepal,¹⁷ which showed that what stood behind the Tibetan was a slightly different recension. When, due to the kindness of Francesco Sferra, Szántó was granted access to photographs of the Tucci archives in 2012, a long-forgotten and almost complete witness of the text emerged. This too turned out to be a different, much longer recension. The manuscript is dated in the Pāla style; therefore, for the sake of convenience we shall refer to the text transmitted in this witness as the “Pāla recension”, while the text behind the Tibetan will be termed the “Tibetan recension”, and the text of which Tanaka's find is a witness, the “Nepalese recension”. We also have a short fragment preserved in Beijing, which may or may not be part of a “Chinese recension”.¹⁸

¹⁵An index sheet in the codex attributes the work to one Padmavajra, but a Tibetan heading in a margin claims it is the work of one 'Phags pa, that is to say, the *Ārya. The available portions have since been published in Kano and Szántó 2020.

¹⁶D 1869, P 2732. According to the colophon, the translation was made in Bal yul mthil by the ‘great *paṇḍita*’ Nya ya na shrī, and the ‘great Tibetan translator’, the monk Blo ldan shes rab. The latter is the famous translator of the Rngog (1059–1109; see Kramer 2007). Nothing is known about the South Asian scholar, who may or may not have been a Newar. His name is odd; perhaps the original form was *Nayanaśrī or *Nyāyaśrī. Kramer (2007, 41–42) suspects that this cooperation must have taken place in Patan (as Verhagen identifies *mthil*), on Rngog's return from Magadha shortly before 1092. See also Kano 2016, 195. Rngog's enthusiasm and enormously important work in the field of logic and epistemology is well known (e.g., van der Kuijp 1983, 29–58). This interest may explain why he chose the *Sāramañjarī* for translation.

¹⁷National Archives Kathmandu 1-1697 2/20 = Nepal German Manuscript Preservation Project reel no. A 994/8. It is now the subject of a monograph, Tanaka 2017, reviewed in Szántó 2017b.

¹⁸This is a single-folio fragment, only the recto of which is inscribed, containing the very end of the work. We thank Ye Shaoyong for granting us access to this image.

1.3.1 The “Pāla Recension” Manuscript

What we can reconstruct from the history of this remarkable Pāla manuscript is the following. According to the colophon, it was commissioned by a Buddhist male (it is not made explicit whether a monk or a layman) called Ratnamati, or one whose name began with Ratnamati°. The copying was finished on the sixth of the month of *āṣāḍha* in the fifth regnal year of Nayapāla. Fortunately, there was only one Pāla emperor by this name, so we can be relatively confident that this ruler was meant.¹⁹ According to the latest advances in Pāla chronology,²⁰ Nayapāla ruled for at least fifteen years, and his predecessor’s rule came to an end around 1028. Various sources indicate that this was a period of war, so it is almost impossible to determine which regions were obedient to Nayapāla’s command during these years. However, judging by the style of the dating, it must have been copied in a polity under Pāla rule. The scribe says nothing more, save for the customary disclaimer of having copied the text as he saw it, and declaring the measurement of the text as “2,100”. The unit is not specified, but it is almost certain that he means *granthas* (units of thirty-two syllables).²¹

At some point in the next decades or centuries, the artefact was taken to Tibet, eventually ending up at Zhwa lu Ri phug (or Ri sbug/spugs), a small but very important subsidiary of Zhwa lu proper, once home to the famous scholar Bu ston Rin chen grub.²²

It was not until modern times that the manuscript was first noticed here by Dge ’dun chos ’phel²³ and Rāhula Sāṅkrtyāyana, most likely during their visit from 5 to 15 August, 1936. According to the latter’s

¹⁹It is unlikely that we are dealing with the Nayapāla of the Kāmboja Pālas (see Majumdar 1938). His record dates to the late 10th century, which for our manuscript is more or less impossible on palaeographical grounds.

²⁰See Dimitrov 2016, 756.

²¹Here is a formatted diplomatic transcript of the colophon (f. 39r6–7): *deyadharmoyam pravaramahāyānāyāyino ratnamatikṛte yad atra puṇyaṃ tad bhavato ācāryopādhyāyamātāpitr̥pū-
rvaṅgamaṃ kṛtvā sakalasatvarāśer anuttarajñānāvāptaya iti || śrīmannayapāladevasya pravarddha-
mānavijayarāyē samvat 5 || āṣāḍhadine 6 || pramāṇam asya 2100 || yathā dṛṣṭam tathā likhitaṃ
lekhako (two lost akṣaras) doṣa iti || ||.*

²²See also Deleanu 2006, 51–54 and 63–66, who offers the hypothesis that the Ri phug collection originally came from Sa skya.

²³The Sarnath edition of his journal, the *Gtam rgyud Gser gyi thang ma* (written between 1934 and 1941, finished in Sri Lanka; see Norbu Śāstrī 1986, 15–16) reads: *Ri phug nas rgya dpe rnam sgdan drangs te bltas pas | pod che chung bzhi bcu zhe gnyis kyi nang du | [...]*

report, they attempted to take photographs of the manuscripts found at the location, but the plates were somehow spoiled by the photographer. A second attempt was made, and was successful, but it did not capture the entire collection. Unfortunately, our manuscript was not among the lucky few. Nevertheless, Sāṅkr̥tyāyana did take some notes, which were published.²⁴

The manuscript was observed again, in 1939, by Giuseppe Tucci, who also managed to have it photographed. The procedure was simple: the folios were (somewhat carelessly) pinned to a large wooden board, which an assistant then held upright to face the camera. The quality of the final images varies greatly; the edges in particular are out of focus and sometimes blurred beyond recognition. The photographs are printed on six plates.

Tucci's processed film was converted into digital images by Francesco Sferra.²⁵ In this incarnation, they received the file identifications EE010001 to EE070001, and it was in this form that we first accessed the witness.²⁶ The folios were photographed in the correct sequence, with the exception of 9 and 25, which were mistaken for each other.²⁷ Folios 1r and 39v were not photographed, presumably because Tucci did not consider them important enough. Furthermore, in the process of photographing the two sides of each leaf, neither 32 nor 33 were turned

sāramanydzarī — gnad kyi snye ma cha tshang | tsaturangasādhanatīkā — yan lag bzhi sgrub thabs kyi 'gral pa slob dpon samantabhadras mdzad pa |. The inadequate English translation of this text (Jinpa and Lopez 2014, 39–40) has “mountain cave” for the toponym and splits the somewhat confusing entry into two, adding the item mentioning the *Amṅāyamañjarī* between them.

²⁴See Sāṅkr̥tyāyana 1937, 44. He calls the script “Kuṭilā”, gives the measurements as 22.5/2.25 (length/width in inches), the number of folios as 39, and the number of lines as 7 (although this varies between 6 and 8), and notes that the witness is complete in spite of some torn leaves. He then transcribes the available incipit, the explicit, and the colophon. The narrative given in Sāṅkr̥tyāyana's biography (1994 [1998], 251) differs slightly from the account given in the report.

²⁵The first guide to this remarkable collection is Sferra 2008. Our manuscript is described on p. 45 (item 30).

²⁶The arrangement of folios is as follows. EE010001: 1v, 2r up to 8r, 25r, 10r up to 15r; EE020001: 16r up to 24r, 9r, 26r up to 30r; EE030001: 31r up to 39r; EE050001: 2v up to 8v, 25v, 10v up to 15v; EE060001: 16v up to 24v, 9v, 26v up to 30v; EE070001: 31v, 32r bis, 33r bis, 34v up to 38v.

²⁷The rectos contain, in the middle of the upper margin, a series of Arabic numerals. We cannot say with certainty who added these numbers, but in any case, 9 and 25 had already been confused.

over to the reverse side of the folio, resulting in duplicate images of both rectos and missing images of both versos. Folios 1 and 4 are missing the left third; folio 9, about one-sixth of the same area.²⁸

The manuscript then somehow made its way to Beijing, where it was archived once again.²⁹ Thanks to the good offices of Ye Shaoyong, we could gain access to these images as well. For these images, the folios had been arranged on a flat surface, four at a time (five in the first and three in the last). Through this set, we also have access to the cover pages and the two versos not archived by Tucci, as well as most of the original numeration.³⁰ The black-and-white pictures show little further damage since

²⁸These parts may simply have broken off and disappeared. However, in some other cases, we know that Indian manuscripts were used for healing purposes; see Sāṅkr̥tyāyana 1957, (67): “The way in which I obtained [this manuscript of the *Dohākośā*] was very strange. On my second journey searching for Indian palm-leaf manuscripts, I arrived at Sa skya. There were some palm-leaf manuscripts there. Upon my inquiries, someone said that the chaplain [H. *pujārī*] of a local temple has a bundle of palm-leaf manuscripts in his possession. My memorable friend who has now passed away, Geshe Saṅghadharmavardhana (Gendun Chomphel), went there and somehow obtained the bundle. In Tibet, palm-leaf manuscripts that came from India are thought of as extremely holy [H. *pavitṛ*]. If a drop of water that has washed a palm-leaf manuscript enters the mouth of a moribund person, his/her sins are washed away; of this they have no doubt. This is a belief similar to what we [Indians] think Ganges water does for a person on the verge of death. [So] it should not come as a surprise that there [too] every pious householder would wish to keep such holy things in their house. For those devotees wishing to be even more pious, the chaplain gave as holy victuals [H. *prasād*] pieces he had broken off a palm-leaf manuscript, and it was for this purpose that he was in the possession of the bundle of leaves from various books. Who could say how many leaves from what variety of books have been distributed in this way? I was not going to allow this chaplain to resume custodianship of these important leaves. He did receive a small fee, so he did not object.” Translation from Hindustani in Szántó 2023.

²⁹See Saerji 2014, 294. For the collection it was included with when it was moved, see Wang Sen’s catalogue in facsimile in Hu-von Hinüber 2006.

³⁰The arrangement of the folios is as follows: 1 = misc. cover-leaf recto, 1r with scribbles (marked 002A), 2r to 4r (003A-005A); 2 = misc. cover-leaf verso, 1v to 4v (002B-005B); 3 = 5r to 8r (006A-009A); 4 = 5v to 8v (006B-009B); 5 = 25r (010A), 10r to 12r (011A-013A); 6 = 25v (010B), 10v to 12v (011B-013B); 7 = 13r to 16r (014A-017A); 8 = 13v to 16v (014B-017B); 9 = 17r to 20r (018A-021A); 10 = 17v to 20v (018B-021B); 11 = 21r to 24r (022A-025A); 12 = 21v to 24v (022B-025B); 13 = 9r (026A), 26r to 28r (027A-029A); 14 = 9v (026B), 26v to 28v (027B-029B); 15 = 29r to 32r (030A-033A); 16 = 29v to 32v (030B-033B); 17 = 33r to 36r (034A-037A); 18 = 33v to 36v (034B-037B); 19 = 37r to 39r (038A-040A); 20 = 37v to 38v (038B-039B), 39v with scribble (040B). Folio 1r has the Tibetan title of the work in *dbu med* script: *gnad kyi snye ma zhes bya ba yan lag bzhi pa’i sgrub thabs kyi ’grel pa sloon* [*bsdus yig* for *slob dpon*] *kun tu bzang pos mdzad bzhus* | and then a badly written consecration formula: *h | | ye dharma hetuprabhava* up to

the 1930s. Unfortunately, conducting a personal autopsy of the witness was impossible.

The manuscript consists of 39 large leaves, on which the text is arranged in a tripartite format; the three parts are separated by two completely empty string spaces. There are usually 7 lines, with about 120 *akṣaras* per line.³¹ It is the work of one scribe, or possibly two, if we discount the possibility that hands might change somewhat after long periods of writing. The most important palaeographical feature is that while the manuscript is clearly the product of a Pāla scriptorium, it more than occasionally employs techniques we would instinctively, due to received wisdom, call Nepalese: most notably, the hook-tops and the *śirorekḥā e/o*. This is by no means an isolated incident; however, this is neither the time nor the place to reconsider East Indian palaeography. Other features of the scribal dialect are: occasional fluctuation in vowel quantity between *i/ī* and *u/ū*; the rare conflation of *ya* and *ja* as well as *kṣa* and *kha*; the rare fluctuation of intervocalic *ba* or *va* and *ma* (also *pa* and *va* in *yugapat/yugavat*³²); and the not-uncommon elision of the *visarga* before unvoiced consonants. The manuscript was read and annotated by at least two rather attentive readers, one of them much older than the other, as evinced by an archaic *bha* on the lower margin of 15v.

1.3.2 *Samantabhadra's Environment*

As for the date of the author Samantabhadra, he must have been active before or during the date of the manuscript, i.e., before ca. 1030. However, we can push back this terminus ante quem by almost two centuries. While the first and a half verse is missing in the Pāla manuscript, the Tibetan translation shows that there was a stanza in which he specified the person who commanded him to write the commentary.³³ The name of

mahāśramaṇaḥ ye svāhā ||. Folio 39v contains a scribble of the alphabet: + + *siddhir astu* | *a ā i ī* up to *śa ṣa sa ha kṣaḥ* ||. Note that the title of the canonical translation is slightly different: *snying po* or *snying po'i* for *gnad kyi*.

³¹Note that the scribe's measurement is very accurate: 39 leaves whose 2 sides each contain 7 lines containing 120 *akṣaras*, which, divided by 2,100, yields 31.2, i.e., almost 32, the measure of a *grantha*.

³²There is a slight chance that this spelling goes back to the author himself: in the very good Göttingen manuscript of the *Maṅḍalavidhi*, 108d also has *yugavat kramaśo 'tha vā*.

³³C 1r3, D 1869 1r3, G 333v3, N 365r1, P 2732 274v5: *Grags pa'i zhabs kyi's bkas bskul bas* || *sgrub* (CD, *bsgrub* GNP) *pa'i thabs ni bdag gis bya* ||.

this authority can be reconstructed as *Kīrtipāda. As already shown in Szántó 2015 (552–554), there is some evidence to guarantee that this was the same as one Śrīkīrti, also a student of Jñānapāda’s Konkani master, Pālitapāda. It therefore stands to reason that Śrīkīrti was more or less from the same generation as Jñānapāda, which would make Samantabhadra coeval with Jñānapāda’s direct disciples. In other words, Jñānapāda was Samantabhadra’s “uncle-guru”, and therefore only one generation removed. However, this generation gap must have been quite large, because Samantabhadra often refers to Bhadrāpāda, i.e., Dīpaṃkarabhadra, Jñānapāda’s direct disciple. He also seems to speak of the episode of Pālitapāda requesting Jñānapāda to write his text as something not from his lifetime. Our author therefore probably dates from the middle of the 9th century.

This date is substantiated by the pool of texts from which Samantabhadra quotes (see Appendix A). There is nothing here to suggest a date after 900; in particular, the *tantras* that are quoted (the longer *Paramādya*,³⁴ the nebulous *Guhyatilaka*, the once immensely popular *Guhyendutīlaka*, the now-lost *Mahāsamayattva*, the *Vajraśekhara*, and the *Sarvabuddhasamāyogadākinījālaśaṃvara*) betray a 9th-century environment.³⁵ Discounting Jñānapāda himself, whose two other works (the *Mahāyānalakṣaṇasamuccaya* and the *Ātmasādhanāvātāra*) are quoted profusely, the latest *śāstrakāra* appealed to is Śāntarakṣita (ca. 725–788). As will be shown below, the influence of Kamalaśīla (ca. 740–795) is also evident.³⁶

We have no evidence whatsoever as to where the text was written. If *Kīrtipāda did not relocate, there is a slight possibility that Samantabhadra too was active around the Konkani. However, for the time being, this must remain mere speculation.

The fact that the *Sāramāñjarī* of Samantabhadra survives in several recensions offers us a tantalizing glimpse into the workshop of a tantric author of the mid-9th century. The Pāla manuscript is the most complete

³⁴Note that Samantabhadra refers to two texts by this name: the *Adhyardhaśātikā Prajñāpāramitā* and the text transmitted in Tibetan translation as the **Paramādya-mantrakalpakhaṇḍa*.

³⁵In the commentary on v. 11 (Ms 4v5), the deity Vajrahūmkāra is mentioned in passing. This is probably the chief deity of the *Vajrāmṛtatantra*. However, we now know that this was one of the earliest of the scriptures retrospectively classed as the *yoginītantras*.

³⁶For Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, we follow the dates proposed by Frauwallner 1961, 141–144.

and longest witness of his efforts, and our hypothesis is that this was the latest version. Now, one would expect that a tantric author would have added more and more esoteric materials as his understanding of the text grew. However, what we seem to have is the addition of more and more Mahāyāna doctrine and epistemology, showing that the author's primary concern was to show how these are compatible and complementary with tantric teachings.

As for Samantabhadra's influence, the evidence is somewhat surprising. On the one hand, we have several close parallels with *Vītapāda's and *Thagana's commentaries. The direction of borrowing is not clear. However, many of the philosophical passages examined in this book show up later in two rather unexpected places: the **Sugatamatavibhāṅga-bhāṣya* of Jitāri (ca. 940–1000 or late 10th to early 11th cent.) and the *Tārkabhāṣā* of Mokṣākaragupta (active between 1050 and 1202³⁷). We have more to say on this below.

1.3.3 The Passage Examined in This Book

To give some context to the passage we will examine, the first half of the description of the so-called Yoga of the Drop (*binduyoga*), here is a general outline of the *Samantabhadrasādhana*. The technical terms are taken either from the root-verses or the commentary and are given simply for the sake of reference. An apostrophe after a number denotes a *mantra* after the verse bearing that number.

- 1 Obeisance verse to Mañjuśrī.

³⁷Kajiyama 1998 [1966], 1 and 6–11. The terminus post quem is determined by the authors Mokṣākaragupta cites; the terminus ante quem, by the date around which Jagaddala, the monastery where the author worked, was destroyed (the date 1292 in the first line of p. 10 in Kajiyama's introduction must be a typographical error for 1202, also cf. l. 21 of the same page). The site of this institution is now identified with some ruins found in Naogaon District, Rajshahi Division, northwest Bangladesh. Several classical sources attest that Jagaddala was situated in Varendra/Varendrī; we can therefore dismiss the opinion, also discussed by Kajiyama, that this site was in Orissa. See also Kano 2016, 124. Khro phu lo tsā ba's biography seems to attest the existence of the monastery as late as 1208/9 (*Paṅ grub gsum gyi rnam thar Dpag bsam 'khri shing*, p. 176), but this is only a small extension of the time limit, as Jagaddala was indeed destroyed soon after. The *Tārkabhāṣā* was transmitted widely: the most reliable edition is based on an old Kannada manuscript once in the possession of a Jaina scholar (Iyengar 1952, iii–iv), and the title is also mentioned in a Burmese inscription from 1442 containing a list of books gifted to a monastery (Taw Sein Ko 1899, 45).

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- 2–3 Statement of purpose.
- 4–6 Qualifications of the practitioner (*mantrin*) and the place of practice (*sthāna*).
- 7–18' Preliminaries: purification (*saṃsuddhi*); adornment of the meditation chamber (*dhyānālaya*); visualization and worship of buddhas, etc.; confession of sins (*pāpadeśanā*); rejoicing in merit (*puṇyānumodanā*); taking refuge (*śaraṇagamana*); generating the resolve for awakening (*bodhicittotpāda*); contemplation of emptiness (*śūnyatā*).
- 19–69' First Yoga Meditation (*ādiyogasamādhi*): visualization and symbolism of the inverted triangle (*dharmodayā*); of the *maṇḍala* palace (*kūṭāgāra*); of the moons etc. of the Fivefold Awakening (*pañcākārābhisaṃbodhi*); of oneself as the deity Vajrasattva, with three faces and four arms, embracing a consort; of the subsidiary deities; then of oneself as the main deity Mañjuḥṣa/Mañjuvajra/Mañjuśrī in his pledge aspect (*samayasattva*), awakened by the songs of the goddesses; of the emanation of subsidiary deities, empowerment (*adhiṣṭhāna*), and making love to the consort (*rati*).
- 70–108 The Foremost King of Maṇḍalas Meditation (*maṇḍalarājāgrīsamādhi*): emanation of the *maṇḍala* deities via ejaculation (*utsarga*); inviting and worshipping the gnosis circle (*jñānacakra*); tasting nectar (i.e., consumption of antinomian substances; *amṛtāsvāda*).
- 109–129 The Foremost King of Acts Meditation (*karmarājāgrīsamādhi*)/The Yoga of the Drop (*binduyoga*): introducing the entire world as buddhas into the *mantra* (situated in the heart of the gnosis being [*jñānasattva*] on a scimitar upon a moon disc)—while undertaking **a philosophical meditation on the nature of things and the mind**—and the *maṇḍala* into its *bindu*; fusing the mind as a perfect *bindu*; repeated emanation (*spharāna*) and resorption (*samharāna*) of rays of light thence through the pores. See Appendix C for the full reconstructed text.
- 130–131 The Subtle Yoga (*sūksmayoga*): emanation and resorption of buddhas; perceiving the signs of stabilization (*sthairyanimitta*).

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- 132–138 Recitation (*japa*) and reinvigoration (*āpyāyana*).
- 139–143 Dismissal of the deities (*visarjana*) and rising from the formal meditation session (*utthāna*).
- 144–146 The yogic way of eating (*bhojanavidhāna*) and forms of oblation into fire (*homa*).
- 147–151 Concluding verses on the superiority of the practitioner (*yogin*).
- 152–153 Mending broken vows (*khaṇḍitasamayotthāpanavidhī*).
- 154–155 Differences between the morning meditation session (*prātaḥsandhyā*) and the others.
- 156 Achieving and exercising supernatural accomplishments (*siddhisāadhanavidhāna*).
- 157 Doing away with obstacles (*vighnanivāraṇavidhī*).
- 158–162 Concluding verses on the identity of the mind and the *maṇḍala* implying the superiority of the tantric method.
- 163–164 Apology and dedication of merits.

The ways in which the four limbs (*caturāṅga*) relate to this model merit a separate study, especially because there seem to have been serious differences among the exegetes.³⁸ However, this is outside the scope of the present work.

The passage we will edit and examine is the one marked in bold in the previous outline, corresponding to Samantabhadra’s *Sāramañjarī* on Jñānapāda’s *Samantabhadrasādhana* vv. 109–120. For the rest of this section of the *mūla*, see Appendix C. Quantitatively speaking, this means dealing with 12 out of 164 verses and about one-eighth of the full commentary in its longest recension. While this may not seem much, we argue that it is one of the earliest and most informative documents about the interactions that must have taken place between the logico-epistemological school and tantrism.

³⁸A short and lucid overview is presented in Tanaka 2017, 34–37. An alternative overview is tabulated on p. 46 of the same work.

1.4 Notes on the Use of Designations, Terms, and Translations

1.4.1 Designations

For the sake of convenience, for some schools or traditions, we purposefully use the general name with which they are called in the *Sāramañjarī* or in the texts that are translated within the various chapters of the book. This is the case for example with Sautrāntika, Mīmāṃsakas, etc. No further specifications, such as mention of sub-schools, etc., are added, unless necessary.

What is here referred to as Buddhist “logico-epistemological tradition”, “tradition of logic and epistemology” (*pramāṇa*), etc., is a tradition of thinkers designated as such mainly based on the *a-posteriori* labelling in Tibetan texts.³⁹ The corpus of texts belonging to this tradition is found mostly in the ‘*pramāṇa*’ (*tshad ma*) section of the Bstan ’gyur of the Tibetan Buddhist Canon. In modern scholarship, Steinkellner and Much (1995: XV) regard as such a group of authors that share the same interest for epistemology, but also mostly follow Sautrāntika and Yogācāra doctrines as introduced by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. We use this designation to indicate a lineage of thinkers who follow and draw on the works of Vasubandhu,⁴⁰ Dignāga, and Dharmakīrti, by commenting on them or simply elaborating on, discussing and adaptively reusing their doctrines and arguments. This lineage is also what we point at when referring to a non-Esoteric Mahāyāna mainstream. In the 8th century, particularly, we believe that Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla provided a systematization of the mainstream combining the tenets of the logico-epistemological tradition and a final Madhyamaka perspective on ultimate truth. Our hypothesis is that Jñānapāda and Samantabhadra testify to the importance of the legacy of such systematization.

³⁹The terms found therein are, for example, ‘the Cittamātrīn that follow logic/reasoning’ (*rigs pa rjes su ’brang ba’i sems tsam pa*) and ‘the Sautrāntikas that follow logic/reasoning’ (*rigs pa rjes su ’brang ba’i mdo sde pa*). On this and for a general introduction to the school, see Tillemans 2011.

⁴⁰As is known, there is a debate on the number of authors called Vasubandhu and the attribution of the works regarded as his. On this, among others, we refer to the summary presented in Kritzler 2019. In this book, we consider the author of the *Abhidharmakośa* and *Bhāṣya*, the *Vimśikā* and the *Trīṃśikā* (arguably the same person) as one of the authoritative exponents of the tradition.

1.4.2 Terms and Translations

The Sanskrit term *ākāra* has been translated differently by various scholars, the most common translations being ‘image’, ‘aspect’, or ‘form’. We will be employing either ‘image’ or ‘form’, depending on whether the term refers to the object’s phenomenal appearance in cognition or to its physical aspect.

We have translated *svabhāva* and *rūpa/svarūpa* simply with ‘nature’. Given its semantic complexity, *svabhāva* is also translated as ‘essential property’ or is left untranslated in specific contexts. *Rūpa* is at times translated as ‘nature-form’ to render both the ideas of ontological status and physical form.

Anupalabdhi is translated as ‘non-cognition’, while *upa-√labh* is generally rendered as ‘apprehend’.

In spite of different possible renderings of the term, we translate *vi-jñāna* simply as ‘cognition’ or ‘primary awareness’ depending on whether emphasis is laid on its epistemic aspect or its referring to the aggregate (*skandha*).

We translate *viññaptimātratā* as ‘mere cognition’ based on Kellner and Taber (2014, 735; see also Introduction n. 14). We use this translation especially when referring to works or contexts that discuss and refer to that doctrine as elaborated and justified based on Vasubandhu’s *Vīṃśikā*.

Ahaṃkāra is translated as both ‘sense of I’ and ‘sense of individuality’.

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2.1 Overall Structure of the ‘Philosophical Portion’. Its Scope and Doctrinal Elements

The ‘philosophical portion’ of the *Sāramañjarī*, which forms the subject of this book, is the commentary of Samantabhadra on vv. 109–120 of Jñānapāda’s *Samantabhadrasādhana*. Here, the author presents the Yoga of the Drop (*binduyoga*), a specific type of mental cultivation. The *binduyoga* consists in the visualization of the whole world, perfectly awakened, in the body of the seed-syllable residing in the heart of the gnosis-being’s scimitar, as well as the visualization of the *maṇḍala*-circle, which has everything as its nature, in the drop (*bindu*) of that syllable.

Samantabhadra introduces Jñānapāda’s verses as a response to the fictitious objection that, if external things exist, then this practice is not logically justified through arguments (*upapatti*). The motive of posing such an objection is to prompt a rational analysis of the proof for the non-existence of objects that are external (*bahis*) to cognition—the latter being only aware of itself, devoid of an apprehender (*grāhaka*) or an apprehended (*grāhya*). As we shall see, this self-awareness of cognitions is regarded as only conventionally true, because it is supported by reason. Ultimately, however, Samantabhadra aims to demonstrate that cognitions, too, are not real.

While Jñānapāda’s verses afford equal prominence to the positive assertion of his standpoint (*pars construens*) and the refutation of others’ theories (*pars destruens*), in the commentary Samantabhadra insists par-

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ticularly on the *pars destruens*. The style seems to echo that of other more strictly philosophical treatises that are concerned with debates.

This combination of rational justification with attacks on different views in the framework of depicting a proper meditative practice is certainly not unique to the *Sāramañjarī*. Other works dealing precisely with meditative undertakings, such as the *Bhāvanākramas* by Kamalaśīla, engage in a process of progressively refuting inferior doctrines in order to generate conceptual certainty about a superior, final truth. In this case, such a process is explicitly connected with cultivating the insight born of reflection (*cintāmayī prajñā*),¹ and is intended to ascertain whether the object of mental cultivation is real.² Similarly, in the *Sāramañjarī*, the use [of the absence] of positive proofs (*sādhakapramāṇa*) and [the presence] of negative proofs (*bādhakapramāṇa*) is introduced as having the final aim of generating rational conviction about the object of mental cultivation.³ This is spelled out by Samantabhadra in the concluding passage:

evam eva saṃbuddhīkṛtanikhilajagadantarbhāvanam nijamantre (see 109d), *tadbindau ca viśvasvabhāvamaṇḍalacakra vibhāvanam upapannam eveti vijñeyam, jñeyādyabhāve svapratibhāsasyaiva tathotpādāt. iti sarvaṃ sustham.*

¹On the role of the *cintāmayī prajñā* in the *Bhāvanākramas*, see Kellner 2020. For a general review of *cintāmayī prajñā*, see Eltschinger 2014, 318–328 and Eltschinger 2010a.

²On the relationship between *cintāmayī prajñā* and *bhāvanāmayī prajñā* in Kamalaśīla's *Bhāvanākrama I*, see *tataś cintāmayā prajñayā nītaneyārthatayā nūvedhayati | tataś tayā niścītya bhūtam arthaṃ bhāvayen nābhūtam | anyathā hi viparīṭasyāpi bhāvanād vicikitsāyās cāvyapagamāt samyagjñānodayo na syāt | tataś ca vyarthaiva bhāvanā syāt | yathā tīrthikānām | uktaṃ ca bhagavataī — nairātmyadharmān yadi pratyaveksate tān pratyaveksya yadi bhāvayeta | sa hetu nīrvāṇaphalasya prāptaye yo anyahetu na sa bhoti śāntaye | | [Samādhirājasūtra 9.37] iti. (Bhāvanākrama I, ed. pp. 9, 17–10, 4) 'Afterwards, through the insight born of reflection, he penetrates [the meaning of the scriptures] as being explicit or implicit. Then, having ascertained through that, he can meditate on the real meaning, not the false one. For, otherwise, because one also meditates on what is false and the doubt is not removed, there cannot be the arising of correct knowledge. And, therefore, the mental cultivation would be completely purposeless, like [that] of the non-Buddhists. And this is said by the Bhagavat [in the *Samādhirājasūtra*]: "If he considers the selfless *dharma*s, if, having considered them, he meditates on them, this is the cause for the attainment of the fruit that is *nīrvāṇa*; that which is another cause does not [lead] to peace.'" On the relation between meditative cultivation and reasoning in Kamalaśīla, see Kellner 2020.*

³Similarly, Eltschinger (2014, 322) notes that, according to Dharmakīrti, 'the reliability of a yogin's perception rests on the fact that its objects have been submitted to a rational analysis carried out by means of (a) *pramāṇa*(s)'. On yogic perception and the conditions of its reliability in Dharmakīrti and commentators, see Eltschinger 2009. On Kamalaśīla's view on yogic perception and its connection with the Bodhisattva path, see Funayama 2011.

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In this way, then, it must be known that the introducing of the entire world that has been made perfectly awakened ‘into the self-mantra’ (see 109d), and the visualization of the *maṇḍala*-circle, which has everything as [its] nature, into the drop of that are demonstrated. [This is] because, since there are no [external objects that are] cognizable and so on, it is only the own appearance [of the mind] that arises like that [(i.e., with false images of external objects)]. Thus, everything is well established.

In analyzing this dialectic process, the general impression is that Samantabhadra strives to provide materials from the so-called logico-epistemological tradition,⁴ particularly from the mainstream Dharmakīrtian one. In doing this, he mirrors some of the argumentations and refutations (not to mention the very sequence of the overall argumentative strategy) found in Śāntarakṣita’s and Kamalaśīla’s works, his ultimate perspective being a Madhyamaka one.

More so than in the *Samantabhadrasādhana*, in the commentary, emphasis is laid on the detailed disproof of Brahmanical opponents. In certain cases, when Jñānapāda appears to be attacking only other Buddhists, Samantabhadra takes the opportunity to include a criticism of non-Buddhist views, especially those of some Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas. In doing so, he appears to be regarding the dialectic/apologetic pursuit as also having a spiritual/soterial value.⁵ This is perhaps a sign of a greater need to compete with non-Buddhists. The final outcome is that of portraying many different arguments and doctrines from various traditions, both Buddhist and non-Buddhist, in the style of a ‘paradoxography’.

Our hypothesis is that in this portion of the *Sāramañjarī*, Samantabhadra (following, in part, Jñānapāda)⁶ appropriated Śāntarakṣita and

⁴For an account of this tradition, see Eltschinger 2014; for an overview on its literature, see Steinkellner and Much 1995.

⁵With reference to the insight born of reflection, Kamalaśīla states: *yuktyā hi sthīrkr̥tasyāgamārthasyānyair apohitum aśakyatvāt | ato yuktyāpi pratyavekṣaṇīyam |* (*Bhāvanākrama I*, ed. p. 11, 4–5). ‘Since the meaning of the scriptures that is confirmed indeed by reasoning cannot be denied by the opponents, one must therefore investigate also by means of reasoning.’ Eltschinger (2010a, 462–463) notes that starting from the mid-6th century, reasoning (*yukti*), connected with *cintāmayī prajñā*, intended for examining and demonstrating key concepts of Buddhism, had merged together with the science of logical reasons (*hetuvidyā*), meant to defeat and convert non-Buddhist opponents.

⁶As noted in the general introduction to this volume, Jñānapāda studied under Hari-
bhadra, author of the *Abhisamayālaṃkāralokā*, in Taxila, and lived in Nālandā for a period

Kamalaśīla’s doctrinal legacy by drawing on their oeuvre. In this respect, while the general structure is certainly closer to that of purely Madhyamaka works, such as the **Madhyamakālamkārikā*,⁷ Samantabhadra also greatly exploits materials found in more strictly philosophical writings,⁸ such as the *Tattvasaṃgraha* and the *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā*, which are arguably earlier than the above-mentioned texts.⁹ The echo of Kamalaśīla’s arguments and refutations from the *Pañjikā*, in particular, resonates throughout the text and, in the case of the criticism of atoms, it is even made explicit.¹⁰ We shall discuss some evidence for this in detail in the following.

What is more important, however, is that Jñānapāda and Samantabhadra seem to share the doctrinal system of Śāntarakṣita and Kama-

of time. In his *Prajñāpradīpāvalī*, he copies a significant portion of Haribhadra’s *Abhisamayālamkāralokā* word by word (Dalton and Szántó 2019, 266). Haribhadra is sometimes associated with Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, being regarded as a disciple of the former and influenced by the latter (see also n. 56). On his life and works, see Harter 2019.

⁷These include, among others, the **Madhyamakālamkārikā* and **Madhyamakālamkāravṛtti* of Śāntarakṣita as well as the **Madhyamakālamkārapañjikā*, **Madhyamakāloka*, the **Vajracchedikāṭīkā*, and the three *Bhāvanākramas* of Kamalaśīla. For a list of Kamalaśīla’s works, see Keira 2004, 3.

⁸On the relation between rational argumentation and spiritual path in Śāntarakṣita’s and Kamalaśīla’s *Tattvasaṃgraha* and *Pañjikā*, see McClintock 2010 (especially pp. 105–111 and n. 294; 299–303) and 2019. In particular, she argues (2019, 437) that ‘the arguments in the *Tattvasaṃgraha* and the *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā* are aimed at others, rhetorically at least and quite possibly in the public square. But they are also necessary to rehearse again and again for the Buddhist’s own “familiarization with reality” (*tattvābhyāsa*), which is a critical step that must be taken before one meditates in such a way as to turn these conceptual insights into modes of knowing and experiencing the world.’

⁹The *Tattvasaṃgraha* was likely composed before 763 (Frauwallner 1961, 143; Krasser 1992, 157), the *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā*, likely ca. 780 (Schmithausen 1965, 216 n. 150; Krasser 1992, 157). It has been put forward that Śāntarakṣita wrote the *Tattvasaṃgraha* before the **Madhyamakālamkāravṛtti*, since the latter explicitly mentions both the former (as *de kho na bsdus pa*) and the *Paramāthaviniścaya* (as *don dam pa gtan la dbab pa*); see **Madhyamakālamkāravṛtti*, ed. p. 330, 13. This also demonstrates that the **Madhyamakālamkārikā* must have been composed after the *Tattvasaṃgraha* (and the *Paramāthaviniścaya*). By the same token, Funayama (2007, 192) notes that it is possible that Kamalaśīla composed the **Madhyamakālamkārapañjikā* after the *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā*; in this context, he mentions Mimaki 1982b, 221.

¹⁰Needless to say, some similar passages or identical argumentations can be found also in other works of Kamalaśīla that are Madhyamaka in nature, such as the **Madhyamakālamkārapañjikā*. However, we think there is enough evidence to believe that here he is quoting directly from the *Pañjikā*, which is also arguably earlier than any of the above-mentioned texts of his.

laśīla in its entirety: both their so-called ‘Yogācāra-Madhyamaka synthesis’¹¹ and their hierarchy¹² of other, inferior, views.¹³ This synthesis finds its full expression in those works that are traditionally regarded as purely Madhyamaka and is found less in the *Tattvasaṃgraha* or the *Pañjikā*. Jñānapāda and Samantabhadra present the Vijñānavāda, with its key doctrine of ‘mere cognition’ (*vijñaptimātratā*),¹⁴ as professing the highest (provisional and) conventionally sound truth, ‘a necessary stepping stone for the full realization of emptiness’ (Kellner 2020, 43). However, it is the Madhyamaka that provides the ultimate final standpoint on the reality of things, namely, selflessness.

In short, in this ‘philosophical portion’, Samantabhadra reuses proofs and doctrines found in various works of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla. He does so while outlining a process of progressive refutation of different conceptual constructions regarding reality and real things. This process, which is dialectic in nature (i.e., involves reasoning), is organized according to a specific hierarchy of truths—reflecting the hierarchy present in the writings of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla. The ultimate motive is (to provide instruction on) attaining conceptual certainty regarding the emptiness of all things as well as the fundamental erroneousness of all concepts. As we shall see, ultimately, Jñānapāda and Samantabhadra

¹¹According to Bu ston Rin chen grub (*Chos ’byung*, ed. p. 152, 2; Obermiller 1932, 135), Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla are classified as Yogācāra-Mādhyamika (in Tibetan: *Rnal ’byor spyod pa’i dbu ma pa*). This means that they advocate the conventional reality of Vijñānavāda and the ultimate reality of Madhyamaka, proposing independent arguments to prove both. On this, see, e.g., Seyfort Ruegg 1981, 87–100. On the central tenets of Śāntarakṣita’s and Kamalaśīla’s thought, see Ichigō 1985, lx–xcvii and Keira 2004, 1–2 and n. 3. Ichigō (1985, xcvi, n. 2) notes that, in the **Madhyamakālaṅkāraḥ*, Kamalaśīla defines Yogācāra-Madhyamaka and Sautrāntika-Madhyamaka as the ‘two paths of the Mādhyamika’ (D 128r1; P 128v4). On their position according to other Tibetan scholars, see Mimaki 1982a, 27–38. With reference to Śāntarakṣita’s Yogācāra-Madhyamaka synthesis, see also Blumenthal 2004, 41–51.

¹²The latter is true only *lato sensu*, since the exact progression of refutations sometimes differs from that in the works of the two masters (and these present different progressions themselves). The reasons underlying those differences are beyond the scope of this introduction.

¹³On their doctrinal hierarchy and the concept of a ‘sliding scale of analysis’, see § 6.

¹⁴For this translation of the term, see Kellner and Taber 2014, 735. They highlight that, in the *Vimśikā*, the meaning of *vijñapti* is that of a cognitive ‘event-aspect’, and that *mātra* serves the purpose of denying objects. We use this translation especially when referring to works or contexts that are related to that doctrine as elaborated and justified starting with that work of Vasubandhu.

advocate a path of rationality and conceptuality that culminates in the self-combustion of rationality and conceptuality.

2.2 *Statement of Conventional Truth: Self-Awareness (svasaṃvedana) of Cognitions*

After a preliminary and cursory commentary on verse 110, Samantabhadra states the *siddhānta*, the final point of view that he is aiming to prove in this first stage, namely, the self-awareness of all cognitions. Cognitions are unitary events that are identical to themselves and occur without any external, i.e., different, entity, which would (necessarily) have the aspect of an apprehended or an apprehender. This position is clearly related to conventional truth. From this perspective, perception, which is self-aware, a-conceptual, and non-erroneous,¹⁵ is the only reality. It manifests with images, which are conceptually formed through the aspects of apprehended and apprehender and are not real. In order to support his standpoint, Samantabhadra quotes two verses by Dharmakīrti (between 550–660):¹⁶ *Pramāṇaviniścaya* 1.38, a verse that was very popular in the literature of the tradition of logic and epistemology (*pramāṇa*), and *Pramāṇavārttika* Pratyakṣa° 354.

In other words, Samantabhadra initiates the gradual argumentative process by first asserting its final conclusion, this also being his own thesis on conventional truth. Conventional reality is ‘mere cognition’¹⁷; this theory is elaborated and justified according to the way of the Dignāga-Dharmakīrtian tradition.

¹⁵This view is a key doctrine in the Buddhist logico-epistemological tradition. Cf. *Pramāṇasamuccaya* 1.3cd and *Vṛtti* (ed. p. 2, 7–9): **pratyakṣam kalpanāpodham** yasya jñānasya kalpanā nāsti, tat pratyakṣam | *atha keyam kalpanā nāma nāmajātyādīyojanā* | ‘“Direct perception is devoid of conceptual construction.” That cognition which has no conceptual construction is direct perception. Then, what indeed is this conceptual construction? “The connection with designations, universals, etc.”’ *pratyakṣam kalpanāpodham abhrāntam abhīlāpīnī* | *pratītiḥ kalpanā* [...] (*Pramāṇaviniścaya* 1.4ac1). ‘Direct perception is devoid of conceptual construction [and] non-erroneous. Conceptual construction is a cognition endowed with linguistic expressions.’ This part of the verse is also quoted by Śāntaraksita in *Tattvasaṅgraha* 1213ac1.

¹⁶Dharmakīrti’s chronology has been extensively and longly debated. We follow the rough dating by Eltschinger 2019. For a summary of the debate, see Eltschinger 2019.

¹⁷For a similar statement in **Madhyamakālamkārikā* 92, see n. 98.

2.3 Refutation of the Apprehender (*grāhaka*)

Samantabhadra interprets verse 110 as the claim that there are no positive proofs of the existence of something different from the images appearing in a unitary cognition. This applies to an apprehender, the grasping cognition of that cognition, as well as to an apprehended, an object of that cognition. The positive proofs to which Jñānapāda is explicitly referring in this verse consist in direct perception and ‘another *pramāṇa*’, which is obviously inference. While commenting on this, Samantabhadra adds implication (*arthāpatti*) as well, since he is also targeting the Mīmāṃsā, particularly Kumāriḷa Bhaṭṭa (ca. 6th cent.).¹⁸ Accordingly, from the very beginning, our author is leveling his criticism at the non-Buddhist opponents, as well.

2.3.1 The Apprehender as a Property-Bearer (Against Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika)

The first target of refutation is the concept of a real apprehending subject of cognitions. In particular, Samantabhadra takes issue with the idea of that apprehending subject being a property-bearer. This is in response to a first objection that runs as follows: Awareness is a property. Properties are observed as depending on a property-bearer. Accordingly, there must be a locus of that property, and this is the agent of that activity,¹⁹ i.e., the apprehender.²⁰ Since there is an apprehender, there must also be an apprehended.

¹⁸According to Kumāriḷa, an action cannot be seen, but it can be inferred from its result, through *arthāpatti*. If the object is seen, then one can infer the occurrence of an act of cognition from it; otherwise, that object would not be cognized. See *tasyaṃ tu grhyamāṇāyāṃ anyā dhīr grāhikeṣyate* | (*Ślokavārttika* Śūnyavāda 67ab); *sāpi hy arthāpattyaṇumānena vā grhyate, yathā vaksyati ‘nānyathā hy arthasadbhāvah’ itī* (*Nyāyaratnākara*, ed. p. 205, 31–32); *nānyathā hy arthasadbhāvo drṣṭaḥ sann upapadyate | jñānaṃ cen nety atah paścāt pramāṇam upajāyate* || *na cāpy apratibandhena kevalena graho bhavet | viśiṣṭakāraṇābhāve ‘py artho naivānubhūyate* || (*Ślokavārttika* Śūnyavāda 182–183).

¹⁹One should note that in the *Nyāyavārttika* (as well as *Nyāyabhāṣya*) and the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, cognition (*jñāna* or *buddhi*, respectively) is described as a quality (*guṇa*), not an activity. On this, see n. 22 and English Translation n. 50.

²⁰In the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, Vasubandhu makes reference to an unidentified opponent, likely a Vaiśeṣika, who aims to establish the Self (*ātman*) in a similar way. See *avaśyam ātmābhyupagantavyaḥ, smṛtyādīnāṃ guṇapadārthatvāt, tasya cāvaśyaṃ dravyāśritatvāt teṣāṃ cānyāśrayāyogād itī cet* | *na* | (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* Puḍgalavādapratīṣedha, ed. p. 148, 11–

The opponent here is introduced as compounding two arguments that are employed by the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas in order to prove the existence of a permanent and all-pervading Self (*ātman*). The main idea is that the existence of a property-bearer is inferred from the existence of properties, which must depend on it. Some properties, such as pleasure, pain, desire, or aversion, must belong to a property-bearer and they do not belong to the body.²¹ In the Nyāya context, the list of properties that are an inferential mark for the Self in this way includes cognition (*jñāna*).²² At the same time, Samantabhadra also echoes another

12). ‘[An opponent could argue:] (*iti ced*) The Self must be necessarily admitted, (i) because memory and so on are [included in the] category of qualities, (ii) because that [category of qualities] necessarily depends on a substance, and (iii) because for those [(i.e., memory and so on)] another substratum[, different from the Self, would] be illogical. [It would be answered:] No.’

²¹At the end of this discussion, Samantabhadra defines this as an inference or an implication, perhaps alluding to the fact that this type of argument could be interpreted as both. As a matter of fact, Naiyāyikas see *arthāpatti* as a special type of inference.

²²See *Nyāyavārtika ad* 1.1.10, ed. p. 64, 12–18: *atha vecchādveṣaprayatnasukhaduḥkhajñānāny ātmano liṅgam ity anyathā vamaṃyanti | guṇā icchādayaḥ | guṇās ca paratantrā bhavanti nyāyaḥ | guṇatvaṃ ca pārīśeṣyān na sāmānyaviśeṣasamavāyabhāvo ’nityatvāt | na dravyaṃ karma vā vyāpakadravyasamavāyāc chabdavad ityevamādi sāmānyato dṛṣṭam ity etasmīn anumānam vamaṃtam | etenānityatvāt paratantryam icchādīnām kāryatvāc ca rūpādīvad ity uktam | ayāvāddravyabhāvitvena ca śarīraguṇatvapratīśedhaḥ | tatpratīśedhāc cātmaḡuṇatvam iti pārīśeṣyāt siddha ātmeti | ‘Or else, some explain [the *sūtra*]: “Desire, aversion, effort, pleasure, pain, and cognition are the inferential mark of the Self” otherwise. Desire and so on are qualities and the logical rule is that qualities are dependent on [a subject]. Moreover, since it is the only alternative left, being a quality is not being a universal, a particular or an inherence, since [qualities] are impermanent; nor is [being a quality] a substance or an activity, since [qualities] are inherent in a pervading substance, like sound [in the sky]. This and other [similar ones] are [the type of inference called] ‘apprehended as a generality’ (*sāmānyato dṛṣṭam*). In this way the inference was described in the [*Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.5]. Through this, there is the dependence of desire, etc., because they are impermanent and because they are an effect, like visual forms and so on. This is said. Furthermore, since they do not last as long as the substance [lasts], it is denied that they [can] be qualities of the body. And, due to that negation, it is [admitted that they are] a quality of the Self. Since it is the only alternative left, the Self is established.’ See also *prāṇāpānanimeṣonmeṣajīvanamanogātīndriyāntaravikārāḥ sukhaduḥkhe icchādveṣau prayatnaś cety ātmaḡgāni | (Vaiśeṣikasūtra 3.2.4)*, as well as the commentary by Candrānanda: *sukhādayaś ca guṇisāpekṣāḥ, guṇatvāt, rūpavat (Vaiśeṣikasūtravṛtti ad Vaiśeṣikasūtra 3.2.4, ed. p. 29, 5)*. ‘And pleasure, etc., stand in need of a property-bearer, because [they] are properties, just as colour.’; *sukhaduḥkhecchādveṣaprayatnaiś ca guṇair guṇy anumīyate | te ca na śarīrendriyaguṇāḥ [...]* (*Padārthadharmasamgraha*, ed. p. 70, 6) ‘And [the Self] is inferred [as] a property-bearer through the properties that are pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and effort; and these are not properties of the body or of the sense faculties [...]’. For a recent reference to this argument, see Watson 2017, 310 n. 6 and the works cited there.*

argument that is employed by Naiyāyika and Vaiśeṣika authors to establish the Self. An activity, such as being aware, needs an agent, and that agent is the Self.²³ A similar formulation combining the two arguments is indeed found, for example, in the works of a later Vaiśeṣika author, namely, Śrīdhara (ca. 10th cent.).²⁴

Samantabhadra's response is grounded in the impossibility of finding a means of reliable cognition (*pramāṇa*) that could establish an apprehending subject. It cannot be direct perception, because that subject is, by definition, extrasensory. Furthermore, it cannot be inference, since there is no observed relation between awareness as a property and its property-bearer, i.e., someone who is aware. In general, the response is based on the postulate, presumably shared by all the parties, that the *grāhaka* is not perceivable.²⁵

An implicit objection advancing a proof through *arthāpatti* follows. Here, the opponent rebuts precisely the assumption that the apprehender cannot be established because it is not perceivable. Much to the contrary, the apprehender can in fact be inferred from the occurrence of sense cognitions, just like sense faculties. Sense faculties are commonly referred to as an example of an object that, in spite of being radically imperceptible, can still be postulated given the occurrence of sense perceptions. Some proponents of [the reality of] the Self (*ātmavādin*) employ cognitions as evidence for the existence of the Self, though extrasensory, because they require an agent. This is alluded to, for example, in some

²³See, e.g., *tasya sauksmyād apratyakṣatve sati karanaiḥ śabdādīyupalabdhy anumitaiḥ śrotvādībhiḥ samadhigamaḥ kriyate | vāsyādīnāṃ karanānāṃ kartṛprayoḥyatvadarśanāt | śabdādīṣu prasiddhyā ca prasādhako 'numīyate |* (*Padārthadharmasaṅgraha*, ed. p. 69, 6–10). 'Since it is not directly perceived, because of its being subtle, [the Self] is cognized through [its] instruments, such as the auditory faculty, which are inferred from the perception of sounds and so on. This is because one observes that instruments, such as an axe, are used by an agent. Moreover, the cognizer is inferred through the cognition regarding sounds and so on.' For similar arguments in Nyāya sources, see Eltschinger and Ratié 2013, 140 n. 77, 181 n. 206, 182 n. 207 and the works cited there.

²⁴See *śabdādīṣu viśayeṣu prasiddhir jñānaṃ tatrāpi prasādhako jñātānumīyate | jñānaṃ kvacid āśrītaṃ kriyātvāc chidīkriyāvat | yatredam āśrītaṃ sa ātmā |* (*Nyāyakandali*, ed. p. 71, 15–17). 'The knower (*prasādhaka*) [i.e.,] the knowing agent (*jñātṛ*) is inferred also with respect to knowledge (*prasiddhi*) [i.e.,] the cognition (*jñāna*) of objects, such as sound. A cognition must reside in some [substratum], because it is an action, such as the action of cutting. That in which it resides is the Self.'

²⁵On the (im)perceptibility of the *ātman* according to different authors of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, see § 8 and § 8.1.

Vaiśeṣika²⁶ and Nyāya sources.²⁷ Moreover, the view that the Self is deduced from its effect [such as cognitions], like the sense faculties from the sense perceptions, is introduced as a Naiyāyikas' idea in Bhaṭṭa Rāma-kaṇṭha's (ca. 950–1000) *Nareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa*.²⁸

The inference of sense faculties is based on the commonly observed fact that, even though all the other causes are present, an effect does not occur if a certain, additional, cause is missing. On the other hand, the effect does occur when that cause is present. This is the case for sense faculties, as demonstrated by the example of blind people, who do not grasp an object, albeit manifest, because their sight is impaired. However, the Buddhists answer that this cannot be the case for the Self. In spite of its sharing the characteristic of being imperceptible, the Self cannot be inferred through the same inference as the sense faculties. This topic is discussed in Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* Puḍgalavādapraṭiśedha:

anumānaṃ ca tadyathā pañcānām indriyāṇām | tatredam anumānam | sati kāraṇe [sakāraṇe ed.] kāraṇāntarasyaḥbhāve kāryasyābhāvo dṛṣṭo bhāve ca punar bhāvas tadyathāṅkurasya | saty eva cābhāsaprāpte viśaye manaskāre ca kāraṇe viśayagrahaṇasyābhāvo dṛṣṭaḥ punaś ca bhāvo 'ndhabadhīrādīnām anandhābadhīrādīnām ca | atas tatrāpi kāraṇā[karaṇā° ed.]ntarasyaḥbhāvo bhāvas ca niścīyate | yac ca tatkāraṇāntaram tad indriyam ity etad anumānam | na caivam ātmano 'stīti nāsty ātmā | (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya Puḍgalavādapraṭiśedha, ed. p. 4, 15–23).

Moreover, [with reference to the *dharmas*,] there is an inference, as in the case of the five sense faculties. In this respect, the inference is as follows: When there is a cause, the absence of the effect is observed in the event of the absence of another, additional cause. Moreover, on the other hand, the presence [of the effect is observed] in the event of the presence [of that further cause], as with regard to a sprout. And, when indeed the object has appeared, and the attention, [which is another] cause, [is aroused,] the absence of the apprehension of the object is observed for the blind, deaf, etc., and, on the other hand, [its] presence [is observed] for the non-blind, non-deaf, etc. Therefore, in both of these cases, [respectively,] the absence and the presence of an additional cause

²⁶See *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha* in n. 23, and Eltschinger and Ratié 2013, 140 n. 76.

²⁷For similar arguments in Nyāya sources, see Eltschinger and Ratié 2013, 140 n. 77, 181 n. 206, 182 n. 207 and the bibliography therein.

²⁸See *satyam | ata evendriyādir iva kāryāt so 'picchātmakād anumīyata iti naiyāyikāḥ* | (Watson 2006, 130).

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is ascertained. Furthermore, the further cause of that [apprehension] is the sense faculty. This is the inference. However, there is no such [inference] regarding the Self. Therefore, there is no Self.

In the *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*, while responding to an *ātmavādin*, Dharmakīrti argues that the Self cannot be inferred in the same way as sense faculties, precisely because of its being imperceptible:

[...] *anupalambhaṃ cāsyā pramāṇayata ātmavādo nirālambaḥ syāt | apratyakṣatvād ātmanas tatkāryāsiddheḥ | indriyādināṃ tu vijñānakāryasya kādācīkatvāt sāpekṣyasiddhyā prasiddhir ucyate | kim apy asya kāraṇam astīti | na tv evambhūtam itī | naivaṃ sukhādikāryaṃ prasādhitam kaṃcid arthaṃ puṣṇāti | yena kenacit kāraṇavattvābhyupagamāt | tathā cānupalambha evātmanaḥ syāt |* (*Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti ad Pramāṇavārttika Svārthānumāna*^o 22, ed. p. 16, 11–17).²⁹

[...] Moreover, the doctrine of the Self for those [people] who regard non-cognition as a means of reliable knowledge would be groundless. This is because the effect of the [Self] is unestablished, since the Self is non-perceivable. Nevertheless, regarding the sense faculties, etc., due to the fact that the effect that consists in the [sense] cognition is proven as dependent on them—because [this sense cognition] is occasional—the proof is stated [as follows:] ‘There [must] be a certain cause of this [effect that is the sense cognition].’ However, it is not [said as follows:] ‘[The cause] is of this kind.’ In this way, the effect that is pleasure, etc., being established, does not serve any purpose [in establishing the Self]. This is because it is admitted that [pleasure, etc.] has a cause [that is] in an undifferentiated manner [and not with specific characteristics]. And, in this way, there can be only the non-cognition of the Self.³⁰

In order to counter the *ātmavādin*’s objection, Samantabhadra resorts to a *regressus ad infinitum* as an undesired consequence. Sense cognitions can be

²⁹For Śākyabuddhi’s and Karṇakagomin’s comments on this passage, see Eltschinger and Ratié 2013, 149 n. 103. Dharmakīrti also refers to the illogicality of proving the absence of something imperceptible based on its non-cognition. See *adṛśyānupalambhād abhāvāsiddhau* [...] (*Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti ad Pramāṇavārttika Svārthānumāna*^o 18c, ed. p. 13, 4); *upalambhānupalambhābhyāṃ hi tayoh pratibandhaṃ jānīyāt, tau cātyantaparokṣasya na sidhyataḥ* | (*Pramāṇaviniścaya* 3, ed. p. 118, 7–8).

³⁰On this passage, see Eltschinger and Ratié 2013, 146–151.

explained without admitting an apprehending subject. The causal complex that precedes the occurrence of a perception is enough to account for it. If one were to admit the need for more causes, there would be no grounds for limiting the number of ‘necessary’ additional causes.³¹

2.3.2 *The Apprehender Intended as Mind and Mental States (Against the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas)*

While Jñānapāda does not mention the non-Buddhist thesis of an apprehending subject of cognitions, Samantabhadra regards its refutation as the initial step in the criticism of the concept of ‘apprehender’. First of all, he wants to discard the idea that there must be a permanent locus of that property that is awareness, namely, the Self as an apprehender. He then goes on also to refute the view that mind and mental states, which do not depend on an apprehending subject, can themselves be the apprehender of objects. The duality is now that of mind and objects which are external to it. Here, Samantabhadra is addressing fellow Buddhists, particularly the Vaibhāṣikas and (later) the Sautrāntikas. While not engaging with the position of the Self as a *grāhaka*, in the *Samantabhadrasādhana*, Jñānapāda also introduces a refutation of mind and mental states as apprehending external objects.

The first objection Jñānapāda and Samantabhadra respond to is that, granted that mind does not have something else as its apprehender, it is itself brought to awareness internally, in the form of feelings, etc., as the apprehender of something else. This objection may be from a Vaibhāṣika and is also found in the quotation from Jñānapāda’s *Ātmāsādhanaṅvātāra* that is quoted in the *Sāramañjarī* immediately following. A

³¹With reference to the logical defect of the *regressus ad infinitum* regarding the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā theory of cognition, see English Translation n. 15.

similar position appears to be held by Śubhagupta³² (8th cent.).³³ In fact, the idea that mind and mental states are the apprehender of an object and its different aspects, respectively, is a Vaibhāṣika one. In the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, Vasubandhu states:

ta eva hi cittacaitāḥ sāśrayā ucyante indriyāśritatvāt | sālambanā viśaya-grahaṇāt | (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya ad 2.34bcd1*, ed. p. 62, 5–6).

For precisely these mind and mental states are said to have a basis, because they are based on the sense faculties. [They are said] to have an object-support, because they apprehend [their respective] object.³⁴

³²While arguing against the *sahopalambhaniyama* argument (see *infra*, n. 36, n. 37), Śubhagupta appears to claim that there is indeed an internal awareness of cognition in the form of feelings. At the same time, cognition, which is cognized insofar as it has the *svabhāva* of being a cognition, due to a causal process, has the nature of making an external object known (without assuming its form). So, like light and visual forms, a cognition and its object are part of the same causal complex and, accordingly, they are cognized ‘together’. See *don dmigs tshe na gdung ba dang || dga’ ba’i tshor ba de dag ni || gal te shes pa’i ngo bo yi || tshor ba med par mi srid do || gal te rtogs pa rang ngo bo || ‘ga’ zhig kho na myong zhe na || shes dag ngo bo mi myong bas || de yi phyir na de mi rigs || [...] gang gis lhan cig myong ‘gyur ba || tshogs pa snga ma kho na las || shes pa yul bcas skad cig ste || snang ba dang bcas gzugs bzhi no ||* (**Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā* 78–79; 81). ‘At the moment of the perception of an object, those awarenesses of pain and pleasure could not occur if there is no awareness of the form of cognition; ‘If [it is argued that] the awareness is just of the mere form of cognition, [the reply will be that] this is illogical, since the form of pure cognition is not brought to awareness; [...] ‘But [it is] precisely the preceding (*pūrvikā*) [causal] complex [that] can make the instant of the object cognized, in the same way that a visual form [is lit up] by light, by which there can be [their] being brought to awareness together.’ (**Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā* 78–79; 81).

³³On Śubhagupta’s life and works, see Saccone 2019.

³⁴Yaśomitra comments on this as follows: *yena te sālambanās tasyaivālambanasya prakāreṇa grahaṇāt | katham | vijñānaṃ hi nīlaṃ pītaṃ vā vastu vijñānī upalabhata ity arthaḥ | tad eva tathāalambanaṃ vastu vedanānubhavati | samjñā paricchinnati | cetanābhisamkarotītyevamādi | athavā tasyaivāalambanasya vijñānaṃ sāmānyarūpenopalabhyatārūpaṃ grhṇāti | viśesarūpeṇa tu vedanānubhavanīyatārūpaṃ grhṇāti | samjñā paricchedyatārūpaṃ grhṇātītyevamādi |* (*Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*, ed. pp. 141, 29–142, 6). ‘[They are said *sālambanāḥ*] due to the apprehension in a [certain] manner of precisely that object-support, through which they have an object-support. How? For primary awareness cognizes, i.e., perceives, an indigo or a yellow thing. This is the meaning. Feeling experiences this very object, that is, such an object-support [as pleasurable, etc.]; notion determines [it]; volition conditions [it], and so on and so forth. Or else, with regard to that very object-support, through [its] general form, primary awareness apprehends the nature of being perceived. Whereas, through [its] specific form, feeling apprehends the nature of being experienced; notion apprehends the nature of being determined, and so on.’

Introduction

This topic is discussed, for example, in Durvekamiśra’s commentary on Dharmottara’s *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* where *Madhyāntavibhāga* 1.8 is quoted:

*vaibhāṣika prakriyayā yadācāryeṇa cittacaittau bhedenoktau tayor artham āha
— cittam arthamātragrāhi vastumātragrāhi | ‘tatrārthadr̥ṣṭir vijñānam’ iti
vacanāt | caittā viśeṣāvasthāgrāhiṇo viśeṣāvasthāsvikarttāro viśeṣāvasthākārā
itī yāvat | tadviśeṣe tu caitasā iti vacanāt | (Dharmottaraṣṭīpa, ed. p. 64,
8–10).*

When the master [Dharmottara] says that mind and mental states are different, in the way of the Vaibhāṣikas, he [also] states [their] object: Mind is the apprehender of nothing but the object, that is, it is the apprehender of nothing but a thing. [This is] based on the authoritative statement (*vacana*) [i.e., the *Madhyāntavibhāga*]: ‘Among these, cognition is the vision of the object.’ [Moreover,] mental states are the apprehender of different conditions, i.e., they seize (*svikarttārah*) different conditions—that is to say, they have the aspects of different conditions. [This is] based on the authoritative statement [i.e., the *Madhyāntavibhāga*]: ‘And, the mental states are [the vision] of its differences.’

Here Dharmottara is commenting on *Nyāyabindu* 1.10, where Dharmakīrti enunciates the self-awareness of all minds and mental states (*sarvacittānām ātmasaṃvedanam*).

In countering the first objection, Samantabhadra advances the *sahopalambhaniyama* argument,³⁵ a pivotal theory for the Dharmakīrtian tradition. This argument is meant to prove the non-difference between a cognition and its object, since they are always invariably perceived together. This is stated by Dharmakīrti in *Pramāṇaviniścaya* 1.54ab,³⁶ but is already present with a different formulation in the *Pramāṇavārttika*.³⁷

³⁵On this argument, see Matsumoto 1980; Iwata 1991; Taber 2010; and Kellner 2011b, 419–424.

³⁶See *sahopalambhaniyamād abhedo nīlataddhiyoḥ | apratyakṣopālabhasya nārthadr̥ṣṭiḥ prasidhyati || (Pramāṇaviniścaya 1.54)*. ‘There is no difference between an indigo [thing] and its cognition, because they are necessarily perceived together. The vision of an object is not established for someone who does not directly perceive his/her perception.’

³⁷See *sakṛt saṃvedyamānasya niyamena dhīyā saha | viśayasya tato ’nyatvaṃ kenākāreṇa sidhyati || bhedaś ca bhrāntivijñānair dr̥ṣyetendāo ivādvaye | saṃvittinīyamo nāsti bhinnayor nīlapīṭayoh || nārtho ’saṃvedanaḥ kaścid anarthaṃ vāpi vedanam | dr̥ṣṭaṃ saṃvedyamānaṃ tat tayor nāsti vivekitā || tasmād arthasya durvāraṃ jñānakālāvabhāsinah | jñānād avyatīrekitvam [...]* (*Pramāṇavārttika* Pratyakṣa° 387–390abc). ‘With regard to an object that is brought to awareness, neces-

There is no possible proof for the separate existence of an object external to its cognition, since the object is invariably found along with that cognition. They must be acknowledged as non-different. However, they are conceived as different by people having misconceptions, as in the case of the two moons seen by those suffering from dimness of vision. In his answer, Samantabhadra appears to refer to both formulations of that argument as found in the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* and the *Pramāṇavārttika*. Moreover, he concludes with a quotation from the latter work (see English Translation § 111.1).

In short, echoing Jñānapāda's words, Samantabhadra responds that mind and mental states are always perceived together with sense objects and, accordingly, cannot have a relationship of cause and effect. Such a relationship requires a time difference between two things, but feelings and sense objects are synchronous. For this reason, feelings cannot apprehend sense objects, just as sense objects cannot apprehend feelings. Furthermore, bringing the *sahopalambhaniyama* argument into play, Samantabhadra concludes that they are established as non-different, since they are invariably perceived together. This is adduced as further evidence for feelings not being the apprehender (nor the effect) of sense objects.

The *sahopalambhaniyama* argument, which is widely cited as evidence for the doctrine of mere cognition, is largely advocated by subsequent authors within the 'mainstream' logico-epistemological tradition. In the *Tattvasaṃgrahaḥpañjikā*, in particular, Kamalaśīla defends this argument against the attacks of Śubhagupta, a syncretic figure, hovering between

sarily simultaneously with [its] cognition, by virtue of which image is its being different from that [cognition] established? Moreover, [their] difference can be seen by people having erroneous cognitions, like [the vision of] two moons when there is [only] one. There is no necessity of being aware of two distinct [things, such as] indigo and yellow. There is no object that is not brought to awareness, or else, an awareness, albeit devoid of an object, is [always] observed as being brought to awareness. Hence, there is no difference between those two [(i.e., the object and its awareness)]. Therefore, the non-difference of an object that appears at the moment of [its] cognition from [that] cognition necessarily follows [...].’ On these verses, see Vetter 1964, 73–74; Eltschinger 2005, 166 and n. 34, and Eltschinger 2010. Iwata (1991, 1, 15–18) also refers to *Pramāṇavārttika* Pratyakṣa° 333–335. Kellner (2017, 115) discusses *Pramāṇavārttika* Pratyakṣa° 335 as presenting an argument that is ‘very close to a *sahopalambhaniyama*-inference, if not fully identical with it.’ At the same time, she claims that this might be a weaker version of the proof if compared to the *sahopalambhaniyama* argument, because it does not involve the innate reflexive awareness of perception in the same way.

being a Vaibhāṣika and a Sautrāntika.³⁸ As noted above, his position is somewhat similar to that of Jñānapāda’s (and Samantabhadra’s) opponent. Accordingly, this opponent may be a Vaibhāṣika (or a para-Vaibhāṣika, such as Śubhagupta himself?).³⁹

Following the reference to the *sahopalambhaniyama* argument, Samantabhadra poses an objection to it. Visual forms are the producers of cognitions, i.e., their cause, and, accordingly, precede them. It is not tenable that they could be perceived simultaneously. A similar claim is found in the commentary on *Pramāṇaviniścaya* 1.54cd as a refutation of the *sahopalambhaniyama* argument stated in *Pramāṇaviniścaya* 1.54ab. In the *Sāramāñjarī*, the objection could be advanced from both a Vaibhāṣika and a Sautrāntika standpoint.⁴⁰ The two traditions, in fact, admit an external object as the cause of its own cognition, albeit in different ways. Samantabhadra critically engages them both. He aims to deny the idea of a cause-effect relationship between an object and its cognition: This cannot be justified in any scenario, whether the cognition is regarded as being devoid of the image (*ākāra*)⁴¹ of its object (the Vaibhāṣika view) or as being

³⁸For an outline of Śubhagupta’s views, see Saccone 2022.

³⁹If, as we surmise, the influence of Śāntarakṣita’s and Kamalaśīla’s thought and works on our two authors was so decisive, then the refutation of Śubhagupta’s theories might simply be viewed as a consequence of that.

⁴⁰Cf. *viśayasya vijñānahetutayopaniḍheḥ prāg upalambhaḥ paścāt samvedanasyeti cet* | (*Pramāṇaviniścaya ad* 1.54cd, ed. p. 40, 11–12). For an English translation and analysis of the passage in the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, see Kellner 2011b, 420. This passage is also quoted by Kamalaśīla in the *Tāttvasaṃgrahaḥ* while defending the *sahopalambhaniyama* argument, mainly from Śubhagupta’s attacks: *nanu cācāryadharmakīrtinā viśayasya jñānahetutayopaniḍheḥ prāg upalambhaḥ paścāt samvedanasyeti cet ity evaṃ pūrvapakṣam ādarśayataikakālārthaḥ sahaśabdo ’tra darśito na tv abhedārthaḥ | ekakāle hi vivakṣite kālābhedopadarśanam parasya yuktaṃ na tv abhede satīti cet* | (*ad Tāttvasaṃgraha* 2029–2030, ed. pp. 192, 15–193, 1). ‘[Śubhagupta objects,] “Surely, the master Dharmakīrti—who expounds the *pūrvapakṣa* with the following, ‘and if [it is argued that], at first, there is the perception of an object because of its proximity, since it is the cause of the cognition, and then, [subsequently, the perception] of the awareness [...]’ (*Pramāṇaviniścaya ad* 1.54cd)—shows that, in this [half verse, i.e., 1.54ab], the word ‘together’ means ‘synchrony’ and not ‘non-difference’. For, if ‘synchronic’ is intended, it is logical for the adversary to put forward a difference of time, but not if there is a non-difference.”’ This passage is included in a portion of the text discussing and refuting the *nirākāravāda*, the theory that sense cognitions do not take the images of their objects. See Saccone 2018, 260–292.

⁴¹The Sanskrit term *ākāra* has been translated differently by various scholars, the most common translations being ‘image’, ‘aspect’, or ‘form’. We will be employing either ‘image’ or ‘form’, depending on whether the term refers to the object’s phenomenal appearance in cognition, or to its physical aspect.

endowed with it (the Sautrāntika view). These two theses are respectively known as *nirākāravāda* and *sākāravāda*.⁴²

2.3.3 *Refutation [of One] of Vasubandhu's Opponent[s] in the Viṃśikā as well as of the Anyākāravāda (Mīmāṃsā)*

The refutation of the two Buddhist theses is discussed very briefly, by using arguments that are already found (among others) in Kamalaśīla's works (for example, the *Tattvasaṃgrahaṇīkā* and the **Vajracchedikāṭīkā*).⁴³ Despite the existence of several other proofs he could employ to refute the Vaibhāṣika and the Sautrāntika epistemological theories, Samantabhadra gives the impression of dismissing the Buddhist theses hastily. Instead, he levels a longer and more detailed criticism at the *anyākāravāda*, a position held by/attributed to the Mīmāṃsakas.⁴⁴

The sequence of the refutation of the three theses is indeed the same as that found in the Bahīrarthaparīkṣā of the *Tattvasaṃgraha* and the *Tattvasaṃgrahaṇīkā*. However, unlike Samantabhadra, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla devote more space to the refutation of the Buddhist antagonists than that of the Brahmanical opponents. In fact, in that chapter, while discussing the *anyākāravāda*, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla address their criticism (once again) to their Buddhist peer Śubhagupta (a main target also due to his *nirākāravāda*).

In this part of the *Sāramañjarī*, the initial objection (which is not present in the Tibetan translation) is advanced from the perspective of

⁴²The term *nirākāravāda* generally indicates epistemological theories that regard sense cognitions as occurring without assuming the image of their objects. The term *sākāravāda*, in turn, applies to those views that regard sense cognitions as being endowed with the image of their objects. The two terms are also used to indicate two sub-schools of Yogācāra, see § 6 and n. 84, 85, 86. When provisionally admitting a form of externalism (*bahīrarthavāda*) in the *Tattvasaṃgraha* and the *Pañjikā*, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla endorse the *sākāravāda*. However, within the context of the Bahīrarthaparīkṣā, when advocating *vijñaptimātrata*, they refute both the *nirākāravāda* and the *sākāravāda*. Similarly, in their Madhyamaka works, they criticize both positions. The same holds true for Jñānapāda and Samantabhadra. For one of the first studies on the subject of *nirākāravāda* and *sākāravāda*, see Kajiyama 1965 and 1998 [1966], 154–158. For a more recent overview on the subject of *ākāras* of cognitions, see Kellner and McClintock 2014.

⁴³For the arguments against the Vaibhāṣikas, see English Translation n. 29. For the arguments against the Sautrāntikas, see English Translation n. 30.

⁴⁴For a definition of *anyākāravāda*, see *infra* in this section.

Introduction

someone who justifies the existence of an external object through implication. External objects are necessary to explain the commonly experienced restrictions (*niyama*) of time, space, image, and causal efficiency when we perceive something. This is most likely a reference to a similar objection found in the *Vimśikā*.⁴⁵

na deśakālaniyamaḥ santānāniyamo na ca |
na ca kṛtyakriyā yuktā vijñaptir yadi nārthataḥ ||
(*Vimśikā* 2 ed. Lévi 1932; ed. Silk; ed. Ruzsa and Szegedi).⁴⁶

If a cognition [does] not [arise] from an [external] object, then there are no restrictions in terms of space and time and no non-restrictions in terms of mental continuums. Moreover, [with regard to this,] causal efficiency is not tenable.

Here, one difference is that Vasubandhu's opponent is explicitly talking about a non-restriction regarding mental continuums (*santāna*), while Samantabhadra's opponent is talking about a restriction regarding images (*ākāra*). However, in further elaborating on the subject, Samantabhadra will indeed take issue with the notion of non-restriction in terms of *santānas* (disregarding the notion of restriction of *ākāras*).⁴⁷ This is because he understands those two (i.e., non-restriction of *santānas* and restriction

⁴⁵For a detailed philosophical analysis of the arguments found in the *Vimśikā*, see Kellner and Taber 2014.

⁴⁶As mentioned by Kellner and Taber (2014, 735–736), who refer to the studies of Harada (2003) and Hanneder (2007), this verse, which is the second in Lévi's edition, may have in fact been the first. This is inferred from the fact that the first *kārikā* in that edition (and in the manuscript containing the *kārikās* only), while missing from the Tibetan translations and Xuanzang's Chinese translation, corresponds there to prose sentences of the introductory portion of the commentary. Therefore, according to Harada's and Hanneder's thesis, the first verse was purposefully fashioned based on the prose passage in the commentary. However, Ruzsa and Szegedi (2015, 134) take it to be part of the original Sanskrit text, as does Silk (2016, 151–152).

⁴⁷As a matter of fact, Samantabhadra responds to his opponent by reversing the use of the example of the hairnet, which is brought forward by Vasubandhu's opponent. The latter aims to show an instance of an object that is not external, but appears in the vision of someone due to an eye defect, and, accordingly, is exclusive only to a single mental continuum. On this, see English Translation n. 38. Samantabhadra argues, instead, that some people who have the same ocular defect and find themselves in the same place and at the same time all see hairnets. Still those hairnets are not really there. Thus, he uses the example of the hairnet as an example of something that is not external and yet seen by more than one person in the same place and at the same time.

of *ākāras*) to be one and the same. He arguably intends the *ākāra* restriction to mean the fact that many mental continuums (all of those that are present in the same place and time)⁴⁸ are endowed with some specific *ākāras* related to certain specific objects. Samantabhadra's direct response to 'his opponent' also openly echoes the *Vīṃśikā*. One does not need an external object to account for those restrictions in perception. They can be explained as the effects of certain latent impressions (*vāsanā*), as in dreams and so on.⁴⁹

Following this, Samantabhadra introduces another objection. It is intended to establish that dreams and other erroneous cognitions are in fact cognitions grasping object-supports that are external to them. This serves the purpose of showing that that example, which is advanced to prove a restriction in terms of time/space also when external objects are absent, is not tenable. At the same time, it is the statement of an epistemic standpoint, namely, the *anyākāravāda*. A cognition is always and only the grasper of something other than itself, even in those instances where no external objects are commonly admitted to exist. The verse quoted here is taken from the Nirālambanavāda chapter of Kumāriḷa Bhaṭṭa's *Śloka-vārttika*; in fact, it is the second half verse of 107 and the first half verse of 108 (according to editorial conventions). The same quotation, in this exact form, is found in the Mīmāṃsāparikalpītāmaparīkṣā of the *Tattva-saṃgrahaṭaṇḷikā* (*ad Tattvasaṃgraha* 250). Meanwhile, verse 108 is quoted in the Bahirarthaparīkṣā of the *Pañḷikā* to introduce very briefly the *anyākāravāda*, which is mentioned and refuted along with the *nirākāravāda* and the *sākāravāda*. Samantabhadra's arguments in this part do not bear any striking similarities to the arguments advanced in those parts of the *Pañḷikā* (except in one instance; see *infra*). However, the presence of the quotation of those two half-verses as well as the reference to verse 108 in the context of the refutation of the *anyākāravāda* is reminiscent of Kamalaśīla's work.

⁴⁸On a similar idea in the *Vīṃśikāvṛtti*: *tatra deśakāle pratiṣṭhītānāṃ sarveṣāṃ santānānīyama utpadyate na kasyacid eva* | (ed. Silk 2016 p. 150, 22–24); *tasmin deśakāle sthītānāṃ sarveṣāṃ santāne 'nīyamam utpadyate, naikasyaiva* (ed. Ruzsa and Szegedi 2015 p. 137, 4–5).

⁴⁹See *deśādīnīyamah siddhah svapnavat pretavat punah* | *santānānīyamah sarvaih pūyanadyā-dīdarśane* || *svapnopaghātavat kṛtyakriyā narakavat punah* | *sarvaṃ narakapālādīdarśane taiś ca bādhanē* || (*Vīṃśikā* 3–4 ed. Lévi).

Samantabhadra introduces the *anyākāravāda* thesis of the Mīmāṃsākas specifically in connection with the idea that a spatio-temporal restriction of cognitions can happen only when external objects are present.⁵⁰ What follows is a refutation, point by point, of the position that (i) restriction in terms of time and space, (ii) non-restriction of continuums, and (iii) restriction of causal efficiency are necessarily linked to the presence of an external object. In particular, with reference to (i), he also uses one *prasāṅga*-based argument that partly recalls Kamalaśīla's⁵¹ in his critical engagement with that same verse from the *Ślokavārttika* (namely, Nirālambanavāda 107cd–108ab). If an object could appear even in cognitions that have a different image (*anyākāra*), there would be the undesired and untenable consequence that we would not experience different cognitions for different objects.⁵²

To sum up, (as made particularly explicit in the Pāla recension) Samantabhadra employs the refutation of the *anyākāravāda*, as maintained by the Mīmāṃsākas, as part of his argumentative strategy to defend Vasubandhu's initial argument to establish mere cognition (*vijñaptimātratā*). The positive statement of his standpoint is then entrusted to a frequently cited verse of Dharmakīrti, i.e., *Pramāṇavārttika* Pratyakṣa° 336. The restrictions in terms of space and so on can be explained through the awakening of a specific internal latent impression. In other words, the occurrence of a specific cognition in a specific time and space for more than one specific mind does not necessarily require an external object. As is known, the ultimate goal of proving *vijñaptimātratā* also underpins the Bahirarthaparīkṣā chapters of the *Tattvasaṃgraha* and its *Pañjikā*.

⁵⁰This is particularly true for the text contained in the Pāla recension.

⁵¹As a matter of fact, in the Bahirarthaparīkṣā of the *Tattvasaṃgraha*, Śāntarakṣita also brings forward a similar argument. See *anyākāram api jñānam katham anyasya vedakam | sarvaḥ syāt sarvasaṃvedyo na hetuś ca niyāmakaḥ ||* (*Tattvasaṃgraha* 2039). 'Also, being endowed with one image, how can a cognition be aware of another thing? Every [object] could [then] be brought to awareness by every [cognition], and the cause would not be restricting (*niyāmaka*).'

⁵²See *na hy anyena rūpeṇānyasya pratibhāsanam yuktam atiprasāṅgāt | evaṃ hi sarvaṃ eva jñānam sarvaviśayaṃ prasāyeta | tatas' ca pratiniyatārthavyavasthoccheda eva syāt ||* (*Tattvasaṃgraha-ḥapañjikā ad Tattvasaṃgraha* 251, ed. p. 129, 22–24). 'For it is not tenable that one thing appears through [a cognition endowed with] another form, due to overextension. This is because, if it were like this, every cognition would follow as having every [thing as its] object [i.e., as being undifferentiated]. Moreover, therefore, there would be the end of the determination of specific objects.'

2.4 Against an 'Anti-Sahopalambhaniyama-Argument Externalist'⁵³

The final statement of this part, which concludes the refutation of an apprehender of cognitions, reconnects with the initial thesis that is referred to also in v. 111 of the *Samantabhadrasādhana*. Awarenesses, in the form of feelings, etc., cannot be the apprehender of external objects, since they are perceived together with them. This is the positive statement of the core concept of what is established through the *sahopalambhaniyama* argument. As noted above, the initial opponent is likely a Vaibhāṣika, who argues that those cannot be perceived together because an external object, as the cause of a cognition, precede awareness. Samantabhadra counters this by refuting the three theses according to which a cognition can apprehend an external object. His final conclusion is the untenability of external objects as the cause of cognitions. Given this, the logical defect advanced by the opponent does not hold. Mind and mental states are indeed necessarily perceived together with their objects.

This conclusion is, in turn, followed by a final objection that is raised once again from an externalist point of view. The opponent is yet another adversary of the *sahopalambhaniyama* argument. He concedes that feelings and objects of sense cognitions can be cognized simultaneously. However, although being apprehended together, they are conceptually

⁵³We use the term 'externalism' as the English translation of *bāhyārthavāda* or *bahirarthavāda*, intending it mostly in an anti-*vijñaptimātratā* key. With this term, we refer to views according to which material objects are real and are the cause of their cognitions (whether or not such cognitions assume the image of their objects), based on Kamalaśīla's definition of *bahirarthavāda* as a doctrine establishing that an external object is apprehended and that atoms are real. See *etac ca sarvaṃ paramāññānāṃ siddhiṃ bāhyasya cārthasya pratyakṣatvasiddhiṃ abhyupagamyoktam | yasya tu vijñānavādinah [...]* (*Tattvasaṃgrahaḥapañjikā ad Tattvasaṃgraha* 587, ed. p. 244, 20–21). 'And all this[, which has been discussed so far,] is stated accepting (*abhyupagamyā*) the establishment of atoms and the establishment of the direct apprehensibility of an external object. But [there are the] Vijñānavādins, [...].' In particular, he defines the theory that cognitions have an [external] object (*viśaya*) as *bahirarthavāda*. See *tathā hi — idam jñānam aṅganyam tāvad bahirarthavādinā satā naiveṣṭayam, anyathā hi vijñānamātratādarśanam eva syāt |* (*Tattvasaṃgrahaḥapañjikā ad Tattvasaṃgraha* 591, ed. pp. 245, 24–246, 10). 'To explain: This cognition is not admitted as truly being devoid of an object by someone who is a *bahirarthavādin*, since otherwise precisely the theory of *vijñānamātratā* would be [admitted].' He uses the term *bahirarthavādin* as generally referring to those who maintain externalist views, and thus also to the Mīmāṃsakas; see *yeyam asmābhir vijñānavādashūitair nirākāracintā prāg akāri sā sāmpratam bāhyārthābhiniṣṭān bhavato mīmāṃsakān prati bahirartham abhyupetya sarvajñe pratipādyamāne bhavatām bahirarthavādinām ka-tham api nopayujyate eva kartum |* (*Tattvasaṃgrahaḥapañjikā ad Tattvasaṃgraha* 3645, ed. p. 1130, 15–17). On the latter passage, see also McClintock 2010, 340–341 and n. 742.

determined with the conditions of apprehender and apprehended, because they are part of the same complex of causes that has a specific cognition as its result. This seems to summarize some of Śubhagupta’s epistemological theses, which were conceived in critical engagement with the *sahopalambhaniyama* argument. In his **Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā*, he argues that the cognitive process requires two elements in order to occur: A cognition, which is the only apprehender, and an object (specifically, a **viśaya*), which possesses a form that is apprehended. Cognitions are compared to pure ‘light’, since they have the nature of making their objects known. For this reason, a cognition and its object depend on each other and are part of the same causal complex, namely, a particular perceptual act. He concludes that this is why a cognition and its object are necessarily perceived together; the invariable restriction (*niyama*) is due to their causal relationship, not their non-difference.⁵⁴

Śubhagupta’s thought is summarized similarly in Kamalaśīla’s *Tattvasaṃgrahaḥ*⁵⁵ as well as **Madhyamakālamkāraḥ*. In the latter

⁵⁴See *shes pa las gzhan ’dzin pa med* || *yul med par ni dbang blo med* || *de phyir than cig rig pas na* || *sngon po de’i blo geig phyir min* || (**Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā* 66); *nānyo ’sti grāhako jñānān nāksadhīr viśayair vinā | ataś ca sahasaṃvitīr nābhedān nīlataddhiyoḥ* || (original Sanskrit from *Tattvasaṃgrahaḥ* ad *Tattvasaṃgraha* 2031, ed. p. 194, 11–14). ‘There is no other apprehender besides cognition, [and] there is no sensory cognition without objects. And therefore, the [fact of] being aware [of them] together is not because of the non-difference of[, for example,] an indigo [thing] and its cognition.’; *gang gis than cig myong ’gyur ba* || *tshogs pa snga ma kho na las* || *shes pa yul bcas skad cig ste* || *sngang ba dang bcas gzugs bzhin no* || (**Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā* 81); *pūrvikaiva tu sāmagrī sajnānam viśayakṣaṇam | sālokarūpavat kuryād yena syāt saḥavedanam* || (**Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā* 81; original Sanskrit from *Tattvasaṃgrahaḥ* ad *Tattvasaṃgraha* 2031, ed. p. 194, 15–195, 1). ‘But [it is] precisely the preceding (*pūrvikā*) [causal] complex [that] can make the instant of the object cognized, in the same way that a visual form [is lit up] by light, by which there can be [their] being brought to awareness together.’; *gang tshes pa dang don dag* || *snga phyi kun tu ’byung de’i tshes* || *de dang ’dra phyir de ming gi* || *dnogs su than cig myong ma yin* || (**Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā* 82). ‘Since cognitions and [their] objects always arise in continuity, then the term [“co-perception”] is [used], because it is [just] like that; however, in reality there is no co-perception [of them].’

⁵⁵See also *tathā hi — viśayaviśayibhāvena niyatavād anyathāpi sahopalambhaniyamaḥ sambhavaty eva | yato jñānasya grāhaka eva svabhāvo viśayagrahaṇadharmakatvāt | tasya viśayasāyāpi tadgrāhya eva svabhāvaḥ | tayoś caikasāmagryadhīnatvān nityam saḥabhāvitā* | (*Tattvasaṃgrahaḥ* ad *Tattvasaṃgraha* 2031, ed. p. 194, 2–6). ‘To explain: Because [they are] restricted [to each other] as being an object (*viśaya*) and its cognition (*viśayin*), the necessity of being perceived together is indeed possible also otherwise, because the nature of a cognition is nothing but [that of being an] apprehender, due to [its] having the property of apprehending the object; the nature of the object, in turn, is nothing aside from [being]

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case, the same passage is also found in Haribhadra's *Abhisamayālamkāra-lokā* (who likely copies Kamalaśīla).⁵⁶ There too Śubhagupta is reported as saying that apprehender and apprehended are two concepts through which the occurring of a perceptual act is conceptually determined.

slob dpon dge srungs na re | [...] shes pa de la sngon po la sogs pa myong ba'i ngo bo nyid du rnam par bzhas pa gang yin pa de ni sngon po la sogs pa myong ba'i ngo bo yin pa'i phyir yin gyi | sngon po la sogs pa'i ngo bor gyur pa'i phyir ni ma yin te | 'di ltar rnam pa ni dmigs pa 'dzin pa'i rnam pa kho na yin par brjod kyi | dmigs pa'i ngo bo ni ma yin no | | sngon po la sogs pa phyi rol gyi lta bur snang bar shes pa gang yin pa de ni shes pa'i rnam par ma yin gyi | sngon po la sogs par rig pa'i shes pa nyams su myong na sgrub pa pos sngon po la sogs pa de lta bu'i ngo bor rtogs so zhes zer ba [...] (**Madhyamakālamkārapañjikā*, ed. p. 163, 2 [...] 5–12).

[...] nīlādīsamvedanarūpatā yā tasya vyavasthāpyate sā tatsamvedanarūpatvān na tu nīlādīrūpāpatteh. tathā hi — ālambanagrahaṇāprakāra evākārah, na tu tādrūpyam | yat tu nīlādi bahir iva pratibhāsamānam ālaksyate tan na jñānākāratayā | api tu jñānam nīlādīsamvedanam anubhavan pratipattā mohāt tathā bahīrūpeṇa nīlādīkam adhyavasyatīti | (*Abhisamayālamkāralokā* Tathatāparivarta, ed. pp. 633, 1–6).

The master Śubhagupta says: '[...] The fact that this [cognition] is determined as having the nature of experiencing an indigo [thing] and so on, is because it has the nature of experiencing an indigo [thing] and so on, and [it is] not because it assumes the form of

apprehended by that [i.e., the cognition]]; and since these two are dependent on one [causal] complex, they always appear together.' A far less articulated objection that is based on the same principle is brought forward in *Pramāṇaviniścaya* ad 1.54ab. There, light and visual forms are indicated as a counterexample where two things that are different are indeed necessarily perceived together. On this, see Saccone 2018, 287 n. 284.

⁵⁶Several scholars have noticed the dependence of Haribhadra on Kamalaśīla. Ichigō (1985) traces some parallel passages between the **Madhyamakālamkārapañjikā*, **Madhyamakālamkāravṛtti*, on the one hand, and the *Abhisamayālamkāralokā* on the other. Given that, in the same work, Haribhadra also copies from Śāntaraksita, it seems reasonable to assume that the parts found in the *Abhisamayālamkāralokā* are copies of the prose in the **Madhyamakālamkārapañjikā*. Taniguchi (1992) discusses the parallel passages in the *Bhāvanākrama I* and the *Abhisamayālamkāralokā*, and brings evidence for the conclusion that the latter is quoting the former. Sparham (1989, 3, and various other places; 2006, 152) also refers to instances of passages in the *Abhisamayālamkāralokā* that are copied from several works by Kamalaśīla, including the *Tattvasaṃgrahaṇāpañjikā*. For an instance of Haribhadra certainly borrowing, also verbatim, from the *Tattvasaṃgrahaṇāpañjikā*, see n. 76. Regarding the dependence of Haribhadra on Kamalaśīla, see also Amano 1969 and Moriyama 1986–1987.

an indigo [thing] and so on. To explain: An image (*ākāra*) is said to be only [the] *aspect* (*prakāra*) of apprehending the object-support, but not the *form* of that object-support [*Abhisamayālamkā-rālokā*: But not the *similarity* of form (of the cognition with the object)]. As for [that] indigo [thing] and so on, which is cognized as appearing as if it were external, it is not an image of cognition [*Abhisamayālamkā-rālokā*: It is not cognized as being an image of cognition]. However, the cognizer, experiencing a cognition [that is] the awareness of an indigo [thing] and so on, conceptually determines the indigo [thing] and so on with such an image [*Abhisamayālamkā-rālokā*: Due to ignorance, he conceptually determines an indigo (thing) and so on, in this way, namely, with an external image].⁷

Since Jñānapāda and Samantabhadra knew both Kamalaśīla and Hari-bhadra and most likely refer to their works, it can be argued that they indeed intend Śubhagupta as the paradigmatic advocate of the anti-*sahopalambhaniyama*-argument externalism.

2.5 Refutation of the Apprehended (*grāhya*). The Neither-One-Nor-Many Argument

The section on the absence of positive proofs that demonstrate external objects concludes with the claim that this was (also) meant as a refutation of the two aspects of apprehender and apprehended. In fact, Samantabhadra ends the section with a quotation from the *Ātmasādhanāvātāra* that includes some arguments to prove the unreality of those two aspects. This quotation is absent in the recension lying behind the Tibetan translation.

The following section is devoted to the specific refutation of the apprehended, this being a material external object, with the goal of establishing the doctrine of *vijñaptimātratā*. In order to do this, Jñānapāda introduces the neither-one-nor-many argument; so does Samantabhadra, who also uses the argument to counter that very doctrine when shifting to a Madhyamaka perspective.

In particular, Samantabhadra takes the opportunity to investigate and disprove several conceptions of the real existence of external objects, starting with the Vaiśeṣika categories (*padārtha*),⁵⁷ admitted also by the

⁵⁷Samantabhadra mentions only *dravya*, *guṇa* (in fact in the reverse order for stylistic reasons), and *samavāya*. Then, he uses *ādī*, potentially including the other categories. Based on the parallel with the *Tattvasaṅgraha* and *Pañjikā*, we believe he intends them to be *dravya*, *guṇa*, *karman*, *sāmānya*, *viśeṣa*, and *samavāya*.

Naiyāyikas.⁵⁸ He directs his criticism only towards the category of substance (*dravya*), with the understanding that if this is refuted, so are all the other categories.⁵⁹ In analyzing the nine substances (i.e., earth, water, fire, wind, sky, time, space, Self, and internal organ [*manas*]), Samantabhadra starts with sky. This section does not present any significant novelties. He continues by denying the remaining categories in exactly the same order and with similar arguments as found in the Dravyapadārthaparīkṣā of the *Tattvasaṃgraha* and the *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā*. After having refuted sky, time, and space, however, he makes original use of an argument already found elsewhere: He counters the tenet of the permanence of those elements by adaptively reusing a verse by Dharmakīrti. The aim is to establish that if they are admitted as eternal, they will either produce their effects at all times, or never at all. In its original context, this verse tackles the view of the permanence of universals.⁶⁰ Kamalaśīla too quotes the same verse, but in a chapter different from the Dravyapadārthaparīkṣā.⁶¹

⁵⁸Like Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla before him, Samantabhadra arguably treats the concept of six categories as a tenet that is shared by both traditions. See *jātyāder niḥsvabhāvatvam ayuktam prāk prakāśitam | dravyādayaḥ ṣaḍ arthā ye vidyante pāramāṛthikāḥ | | ity akṣapāda-kānādāḥ prāhur āgamamātrakāḥ | dravyādiḥpratiśedho 'yaṃ samkṣeṣeṇa tad ucyate | |* (*Tattvasaṃgraha* 546–547) [...] *yato dravyagūṇakarmasāmānyaviśeṣasamavāyākhyāḥ ṣaṭ padārthāḥ pāramāṛthikāḥ dravyasantaḥ santīty āhur akṣapādādayaḥ | Akṣapādaśīyatvād ākṣapādā naiyāyikāḥ | Kaṇādaśīsyās tu vaiśeṣikāḥ kānādā ucyante | āgamamātrakā ity āgamamātram apetyuktikam eṣām astīty āgamamātrakāḥ | |* (*Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā ad Tattvasaṃgraha* 546–547, ed. p. 231, 15–19). ‘The fact that universals, etc., are devoid of nature, which has been expounded previously [in the Sthirabhāvaparīkṣā], is not tenable. The six categories, beginning with substance, which exist, are ultimately real. So say the followers of Akṣapāda [(i.e., the Naiyāyikas)] and the followers of Kaṇāda [(i.e., the Vaiśeṣikas)], who [rely] only on Scriptures (*āgama*). Therefore, the following refutation of [the categories,] beginning with substance, is briefly expounded. [...] [This is] because the followers of Akṣapāda, etc., say: The six categories, namely, substance, quality, activity, generality, specificity and inherence, exist ultimately, i.e., exist substantially. Since they are students of Akṣapāda, [they are called] “followers of Akṣapāda”, that is to say the Naiyāyikas. And the Vaiśeṣikas, who are students of Kaṇāda, are called “followers of Kaṇāda”. “[Those] who [rely] only on Scriptures”, i.e., for them, mere Scriptures are [valid] free from reasoning. [This is why] they are [called] “[those] who [rely] only on Scriptures.”’ On *Tattvasaṃgraha* 546–547 and the related *Pañjikā*, see Saccone 2016, 168 n. 14.

⁵⁹This is also stated by Śāntarakṣita at the beginning of the Guṇapadārthaparīkṣā of the *Tattvasaṃgraha*, see English Translation n. 48.

⁶⁰On this verse, see Franco and Notake 2014, 74–75 and English Translation n. 56.

⁶¹See the Sāmānyaparīkṣā of the *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā*: *yathoktam — tasya śaktir aśaktir vā yā svabhāvena samsthītā | nityatvād acikitsyaśya kas tām kṣapayitum kṣamaḥ | | iti | |* (*Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā ad Tattvasaṃgraha* 788–794, ed. p. 317, 7–10).

2.5.1 *Atoms: Criticism of the Vaiḥāṣikas*

Samantabhadra continues by analyzing the physical elements. Regarding these, he mentions the two possible natures they have according to the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems: the whole as their impermanent nature, and the atoms as their permanent one. With regard to the refutation of the whole, Samantabhadra once again shows his indebtedness to Śāntaraḥṣita and Kamalaśīla, in particular to their attacks against the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika concept of the whole in the Dravyapadārthaparīkṣā of the *Tattvasaṃgraha* and the *Pañjikā*.⁶² With reference to atoms, however, Samantabhadra appears less concerned with focusing on Brahmanical opponents. At the same time, they do somehow remain his target; he makes a point of specifying that there is no refutation of the Mīmāṃsakas' atomic theory, since they do not necessarily admit one. This specification is in fact not found in the recension behind the Tibetan translation.

Samantabhadra's main scope is now to refute the atomic theory of the Vaiḥāṣikas (from Kashmir). He introduces three possible theses regarding the nature of atoms: the Vaiḥāṣikas', the Vaiśeṣikas', and the Sautrāntikas'. In fact, what he presents is the epistemic counterpart of those ontological theses. The Vaiḥāṣikas, he asserts, uphold the perceptibility of atoms. The Vaiśeṣikas maintain that they aggregate to form a whole and are perceived as such. The Sautrāntikas claim that they are like *piśācas*,⁶³ always beyond the reach of the senses, and are known through the images they bestow on cognition. Samantabhadra interprets the second half of Jñānapāda's verse 113 as primarily countering the Vaiḥāṣika view of atoms that are the object of perception. Jñānapāda says that the apprehended, i.e., an external object of cognitions, cannot be atoms, because they are never apprehended with their own form, one by one, as distinct from each other.

⁶²See *Tattvasaṃgraha* 592–593 and *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā ad Tattvasaṃgraha* 592–593 in English Translation n. 63.

⁶³The present participle of the denominative (i.e., *piśācāyamāna*) used to refer to the Sautrāntika theory of atoms is found also in Manorathanandin's *Pramāṇavārttikavyūtti ad Pramāṇavārttika* Pratyakṣa° 336: *na, tathāpi paroḥṣasya bāhyasya sādhakasyābhāve 'pi nābhāvasthīr itī cet, pratibhāsamānaṃ jñānaṃ bāhyaṃ tu na pratibhāsata eveti tāvataivābhīmatasiddheḥ, sādha-kapramāṇarahitapiśācāyamānabahirarthaniṣedhe nāsmākam ādaraḥ* | (Sanskrit text as quoted in Ratié 2014, 359 n. 23). On this, see also Ratié 2014 and Arnold 2008. For a discussion of this passage and its interpretation by each of these scholars, see Saccone 2016, 181 n. 63.

This verse and its interpretation are reminiscent of *Vimśikā* 11 and its *Vṛtti*,⁶⁴ particularly, the refutation of the object of cognitions as being manifold and composed of atoms.⁶⁵ However, in the *Samantabhadrasādhana*, only two theses regarding the object of perceptions are mentioned: that of one (*eka*) object and that of a manifold (*aneka*) object as consisting of atoms. This second one, in Samantabhadra's interpretation, is attributed to the Vaibhāṣikas. The *Vimśikā*, instead, states three possible theses concerning the nature of an external sense sphere (*āyatana*) that could be the object of sense perceptions: namely, (i) it being one (*eka*), like the whole admitted by the Vaiśeṣikas; (ii) it consisting in many (*aneka*) atoms; or (iii) it being those atoms aggregated (*saṃhata*). The last one is introduced as upheld by the Vaibhāṣikas from Kashmir.⁶⁶

In the literature of the logico-epistemological tradition, starting from the *Vimśikā*, the number of theses on the nature of an external object are generally listed as two or three.⁶⁷ The idea that atoms are not the object of sense cognitions since they are not apprehended distinctly in their form is also found in the *Vimśikā* (as seen above) and the *Ālambanaparīkṣā*,⁶⁸ and elaborated on in the *Tattvasamgraha* and *Pañjikā*. In particular,

⁶⁴See *na tad ekam na cānekam viśayaḥ paramāṇuśah | na ca te saṃhatā yasmāt paramāṇur na sidhyati ||* (*Vimśikā* 11) [...] *yat tad rūpādīkam āyatanam rūpādivijñaptinām pratyekam viśayaḥ syāt tad ekam vā syād yathāvayavirūpaṃ kalpyate vaiśeṣikāḥ | anekam vā paramāṇuśah | saṃhatā vā ta eva paramāṇavaḥ |* (*Vṛtti* on *Vimśikā* 11, ed. Lévi p. 6, 27–29). 'That [external sense sphere (*āyatana*)] as the object (*viśaya*) [of sensory perceptions] is not one, nor many [divided] into atoms. Nor is it those [atoms themselves when] aggregated, since the atom is not established.' [...] 'Any [external] *āyatana*, such as a visual form, that could be the object, respectively, of the perceptions of visual forms, etc., could be one, like a thing that has the nature of a whole (*avayavin*) is imagined by the Vaiśeṣikas; or many [divided] into atoms; or those atoms themselves [when] aggregated.'

⁶⁵There, Vasubandhu states that atoms are not the object of sensory perceptions because they are not apprehended individually: *nāpy anekam paramāṇūnām pratyekam agrahaṇāt |* (*Vṛtti* on *Vimśikā* 11, ed. Lévi p. 6, 30–7, 1).

⁶⁶Unlike with the Vaiśeṣikas, Vasubandhu does not immediately ascribe this view to the Vaibhāṣikas. However, after refuting it, he introduces an objection of theirs defending the idea of aggregated (*saṃhata*) atoms: *naiva hi paramāṇavaḥ saṃyujyante niravayavatāt | mā bhūd eṣa doṣaprasaṅgaḥ | saṃhatās tu parasparam saṃyujyanta iti kāśmīravaibhāṣikāḥ |* (*Vṛtti* on *Vimśikā* 13, ed. Lévi p. 7, 9–10). 'It is indeed not the case that atoms conjoin, since they do not have parts. Let there not be the undesired consequence of this defect [for us]. However, [when] aggregated[, they] do join each other. This is [the view of] the Vaibhāṣikas from Kashmir.'

⁶⁷On the possible theses regarding an external object of cognitions in Śāntaraksita, Kamalaśīla, Vasubandhu and Dignāga, see Saccone 2018, 66–71.

⁶⁸See *der mi snang phyir de'i yul ni || rdul phran ma yin dbang po bzhin ||* (*Ālambanaparīkṣā* 1cd). 'Atoms are not the object of a [perception], since they do not appear in

Śāntarakṣita claims that atoms are not established by direct perception because they do not appear there in their partless form.⁶⁹ While commenting on this, Kamalaśīla specifies that they do not appear in a cognition admitted as direct perception and acting as the cause of their own ascertainment.⁷⁰ The opponent here is Śubhagupta, who is attacked as the upholder of the thesis of atoms as external objects of cognition.⁷¹

The hypothesis that, once again, Jñānapāda and Samantabhadra draw on the treatment of the same topic in the Bahirarthaparīkṣā of the *Tattvasaṃgraha* and (especially) its *Pañjikā* is supported by the following. While discussing atoms in the *Samantabhadrasādhana*, Jñānapāda introduces a verse stating a *prasaṅga*-based argument, namely, stanza 114. If an atom is admitted as devoid of parts (as it is by all the opponents), since it cannot be surrounded by other atoms, it will not be able to aggregate. If this is the case, accumulations, like the sphere of earth, are not logical, and the opponents are left with an undesired consequence of their own thesis. Samantabhadra presents this verse as the response to an objection by an adversary trying to demonstrate the existence of atoms through inference. Atoms are inferred because, otherwise, the occurrence of coarse things could not be explained.

Similarly, after the above-mentioned proof through absence of direct perception establishing atoms, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla also introduce a disputant advancing a possible inference. Namely, what is firstly visible must consist of an accumulation of subtle things, since it is coarse,

it, like the sense faculties [do not, in spite of being its cause].’ The whole verse in the original Sanskrit is found in the *Pramāṇavārttikālamkāra*. See *yady apīndriyavijñaptēh kāraṇaṃ paramāṇavaḥ | atadābhatayā nāsyā akṣavad viśayo ’navaḥ || (Pramāṇavārttikālamkāra ad Pramāṇavārttika Pratyakṣa° 294, st. 597, ed. p. 336, 5).*

⁶⁹See *na tāvat paramāṇūnām ākāraḥ prativedyate | nirāṣānekamūrtānām pratyayāprativedanāt || (Tattvasaṃgraha 1967).* ‘First of all, the form of atoms is not specifically brought to awareness, since, in cognition, there is no specific awareness of [atoms that are] devoid of parts, many and corporeal.’

⁷⁰See *yataḥ pratyayāprativedanād ity atra pratyakṣābhimate pratyaye parāmarśahetāv a-pratibhāsanād ity ayam artho ’bhīpretah | (Tattvasaṃgrahaḥpañjikā ad Tattvasaṃgraha 1972, ed. p. 161, 6–8).* ‘Because, with regard to this—i.e., “since there is no specific awareness in/of cognition” (*Tattvasaṃgraha* 1967d)—the intended meaning is: “Since there is no appearance [of atoms] in a cognition admitted as direct perception [and acting as] the cause of a reflective awareness.”’

⁷¹On the debate on this particular subject, see Saccone 2014 and Saccone 2018, 71–86.

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like, for example, a mountain.⁷² This disputant (like that of Samantabhadra) refers to the property of coarseness as an inferential mark for the existence of accumulations of subtle things, that is to say atoms. Perceivable things are established as an accumulation of subtle things, since they are coarse. In other words, what an ordinary being apprehends must be understood as the gathering of subtle things, since the latter are, by definition, imperceptible; only through accumulation do they reach perceptibility, i.e., become coarse. This inference is valid for atoms and their aggregates as well. In the Bahirarthaparīkṣā, the objection is not explicitly ascribed to anyone, but given the flow of the argument, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla clearly imply that it is upheld by Śubhagupta. In fact, in the *Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā, we find a *kārikā* that seems to be the reverse of Jñānapāda's stanza 114:⁷³

phan tshun bdag nyid ma reg pa | |
cha shas med par rnam gnas te | |
de phyir sa yi dkyil 'khor sogs | |
bsags pa las ni byung ba yin | | (*Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā 56)

[Atoms] do not touch each other's nature-form [and] are established (**vyavasthita*) as being devoid of parts; therefore[, i.e., because they are devoid of parts and, hence, unitary,] they arise having aggregated, like in the sphere of earth.

⁷²See *sūkṣmapracayārūpaṃ hi sthūlatvād ādyacākṣuṣam* | *parvatādivad atrāpi samasty eṣānumeti cet* | | (*Tattvasaṃgraha* 1974). 'If [Śubhagupta argues that] [what is] visible at first indeed consists of an accumulation of subtle things since it is coarse, such as a mountain, [then,] also in this case[, i.e., with reference to atoms and their aggregates], there is this inference [...]'; *syād etat — anityatādivad aṇavo 'pi siddhā eva pramāṇataḥ* | *tathā hi — yad yat sthūlaṃ tat tat sūkṣmapracayāmakam, yathā parvatādayaḥ* | *sthūlaṃ cādyacākṣuṣam avayavidravyam iti svabhāvahetuḥ* | *cākṣuṣagrahaṇam acākṣuṣasya divyaṇukāder vyavacchedāya* | (*Tattvasaṃgrahaṇajīkā ad Tattvasaṃgraha* 1974, ed. pp. 161, 18–162, 3). 'Let the following be the case: "Atoms are also, indeed, established through a *pramāṇa*, [exactly] like impermanence, etc. To explain: Everything that is coarse consists of an 'accumulation of subtle things', like mountains and so on, and '[what is] visible at first', a part-possessing substance, is a coarse [entity]. Thus, there is a logical reason as an essential property. The apprehending (*grahaṇa*) of the visible is in order to ascertain the non-visible—for example, a dyad of atoms.''

⁷³See **niravayavatve cāṇor anekaparamāṇuparīkarābhāvāt* | *bhūmaṇḍalādirūpaḥpracyo na hi kaścid atra syāt* | | 'Moreover, if an atom is [admitted as] devoid of parts, since it [can]not be surrounded by many atoms, no accumulation, such as the sphere of earth, etc., would be possible at all in this case.'

In commenting on verse 114, Samantabhadra introduces two arguments that are reminiscent of those presented in *Vimśikā* 12,⁷⁴ which is quoted at the end of the paragraph (in the Pāla recension only). The first one is based on the undesired consequence of an atom's divisibility. An atom would follow as having parts, since it is admitted as joining with other atoms synchronically (and this is a *conditio sine qua non* for its aggregating). In fact, Samantabhadra explicitly states that such an atom, which aggregates and is accordingly endowed with parts, undesirably follows as manifold. Here, the bottom line is that atomists try to justify the existence of material things as ultimately consisting of irreducible unities of matter. However, in order to be such, these unities must aggregate and by aggregating they lose their singularity. In other words, a unitary atom is never to be found and any atomic theory proves to be simply absurd.

The second argument in *Vimśikā* 12 is based on the undesired consequence of the untenability of atoms' aggregation if they are viewed as being unitary, i.e., devoid of parts. However, for this second argument, Samantabhadra introduces a more detailed elaboration, which is taken directly from the *Tattvasaṃgraha* and the *Pañjikā*. In this case, we actually have a straightforward (albeit unattributed) quotation from Śāntarakṣita's work. As a matter of fact, the type of argument Samantabhadra uses, focusing on the idea of the nature (*svabhāva*) of atoms as opposed to their mere physical segments, is first presented in verses 1989 and 1990 of the *Tattvasaṃgraha* (which is indeed quoted in the *Sāramañjarī*) as well as the *Pañjikā*.⁷⁵

⁷⁴See [...] *yasmāt | śatkena yugapadyogāt paramānoḥ śadamśatā | śadbhyo digbhyah śadbhiḥ paramānubhir yugapadyoge sati paramānoḥ śadamśatā prāpnoti, ekasya yo deśas tatrānyasyāsambhavāt | śaṇṇām samānadeśatvāt piṇḍaḥ syād anumātrakaḥ || atha ya evaikasya paramānor deśaḥ sa eva śaṇṇām | tena sarveṣāṃ samānadeśatvāt sarvaḥ piṇḍaḥ paramānumātraḥ syāt parasparāvyatirekāḍ iti na kaścit piṇḍo drśyaḥ syāt ||* (*Vimśikā* 12 and *Vṛttī*, ed. Lévi p. 7, 2–9). “[...] Since, “because of the simultaneous joining with six [atoms], an atom would have six parts.” Since there is the simultaneous joining with six atoms from six directions, an atom [would] follow as having six parts, given that it is impossible for another [atom to occur] in that spot where one [atom] is. “Since [those] six [atoms] would all be in the same spot, a conglomerate would amount to only one atom.” If [it is argued that] precisely that spot where one atom is is also [the spot] for the [other] six [atoms], then, since all of them would share the same spot, every conglomerate would amount to only one atom because there would be no exclusion from each other. Therefore, no conglomerate would be perceivable.”

⁷⁵With reference to these verses, *Tattvasaṃgraha* 1989–1991 (and **Madhyamakālamkā-rakārikā* 11–12, see English Translation n. 70), Kajiyama (1978, 141 n. 5) maintains that

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*tathā hi — yenaikarūpeṇaikānvabhimukho madhyavartī paramāṇus tenaivāparaparamānvabhimukho yadi syāt tadā parivārakāṇām aṅūnām ekadeśatvaprasaṅgāt **pracayo na** syāt | prayogaḥ — yad ekarūpaparamānvabhimukhasvabhāvaṃ tad ekadeśam yathā tasyaiva pūrvadeśasthitāḥ paramāṇur ekaprāsādābhimukhapūrvaprāsādavad vā | ekarūpaparamānvabhimukhasvabhāvās ca sarve parivāryāvasthitāḥ paramāṇava iti svabhāva-hetuḥ | ataḥ pracayo na syāt | (Tattvasaṃgrahaḥaṅjikā ad Tattvasaṃgraha 1989–1990, ed. p. 167, 12–19).*

To explain: If an atom that is in the middle [of many others] could face the other atoms precisely with that singular ‘nature-form’ with which it ‘faces [only] one atom’, then there would ‘not’ be an ‘accumulation’ of the surrounding atoms because of the undesired consequence (*prasaṅga*) of their occupying the same space. The proof statement is [as follows]. That which is endowed with the essential property of facing an atom provided with a unitary nature-form occupies only one space, as [it is with] the atom [that is] situated in front of that very [atom], or a building [that is placed] in front of and faces only one building. And all atoms positioned as surrounding [another single atom] are endowed with the essential property of facing an atom [that is] provided with a unitary nature-form. Thus, there is a logical reason based on essential property. Therefore, there cannot be an accumulation [of atoms].

If atoms are unitary, they have only one nature (*svabhāva*). If the central atom of an aggregate has the nature of facing one atom, all the surrounding atoms will occupy the same spot as that one. This is because they all surround that same atom with that unitary nature. Accordingly, no surrounding by many atoms in different places will be possible and no aggregate could arise. This argument of Kamalaśīla is also presented in the *Abhisamayālamkāralokā* in a slightly different form, but with verbatim parallel phrasing.⁷⁶

while in the *Viṃśikā* and *Vṛtti* Vasubandhu analyzes atoms quantitatively, Śāntarakṣita criticizes them qualitatively, changing the idea of segments of atoms into that of intrinsic natures. Here, Samantabhadra’s reference to *svabhāva* is based on Śāntarakṣita’s and (most likely) Kamalaśīla’s elaboration of the argument.

⁷⁶See *atha vijāṭīyair api saṃsparśo nānumanyate, tadā yo ’sau madhyavartī paramāṇur yenaikena svabhāvenaikaparamānvabhimukhāvasthitas tenaivānyaparamānvabhimukho, yad vānyeneti vikalpādāyam. tatra yady ādyāḥ pakṣas tadā yad ekarūpaparamānvabhimukhasvabhāvaṃ tad ekadeśam. tadyathā tasyaiva paramāṇoḥ pūrvadigavasthitāparamāṇuḥ. ekaparamānvabhimukhasvabhāvās ca sa-*

Kamalaśīla’s argument is advanced consistently against all three types of possible theses on how atoms can aggregate.⁷⁷ However, afterwards, he takes explicit issue with Śubhagupta’s atomic theory as discussed in the **Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā*. In particular, Kamalaśīla refutes some of the ideas brought forward by Śubhagupta in critical engagement with Vasubandhu’s *Vīṃśikā* 14ab and *Vṛtti*⁷⁸ (as well as 12).⁷⁹ It is to be

ve parivārahāḥ paramāṇava iti svabhāvahetuḥ | (*Abhisamayālamkāralokā* Tathatāparivarta, ed. p. 625, 5-11 [the underlined text is copied verbatim from the *Pañjikā*]). ‘If the contact by heterogeneous [atoms] as well is not admitted, then, the atom that is in the middle [of many others] will face the other atoms precisely with that singular nature with which he is placed as facing [only] one atom, or [it will do that] through another [nature]. These are the two options. Among these, if the first thesis is [admitted], then, that which is endowed with the essential property of facing an atom provided with a unitary nature-form occupies only one space, like, for example, the atom that is placed in the eastern direction in relation to that very atom. And all surrounding atoms are endowed with the essential property of facing an atom [that is] provided with a unitary nature-form. Thus, there is a logical reason based on essential property.’ The underlined text is identical to *Tattvasaṃgrahaḥpañjikā* 1989–1991 (ed. p. 167, 12-19).

⁷⁷ See *tatra kecid āhuḥ — parasparaṃ saṃyujyante paramāṇava iti | sāntarā eva nityaṃ na spr̥ṣan-
tīty apare | nīrantaratve tu spr̥ṣtasamjñety anye | tatra itasmīn pakṣatraye ’pi madhyavartinah
paramāṇor bahubhiḥ parivāritasya yadi digbhāgabhedo na syāt, tadā cittacāitasikakalāpasyeva pra-
cayo na syād anamśatvāt* | (*Tattvasaṃgraha ad Tattvasaṃgrahaḥpañjikā* 1989–1990, ed. p. 167,
6–11). ‘In this respect, some say: “Atoms conjoin with each other”; others [say]: “Indeed,
having interstices, they never touch [each other]”; [and still] others [say]: “Having no in-
terstices, there is, however, the idea of touching [each other]”. In this regard—regarding
all of these three theses—if an atom “that is in the middle” [and] surrounded by many
[other atoms] had no difference of parts based on orientation, then there would “not”
be an “accumulation” [of atoms,] [just] like [there is not] for a bundle of [single entities
such as] mind and mental states, because [that atom] would not have parts.’

⁷⁸ See *yadi ca paramāṇoḥ saṃyoga īsyate yadi vā nesyate | digbhāgabhedo yasyāsti ta-
syaikatvaṃ na yujyate | anyo hi paramāṇoḥ pūrvadigbhāgo [’py anyo* ed. Ruzsa and Szegedi
p. 148, 2] *yāvad adhodigbhāga iti digbhāgabhedo sati katham tadātmakasya paramāṇor ekatvaṃ yo-
kyate* | (*Vīṃśikā* 14ab and *Vṛtti*, ed. p. 7, 17–21). ‘And [regardless of] whether or not the
conjoining of an atom [with other atoms] is admitted: “The singularity of that which is
endowed with a difference of parts based on orientation is not tenable.” For, regarding
[a unitary] atom, there being a difference of parts based on orientation so that the part
that is in the east up to the part that is at the nadir are different, how will the singularity
of an atom consisting of those [parts] follow?’ On this, see Saccone 2018, 93–103. On
Śubhagupta’s criticism of (parts of) Vasubandhu’s *Vīṃśikā*, see Saccone 2015.

⁷⁹ Kamalaśīla refers to a few verses of the **Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā*. These are part of the
refutation of the *pūrvapakṣa* expounded in **Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā* 45ab: *rdul phran phyogs cha
tha dad phyir* | | *med ces smras gang de ma ’brel* | |. ‘What is said [by Vasubandhu], “Atoms
are not real, since there is a difference of parts based on orientation” is incoherent (*ma
'brel/*asambaddha, *asaṅgata*).’ This clearly echoes Vasubandhu’s argument as expounded
in the *Vīṃśikā*, specifically in k. 14ab, but is also a general summary of his proof against
atoms as unitary. In fact, the property of a difference of parts based on orientation is also
presupposed in the argument as found in *Vīṃśikā* 12ab. See n. 74.

noted that Śubhagupta closes the section dealing with such a criticism with a statement of his *siddhānta* on atoms. This is argued in the same *kārikā* 56 that Jñānapāda might be reversing in his verse 114 (see *supra*).

In the *Sāramañjarī*, the conclusion, which is not found in the Tibetan recension, is entrusted to the quotation of *Vimśikā* 12 and consists in the declaration of an atom's lack of singularity. Moreover, if the atom is not singular, there cannot be many atoms, since these aggregate as singular entities.⁸⁰ In this sense, the neither-one-nor-many argument is shown as the final refuting proof against external, material objects.

In the Pāla recension, at the end of the portion disproving the reality of atoms, a paragraph is added. Therein, Samantabhadra intends to justify the validity of a separate refutation of the whole as such, different from that of atoms. He quotes the *Ślokavārttika*, implying that such a refutation can be aimed at the Mīmāṃsakas, since they do not necessarily admit atoms (but admit external material objects, nonetheless).

2.6 'The Yogācāra-Madhyamaka Synthesis'. Conventional Reality of Vijñānavāda, Ultimate Reality of Madhyamaka

In the first part of the 'philosophical portion', Samantabhadra clearly sets the goal of demonstrating *vijñāpīmātratā*. This is provisionally admitted against any forms of externalism, whether Brahmanical or Buddhist. Moreover, the achievement of this goal, through a conceptual ascertainment, is put into relation with spiritual practice as its necessary requirement. External objects need to be proven as unreal to justify the practice of visualization.

However, having undertaken the method of the neither-one-nor-many argument (and having brought it to its extreme consequences), the

⁸⁰Cf. *evaṃ tāvad ekatvaṃ paramāññānam asiddham | tadasiddhau nāpy anekatvaṃ siddham, tatsandohātmakatvāt tasyeti nāsiddho 'ññānam abhāvavyavahāre sādhanā hetuḥ* || (*Tattvasaṃgrahaṭīkā ad Tattvasaṃgraha* 1992–1996, ed. p. 172, 10–12). 'In this manner, first of all, the singularity of atoms is unestablished. If this is unestablished, [their] manifoldness is also unestablished, since the latter consists of a conglomeration of those [unitary things]. Therefore, the logical reason [that is] a proof regarding treating atoms as absent is not unestablished.' Cf. *ekasya kasyacit svabhāvasyāsiddhāv anekarūpatāpy ayuktimatī | ekasamūharūpatvād anekasya* | (*Bhāvanākrama I*, ed. p. 13, 9–10); *gang gcig pa'i rang bzhin du mi 'thad pa de du ma'i bdag nyid du khas blangs pa ni rigs pa ma yin pa nyid de | 'di ltar du ma ni gcig bsags pa'i mtshan nyid do* || (**Madhyamakālamkāravṛtti*, ed. p. 172, 10–12).

practitioner cannot but surpass this provisional truth, too, in order to attain also the next level of truth, that of the unreality of the mind as well. It is to be noted that Jñānapāda, in the *Samantabhadrasādhana*, does not devote a separate refutation to cognitions. Samantabhadra explains this with the mere fact that it is quite evident that the same arguments refuting external objects also refute their cognitions. Just like those objects, cognitions cannot stand the test of the neither-one-nor-many argument. Accordingly, there is no need for the master to repeat himself.

The idea of a doctrinal hierarchy—according to which some viewpoints are more correct than others in a certain context, only to be transcended in a different one—is found in the work of many Buddhist authors.⁸¹ The exact same progression that one finds in the philosophical portion is also present in Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla. With reference to these authors and this peculiar argumentative strategy, Sara McClintock (2010, 97)⁸² has adapted the term ‘sliding scale of analysis’. Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla also share the idea that *vijñaptimātratā* is superior to externalism, even though they themselves, in other contexts, defend a version of it.⁸³ However, as we will see in greater detail, they (particularly Kamalaśīla) demonstrate, with arguments analogous to the ones found here, that Madhyamaka is the ultimate truth. On the level of conventional truth, nevertheless, they are committed to the truth of mind-only (*cittamātra*, see *infra*). So is Samantabhadra, who states:

[...] *saṃvṛtyā syād vijñānam, saṃvṛter aśakyāpahnavatvāt.*

[...] conventionally, cognition will be [real], since conventional reality cannot be denied.

After claiming that cognition itself cannot pass the test of the neither-one-nor-many argument, and therefore cannot be treated as real, Samantabhadra turns to the *pars destruens*. Unlike Jñānapāda, he apparently feels the need to spell out the arguments against the true reality of

⁸¹For this idea in Dharmakīrti, see Dunne 2004, 53–79; Dreyfus 1997, 98–99, 103–105; and Kellner 2011a.

⁸²She has referred to this as early as McClintock 2003. Previously, Kajiyama (1978) also discussed a similar theme regarding the **Madhyamakālamkārikā*, the **Madhyamakālamkāravṛtti*, and the **Madhyamakālamkārapañjikā*.

⁸³On this topic, see Saccone 2016.

cognitions. He goes on by attacking two important groups within Vijñānavāda, which were subsequently called **satyākāravāda* (usually and commonly known also as *sākāravāda*)⁸⁴ and **alīkākāravāda* (usually and commonly known also as *nirākāravāda*).⁸⁵

Being a later development of the Yogācāra, which occurred after Dharmakīrti and reached its final phase with Ratnākaraśānti and Jñānaśrīmitra (Kajiyama 1998 [1966], 155), the controversy between the two groups essentially focuses on determining the ultimate nature of cognition, and, more precisely, the nature of the knowledge of an emancipated person, who has acquired non-conceptual gnosis (*nirvikalpañāna*). For the first group, every cognition must have an image, as do the cognitions of an emancipated person, who is still devoid of concepts, even while knowing images. For the second group, pure cognition is like a crystal and images are unreal. The knowledge of an emancipated person is accordingly free of images.⁸⁶

In criticizing these theses, Samantabhadra establishes a hierarchy between the two, with the **alīkākāravāda* being more tenable than the **satyākāravāda*, which is refuted first. It goes without saying that, regardless of this provisional, conventional, superiority, the **alīkākāravāda* position is ultimately not true either.

The same hierarchical system of truths is shared in its entirety by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla. Based on this same progression, in his **Madhyamakālamkārikā*, Śāntarakṣita investigates several doctrines on the reality of things through the lens of the neither-one-nor-many argument.

⁸⁴On the non-equivalence between the terms *sākārajñānavādin* and **satyākāravādin*, with special reference to Kamalaśīla, see Funayama 2007.

⁸⁵Funayama (2007, 190) recommends some caution in ascribing the use of these labels and that classification between the sub-schools of Yogācāra to authors who are earlier than the 10th/11th century, particularly Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla. For the sake of convenience, we will use the term **alīkākāravāda* and **satyākāravāda*, albeit anachronistically, when talking about the standpoints that were refuted by earlier authors such as Jñānapāda and Samantabhadra. Moriyama (2014) examines the debate in Śāntarakṣita's **Madhyamakālamkārikā* and particularly discusses Ratnākaraśānti's view on images being false (*alīka*) or non-existent (*asat*). Isaacson and Sferra (2014, 64 and n. 21) note that Ratnakīrti distinguishes this view of Ratnākaraśānti from *nirākāravijñānavāda* and refers to his position with the expression: *alīkākārayogin pāramārthikaprakāśamātra (Citrādvaitaprakāśavāda*, ed. p. 129, 6).

⁸⁶For a brief survey of studies on these two sub-schools and related bibliography, see Funayama 2007, 187–192.

In the *Bhāvanākrama I*, after having stated the provisional truth of Vijñānavāda, Kamalaśīla introduces similar arguments to deny the viewpoints of those two groups in the same order.⁸⁷ This may lead one to conclude that the two authors (as well as Samantabhadra who most likely follows them) can be regarded as **alīkākāravādins* when it comes to this controversy among Yogācārinś.⁸⁸

In fact, in the *Sāramañjarī* (as well as in the *Ātmasāadhanāvātāra*), the *sākāravāda*/**satyākāravāda* is the first thesis to be attacked. It is proven as being less tenable than the contrary view, since images in cognition necessarily face the same logical defect as material objects possessing spatial extension. The very same thing that is a shaped external entity for a *bahīrarthavādin* is an image for the *sākāravādin*. Images also have an extension and cannot stand the scrutiny of the neither-one-nor-many argument.⁸⁹ The same argument also disproves the reality of cognitions that the **alīkākāravādins* admit to be ultimately pure and devoid of images, which are false. The two, cognition and image, must be viewed as one and the same, because cognition's real nature is manifestation (according to them), and it never manifests without an image. Therefore, given their standpoint, images cannot possibly follow as false and the **alīkākāravādins'* position is proven as untenable.

As in the case of Kamalaśīla in the *Bhāvanākramas (I and III)*,⁹⁰ Samantabhadra's objective also appears to be that of advocating the deconstruction of all concepts as based on the conceptual dichotomy of existence/non-existence.⁹¹ The latter two are not real and are logically

⁸⁷On this, see also Kellner 2020.

⁸⁸In the Bahīrarthaparīkṣā of the *Tattvasaṃgraha* and *Pañjikā*, in verses 2040 to 2045 (and to a certain extent up to 2049), Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla appear to defend themselves as *nīrākāravijñānavādins*. Funayama (2007, 191) notes that a good number of Tibetan doxographies classify Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla as **satyākāravādins* as far as their Yogācāra position is concerned (see also Mimaki 1982a, 29–31). For a discussion of their positions regarding this subject in contemporary scholarship, see Funayama 2007, McClintock 2014, and Saccone 2018, 296 n. 320.

⁸⁹For parallel arguments against the *sākāravāda* in Kamalaśīla and Śubhagupta, see English Translation n. 30.

⁹⁰On this topic and for references to related passages, see Kellner 2020.

⁹¹In *Bhāvanākrama I*, while commenting on *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* 10.258, Kamalaśīla introduces these ideas while talking of *vīpaśyanā*, the meditative counterpart of a rational inquiry regarding the reality of things: *tasmāt samāhitasya prajñayā nirūpayataḥ sarvadharmānām anuṣalambhaḥ | sa eva paramo 'nuṣalambhaḥ | sā ca tādṛśī yoginām avasthānalakṣaṇā gatir*

conceived based on the dependence of non-existence on existence.⁹² Reality is devoid of the tetralemma (*catuṣkoṭi*) and consists in the very fact of being devoid of reality. The whole universe is thus established as being comprised merely of concepts (*kalpanā*), which are unreal *per se* and must be eliminated. The main error is that of ascribing a real, independent nature (*rūpa*, *svabhāva*) to things that are devoid of it. The reification of entities can and must be fought against through the process of gradual rational deconstruction of several views, as is expounded in detail in this ‘philosophical portion’.

2.6.1 *Jñānapāda and the Laṅkāvatārasūtra Verse(s)*

As mentioned above, Samantabhadra makes a point of justifying why Jñānapāda does not introduce a separate refutation of the reality of cognitions. Nevertheless (in the Pāla recension only) he concludes the section by quoting from another of this master’s works, the *Ātmasādhana-vatāra*. There, Jñānapāda embarks on a rejection of mind-only (*cittamātra*), which he admits only as conventionally real.

anābhogā | *tataḥ paraṃ draṣṭavyasyābhāvāt* | **sānteti** bhāvābhāvādivikalpalakṣaṇasya prapañca-syopasamāt | *tathā hi yadā prajñayā nirūpayan na kimcid bhāvasvabhāvam upalabhate yogī, tadāsyā naiva bhāvavikalpo bhavati* | *abhāvavikalpo ’pi tasya nāsty eva* | *yadi bhāvaḥ kadācid dr̥ṣṭo bhavati, evaṃ sati tannisēdhenābhāvavikalpaḥ pravartate* | *yadā tu kālatraye ’pi bhāvo yoginā prajñācakṣuṣā nirūpayatā nopalabdhaḥ, tadā katham tasya pratiśedhenābhāvavikalpam kurvīta* | *evam anye ’pi vikalpās tadā tasya na saṃbhavanty eva bhāvābhāvavikalpābhyāṃ sarvavikalpasya vyāptatvāt* | *vyāpakābhāve ca vyāpyasyāsaṃbhavāt* | *ayam asau paramanūrvikalpo yogaḥ* | (*Bhāvanākrama I*, ed. p. 21, 6–17). “Therefore, there is no perception of any *dharma*s for one who is absorbed in *samādhi* [and] investigates through insight. This indeed is the supreme non-perception. And such “understanding” of the yogins, characterized by stability, is [called] “devoid of effort” because there is no[thing] to be seen beyond that, and is said [to be] “pacified” because of the pacification of the mental proliferations characterized by concepts, such as existence and non-existence. To explain: When, investigating through insight, the yogin does not perceive any nature of existence, then he does not have any concept regarding existence at all. In fact, he does not have the concept of non-existence, either. If existence is seen at some point, then the concept of non-existence occurs through its negation. However, when existence in all three times is not perceived by the yogin who investigates through the eye of insight, then how could he adopt (*kurvīta*) the concept of non-existence through the negation of that [concept of existence]? Similarly, then, other concepts, too, [will] not occur for him at all, because all concepts are pervaded by the two concepts of existence and non-existence and because the pervaded is not possible if there is no pervader. Precisely this is the supreme *yoga* devoid of concepts.”

⁹²Non-existence is admitted as presupposing existence. On this concept and a parallel in the *Bhāvanākrama I*, see English Translation n. 90.

His criticism, however, appears to target exclusively the thesis that cognitions endowed with images are real. Unlike Samantabhadra in the *Sāramañjarī*, he does not engage with the *nirākāravāda*/**alīkākāravāda* at all.⁹³ The argument against the *sākāravāda*/**satyākāravāda* is the same as the one discussed in the *Sāramañjarī*, namely, a neither-one-nor-many argument. Since images in sense cognitions (precisely like sense objects) also appear as shaped, they must follow as manifold, such as in the case of the appearance of a multicoloured rug. A unitary cognition is never seen; it is logically untenable, even if one tries to reduce an image to its infinitesimal components. Similar argumentations against the *sākāravāda* are found in earlier works of other authors, including the *Tattvasaṃgraha* and *Pañjikā* (albeit within a different type of proof)⁹⁴ as well as other writings by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla.⁹⁵

In this passage, Jñānapāda asserts that, from a purely conventional point of view, if not properly examined, things can tenably be viewed as impermanent and having a specific causal efficiency, which is their distinctive characteristic. However, based on a specific progression of refutations of all conceptions regarding the real nature (*svabhāva*) of all things, it is demonstrated that these are ultimately selfless, i.e., unreal. This strongly reminds us of the rigorously Madhyamaka position upheld by Śāntarakṣita in the **Madhyamakālaṃkārikā*. There, the author admits only one type of conventional reality (*saṃvṛti*), the true one, and describes it as: (i) agreeable so long as it is not investigated critically (*avicāraramaṇīya*); (ii) characterized by arising and decay; and (iii) having causal efficiency.⁹⁶ This is quite common in Madhyamaka works of his period.⁹⁷ As also noted by Ichigō (1985, lxiv–lxv), for Śāntarakṣita, conventional truth is also ‘nothing but mind-only’.⁹⁸ On the other hand,

⁹³This does not mean he adopts this point of view as final. His ultimate standpoint is clearly a Madhyamaka one.

⁹⁴In the *Tattvasaṃgraha* and *Pañjikā*, the argument is used to prove that cognitions, as endowed with images, cannot apprehend external objects. The proof is against the Sautrāntika and finally aims to demonstrate mere cognition.

⁹⁵With regard to the arguments against *sākāravāda* as found in Śāntarakṣita’s and Kamalaśīla’s works, see Saccone 2018, 116–118.

⁹⁶Cf. *ma brtags gcig pu nyams dga’ zhing* || *skye dang ’jig pa’i chos can pa* || *don byed pa dag nus rnam kyī* || *rang bzhin kun rdzob pa yin rtogs* || (**Madhyamakālaṃkārikā* 64).

⁹⁷These three elements that describe correct conventional reality are also found in other authors of this period, including Jñānagarbha. On this, see Eckel 1992, 137–138.

⁹⁸See *sems tsam la ni brten nas su* || *phyi rol dngos med shes par bya* || *tshul ’dir brten nas de la yang* || *shin tu bdag med shes par bya* || (**Madhyamakālaṃkārikā* 92). ‘Being based

Kamalaśīla distinguishes between the two kinds of conventional truth, *mīthyāsamvṛti* and *tathyāsamvṛti*—the first being that of mere verbal conventions, and the second, that of dependent origination and ‘causal efficiency, which is well known even to a cowherd’ (see Ichigō 1985, lxii).

In order to substantiate his claim, Jñānapāda refers to a rather popular verse from the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, namely, 10.256, which is also quoted in the *Bhāvanākrama I* (and in the **Madhyamakālamkāravṛtti* as well as the **Madhyamakālamkārapañjikā*)⁹⁹ and connected with the cultivation of *vipaśyanā*. There, Kamalaśīla in fact quotes three verses from the *sūtra*, 10.256–258.¹⁰⁰ In commenting on them, he introduces a specific progression of investigations that form the mental cultivation of insight (*prajñābhāvanākrama*).¹⁰¹ The sequence is similar to the one we have seen in the *Sāramañjarī*, where the rejection of the reality of external objects is followed by that of the reality of cognitions. With reference to the latter, the thesis that cognition is endowed with images is refuted before that of it being devoid of images, thus establishing a hierarchy of truths between the two views of *sākāravāda*/**satyākāravāda* and *nirākāravāda*/**alīkāravāda*. As noted by Kajiyama (1978, 140), each of the different stages in the *Bhāvanākrama* corresponds to a different school of Buddhism, with the first two being the Sarvāstivāda and the Sautrāntika. The scholar (1978, 132) also notes that Kamalaśīla is here following his master Śāntarakṣita¹⁰² who, in turn, is referring to Nāgārjuna’s *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā* vv. 21, 34.¹⁰³ A very similar progression of stages (also generally referred to as ‘fourfold *yoga*’), along with a direct quotation from the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, i.e., kk. 256–257, is found in the **Madhyamakālamkāropadeśa* by Ratnākaraśānti.¹⁰⁴

on *cittamātra* one should know the inexistence of external objects. Based on this doctrine-method (**naya*), also that should be known as totally devoid of Self.’

⁹⁹See, respectively, ed. pp. 296 and 297, as well as the **Madhyamakāloka* (Keira 2016, 105, 22–25). On this verse and related contents in the **Madhyamakālamkārakārikā*, see Kajiyama 1978.

¹⁰⁰On *Bhāvanākrama I* and the quotation of *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* 10.256–258 (ed. pp. 298, 15–299, 3) found therein, see particularly Kellner 2020 and the English translation in the appendix. Cf. also Nagasawa 1962; Kajiyama 1978; Gómez 1983; Lindtner 1997; and Bentor 2002.

¹⁰¹A parallel is found in the *Bhāvanākrama III* (ed. pp. 5, 15–8, 17). This starts with an investigation of the concept of *puḍgala*, which is not present in the *Bhāvanākrama I*.

¹⁰²In this respect, he mentions **Madhyamakālamkārakārikā* 92. See n. 98.

¹⁰³On these verses as quoted in the **Madhyamakālamkāravṛtti*, see ed. p. 302 and n. 1, n. 2; Kajiyama 1978, 143 n. 31.

¹⁰⁴On this, see Yiannopoulos 2012, 176–185; Bentor 2002, 42–44; and Westerhoff 2018, 208–209.

In the case of the *Ātmasādhyanāvātāra*, however, Jñānapāda does not explicitly attack the *nirākāravāda*/**alīkākāravāda*. In fact, he states that one cannot deny the conventional reality of things based on their mere appearance, and thus his assertion is in line with the aforementioned doctrine in the sense of admitting *ākāras* as only conventionally true.¹⁰⁵ He quotes only one verse from the *Lankāvatārasūtra* in order to suggest that, after externalism, the belief in *cittamātra* must also be abandoned. This belief serves to discard inferior concepts related to material objects, but it is, in and of itself, not ultimately true. A statement to the same effect is also found at the end of the **Madhyamakālaṃkārikā*.¹⁰⁶

2.7 The Final Aim: Non-Conceptuality Through Conceptuality

After the refutation of the **alīkākāravāda*, Samantabhadra (commenting on Jñānapāda's conclusion to the same effect) comes to the statement of the innermost meaning of the previous progression of refutations. Through the gradual, rational process of deconstruction of all doctrines and concepts related to real things, i.e., real *svabhāvas*, the practitioner attains the ascertainment of the truth that all things are devoid of Self and are mere conceptual constructions. There is nothing that has an independent *svabhāva*; there is no real cause whatsoever. Everything is but an illusion, like the city of the Gandharvas.

Both Jñānapāda and Samantabhadra suggest that, precisely through the process of dismantling concepts related to 'I' and 'mine', namely, concepts that reify things, practitioners attain their goal, i.e., the purification of concepts. This process must take place through a dialectical analysis, entailing arguments according to the progression previously described. The purification is indeed carried out through a gradual, rational de-reification, the aim of which is the realization of the selflessness

¹⁰⁵Tillemans (1990, 42 n. 92) suggests that in this respect the school is closer to that of the Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas, who recognize an 'object-*qua*-appearance', which is ultimately illusory, but conventionally real. On this view as found in Śāntarakṣita's *Tāttvasaṃgraha* and Kamalaśīla's *Pañjikā*, see McClintock 2019.

¹⁰⁶See n. 98. In the autocommentary on that verse, Śāntarakṣita quotes the three verses from the *Lankāvatārasūtra*, namely, 10.256–258; see **Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*, ed. p. 296; 298; 300.

of all things.¹⁰⁷ Ultimately, to reach conceptual construction devoid of concepts, conceptual construction must be used for the sake of its own purification. This may allude to the attainment of non-conceptual gnosis (*nirvikalpañāna*), which is purely perceptual in nature and ultimately leads to liberation.

There is clearly a shift in perspective here. At the beginning, Samantabhadra had introduced this ‘philosophical portion’ to demonstrate the unreality of external things for the sake of a specific type of visualization. In other words, he wanted to present this as a process for generating conceptual certainty regarding a specific object of mental cultivation. This is in accordance with the authors’ theory of mind-only being conventionally real, a truth that cannot be denied, since it conforms to logic. In this respect, cognitions have a conventional reality and external objects do not. Towards the end, however, Jñānapāda and Samantabhadra give the verses and the ‘philosophical portion’, respectively, the sense of a more comprehensive gradual process of refinement of reason, through which the ultimate goal of purification, i.e., non-conceptuality, can be attained. This is a purely Madhyamaka standpoint and relates to the ultimate level of truth. Quoting an untraced source, Samantabhadra states:

ata evoktam — kalpanāśuddhau yatitavyam.

It is precisely for this reason that it was said: One should strive for the purification of conceptual constructions.

Thus, he clearly marks this purification as the highest spiritual pursuit of the practitioner. When purified, a concept dwells on its own nature, aware of itself, freed from the error of the determination of objects that are other (*bahis*) than itself.

2.8 *Disproving the View of the Self (ātmadarśana)*

As his final step in the philosophical analysis of the concepts concerning real things and admitted by others, Samantabhadra undertakes the refu-

¹⁰⁷For a treatment of the topic of the vision of selflessness as the antidote to radical ignorance, namely, the vision of the Self, in Kamalaśīla, see McClintock 2010, 187–220.

tation of the Self (significantly expanding on what Jñānapāda states).¹⁰⁸ The entire section relies heavily on previous debates and views that are found in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* Pudgalavādapraṭiṣedha (or Ātmavādapraṭiṣedha),¹⁰⁹ in the *Nyāyavārtika* of Uddyotakara (first half of the 6th cent.),¹¹⁰ and, particularly, on the elaboration and treatment of those topics made by Kamalaśīla in the Naiyāyikavaiśeṣikaparikalpitātmaparīkṣā of the *Tattvasaṃgrahaṇīkā*. Long parallel passages are found, at times verbatim, in the **Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhāṣya* of Jitāri, namely, in the Vaibhāṣika section, as well as in the *Tarkabhāṣā*, where Mokṣākaragupta criticizes the Self while expounding the concept of *āśrayāsiddhahetu*, the logical reason whose locus is unestablished.¹¹¹

It is to be noted that, unlike Vasubandhu in the Pudgalavādapraṭiṣedha, in the *Sāramañjarī*, Samantabhadra has no interest in refuting the concept of the *pudgala*, which is upheld by the Buddhist Vātsīputrīyas.¹¹² Such a refutation is, however, the subject of an independent *parīkṣā* in the *Tattvasaṃgraha* and the *Tattvasaṃgrahaṇīkā*.¹¹³

Samantabhadra introduces a distinction between two kinds of views of a permanent Self (*ātmadarśana*), an innate one (*sahaja*) and a conceptually formed one (*ābhisaṃskārika*). This distinction with regard to the personalistic view (*satkāyadrṣṭi*) is also found, for example, in Vasubandhu's

¹⁰⁸This is certainly not the usual sequence, since the concept of the Self is commonly one of the first views to be discussed and refuted in these kinds of philosophical analyses. However, here Samantabhadra is following the order of the topics in the verses of Jñānapāda.

¹⁰⁹With regard to a recent analysis of the arguments in this chapter, see Kellner and Taber 2014, 719–727. For a general study and an English translation of the chapter, see Duerlinger 2003.

¹¹⁰With reference to a philosophical investigation of Uddyotakara's defense of the Self, see Taber 2012; for a summary of the related section in the *Nyāyavārtika*, see also Oetke 1988.

¹¹¹Kajiya (1998 [1966], 120 and n. 326) quotes precisely this part of the *Tattvasaṃgrahaṇīkā* as a parallel of the passage in the *Tarkabhāṣā*. As a matter of fact, Mokṣākaragupta follows Jitāri very closely. See appendix B. On the relationship between Jitāri and Śāntarakṣita, see Shirasaki 1978. On Jitāri's understanding of Dharmakīrti as a Mādhyamika, see Steinkellner 1990.

¹¹²For a comprehensive contribution on the *pudgalavāda*, see Priestley 1999.

¹¹³For a new edition and translation of the Vātsīputrīyātmaparīkṣā of the *Tattvasaṃgraha* and the *Tattvasaṃgrahaṇīkā*, see Sferra 2023.

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*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*¹¹⁴ and *Pañcaskandhaka*, in the *Yōgācārabhūmi*¹¹⁵ (see Kritzer 2005, 292–293), and in the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*.¹¹⁶ In the *Sāramañjarī*, the innate view is said to be common to all ordinary people (*prthagjana*), not to the buddhas, etc. In the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, it is also attributed to animals and is described as morally neutral (*avyākṛta*), while the one that is conceptually formed is unwholesome (*akuśala*).¹¹⁷ This concept can be traced back to certain passages in the *Yōgācārabhūmi*.¹¹⁸ As highlighted by

¹¹⁴See *sahajā satkāyadr̥ṣṭir avyākṛtā | yā mṛgapaḥṣiṇām api vartate | vikalpitā tv akuśaleti pūrvācāryāḥ |* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* ad 5.19c, ed. p. 290, 20–21).

¹¹⁵With reference to the account in the *Yōgācārabhūmi*, see Eltschinger and Ratié 2013, 16; on the passages in the *Pañcaskandhaka* and the *Yōgācārabhūmi*, see Pecchia 2015, 23–24 n. 20, n. 21.

¹¹⁶See *tatra Mahāmate satkāyadr̥ṣṭir dvividhā yad uta saajā ca parikalpitā ca, paratantraṇaparikalpitasvabhāvavāt | tadyathā Mahāmate paratantrasvabhāvāśrayād vicitraṇparikalpitasvabhāvābhiniवेशाḥ pravartate | sa ca tatra na san nāsan na sadasan, abhūtaṇparikalpalakṣaṇatvāt | atha ca bālair vikalpyate vicitrasvabhāvalakṣaṇābhiniवेशena mṛgatr̥ṣṇikeva mṛgāḥ | iyaṃ Mahāmate srotaāpannasya parikalpitā satkāyadr̥ṣṭir ajñānāc ciraḥkālabhiniवेशasaṃcitā | sā ca tasya pudgalanairātmyagrahābhāvataḥ prahīnā | saajā punar Mahāmate srotaāpannasya satkāyadr̥ṣṭiḥ — svaparakāyasamatayā catuḥskandharūpalakṣaṇatvād rūpasyoṭpattibhūtabhautikatvāt parasparahetulakṣaṇatvād bhūtānāṃ rūpasyaṃsamudaya itī kṛtvā srotaāpannasya sadasatpaksadr̥ṣṭidarśanāt satkāyadr̥ṣṭiḥ prahīnā bhavati | ata eva [evam ed.] satkāyadr̥ṣṭiprahīnasya rāgo na pravartate | etan Mahāmate satkāyadr̥ṣṭilakṣaṇam | |* (*Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, ed. p. 117, 17–118, 13) ‘In this respect, o Mahāmati, the personalistic view [can] be of two kinds, namely, innate or conceptually formed, as in the case of dependent nature and conceptually formed nature. For instance, o Mahāmati, based on dependent nature, an attachment to varied conceptually formed natures occurs. Moreover, of those two, the [conceptually formed nature] is not existent [and] not inexistent, [as well as both] not existent and not non-existent, because it has the characteristic of false conceptual construction (*abhūtaṇparikalpa*). And, if it is conceived of by fools, [it is] by virtue of [their] attachment to the varied characteristics of a nature, like a mirage [is imagined] by deer. This personalistic view, o Mahāmati, that is conceptually constructed for the one who has entered the stream is accumulated due to long-time attachment out of ignorance. Furthermore, this [view] is removed due to the absence of the grasping [of a Self], thanks to his/her [realization of the] selflessness of the *pudgala*. The innate [view], in turn, o Mahāmati, is the personalistic view for the one who has entered the stream. He/She thinks: “Due to the sameness of my own body/person and those of others, the non-origin of the material form of beings is because these [beings] are characterized as the four aggregates and the [aggregate of] material form, because the [*dharmas*] are the elements that are the origin of the material form, [and] because they have the characteristic of one being the cause of the other.” [Based on this reflection,] the personalistic view is removed for the one who has entered the stream, due to the vision of those wrong views that are the extremes (*pakṣa*) of existence and non-existence. Precisely for this reason, passions do not occur to those who have abandoned the personalistic view. This, o Mahāmati, is the characterization of the personalistic view.’

¹¹⁷See *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* in n. 114.

¹¹⁸On this, see Schmithausen 1987, 148, 439 n. 928, and 439 n. 929; Eltschinger and Ratié 2013, 16.

Pecchia (2015, 24 and n. 23), Vasubandhu himself appears to suggest that the distinction between these two types of views of the Self goes back to the *Yōgācārabhūmi*.¹¹⁹ In the *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*, Yaśomitra singles out Kapila and Ulūka, i.e., the founders of Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣika, as the upholders of such views.¹²⁰ In the *Sāramañjarī*, there is explicit mention of Kaṇāda and the Vaiśeṣikas. Samantabhadra also adds ‘etc.’, intending the Naiyāyikas, who are in fact the main target. While the innate view of the Self can be removed only through the path of mental cultivation (*bhāvanāmārga*), the conceptually formed one is eliminated through the path of vision (*darśanamārga*).¹²¹ In fact, Samantabhadra investigates the conceptually formed view in detail in the following passages in order to refute it rationally.

As noted above, the primary targets appear to be the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas. According to the description found in the *Sāramañjarī*, the opponents regard the Self as: (1.) distinct from the body, etc.; (2.) the agent of good and bad actions; (3.) the experiencer of their fruits; (4.) permanent; and (5.) all-pervading.¹²² A very similar description of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view of the Self is found in the Naiyāyikavaiśeṣikaparikāpitātmaparīkṣā of the *Tattvasaṃgraha* (171–172, 174). We shall use bold type for the exact statement of these characteristics.

anye punar ihātmānam icchādīnām samāśrayam |
*svato ’cidrūpam icchanti **nityam sarvagatam** tathā ||*
śubhāśubhānām kartāram karmanām tatphalasya ca |
***bhoktāram** cetanāyogāc cetanam na svarūpataḥ || [...]*
nikāyena viśiṣṭābhīr apūrvābhīś ca saṅgatih |
buddhibhīr vedanābhīś ca janma tasyābhīdhīyate ||

In this regard, others [(i.e., the exponents of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika)], for their part, regard the Self (*ātman*) as the basis (*samāśraya*) of desires and so on, having an insentient nature by itself, eternal

¹¹⁹In that part, Pecchia refers to Hakamaya 1986 on ‘the identification of the *pūrvācāryāḥ*, “former teachers”, mentioned by Vasubandhu with the masters of the *Yōgācārabhūmi*’.

¹²⁰See *yātmavādibhiḥ kapilolūkādibhir vikalpitā |* (*Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*, ed. p. 463, 17–18).

¹²¹On this, among others, see Schmithausen 1987, 148; Eltschinger and Ratié 2013, 16. Cf. also the description of the elimination of the personalistic view in the *Lankāvatārasūtra*, see n. 116.

¹²²Cf. *Tārkabhāṣā*; see English Translation n. 110.

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as well as all-pervading; [they regard it as] the agent of positive and negative actions and as the experiencer of those [actions'] fruit, as conscious due to the connection with consciousness, [but] not by its own nature. [...] Its association with a body, specific and hitherto not [experienced] cognitions, and feelings is called its birth.

The Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas of that period no longer considered agency to be a part of the true nature of the Self.¹²³ The body and the senses are directed through an impulse called effort (*prayatna*). The latter is included in the qualities, like cognition, and is accordingly purely adventitious. With regard to these ideas, while Samantabhadra provides us with a vaguer description, Śāntarākṣita gives us a more accurate depiction in the *Tattvasaṃgraha* (173):

*jñānayantrādisambandhaḥ kartṛtvaṃ tasya bhanyate |
sukhaduḥkḥhādīsaṃvittisamavāyas tu bhokṛtā ||*

[Its] relation with cognition and the instrument, etc., is said to be its agency; [its] inherence with the awareness of pleasure and suffering, etc., is said to be its being the experiencer.

Given the spiritual character of Samantabhadra's *Sāramañjarī*, however, it is most likely that his intention was merely to limit himself to summing up his opponents' position, referring his audience to more detailed treatments such as the ones in the *Tattvasaṃgraha* and the related commentary.

The innate personalistic view (*satkāyadarśana*), on the other hand, is common to all ordinary people (*pṛthagjana*), Buddhist and non-Buddhist alike, and has the form of that concept of 'I' intended as the permanent subject of our experiences.

Samantabhadra begins his refutation of the conceptually formed view of the Self, by demonstrating that there are no positive proofs to prove the Self. Direct perception cannot establish the Self because each sense cognition is necessarily restricted to its proper object, and the Self is not an object of the senses. The inherent imperceptibility of the Self can indeed be seen as a shared viewpoint, particularly if one assumes that Samantabhadra has the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems in mind. This is also

¹²³For a historical account of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika conception of the Self, see for example Watson 2006, 60–67.

postulated at the beginning of the portion, when Samantabhadra rebuts the concept of the ‘apprehender’ as a property-bearer (see § 3.1). The Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas generally (but not always)¹²⁴ admit that the Self cannot be perceived, it must be inferred.¹²⁵ However, as we are about to see, among the Naiyāyikas, Uddyotakara (as well as Udayana, who follows him) does admit that the Self can be perceived.¹²⁶

On the other hand, Samantabhadra argues, inference cannot prove the Self either, because no relation of causality or identity can be granted for a totally imperceptible Self. This idea is already discussed by Dharmakīrti, who argues that the Self, being radically imperceptible, cannot be determined as existent or non-existent.¹²⁷ In general, the logical defect that derives from admitting the Self as imperceptible underpins all of the following proofs against its inferability.¹²⁸ Samantabhadra makes this explicit when discussing the relation of causality. Since this is based on the

¹²⁴See *ātmany ātmamanasoḥ saṃyogaviśeṣād ātmapratyakṣam* | (*Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 9.13). On this, see Isaacson 1993.

¹²⁵See, for example, *tatrātmā tāvat pratyakṣato na grhyate | sa kim āptopadeśamātrād eva pratipadyata iti? nety ucyate | anumānāc ca pratipattavya iti | katham? icchādveṣaprayatnasukhaduhkhajñānāny ātmano līngam iti* || (*Nyāyabhāṣya ad Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.10, ed. p. 16, 1–3). ‘Among these, first of all, the Self is not apprehended through direct perception. [Objection:] “Is it cognized based merely on the teaching of an authoritative person?” It will be responded: “No.” And it must be cognized based on an inference. How? “Desire, aversion, effort, pleasure, pain and cognition are the inferential mark of the Self.”’ A similar concept is expressed in *Nyāyavārtika ad* 1.1.10; see n. 22. In *Nyāyabhāṣya* (ed. p. 9, 8–11), however, Vātsyāyana also states that the Self can be perceived through yogic perception. On this, see Watson 2006, 131 n. 25. According to Taber (2012, 99), Vātsyāyana’s and Uddyotakara’s arguments to prove the Self as commentary on *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.10 are essentially arguments from memory.

¹²⁶While Uddyotakara and Udayana can be considered upholders of the view of the perceptibility of the Self, this cannot be stated (except for the yogins) with regards to thinkers like Vātsyāyana and Vācaspati Mīśra. On the different views of the perception of the *ātman* according to the Naiyāyikas, see Watson 2006, 131 n. 25. In his *Nyāyamañjarī*, Bhaṭṭa Jayanta (ca. late 9th cent.) discusses and refutes four versions of the view of the perception of the *ātman*. He believes that the Self is inferable, but not perceivable. Watson (2020) has identified these views as belonging to four different Mīmāṃsakas (the Vṛttikāra, Kumāriḷa Bhaṭṭa, Umbeka, and Prabhākara).

¹²⁷See *prāṇādeś ca kvacid dṛṣṭyā sattvāsattvaṃ pratīyate | tathātmā yadi dṛṣyeta sattvāsattvaṃ pratīyate* || (*Pramāṇavārttika* Parārthānumāna° 212); *prāṇādāyo ’pi hi kvacid darśanād eva sadasantah pratīyante | na caivam ātmeti na tasya sadasattvapratītiḥ* || (*Pramāṇaviniścaya* 3, ed. p. 118, 10–11). On these two passages of Dharmakīrti and their English translation, see Eltschinger and Ratié 2013, 130.

¹²⁸At the end of the paragraph, Samantabhadra asserts a *conditio sine qua non* for valid inferences. An inferential mark, provided it is real, must be pervaded by the probandum (*sādhyā*). Moreover, in this case, there cannot be such a thing, since the *sādhyā* itself, i.e., the Self, is never established.

ascertainment of positive concomitance (*anvaya*) and negative concomitance (*vyatireka*), they cannot establish that relation, because one cannot establish the presence or absence of something that is imperceptible by its very nature and thus is regarded, *ex hypothesi* (of the opponents), as always present, in time and space.¹²⁹

This may also echo Dharmakīrti's response in the *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*,¹³⁰ to an opponent (Uddyotakara) who defends the (*kevala*)*vyatirekīhetu* in relation to a proof of the Self. The *vyatirekīhetu* is a logical reason that is a property of the object of the inference, and is absent in dissimilar instances (*vipakṣa*), but is not present in similar instances (*sapakṣa*). In *Nyāyavārttika ad 1.1.5*, Uddyotakara defines it and provides the example of breath as proof of the existence of the Self in living bodies.¹³¹ Dharmakīrti's refutation is based on the impossibility of determining co-absence when one of the elements is radically inaccessible to perception.

2.8.1 The Perceptibility of the Self

However, as already stated, some Naiyāyikas accepted the idea that the Self was in fact perceptible. In order to refute that view as well, Samantabhadra introduces the objection of an opponent who indeed admits the perceptibility of the Self through a mental direct perception. This is the mental direct perception having the form of the pronoun 'I'. Here, our author must specifically have Uddyotakara in mind.

Like Samantabhadra's opponent, in a prose passage of the *Nyāyavārttika*, the Naiyāyika takes issue precisely with the imperceptibility of the Self as a logical reason for its inexistence. In other words, he aims to counter the Buddhist argument *ex silentio*¹³² (or *ad ignorantiam*).¹³³ He argues, instead, for its perceptibility. This passage is the response to the

¹²⁹On this, see § 3.1.

¹³⁰See *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*, ed. p. 12, 26–13, 11. On this see Eltschinger and Ratié 2013, 117–129.

¹³¹See *vyatirekī vivakṣitavyāpīṭve sati sapakṣābhāve sati vipakṣāvṛttih | yathā nedam jīvaccharīraṃ nīrātmakam aprānādimattvaprasaṅgād iti |* (*Nyāyavārttika ad 1.1.5*, ed. p. 43, 11–12). On this, see Eltschinger and Ratié 2013, 119 and n. 9.

¹³²Taber (2012, 98) deems as *ex silentio* the Buddhist *anupalabdhi* argument that Uddyotakara aims to disprove. According to his analysis, this is the main argument against the Self being considered by Uddyotakara.

¹³³It is called an *argumentum ad ignorantiam* by Kellner and Taber (2014, 721), who discuss the whole argumentative strategy of the chapter (2014, 719–727).

(Buddhist) objection that the Self does not exist, since it cannot be apprehended (*anupalabdheḥ*). Uddyotakara maintains that the cognition ‘I’ is indeed direct perception, since one has a direct cognition of ‘I’ that is independent of inference. This cognition must have the Self as its object (*viśaya*). He states:

nāsty ātmānupalabdher iti cet | atrāpi pratijñādoṣo dṛṣṭāntadoṣaś ca pūrvavat | yad apy anupalabdher iti tad apy ayuktam | sāpy anupalabdhir asiddhā pratyakṣādīpramānaviśayatvād ātmanaḥ | pratyakṣeṇa tāvad ātmapalabhyate | katham pratyakṣeṇa? līngalīngisaṃbandhasmṛtyanapekṣam viśayasvabhāvabhedānuvidhāy aham iti vijñānam rūpādivijñānavat pratyakṣam | (Nyāyavārttika ad 3.1.1, ed. p. 323, 12–15).

If [it is argued that] there is no Self, since it is not apprehended, [it will be answered that] in this case, too, there is a defect in the thesis and in the example, as before. That [logical reason, i.e.,] ‘since it is not apprehended’, is also illogical. That non-cognition (*anupalabdhī*), too, is unestablished, because the Self is the object of *pramānas*, such as direct perception. First of all, the Self is perceived through direct perception. How [is it perceived] through direct perception? The cognition ‘I’ that is independent of a recollection of a relationship between the inferential mark and the *probandum* and conforms to the different natures of the objects is direct perception, exactly like the cognition of visual forms, etc.

Afterwards, he adds that the Self is the only feasible object of the sense of ‘I’ (*ahamkāra*), because it cannot possibly have the aggregates (*rūpādi*) as its object.¹³⁴ The latter is an explicit reference to the Buddhists.

The view of the perceptibility of the Self is also shared by other Brahmanical traditions. This is generally the case with the Mīmāṃsā system.¹³⁵ Kumāriḷa Bhaṭṭa, for example, argues that the Self is cognized

¹³⁴See *atha manyase — asty ayam ahampratyayaḥ, na punar aśyātmā viśayaḥ, hanta tarhi nirdiśyatām viśayaḥ | rūpādir viśaya iti cet | atha manyase — rūpādaya evāhamkārasya viśayaḥ | tathā cuktam ahamkāralambanotpattinimittatvād ātmety ucyata iti | tan na, pratiśedhād asattvāc ca | (Nyāyavārttika ad 3.1.1, ed. p. 323, 17–20).* ‘If you think that there is indeed this cognition “I”, but that its object is not the Self, then, pray, show [its] object! If [it is argued that] the aggregates are the object, [then it will be answered as follows]. If you think that precisely the aggregates are the object of the sense of “I”—and as it is said, [they are] called the Self because they are the cause of the arising of the object-support of the sense of “I”—[it will be responded:] It is not possible. This is because [they] are denied and are not real.’

¹³⁵On different versions of the view of the perception of the Self according to the Mīmāṃsakas, see Watson 2020.

through the cognition ‘I’ (*ahampratīti*), such as in the form ‘I know’,¹³⁶ and that one erroneously identifies oneself with one’s own body, thinking ‘I am fat’. Moreover, in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, there is a statement to the effect that the Self is inferred from the use of the word ‘I’, namely, that the word ‘I’ refers to a specific object.¹³⁷

In the Pudgalavādapraśedha of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, Vasubandhu introduces an opponent, likely a Vaiśeṣika, who argues that the *ātman* is established as the locus of those qualities that are memory and so on (see, n. 20). Later, it is arguably the same opponent who asks about the aim of actions, if there is no Self.¹³⁸ Vasubandhu answers that the aim is feelings such as ‘I am happy’,¹³⁹ and that, when one says ‘I’, they mean the object of the notion of individuality, i.e., the sense of ‘I’ (*ahamkāra*). Moreover, he argues, the real object (*viśaya*) of the notion of individuality is the aggregates (*skandhas*), since people think of their selves as identical with them. They think ‘I am fair’, ‘I am dark’, etc., and these attributes cannot be regarded as belonging to the Self. Accordingly, the notion of individuality and the attributes related to the aggregates always have the same referent, and that notion has only them as its object. The passage reads:

ko ’sāv ahaṃ nāma | yadvīśayo ’yam ahamkāraḥ | kimvīśayo ’yam ahamkāraḥ | skandhaviśayah | katham jñāyate | teṣu snehād gaurādibuddhibhīḥ sāmānādhikaranyāc ca | gauro ’ham ahaṃ śyāmaḥ, sthūlo ’ham ahaṃ kṛśaḥ,

¹³⁶See *ahampratyayavijñēyah svayam ātmopapādyate* | | (*Ślokaṅkārttika* Ātmavāda 107cd); *ahaṃ vedmīty ahaṃbuddhīr jñātāram adhigacchati | tatra syād jñātrvijñānaṃ tadādhāro ’tha vā pumān* | | (*Ślokaṅkārttika* Ātmavāda 110). On this, see Ratié 2011, 55.

¹³⁷See *aham iti śabdavyatirekān nāgamikam* | (*Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 3.2.9). See the discussion of this passage with possible translations/interpretations in Eltschinger and Ratié 2013, 124–126. We follow Oetke’s understanding. See Oetke 1988, 321, 323–324. Cf. also Candrānanda on this: *aham iti śabdena kṣītyādibhīmātmadravyaviśayenaikādhikaranyād ahaṃ prānādimān ahaṃ sukhavān iti | tasmāt prānādiliṅgatvān nāgamikam* | (*Vaiśeṣikasūtravṛtti*, ed. p. 29, 22–23). ‘It is due to the coreferentiality [of the words “breath” or “pleasure”] with the word “I”, which has as [its] object that substance that is the Self which is different from [other substances,] such as earth, [that one utters sentences] such as “I breathe, etc., I am happy”. Therefore, due to the fact that breath and other [things] are [its] inferential mark, that [assertion that the Self exists] is not [based only] on scriptures.’ For other passages to the same effect, see Eltschinger and Ratié 2013, 125–126 n. 28.

¹³⁸See *ātmany asati kimarthaḥ karmārambhaḥ* | (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* Pudgalavādapraśedha, ed. p. 150, 1).

¹³⁹*ahaṃ sukhī syām ahaṃ dukkhī na syām ity evamarthaḥ* | (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* Pudgalavādapraśedha, ed. p. 150, 2).

Introduction

jīrno 'ham ahaṃ yuveti gaurādibuddhibhiḥ samānādhikaraṇo 'yam ahaṃkāro dṛśyate | na cātmana ete prakāraḥ iśyante | tasmād api skandheṣu ayam iti gamyate | (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* Puḍgalavādapraṭiṣedha, ed. p. 150, 3–11).

What is this 'I'? [That] which is the object of this sense of 'I'. What is the object of this sense of 'I'? [It] has the aggregates as its object. How does one know? Due to the attachment to those [(i.e., the aggregates)] and the co-referentiality with cognitions, such as 'fair'. This sense of 'I' is [commonly] observed as being co-referent with cognitions such as 'fair' [in the following way:] 'I am fair', 'I am dark', 'I am fat', 'I am thin', 'I am old', 'I am young'. And these are not admitted as aspects of the Self. For this reason too, this [sense of 'I'] is known with reference to the aggregates[, not the Self].

In the *Sāramañjarī*, in response to his opponent's objection, Samantabhadra makes a similar argument. The object of the cognition 'I' (*ahaṃpratyaya*) is the body and the other aggregates. People think 'I am fat', 'I move', etc. They conceive of 'I' as having attributes that cannot be attributed to the Self—in particular, the Self as it is conceived of by the opponents, namely, the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas (see § 8). This is because some of these properties, such as being fat or being dark, relate to the body, and the Self is admitted as distinct from the body (first point in § 8). Moreover, other qualities, like 'I move', relate to a moving substance, and the Self is admitted by the opponents as immaterial and all-pervading (fifth point in § 8).

In a passage that is found only in the Pāla recension, Samantabhadra continues by saying that one cannot even metaphorically speak of the Self while talking about the body. Here, he is responding to the implicit objection that one could speak figuratively of the Self, while in fact referring to the body. The latter point is also made by Vasubandhu's opponent, who is portrayed as countering that, in such cases like 'I am fair' etc., there is the metaphor of the Self (*ātmopacāra*) with regard to the body.¹⁴⁰ This metaphor is tenable because the body is the 'assistant' (*upakāraka*) of the Self. In a passage of the Naiyāyikavaiśeṣikaparikalpitātmaparīkṣā of the

¹⁴⁰See *ātmana upakārake 'pi śarīra ātmopacāro yathā ya evāyaṃ sa evāham, sa evāyaṃ me bhṛtya iti |* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* Puḍgalavādapraṭiṣedha, ed. p. 150, 12–13). A very similar quotation is attributed to Uddyotakara and the other [Naiyāyikas?] by Kamalaśīla; see *infra*.

Tattvasaṃgrahaḥaṅgikā, Kamalaśīla uses a very similar phrasing as Vasubandhu’s opponent while introducing the statement of antagonists whom he identifies as Uddyotakara and the other Naiyāyikas.¹⁴¹

As a matter of fact, in the *Nyāyavārtika*, Uddyotakara uses this relation of ‘assistance’ between the body and the Self to explain the co-referentiality of the notion/word ‘I’ and the body. This is due to the elision of the possessive suffix (-*mat*);¹⁴² one should more properly say something like ‘my body is fair’ or ‘I possess a fair body’ and so on. They can tenably say this, because the concept of ‘my’ and ‘I’ have the same referent, insofar as one identifies oneself with something that assists them, namely, an instrument they use. Accordingly, the idea that the body is the real object of the notion of individuality is erroneous. I can think that I am my hand, but truly I am not. One perceives only the Self through the *ahaṅkāra*.¹⁴³ As we will see, Samantabhadra’s response to this type of

¹⁴¹See *infra*, *Tattvasaṃgrahaḥaṅgikā ad Tattvasaṃgraha* 214.

¹⁴²See [...] *nanu bhavaty ahaṃ gauro ’haṃ kṛṣṇa itī | na bhavatīti brūmaḥ | katham | na hy etasya draṣṭur yad etan mama rūpaṃ gauram etad aham itī pratyayo bhavati | kevalam matublopaṃ kṛtvā, ahaṃ gaura itī ṣaṣṭhyartham nirdīśati | evam etan na tattvata itī | [...] uktaṃ cātra — rūpādīskandheṣu ahaṅkāro ’tasmims tad itīpratyaya itī | tad evam ahaṅkāravaiśayato’ād ātmā tāvat pratyakṣaḥ | (Nyāyavārtika ad 3.1.1, ed. p. 324, 1–3, 8–10). ‘[...] [Objection:] There is [indeed] [the notion] “I am fair”, “I am dark”. We reply: “There is not [such a notion].” How so? [This is] because, for the [Self, who is the] seer, the notion “This physical form of mine that is fair is me” does not exist. Simply, having elided the possessive suffix -*mat*, [the notion] “I am fair” indicates the meaning of a genitive. This [must be intended] like that, not as ultimately true. [...] And it is said in this respect— “The sense of ‘I’ regarding the aggregates, starting with material forms, is the notion of something regarding what is not that thing [namely, a mistake].” Therefore, since it is the object of the sense of ‘I’ in this way, the Self is indeed directly perceived.’ On this, see Ratié 2011, 54 n. 46.*

¹⁴³See *atha manyase matubloḥād ayam ṣaṣṭhyarthavyapadeśo na tattvata itī, atra ko hetur itī | mamaḥpratyayasamānādhikarāṇasya nirdēśāt | yasmim arthe mamaḥpratyayo ’sya bhavati, tatvavāyam ahaṅkāro ’pīti | mamaḥpratyayasamānādhikarāṇyād gamyate matubloḥa itī | mamaḥpratyayasamānādhikarāṇaś cāyam ahaṅkāro ’nyatve dṛṣṭa upakāraakatvāt | upakārake vastuni mamaḥpratyayasamānādhikarāṇo ’haṃpratyayo dṛṣṭo yo ’yaṃ so ’ham itī | (Nyāyavārtika ad 3.1.1, ed. p. 324, 3–8). ‘[Objection:] If you think that, due to the elision of the possessive suffix -*mat*, this is an indication of the meaning of a genitive, [but it is] not ultimately true, in this respect, what is the cause? [Answer:] Due to the indication of the same referent as the notion “my”; this sense of “I” also occurs precisely with reference to that referent (*artha*), regarding which the notion “my” occurs for him. The elision of the possessive suffix -*mat* is understood based on the co-referentiality of the notion “my” [and the notion “I”]. And this sense of “I” that has the same referent as the notion “my” is observed when there is [something] else[, such as my body], because it is the assistant [of that Self]. With regard to some thing that is an assistant, the notion “I” is observed as having the same referent as the notion “my” [as in the following statement:] “That [assistant] is me.”’*

objection is the same as Kamalaśīla's and is different from that of Vasubandhu.¹⁴⁴

The dispute between Buddhists and Naiyāyikas (as well as Vaiśeṣikas) is evidently the background of Samantabhadra's treatment of the debate. In particular, he is defending the Buddhist view against Uddyotakara. Furthermore, the passage in Samantabhadra follows exactly the same succession of topics as found in the above-mentioned passage of the Naiyāyikavaiśeṣikaparikalpitātmaparīkṣā of the *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā* as well as in the *Tattvasaṃgraha*. It seems very likely that he had this in mind while summarizing the arguments against the perceptibility of the Self. In that part, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla are responding precisely to Uddyotakara's *Nyāyavārttika ad 3.1.1* (which Kamalaśīla quotes almost verbatim):¹⁴⁵

tad ayuktam ahaṃkāre tadrūpānavabhāsanāt |
na hi nityavibhuvādinirbhāsas tatra lakṣyate ||
gauravarṇādīnirbhāso vyaktaṃ tatra tu vidyate |
tatsvabhāvo na cātmeṣṭo nāyaṃ tadviśayas tataḥ ||
(Tattvasaṃgraha 213–214)

tad ayuktam ityādīnā pratividhatte | asiddham ahaṃkārasyātmaviśaya-
 tvam tadākāraśūnyatvāt | prayogaḥ — yad yadākāraśūnyam na tat tadvi-
 śayam | yathā cakṣurjñānam na śabdaviśayam | ātmākāraśūnyam cāham

¹⁴⁴See *bhavaty upakārake 'py ātmopacāro na tv ahaṃkārah | sati śarīralambanatve paraśarīrā-
 lambano 'pi kasmān na bhavati | asaṃbandhāt | yenaiva hi sahāsyā saṃbandhaḥ kāyena cittena vā
 tatraivāyam ahaṃkāra utpadyate nānyatra | anādau saṃsāra evam abhyāsāt | kaś ca saṃbandhaḥ | kā-
 rya-kāraṇabhāvaḥ | (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya Puṅgalavādapraṭiśedha, ed. p. 152, 1–6)*. 'There
 exists the metaphor of the Self also regarding the assistant, but not the sense of "I". If
 [the sense of "I"] has the body as [its] object-support, why does not it have also someone
 else's body as [its] object-support? [The answer will be:] Because there is no relationship
 [between the sense of "I" and someone else's body]. For this sense of "I" arises precisely
 with regard to that body or mind with which it has a relationship, due to habituation
 in this way in the beginningless *saṃsāra*. And what is this relationship? The relationship
 between cause and effect.'

¹⁴⁵See *te hy evam āhuḥ — pratyakṣata evātmā siddhaḥ | tathā hi — līngalīngisaṃbandhasmṛtyan-
 apekṣam aham iti jñānam rūpādījñānavat pratyakṣam | asya ca na rūpādīr viśayaḥ, tadvijñānabhīnna-
 pratibhāsavāt [Jp] °pratibhāsavāt ed.) | tasmād anya eva viśaya iti | (Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā ad
 Tattvasaṃgraha 212, ed. p. 115, 17–20)*. 'For they say as follows: "The Self is established in-
 deed through direct perception. To explain: The cognition 'I' that is independent from
 the memory of a relationship between logical reason (*līnga*) and *probandum* (*līngin*) [(i.e.,
 inference)] is directly perceived like the cognition of visual forms, etc. However, this
 [cognition] does not have visual forms, etc., as [its] object, since it has a distinct image
 from those [sense] cognitions. Therefore, [its] object is indeed [something] different.'"

Introduction

iti jñānam iti vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ | na cāyam asiddho hetur iti darśayati — na hītyādi | tathā hi — nityavibhutvacetanatvādiguṇopeta ātmesyate | na cātrāhampratyaye nityatvādipratibhāso lakṣyate | kiṃ tu gaurō 'ham mandalocanaḥ parikṣās tīrvavedanābhinna ityādidehāvasthāsamsparśenotpatter gauravarnādilakṣaṇaḥ pratibhāsaḥ pratīyate | tasmād dehadvyavasthāsamsparśenotpadyamāno 'hamkāro dehādylāmbana eveti jñāyate | vyaktam iti spaṣṭam askhaladvṛttivāt | tatas ca yad uktam Uddyotakara-prabhṛtibhiḥ — upabhogāyatane śarīre 'yam ātmopacāraḥ, yathānukūle bhṛtye rājā brūte — ya evāham sa evāyam me bhṛtya iti tad apāstaṃ bhavati | tathā [Jp 49v1; yathā ed.] hi — yady ayaṃ gaunaḥ syāt tadā skhaladvṛttir bhavet | na hi loke siṃhamāṇavakayor mukhyāropitayor dvayor api siṃha ity askhalitā buddhir bhavati | madṛyāḥ śarīrādaya iti vyatirekadarśanāt skhaladvṛttir ahamkāraḥ śarīrādiṣv iti cet | na | ātmany api skhaladvṛttivaprasaṅgāt | tatrāpi hi madṛya ātmeti vyatireko dṛśyate | kalpito 'tra bheda iti cet | ūratrāpi samānam astu | tarhi gaurō 'ham ityādipratyayo mukhyas tathāpi kasmād ātmāsya viśayo na bhavatīty āha — tatsvabhāva iti gaurādisvabhāvaḥ, tasya rūpādiguṇāsambhavāt | (Tattvasaṃgrahaṇīkā ad Tattvasaṃgraha 213–214, ed. pp. 115, 21–116, 20).

This [view] is illogical, since the nature of the [Self] does not appear in the sense of 'I'. This is because the appearance of permanence, all-pervasiveness, etc., is not cognized in it.

Nevertheless, in this [sense of 'I,'] the image of a fair colour, and other [physical attributes] is found vividly. However, the Self is not admitted as having that nature[, namely, a material one], therefore, that [sense of 'I'] does not have the [Self] as its object.

With [the words] starting with 'This is illogical', [Śāntarakṣita] is responding [to Uddyotakara's possible objection]. The sense of 'I' is not established as having the Self as its object, since it is devoid of the image of the [Self]. The proof statement is [as follows]: A [cognition] does not have as [its] object anything whose image it is devoid of. [This is] like a visual cognition [that] does not have a sound as [its] object. And the cognition 'I' is devoid of the image of the Self. Thus, there is the non-cognition of the pervader. [With] 'This is because', moreover, he shows that the logical reason is not unestablished. To explain: The Self is admitted as being endowed with qualities such as permanence, all-pervasiveness, and consciousness. However, the appearance of permanence, etc., is 'not cognized' in this cognition 'I'. On the contrary (*kiṃ tu*), [what is] cognized is the appearance characterized by 'a fair colour, and other [physical/psychological attributes]', [which is] due to [its] arising in connection with the perception of conditions of the

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body, such as ‘I am fair’, ‘[I] have weak eyes’, ‘[I am] very thin’, ‘[I am] shattered by violent sensations’. Therefore, the sense of ‘I’ that has arisen due to the perception of bodily states, etc., is known as having only the body, etc., as [its] object-support. [It is known] ‘vividly’, i.e., evidently, since there is no erroneous occurrence. And therefore what is said by Uddyotakara and the other [Naiyāyikas] is discarded. [They say:] [‘There is] this metaphor of the Self (*ātmapacāra*) with regard to the body[, which is] the abode of the [activity of] experiencing. [This is] like [when], with regard to a faithful servant, the king says: I am indeed this servant of mine [=precisely what I am is this servant of mine].¹⁴⁶ To explain: If this [cognition ‘I’ that is expressed with the pronoun ‘I’] were secondary [(i.e., metaphorical)] (*gauna*),¹⁴⁷ then there would be a stumbling functioning [of the pronoun ‘I’]. This is because it is not commonly the case that a non-stumbling cognition refers to both of the two, a lion and a young Brahmin [zealous in study and debate], being[, respectively,] the direct [referent] and the indirect [one] (*āropita*). [Objection:] If [it is argued that,] based on the observation of a distinction [in cognitions/statements such as] ‘my body’, etc., the sense of ‘I’ has a stumbling employment regarding the body, etc., [it will be answered:] No. This is because there is the undesired consequence of the stumbling employment also regarding the Self, since also in this case, [namely,] [when thinking/saying] ‘my Self’, a distinction is commonly observed. [Objection:] If [it is argued that] the difference between those is [just] conceptually constructed (*kalpita*), [it will be responded that] then let the same [hold true] also in the other case. Then, [the opponents say: We concede that] cognitions such as ‘I am fair’ are [employed] primar[il]y; nevertheless, why [can] the Self not be their object? Therefore, [Śāntaraṣita] says: ‘[However, the Self is not admitted] as having that nature’, i.e., the nature of ‘fair’, and so on, due to the impossibility of its having qualities such as material forms.

Here, Kamalaśīla is evidently adaptively reusing Vasubandhu’s argument that the only object of the cognition ‘I’ is indeed the aggregates, contra Uddyotakara. In other words, he aims to defend the former from the attacks of the latter. So does Samantabhadra. However, there is an element of novelty in Kamalaśīla’s argumentative strategy against the

¹⁴⁶See *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* Puḍgalavādapraṭiṣedha in n. 140.

¹⁴⁷To indicate the indirect use of a word, Kamalaśīla also employs the term *bhākta*. In this case, however, he uses *gauna*, perhaps in reference to Dharmakīrti’s terminology.

Naiyāyika(s). He uses a specific argument that is based on the lack of stumbling employment (*skhaladvṛtti*) in the case of the word ‘I’. Based on this, both Kamalaśīla and Samantabhadra reject the idea that the word ‘I’ can be used metaphorically while, in fact, talking about the Self. This is because a figurative use always involves a stumbling employment of the word, and this is not observed in the case of ‘I’. The analogous concept of *skhaladgati* is found in Dharmakīrti’s *Pramāṇavārttika* Pratyakṣa° 37.¹⁴⁸ A word is used primarily with reference to an object according to an established convention, and used secondarily with reference to an object that is similar. However, in this case, the word has a stumbling use. This means that that word conveys its meaning only partially, namely, it makes one apprehend its referent only to a certain extent. Kamalaśīla (and, accordingly, Samantabhadra) uses the topos of the young Brahmin and the lion. In this case, there are clearly two objects, and it is never the case that one primarily uses the word ‘lion’ to indicate both of them. The word ‘I’, however, does not satisfy that requirement. We do not have two objects, the Self and the aggregates, which are different and similar at the same time, by which we would have the Self as the primary referent of the word ‘I’ and the aggregates as the figurative referent. When talking about ‘I’, the only referent is the aggregates. There is no metaphorical use of the word ‘I’ and, accordingly, its primary use as meaning ‘Self’ would also cease, since we would be always talking about the body.

While Samantabhadra summarizes this argument in a few lines, Kamalaśīla elaborates on it in greater detail. In the *Pañjikā*, in order to justify the use of ‘I’ with reference to two different objects, the Self (directly) and the body (metaphorically), Kamalaśīla introduces an opponent. He brings forward the concept of one’s own body, etc. (*madīyāḥ śarīrādāya itī*) to point out an instance in which there are indeed two different referents of two different words. In the latter case, when one says ‘I’ (according to the form of the possessive adjective *madīya*), they primarily intend the Self, attributing it figuratively to the body. In the *Sāramañjarī*, albeit within a different type of argument, an opponent (most likely Uddyotakara) points to the employment of the concept of ‘mine’ (*mamaḥpratyaya*) as evidence that the Self is indeed perceived as different from the body.

¹⁴⁸See *yatra rūḍhyāsadartho ’pi janaiḥ śabdo nivesītaḥ | sa mukhyas tatra tatsāmyād gauṇo ’nyatra skhaladgatiḥ ||* (*Pramāṇavārttika* Pratyakṣa° 37).

Against that objection, Kamalaśīla had countered that if, given the instance of the cognition ‘my Self’, there is in fact a figurative use of ‘I’ also regarding the Self, then the primary meaning of I as ‘Self’ would vanish as well. If one says that the distinction in the case of ‘my Self’ is only conceptually constructed, then that must also be true for ‘my body’. Therefore, one cannot but go back to stating that there is no figurative use of the word ‘I’.

2.8.2 *Anupalabdhi as a Refuting Proof for the Existence of the Self?*

As mentioned above, a few elements of this argument of Kamalaśīla’s are used in Samantabhadra’s proof denying the Self. The latter is aimed at refuting the existence of a Self with an insentient nature. The refutation, which is based on non-cognition (*anupalabdhi*) as a negative proof, is not found *per se* in Kamalaśīla’s *Pañjikā*.

In the *Sāramañjarī*, the part that is devoted to the *anupalabdhi*-based proof regarding the unreality of a non-sentient Self is not found in the Tibetan translation; it appears, instead, in the Pāla recension. The Tibetan ends with the mere statement that *anupalabdhi* disproves the existence of a non-sentient Self. However, in the Sanskrit text, we find a long elaboration on the topic, which, surprisingly, has a word-for-word parallel in the later **Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhāṣya* of Jitāri.

As seen above, in *Nyāyavārttika ad 3.1.1.*, Uddyotakara introduces an opponent whose argument to prove the inexistence of the Self is as follows: ‘There is no Self, since it is not apprehended’ (*nāsty ātmānupalabdher iti cet*). Uddyotakara counters this by demonstrating that the logical reason is unestablished, because the Self is indeed perceived through the cognition ‘I’. Most likely following up on this, Samantabhadra tries to validate the logical reason *anupalabdeḥ*. He immediately makes clear his Dharmakīrtian interpretation of it¹⁴⁹ in the sense of the non-cognition of

¹⁴⁹See *pradeśaviśeṣe kvacin na ghaṭa upalabdhilakṣaṇapṛāptasyānupalabdheḥ | yadi syād upalabhyasatva eva syān nānyathā | (Pramāṇavārttikavāyrtti ad Pramāṇavārttika Svārthānumāna° 1, ed. p. 2, 16–18)*. ‘In some specific place, there is no pot, because there is no perception of something[, such as a pot,] that fulfils the conditions of perceptibility. If [the pot] were there, its being there would indeed be perceived, [but] not otherwise.’ On this passage, see Kellner 2003, 123–124.

something that meets the condition of perceptibility (*upalabdihilakṣaṇaprāpta*)¹⁵⁰ in some place.¹⁵¹ Provided that there are no obstacles to perception, i.e., provided that all its conditions are fulfilled, if one thing exists in one place, it must be perceived. If it is not, it must be treated as non-existent. If the Self existed there, it would have to be apprehended by the same perceptions that have the aggregates as their object, but it is not apprehended. In other words, Samantabhadra is trying to prove that, if intended according to the Dharmakīrtian view of non-cognition, *anupalabdheḥ* is indeed a logical reason that justifies the treatment of the Self as inexistent. As noted by Kellner and Taber (2014, 729–732), Dharmakīrti himself would never consider an argument from ignorance as proof of the non-existence of the Self in all cases and without any doubt.¹⁵²

Following this, drawing particularly on Dharmakīrti's view as presented in the *Hetubindu*, Samantabhadra specifies that, with *anupalabdhi*, he intends the perception of something different that is conjunct in one cognition with one thing (*ekajñānasamsargin*).¹⁵³ It is only in this sense that one must understand that the Self is disproven through the perception of the aggregates.

In the *Hetubindu*, Dharmakīrti says:

¹⁵⁰For the concept of *upalabdihilakṣaṇaprāpti*, see *upalabdihilakṣaṇaprāptir upalambhapratyayāntarasākalyam svabhāvaviśeṣas ca | yaḥ svabhāvaḥ satsv anyeṣu upalambhapratyayeṣu san pratyakṣa eva bhavati sa svabhāvaviśeṣaḥ | (Nyāyabindu 2.13–14)*. ‘The [fact of] meeting the condition of perceptibility is the completeness of the other causal factors for perception and [the presence of] a specific nature. A specific nature is a nature that, if the other causal factors for perception exist, when it exists, is verily perceived.’ For other related passages in Dharmakīrti's works, see Kellner 1999, 197 n. 11.

¹⁵¹On the topic of *anupalabdhi*, see, among others, Kellner 1999 and Kellner 2003.

¹⁵²With reference to Dharmakīrti's view, Kellner and Taber (2014, 730) argue that ‘understood specifically as the non-occurrence of perception, *anupalabdhi* can only prove that things that are not perceived in a situation where their perception, if they existed, would be inevitable, can be cognitively, linguistically and physically treated as non-existent. But the non-apprehension of things without any further qualification is not evidence for their absence; non-apprehension in this sense only yields the absence of its treatment as existent, because to treat something as existent presupposes its apprehension.’ On the subject of the relation between Dharmakīrti's logical theories and his treatment of external objects as absolutely imperceptible, see Kellner 2017, particularly 116–118.

¹⁵³In the *Hetubindu* (see passage quoted below), Dharmakīrti introduces *anupalabdhi* in terms of ‘apprehension of another [thing]’ (*anyopalabdhi*) that is ‘conjunct in one cognition’ (*ekajñānasamsargin*) with something else. However, he had already discussed the topic of *anupalabdhi* as *anyopalabdhi* in earlier works.

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*yatra yasminn upalabhyamāne niyamena yadupalabdhir bhavati yogyatāyā
aviśeṣāt, sa tatsaṃsṛṣṭaḥ, ekajñānasamsargāt | tayoh sator naikarūpaniyatā
pratipattiḥ, asaṃbhavāt | tasmād aviśiṣṭayogyatārūpayor ekajñānasamsargi-
noḥ parasparāpekṣam evānyatvam iheṣṭam | sa kevalas tadapekṣayā tasmād
anyaḥ |* (*Hetubindu*, ed. p. 26, 8–12).

If there is necessarily the perception of one thing, when something else (*yasmin*) is perceived, since [they are] not different in terms of being apt [to be perceived], [then] that one thing (*sa*) is mixed with the other (*tat*^o), because they are conjunct in one cognition. [If] they both exist[, then their] cognition is not restricted to one [of the two] nature[s only], since that would be impossible. Therefore, the other-ness of two natures that have a non-different aptness [to be perceived] [and] are conjunct in one cognition is intended in this case [(i.e., in the case of *anupalabdhī* as *anyopalabdhī*)] as one depending on the other. One, being alone, is other than the other, in dependence on it.

As an expedient to spell out his argument based on *anupalabdhī* (as well as go into further detail regarding his view on the latter), Samantabhadra conjures two objections to his own position. One is a reference to that brought forward by Uddyotakara in the *Nyāyavārttika*; the other is more general in nature.

The passage from the *Nyāyavārttika*¹⁵⁴ is also quoted as an objection in the *Tattvasaṃgrahaḥ*. However, Kamalaśīla responds with a different type of argument.¹⁵⁵ To Uddyotakara, who maintains that Naiyāyikas do not admit the Self as being contained in the body, Samantabhadra rebuts that non-cognition is not a proof against the body as a locus of the Self that is admitted as contained in it. It establishes, instead, that the

¹⁵⁴See *Nyāyavārttika ad 3.1.1*, ed. p. 320, 8–9 (and p. 325, 23).

¹⁵⁵See *atha śarīra ātmā pratiśidhyate, siddham sādhyasi | kasya vā śarīra ātmā vidyate [...] yac coktam — kasya vā śarīra ātmā vidyate iti tad apy asamyak | tathā hi — yeṣāṃ darśanam aṅguṣṭhaparvārdhaśyāmākādīphalāpramāṇa ātmeti teṣāṃ matenātmano mūrttatvāc charīrasthīr asty eveti tān prati pratiśedho yujyate eva |* (*Tattvasaṃgrahaḥ* *ad Tattvasaṃgraha* 220, ed. p. 118, 14–15 [...] 120, 6–8). ‘If the Self [as being contained] in the body is denied, you prove what is already proven. Who admits that the Self is found in the body? [...] And that which is said: “Or, who admits that the Self is found in the body?” is also not correct. In other words, according to the thought of those who think that the Self is the size of half of a thumb or a [small] fruit, such as an awned grain, the Self resides indeed in the body, because it is corporeal. Therefore, against those, the refutation [of the Self as residing in the body] is indeed logical.’

Self is not apprehended when the body is apprehended. Since the two are conjunct in one cognition, then the Self must be treated as non-existent.

Immediately thereafter, the author introduces a second, more general objection that analyzes a few ways in which this *anupalabdhi* could be intended, as well as their logical defects. These statements echo other, earlier types of refutation of the validity of *anupalabdhi* as proof. Samantabhadra once again takes the opportunity to justify his use of an *anupalabdhi*-based argument in this case, as well as to specify the exact meaning of this non-cognition. The opponent himself upholds that the cognition ‘I’ has the Self as its object. However, that cognition is only experienced as having the aggregates as its support. Hence, the opponent cannot but admit that the two must be viewed as conjunct in one cognition and, while one is perceived, the other is not. Therefore, this non-cognition is not the absence of a cognition, and is not a cognition having something else as its object. It is the cognition of something conjunct in one cognition with the Self. As he says: The non-cognition of the Self is nothing but the cognition of the body.

Accordingly, a shift in the interpretation of the argument based on *anupalabdhi* seems to occur in the passage, a shift that is linked to the presence of the long passage in the Pāla recension. At the beginning, Samantabhadra presents such an argument from ignorance as proof of the inexistence of the Self, *tout court*. As noted by Kellner and Taber,¹⁵⁶ Vasubandhu (and Uddyotakara, most likely in critical engagement with him)¹⁵⁷ also appears to see the ‘*anupalabdhi* argument’¹⁵⁸ as proving the very inexistence of the Self. Immediately following, however, in the Pāla recension only, Samantabhadra shows his indebtedness to Dharmakīrti and sets a different goal for his proof. He goes on to argue that one should regard this argument from ignorance as establishing merely the fact that the Self must be treated as non-existent. Here, he might be implying that the sheer non-existence of the Self is not at stake—at least not with regard to the *anupalabdhi* argument. In fact, Samantabhadra clarifies that (against his opponents’ claim) the aim of his proof is just to establish that there is no other object for ‘I’ than the aggregates.

¹⁵⁶See Kellner and Taber 2014, 719–727, and 734 with notes.

¹⁵⁷This is also Taber’s understanding of it; see Taber 2012, 107–109.

¹⁵⁸This is what Taber (2012, 107) calls the original Buddhist argument based on *anupalabdhi* that Uddyotakara counters in *Nyāyavārttika ad* 3.1.1.

One opponent, such as a general Naiyāyika who loosely refers to Uddyotakara's words in the *Nyāyavārttika*, may suggest that the concept/statement 'my body' proves that there is indeed another referent of 'I' that is different from the body. However, Samantabhadra argues, this difference is only conceptually constructed and not real. It is exactly like the difference imagined when one speaks of the body of a statue—this being a classic example of two things that are clearly just one and the same thing. There is no direct perception of the referent of 'my', just as there is no direct perception of the two things: the statue and the body. If there were such a perception, then one should also accept the absurd (and never commonly experienced) difference between the body and the statue. Not only that, but, proceeding by the same logic, one would also have to admit two selves, one possessing the other, since there is indeed the concept/statement 'my Self'. As we have seen, these last arguments somehow echo Kamalaśīla's treatment of the subject in the Naiyāyika-vaiśeṣikaparikalpitātmaparīkṣā (see passage quoted in § 8.1).

In spite of the presence of other arguments against the Self (also by Uddyotakara himself), Samantabhadra is particularly concerned with refuting the idea that the Self can be perceived. It is possible that in Uddyotakara's time, the *anupalabdhi* argument brought forward by Vasubandhu was one of the main arguments against the very existence of the Self. Vasubandhu uses it to prove its inexistence. Samantabhadra appears to be interested in establishing that, when understood properly, the *anupalabdhi* argument is in fact proof that the Self is not being perceived when one has the cognition 'I'. In other words, he is interested in refuting Uddyotakara's refutation of Vasubandhu. However, whether or not he intends it as a final proof of the absolute inexistence of the Self is left unclear. Although he starts by saying that this is precisely the goal of the argument, the following references to the Dharmakīrtian view on *anupalabdhi* seem to suggest that he reappraises his scope: He was merely intending to demonstrate that we do not apprehend a Self when we cognize 'I'.

It is to be noted that, while discussing the innate view of the Self, Samantabhadra hints at the fact that it can be refuted according to the same arguments as before. This emphasizes the need of (first) discarding that view through conceptual means. As seen for example in the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* (see n. 116), the Mahāyānists generally believe that the only way

to eliminate the innate sense of the Self is through the path of mental cultivation.

2.9 Conclusion: The Two Recensions and the Non-Esoteric Mahāyāna

Samantabhadra concludes the ‘philosophical portion’ by emphasizing, once again, that it was meant to logically justify the specific type of visualization that is the object of that part. This practice is tenable because, conventionally, all external things are unreal, whereas the mind, which is devoid of the duality of an apprehended object and an apprehending subject, is real. As far as reasoning and argumentation are concerned, the doctrine of mind-only can be veritably established. However, from a meditative and superior point of view, due to repeated practice on ultimate reality (*paramāṛthābhyāsa*),¹⁵⁹ ‘conceptualization must be purified from concepts’. This is indeed the supreme realization of selflessness.

In sum, what begins as a rational justification of a meditative practice (at a conventional level) turns into the much more ambitious depiction of a strategy aimed at purifying concepts and abandoning misconceptions related to real natures, with the final goal of eliminating concepts altogether (namely, attaining *nirvikalpañāna*).

In this introduction we have outlined Samantabhadra’s philosophical heritage. That he is indebted to Śāntaraṣita and Kamalaśīla and their more or less original elaboration of the doctrines and argumentations of the Vasubandhu-Dignāga-Dharmakīrtian tradition is abundantly clear. In order to understand how original a thinker Samantabhadra was, particularly with reference to Jñānapāda, one should investigate the entire *Sāramañjarī* more comprehensively, as well as the works of Jñānapāda. This remains a desideratum.

At the same time, the impressive length and number of literal borrowings from this philosophical portion by Jitāri (and Mokṣākaragupta) testify to the importance of Samantabhadra’s legacy for the later proponents of the *pramāṇa* tradition. Accordingly, to a certain extent his elaboration of arguments must have been received as original.

¹⁵⁹With reference to the concept of *tattvābhyāsa*, which she translates as ‘familiarization with reality’, and is found as a reference to the composition of the *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā*, see McClintock 2019, 407 and 407 n. 5.

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Our overall impression when comparing the different recensions of the *Sāramañjarī* is that—contrary to what one might have reasonably expected—the aim of expanding the work was not to explain the tantric topics treated therein, but rather to add more and more material from non-Vajrayāna ‘classics’. The intent appears to be that of supporting, or perhaps even legitimizing, a tantric practice and text within non-esoteric ‘Mahāyāna’, as connected to the monastic establishment. The reason for this was doubtless the concern, already clearly visible in *Jñānapāda*, although not in such profuse detail, to show how the esoteric and non-esoteric parts of Buddhist revelation fit together, complement each other, and mutually reinforce one another. While from a practical viewpoint, the tantric path with its visualization and ritual methods was clearly the superior one, it had to be thoroughly grounded and in harmony with what these authors saw as earlier levels of revelation.

II
Texts

Critical Edition of the Sanskrit

We organize the text into numbered paragraphs. The first number shows the verse the comment goes with, the second, sub-units within the discussion. The number 0 means the passage is an *avataraṇikā*. The most important thing this achieves is to mark how the present “Pāla recension” differs from the “Tibetan recension”.

Since at present we do not have access to the Sanskrit of the *mūla*, we reconstructed the verses in bold type and marked each such *pāda* with an asterisk (the only exception is 115cd for which we have external testimony). The reconstruction is of course tentative. We were helped greatly by Smṛtijñānakīrti’s translation, but we also diverge from it if the logic of the metre, or some other constraint, dictates it.

Words we consider to be *lemmata* are also marked in bold. If the *lemma* referred to is not in the verse under discussion, we give the locus in parentheses immediately after it.

Quotations are typeset in italics. If we can trace the quotation, it is given in a separate register using Roman numerals.

Only major editorial interventions are noted. We use the following abbreviations: *em.* means an emendation, *conj.* means a conjecture, *diag. conj.* means a diagnostic conjecture. If the intervention was not ours, we give the name of the person who first suggested the reading, in parentheses. Occasionally we give the manuscripts’s (Ms) *post correctionem* and *ante correctionem* readings thus: Ms^{*p.c.*} and Ms^{*a.c.*}. Very minor corrections, *post correctionem* and *ante correctionem* readings, punctuation marks and the such are not noted.

If the Tibetan translation (marked here as Tib.) was helpful in establishing the intervention, we give that reading in the note preceded by *cf.*;

if the intervention goes against the Tibetan, we give the reading preceded by *contra*. We italicize the relevant portion. Sometimes the Tibetan is not available because of the differences in recensions (marked here with No Tib.), sometimes it is missing due to a fault in transmission, and sometimes it is simply inconclusive.

We adopt a Western-style punctuation, which is almost entirely ours, although it sometimes overlaps with the *daṇḍas* of the scribe. In case of doubt the reader may consult the formatted diplomatic transcript given in the following chapter.

We only mark folio changes; the line changes as well as string-spaces are indicated in the diplomatic transcript.

3.0 *The Meditative Context*

109.0 adhunā **parita** ityādy **āpūrayan viśvam** ityantena (see 129d) binduyogam āha.

***parito nirastavibhramam**
***anantahr̥draśminirmitamunīndraiḥ |**
***saṃbuddhīkṛtam akhilam**
***jagad antarbhāvya nijamantre || 109**

109.1 **anantā** ye jñānasattva**hr̥draśminirmitamunīndrās** taiḥ **saṃbuddhīkṛtam** ata eva **parito nira**^[25v]**stavibhramam jagad akhilam nijamantre** jñānasattva**hr̥nman**tre 'ntar**bhāvya rūpādyā-kṛtimuktam** (see 110a) ityādyartham **ākalayya** (see 127a) **sanmantrabindurūpam** (see 127c) **svamanaḥ paribhāvayed** iti (see 127d) saṃbandhaḥ.

[The Vijñānavāda (Provisional) Standpoint]

3.1 *Pūrvapakṣa*

110.0 nanu bāhyārthasadbhāve katham jñānasattva**hr̥dayavartikaravālasthitabījatanau** saṃbuddhīkṛtanikhilajagadantarbhāvanam tadbindau ca viśvasvabhāvamaṇḍalacakravibhāvanam upapattim anubhavatī?

3.2 Absence of Positive Proof (*sādhakapramāṇa*)

iti manyamāno 'rthasattāsādhakapramāṇābhāvam eva tāvat kathayati
— rūpādyākṛtīyādi.

*rūpādyākṛtimuktam
*pratyakṣeṅkṣyate na tadgrāhi |
*grāhyam na cāpi kiṃcit
*saṃbandhānīkṣaṇān na cānyena || 110

110.1 rūpādyākṛtimuktam¹ iti rūpādyākāra²rahitam **tadgrāhī**ti
tasya rūpāder grāhakaṃ **na pratyakṣeṅkṣyate. grāhyam na cāpi**
kiṃcit pratyakṣeṅkṣyate.

3.2.1 Statement of Self-Awareness (*svasaṃvedana*) of Cognitions

kiṃ tu rūpādyākāram eva svasaṃvidrūpam avikalpakam abhrāntaṃ
pratyakṣaṃ prakāśate. grāhyādirūpaṃ tu vikalpaśilpikalpitam eveti bhā-
vaḥ. yad uktam —

nānyo 'nubhāvyo buddhyāsti tasyā nānubhavo 'paraḥ |
grāhyagrāhakavaidhuryāt svayaṃ saiva prakāśate ||ⁱ

tathā —

avibhāgo 'pi buddhyātmā³ viparyāsitarāsanaiḥ |
grāhyagrāhakasaṃvittibhedavān iva lakṣyate ||ⁱⁱ

iti.

¹°muktam] *em.*, °nirmuktam Ms (unmetrical); *contra* Tib. *nges grol ba*.

²°ākāra°] *em.*, °ākāre Ms; *cf.* Tib. *gzugs la sogs pa'i rnam pa dang bral ba'o*.

³°ātmā] *em.*, °ātma° Ms; *cf.* Tib. *blo bdag rnam par dbyer med kyang*.

ⁱ*Pramāṇaviniścaya* 1.38.

ⁱⁱ*Pramāṇavārttika* Pratyakṣa° 353.

3.2.2 Refutation of the Aspect of the 'Apprehender' (grāhaka)

3.2.2.1 The Apprehender Intended as a Property-Bearer (Against Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika)

nanv⁴ arthajñānaṃ saṃvedanaṃ dharmah. tat kathaṃ saṃvedakam antareṇa bhavet? dharmā hi dharmitantrā dṛśyante, yathā pākādayaḥ. tasmād avāśyam asyāḥ saṃvedanakriyāyāḥ kartrā saṃvedakenāśrayabhūtena dharminā bhāvyaṃ. sa eva ca grāhaka ucyate. tasya rūpādiviṣaya tvād grāhyam api siddham. tato 'numānād⁵ arthāpatter⁶ vā grāhya⁷ grāhaka siddhir iti, kathaṃ tanniṣedhaḥ?

iti śaṅkayā āha — **saṃbandhānīkṣaṇān na cānyeneti. rūpādyā-kṛtimuktaṃ** grāhakaṃ **grāhyam cekṣyata** iti saṃbandhaḥ.

ayam abhiprāyaḥ. anumānenārthāpattiyā paropakalpitapramāṇāntareṇa vā parokṣārthasya na svato 'dhigatiḥ, pratyakṣatāpatteḥ. parato 'pi na, asaṃbandhāt⁸, sarvataḥ sarva⁹ pratipattiprasaṅgāt. saṃbandho 'pi tādātmyatadutpattibhyāṃ nānyo 'vyabhicārī saṃbhavati. tatra —

- (i) tādātmyapratibandhābhyupagame dharmadharminor ekatvam eva vāstavam iti rūpādyākārasaṃvedanam eva kevalam asti. grāhakaḍibhedas tu pratipattradhyavasāyavaśena vyāvṛttinimittatvāt kalpita eveti saṃpratipattir eva.
- (ii) tadutpattipratibandhābhyupagame tu tan¹⁰ niścāyakayoḥ pratyakṣānupalambhayor asaṃbhavaḥ. na hi parokṣe grāhake dharmini tau bhavitum arhataḥ. tatas tadutpattir apy asaṃbhāvinī.

nāpi rūpādivijñānānupapattiyā¹¹ cakṣurādivad¹² grāhako 'numeyaḥ, pūrvapūrvakāraṇakalāpamātrād rūpādyākārajñānasyotpatteḥ. tathāpi ni-

⁴ nanv] *em.*, tanv Ms; *cf.* Tib. *gal te ... ma yin nam.*

⁵ numānād] *em.*, 'nupānād Ms; *cf.* Tib. *rjes su dpag pa'am don gyi go bas.*

⁶ arthāpatter] *em.*, arśāpatter Ms; *cf.* Tib. *rjes su dpag pa'am don gyi go bas.*

⁷ vā grāhya] *em.*, bāhya Ms; *cf.* Tib. *'am ... gzung ba dang 'dzin pa grub pa yin pas.*

⁸ asaṃbandhāt] *em.*, asaṃbaddhāt Ms; *contra* Tib. *'brel pa gzhan las kyang.*

⁹ sarva] *em.* (Isaacson), sarvaṃ Ms; *cf.* Tib. *thams cad rtogs par thal ba'i phyir.*

¹⁰ tan] *em.*, taṃ Ms; *contra* or no reflection in Tib.

¹¹ ānupapattiyā] *em.*, °ānutpattiyā Ms; *cf.* Tib. *mi 'thad pas.*

¹² ādivad] *em.*, °ādiva Ms; *cf.* Tib. *la sogs pa bzhin du.*

mittāntarāṅgikāre 'navasthāprasaṅgo duruttaraḥ¹³. tato na vāstavo grāhyagrāhakaṣaṃvittibhedaḥ. pākādayas tu paramārthatas tathā¹⁴tatho-tpadyamānapadārtharūpā eva vyāvṛttimātrakaḥpitabhedāḥ, na tu tatrāpi vastutaḥ kriyākārahakabhedo dharmadharmirūpaḥ.

3.2.2.2 *The Apprehender Intended as Mind and Mental States (Against the Vaibhāsikas and the Sautrāntikas)*

111.0 nanu mā bhūt¹⁵ saṃvitter anyo grahaḥ, saiva tu sātādirūpeṇāntaḥsaṃviditā¹⁶ bahirdeśastharūpādyākāragrāhiṇī saṃvedyate. tat katham advayasiddhiḥ? ity āśaṅkāyām āha — **vyāpāra** ityādi.

*vyāpāraḥ sātāder
*na kaścīd etatparigrahe dṛṣṭaḥ |
*yugapatpratīyamānam
*rūpādivad eva na grāhī || 111

111.1 tasya rūpādeḥ **parigrahe sātādisaṃvedanasya vyāpāro** [26r] **na kaścīd dṛṣṭaḥ**, yato rūpādinā saha **yugapatpratīyamānam**¹⁷ etat sātādi vartate, tato **rūpādivad evā**grāhakaṃ yuktam. yathā rūpādi sātāder agrāhakaṃ yugapatpratīyamānatvenopakāryopakārahābhāvāt savyetaṛaviśāṇavat, tathā sātādy api rūpāder agrāhakaṃ. abhinnaṃ eva hi sahopalambhaniyamāt, bhedas tu viparyāsitarāśanair ikṣyate, abhinnaśaśinīveti¹⁸ bhāvaḥ. yad uktam —

*paricchedo 'ntar anyo 'yaṃ bhāgo bahir iva sthitaḥ |
jñānasyābhedīno bhedapratibhāso hy upaplavaḥ |*¹

nanu jñānajanakatvena rūpādikam prāk saṃnidhatte paścāt sātādisaṃvittyutpattiḥ. tat katham yugapatpratīyamānatā? atrābhidhīyate —

¹³duruttaraḥ] *em.* (Isaacson), runtaraḥ Ms; Tib. bsal bar dka'o (*durvāraḥ/*durnivāraḥ?).

¹⁴°ārthatas tathā°] *conj.*, °ārthata + + thā° Ms; *cf.* Tib. *don dam par de lta de lta*.

¹⁵mā bhūt] *em.*, bhūt Ms; *cf.* Tib. *med mod*.

¹⁶°saṃviditā] *em.*, °saviditā Ms; *cf.* Tib. *nang du yang dag par myong bar 'gyur ba'i*.

¹⁷°pratīyamānam] *em.*, °pratīyamānam Ms^{p.c.}, °pratīyamānam Ms^{a.c.}; *cf.* Tib. *lhan cig gcig pa nyid du rtogs pa*.

¹⁸°eti] *em.*, °eta Ms; *cf.* Tib. *zhes*.

¹*Pramāṇavārttika* Pratyakṣa° 212.

3.2.2.3 *Refutation of the Vaibhāṣikas' Thesis that Cognitions are Devoid of the Image of their Object (nirākāravāda)*

yadi tāvad Vaibhāṣikamatena nirākāraṃ vijñānaṃ tadutpattipratibandhenākāravato 'rthasya grāhakam iṣyate, tadā pratītimātrasya sarvārthasādhāraṇatvena nīlasyeṣaṃ pratīṭh pītasya veti¹⁹ pratīupratiniyamābhāvād rañjanādyarthakriyārthino niyamena nīlādau pravṛttir na syāt. tataḥ sutarāṃ nārthavedanam.

3.2.2.4 *Refutation of the Sautrāntika's Thesis that Cognitions are Endowed with the Image of their Object (sākāravāda)*

atha²⁰ Sautrāntikanayenākāravād vijñānaṃ prāgbhāvino janakasyārthakṣaṇasya tadutpattiyā grāhakam iṣyate, tadā jñānakāle janakasyā²¹-rthakṣaṇasya kṣaṇikatvenāsattvād ākāradvayasaṃvedanābhāvāc ca jñānākāra eva kevalaṃ saṃvedyata ity artha²²rūpaṃ khapuṣpaṃ nātiśeteti katham arthāṅgikārah?

3.2.2.5 *Refutation of the Proof through Implication (arthāpatti)*

111.2 {no Tib.} arthābhāve deśakālākārārthakriyāniyamenopalambho nopapadyata ity arthāpattiyā nityaparokṣasyārthasya siddhir iti cet, na, asaty api deśādiniyate bāhye vastuni vāsanāniyamāt svapnādivan niyatadesādyupalambho bhaviṣyatīti kim anarthakalpanayātmānaṃ vipralabhemahi?

3.2.2.6 *Refutation of the Objection that Restrictions Can Be Explained Only When External Objects Are Present as Well as of the "Anyākāravāda" (Mīmāṃsā)*

i. *Refuting that there is a restriction in terms of space and time only when an external object is present*

¹⁹veti] *em.*, ceti Ms; *cf.* Tib. 'di ni sngon po'i rtogs pa'am ser po'i rtogs pa yin no.

²⁰atha] *em.*, artha° Ms; *cf.* Tib. 'on te.

²¹janakasyā°] *em.*, janasyā° Ms; *cf.* Tib. skyed par byed pa'i.

²²ity artha°] *em.* (Isaacson), ity arthaḥ | Ms; *cf.* Tib. rig pa'i phyir don gyi rang bzhin (*arthasvarūpaṃ?).

111.3 atha syāt svapnādāv api deśāntaradṛṣṭam bāhyam eva nimittam.
yad āha —

svapnādīpratyaye bāhyaṃ sarvathā na hi neśyate |
sarvatrālambanaṃ²³ bāhyaṃ²⁴ deśakālānyathātmakam ||ⁱ

iti. tat katham svapnādidṛṣṭāntena jāgraddaśābhāvivijñānasya deśādini-
yamo varṇyata iti?

tad asat, svapnādijñānasyālambanānupapatteḥ. tad dhi grahaṇarū-
paṃ vā syāt smarāṇarūpaṃ vā. tatra²⁵ na tāvad grahaṇam, grahaṇasya
hi pūrvagrahaṇānapekṣatvān na pūrva²⁶ darśanaṣayagrāhitāpratīniya-
maḥ syāt, darśanāntaravat. smarāṇarūpatāpy asya nirvikalpatvāt, varta-
mānaṣayatvāt, sphuṭābhatvāc ca nopapadyate. tataḥ katham asya de-
śāntarādīdṛṣṭavastuṣayatvam iti na pratīmaḥ.

111.4 athāstu tan nimittam. deśādiniyamas tu tannimitto na śakyate
samarthayitum. yatraiva hi deśādaḥ saṃnihitam²⁷ bāhyaṃ svapne 'pi
yadi tatraiva pratībhāseta syād asya tan nimittam. na caivaṃ saṃbha-
vati, viśaṃvādābhāvaprasaṅgāt. tadrāhite kutracid eva tatpratībhāse tu
nāsyā hetutvam upapadyate. yadi tadrūparahite pratībhāsaṃ kuryāt, vi-
śeṣābhāvād yatra tatra kuryāt.

ii. *Refuting that there is a restriction in terms of images (i.e., a non-restriction in
terms of mental continuums) only when an external object is present*

asaty api ca sādharmaṇe 'rthe santānāniyama upalabhyate yadā dva-
yoḥ sadṛśaḥ svapnopalambho bhavati, bahūnāṃ vā bhrāntajñānināṃ
keśādīpratībhāsa iti.

iii. *Refuting that there is a restriction in terms of causal efficiency (arthakriyā) only
when an external object is present]*

²³°ālambanaṃ] *em.*, °ālambane Ms; *contra* Tib. kun du dmigs pa la.

²⁴bāhyaṃ] *em.*, bhrāntaṃ Ms; *contra* Tib. 'khrul pa.

²⁵tatra] *em.*, tata Ms; *cf.* Tib. de la.

²⁶pūrva°] *em.*, pūrvava° Ms; *cf.* Tib. sngon mthong ba'i yul.

²⁷saṃnihitam] *em.*, sannahitam Ms; *cf.* Tib. nye ba.

ⁱŚlokaṅkārttika, Nirālambanavāda 107cd–108ab.

tathā bahi[26v]rarthavirahe 'py arthakriyā svapne pratīyata eva. yathai²⁸ jāgraddaśāyāṃ vanitānimittāḥ sātādayas tatpratibaddhās ca vi-
sṛṣṭyādayo 'rthakriyāḥ sākṣād anubhūyante, tathai²⁸ svapnāvasthāyāṃ
api. tato yathā svapnādau bahirartham antareṇa deśaniyamādayo bha-
vanti, tathā jāgraddaśāyāṃ api bhavantaḥ kenābhibhūyante?

yad uktam —

*kasyacit kiṃcid evāntarvāsānāyāḥ prabodhakam |
tato dhīyāṃ viniyamo na bāhyārthavyapekṣayā |*ⁱ

iti. tat saṃvedanasya bāhyanimittatvābhāve kathaṃ rūpādisātādyoḥ
pūrvāparabhāve yugapatpratīyamānatāviraḥadoṣopavarṇanam upapa-
nnaṃ bhaviṣyatīti na vidmaḥ.

nanu yugapatpratīyamānatāyāṃ api rūpādigrāhakatvena niścīya-
mānasya sātāder²⁹ grāhitvam eva, arthasya tu rūpādeḥ sakalapatipatṭr-
sādhāraṇatvena grāhyatvam eva, pūrvapūrvakāraṇakalāpād eva hi vi-
śayajñānakṣaṇānāṃ grāhyagrāhakatvenotpatter niyatatvāt. tat kathaṃ
grāhyagrāhakasāṃkaryasadbhāva iti?

etad apy atyantaniḥsāram, yasmād avikalpātmany adhyakṣe³⁰ na
grāhyagrāhakatvādhyavasāyaḥ sādharmaṇatvaṃ vā nīlasya pratibhāti.
na hi nīlasyāparapatipatṭrdr̥ṣyatvam³¹ adhyakṣagamyam, aparapatīter
api pratyakṣatā³² prasaṅgāt; nāpi lomaharṣādiliṅgajānumānagamyam,
tasya sāmānyaviśayatvāt. tato 'sādharmaṇarūpādiyugapatpratīyamānaṃ
jñānam eva, *yogyadeśakair ajñātasya svayaṃ jñānāt*.ⁱⁱ

²⁸yathai²⁸] *conj.* (Isaacson), omitted in Ms (eye-skip); *cf.* Tib. *ji lta*.

²⁹sātāder] *em.*, sātādre Ms; *cf.* Tib. *bde ba la sogs pa'i*.

³⁰adhyakṣe] *em.*, anyakṣe Ms; *cf.* Tib. *mngon sum la*.

³¹°prati^opatṭrdr̥ṣyatvam] *em.* (Isaacson), °prati^opatṭrdr̥ṣyatvam Ms; *cf.* Tib. *rtogs pa po*
gzhan gyis blta bar bya ba nyid ni.

³²pratyakṣatā°] *em.*, prapratyakṣatā° Ms^{p.c.} (dittography), pra + + Ms^{a.c.}; *cf.* Tib.
mngon sum nyid du thal ba'i phyir ro.

ⁱ*Pramānavārttika* Pratyakṣa° 336.

ⁱⁱ*Pramānavārttika* Pratyakṣa° 16b2c.

3.2.3 *Refutation of the Aspect of the 'Apprehended' (grāhya)*

112.0 nanu cākṣaṇīkam avayavyādirūpam ekam eva bāhyaṃ vastu, tasya pūrvāparakālasthāyitvāt, sādharmaṇatvam apy anumānena vijñāyata iti nāsaṃbaddham. ity āśaṅkāyām āha — **dr̥ṣṭam** cetyādi.

***dr̥ṣṭam** ca yat sitādyam
***tad** eva kālāntareṣu **dr̥ṣṭam** na |
***anyo'nyena virodhāt**
***anayoḥ sātādivan nityam** || 112

112.1 yat sitādyam śuklarūpādikam ekam³³ **dr̥ṣṭam** pratyakṣeṇa pratipannaṃ **tad** eva kālāntareṣu pūrvaṃ paścād vā **na dr̥ṣṭam**. pūrvāpararūparahitam eva dr̥ṣṭam ity arthaḥ. hetum āha — **anyo'nyena** parasparam **anayor** dr̥ṣṭa³⁴ dr̥ṣyamānayor dr̥ṣyamāna³⁵ drakṣyamāṇayor vā **sātādivan**³⁶ **nityam virodhāt**. saṃnihitavartamānamātra-grāhakaṃ hi cakṣurādivijñānam, anyathā dūrvavyavahitāder atītānāgatabālavr̥ddhādeś ca yugapadgrahaṇaprasaṅgo durvārah³⁷ syāt.

112.2 {no Tib.} uktaṃ cācāryeṇa³⁸ bāhyārthanirāsārtham Ātmasā-dhanāvātāre —

nanu grāhyādirūpeṇa pratibhāsamānaḥ katham³⁹ vikalpamātvātmakāḥ saṃsāro bhaved iti cet, na, pratīviśayasya grāhyāditvenāprasiddheḥ. na hi rūpādīpratibhāsavyatirekenānyad grāhyaṃ grāhakaṃ vā kiṃcid upalabhyate. na cāpratīyamānasvarūpaṃ sadyavahāraviśayaṃ nāmātiprasaṅgāt. na ca tatsambaddhapratītau⁴⁰ tatpratītiḥ, atyantāpratyakṣatātmanā kasyacit saṃbandhāprasiddheḥ. antaḥpratibhāsamānasya sātāder grāhakatvaṃ nīlādes tu

³³ ekam] *em.*, eka° Ms; *contra* or no reflection in Tib.

³⁴ dr̥ṣṭa°] *em.*, dr̥ṣṭam Ms; *cf.* Tib. *mthong zin pa dang* | *mthong ba'am*.

³⁵ dr̥ṣyamāna°] *em.*, dr̥ṣyamānan Ms; *cf.* Tib. *mthong bzhin pa dang mthong bar 'gyur* ba.

³⁶ sātādivan] *em.*, sātād iva Ms; *cf.* Tib. *bde ba la sogs pa bzhin du*.

³⁷ durvārah] *em.*, rdurvārah Ms; *cf.* Tib. *bzlog dka' bar*.

³⁸ cācāryeṇa] *em.*, cacāryeṇa Ms

³⁹ katham] *em.*, kathitam Ms; *cf.* Tib. *ji ltar na*.

⁴⁰ tatsambaddhapratītau] *em.*, tatsambaddhāpratītau Ms; *cf.* Tib. *de dang 'brel pa'i dngos* po (!) *gzhan rtogs pas*.

*tadbahūrūpatayā pratītalakṣaṇasya grāhyatvam iti cet, na, sukhāder⁴¹ nīlā-
dau⁴² vyāpārāsiddheḥ⁴³. na cāpratītavypāraṃ grāhakaṃ nāma, tathā sati
bāhyasyā[27r]pi rūpāder grāhakatvaprasaṅgāt. na hi yugapat svātantryeṇa
pratibhāsamānyoḥ kiṃcid grāhyaṃ kiṃcid grāhakaṃ iti pratīnyamakāra-
ṇaṃ paśyāmaḥ. ahaṃ nīlādikaṃ vedmīty api kalpanāmātram eva, svāta-
ntryeṇāntarbahihpratibhāsamānānām pratīteḥ. svatantrānubhavaḥ prakāśana-
paro vā sarva evāyam grāhakaḍivikalpaḥ prabandhaḥ, paraṣparaparigrahavyā-
pārahāteṣv eva pratibhāsamāneṣu bhāvāt. tan na⁴⁴ kiṃcid kasyacid grāha-
kaṃ nāma. tathā cāha — na hi Subhūte dharmo dharmam jānātīti vistaraḥ.ⁱ
yat tūktam — ity api rūpāṇi dvābhyāṃ vijñānābhyāṃ vijñāyanta ityādi,ⁱⁱ tat
tadrūpādhyavasāyamātrāpekṣayā kvacit pudgalādideśanāvad ity adoṣaḥ.*

iti.

112.3 tad iyatā grāhyagrāhakasādhakapramāṇanirāso darśitaḥ.

3.3 *Exposition of Negative Proof (bādhakapramāṇa): Things Have Neither
One Nor Many Svabhāva[s]*

113.0 idānīm bādhakapramāṇenārthānām asattvād vijñaptimātratam
khyāpayann āha — **ekam na cetyādi.**

***ekam na ca rūpāder**
***ādyantādiḥ prabhedato dṛṣṭeḥ |**
***paramāṇuśo 'py adṛṣṭeḥ**
***anekarūpaṃ na bhavati tadvac ca || 113**

⁴¹sukhāder] *em.*, sukhāde Ms; *cf.* Tib. *bde ba la sogs pa'i*.

⁴²nīlādau] *em.*, nīlāde Ms; *cf.* Tib. *sngon po la sogs pa la*.

⁴³vyāpārāsiddheḥ] *em.*, vyāpārāsiddheḥ Ms; *cf.* Tib. *byed pa ma grub pa'i phyir ro*.

⁴⁴tan na] *em.*, tān na Ms; *cf.* Tib. *de lta bas na ... ma yin no*.

ⁱ*Prajñāpāramitā*, untraced.

ⁱⁱ*Locus classicus* untraced.

3.3.1 *Refutation of External Things: The Padārthas of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika*

3.3.1.1 *Sky, Time, Space and Internal Organ*

113.1 ayam abhiprāyaḥ. bāhyaṃ vastv artho guṇadravyādibhedena bahuprakāraḥ parair upavarṇyate. tatra guṇādīnām⁴⁵ dharmānām āsra-
yo dravyam, tanniṣedhenaiva te samūlam unmūlitā bhavantīti na pṛthag
dūṣaṇam abhidhīyate. na cāsati samavāyini samavāya iti taddūṣaṇam api
nākhyāyate.

dravyaṃ ca pṛthivy ap⁴⁶ tejo vāyur ākāśaṃ kālo dig ātmā mana iti
navavidham. tatrātmānantaraṃ nirākartavyaḥ. ākāśaṃ tu śabdaguṇam
iṣṭam, tac caikam iti samānadeśatvāt sarvaśabdānām bhedena śrutir na
syāt. tataś ca samīpadeśa iva vyavahitadeśābhimato 'pi śabdaḥ śrūyeta,
na⁴⁷ vānyo 'pīty ekāntaḥ. dikkālayoś⁴⁸ caikatvāt pūrvāparādipratyayā-
yogaḥ.

syād etad upādīnām bhedenāyaṃ⁴⁹ pratyayavibhāga iti. kim upā-
dhīnām svataḥ paurvāparyam uta parataḥ? tatrādye pakṣe tata eva ta-
tpraūtisiddher niḥprayojanāv etau. dvitīye tu pakṣe yadi dikkālābhyām
eva tadā tad evedam ekatvād anayor na saṃgacchati. anyataś cet tada-
vasthaṃ tayor⁵⁰ vaiyarthyam.

nityāś cāmī vyomadikkālāḥ sahakārisāhitye tadvirahe vālabdhasva-
bhāvabhedāḥ, kathaṃ kadācid eva svakāryaṃ janayeyuḥ⁵¹. tathā hi —

*teṣāṃ śaktir aśaktir⁵² vā yā svabhāvena saṃsthitā |
nityatvād acikīṣyānām kas tām kṣapayitum kṣamaḥ | |ⁱ*

⁴⁵ guṇādīnām] *em.*, guṇānām Ms; *cf.* Tib. de la *yon tan la sogs pa*.

⁴⁶ ap] *em.*, āp Ms

⁴⁷ nā] *em.*, nā Ms; *cf.* Tib. 'am gzhan du yang *mi* 'gyur ro.

⁴⁸ kālayoś] *em.*, °kajālayoś Ms; *contra* Tib. phyogs dang *yul* dag.

⁴⁹ bhedenāyaṃ] *em.*, bhedenayaṃ Ms

⁵⁰ tayor] *em.*, tayo Ms; *cf.* Tib. *de dag*.

⁵¹ janayeyuḥ] *em.*, janayeyu Ms

⁵² aśaktir] *em.*, aktir Ms; *cf.* Tib. *nus med pa*.

ⁱ *Pramāṇavārttika* Pratyakṣa° 22.

anena mano 'pi⁵³ nirastam. yugapajñānānutpattyā ca manovādināṃ
mano 'numeyam. anubhūyanta eva ca nartakīdarśanādaṃ yugapad vi-
jñānāni, na caitan manasi sati kadācid yujyate. tasmān na santy eva vyo-
mādayaḥ.

3.3.1.2 Physical Elements

3.3.1.2.1 The Whole (awayavīn)

prthivīyādayo 'vaśiṣyante. te 'py⁵⁴ awayavīparamāṇubhedena dvidhā ka-
lpitāḥ⁵⁵.

tatrāpi nāvayavī san nāpi paramāṇavaḥ santaḥ, tadubhayatrāpi
bādhaka⁵⁶sadbhāvād iti. tad eva bādhakaṃ yathākramaṃ kathayati.
ekam iti paramāṇubhir dvyaṇukādikrameṇārabdham awayavirūpaṃ
prasiddham ghaṭādikam **ca naivāsti**, **rūpāder ādyanta**⁵⁷madhyādi-
prabhedanānyo'nyavirodhinā dharmeṇa sthūlaikarūparahitasyaiva **dr-**
ṣter hetoḥ. tad anenaikajñānasamsargivastūpalambha⁵⁸rūpo 'nupala-
mbho hetur uktaḥ.

*bhāgā eva hi bhāsante samniviṣṭās tathā tathā |
tadvān anyāḥ punar naiva nirvibhāgaḥ prakāśate ||*ⁱ

e[27v]kasyāvayavasya rāge kampe vā tatsamaveto 'py awayavī raktaḥ ka-
mpamāno vā drśyeta. awayave rāgaḥ kampo vā nāvayavīnīti cet, sa tarhy
araktō 'kampamāno vā drśyeta⁵⁹. ekāvayavāvaraṇe ca tasyāvṛtau⁶⁰ na sa
drśyeta⁶¹. tadanāvaraṇe 'nāvṛtasya tasyopalabdheḥ prasaṅgo durnivā-
raḥ⁶² syād iti bheda-kātmaka⁶³viruddha⁶⁴dharmādhyāsān naiko 'vayavī

⁵³mano 'pi] *em.*, mano Ms; *cf.* Tib. *yid kyang*.

⁵⁴te 'py] *em.*, tapy Ms; *cf.* Tib. *de yang*.

⁵⁵kalpitāḥ] *em.*, kalpitaḥ Ms

⁵⁶bādhaka°] *em.*, vācaka° Ms; *contra* Tib. *sgrub par byed pa* med pa'i phyir ro.

⁵⁷°anta°] *em.*, °antu° Ms; *cf.* Tib. *thog ma dang tha ma*.

⁵⁸°ūpalambha°] *em.*, °ūpalambhā° Ms; *cf.* Tib. *dmigs pa'i* mtshan nyid can.

⁵⁹drśyeta] *em.*, drśyeta Ms

⁶⁰°āvṛtau] *em.*, °āvṛtau Ms; no reflection in Tib.

⁶¹drśyeta] *em.*, drśyeta Ms

⁶²durnivāraḥ] *em.*, durcivāraḥ Ms; *cf.* Tib. *bzlog dka' bar*.

⁶³°ātmaka°] *em.*, °ātmakaṃ Ms; *cf.* Tib. *tha dad pa'i bdag nyid can*.

⁶⁴°viruddha°] *em.*, °viruddham Ms; *cf.* Tib. *'gal ba'i* chos gnas pa'i phyir.

ⁱDharmakīrti? Untraced.

bhavitum arhatīty asadvyavahāraṣayātvaṃ evāsya prāptakālaṃ paśyā-
maḥ.

3.3.1.2.2 Atoms

idānīm ekaṇiṣedhe **cānekarūpam** avaśiṣyate. tac cānekair anekaprakā-
ram upakalpitam. yathā Vaibhāṣikaiḥ sāksād adhyakṣagocarāḥ, Vaiśe-
ṣikais tv avayavyārambhakāḥ, Sautrāntikais ca nityaparokṣāḥ piśācāya-
mānā darśane svākārasamarpaṇapraṇāḥ paramāṇava iṣyante.

tatra tāvad Vaibhāṣikakalpitaparamāṇūn nirākartum āha — **para-
māṇuśo 'pītyādi**. yathā caikaṃ sthūlaṃ nāsti **tadvad anekaṃ ca na
bhavati**. hetum āha — **paramāṇuśo 'py adṛṣṭer** iti⁶⁵ paramāṇurū-
pasya parasparaviviktasyānupalabdher⁶⁶ ity arthaḥ.

114.0 atha sthūlānyathānupapattyā⁶⁷ paramāṇvanumānam ity āha —
niravayavatva ityādi⁶⁸.

*niravayavatve cānor
*anekaparamāṇuparikarābhāvāt |
*bhūmaṇḍalādirūpa-
*pracayo na hi kaścid atra syāt | | 114

114.1 ayam abhiprāyaḥ. sāvayavatvaṃ tāvat⁶⁹ paramāṇor⁷⁰ draṣṭa-
vyam, yugapad aṃśair viruddhadigvartibhiḥ ṣaṭkayogādīnā viruddha-
dharmaśamsargeṇa⁷¹ sthūlasyeva nānātvaprasaṅgāt. **niravayavatve
cāṃśalākṣaṇāvayavarahitave** saty ekasyāṇor⁷² **anekaiḥ paramāṇu-
bhiḥ parikarasya** pariveṣṭanasyā**ābhāvaḥ** syāt, yataḥ paramāṇupari-

⁶⁵iti] *em.*, iri Ms; *cf.* Tib. *zhes bya ba'o*.

⁶⁶viviktasyānupalabdher] *em.*, °viviktasyānupalabdher Ms; *cf.* Tib. *phan tshun tha
dad pa ni mi dmigs pa'i phyir ro*.

⁶⁷sthūlānyathānupapattyā] *em.*, sthūlām anyathānupapattyā Ms; *cf.* Tib. *rags pa gzhan
du mi 'thad par*.

⁶⁸niravayavatva ityādi] *em.*, niravayavyādi Ms; *cf.* Tib. *rdul phran cha med yin na zhes
bya ba la sogs pa'o*.

⁶⁹sāvayavatvaṃ tāvat] *em.*, sāvayavatāṃvat Ms; *cf.* Tib. *re zhig ... cha shas dang beas par
ni*.

⁷⁰paramāṇor] *em.*, paramāṇonair Ms; *cf.* Tib. *rdul phra rab nmams*.

⁷¹śamsargeṇa] *em.*, °śamsargiṇa Ms; *cf.* Tib. 'gal ba'i chos dang ldan pas.

⁷²ekasyāṇor] *em.*, ekasyākṣaṇor Ms; not reflected in Tib.

veṣṭane tasyādharo⁷³ttaracaturdikparamāṇumadhyāsino niyamena ṣa-
ḍaṃśatāpatīḥ. yo hy asya svabhāvaḥ pūrvaparamāṇupratyāsanno na sa
evāparaparamāṇupratyāsanno⁷⁴ ghaṭate, tayor ekadeśatāpatteḥ. evaṃ
hi pūrvaparamāṇusamnihitaḥ svabhāvo 'paraṃ paramāṇuṃ pratyāsi-
ded yadi, so 'pi tatra syāt. pratyāsattyaabhāve⁷⁵ 'py ābhimukhyamātre 'py
ayam eva doṣaḥ. tatas ca paramāṇumātrapiṇḍarūpaprasaṅgād **bhūma-
ṇḍalādīrūpapracayaḥ kaścīd atra na hi syāt.** yad āha —

*saṃyuktaṃ dūradeśasthaṃ nairantaryavyavasthitaṃ |
ekāṇvabhīmukhaṃ rūpaṃ yad aṇor madhyavartinaḥ ||
aṇvantarābhimukhyena tad eva yadi⁷⁶ kalpyate |
pracayo bhūddharādīnām evaṃ sati na yujyate ||ⁱ*

iti.

114.2 {no Tib.} tasmād avaśyaṃ tayoh⁷⁷ svabhāvayor bhedo 'bhyu-
pagantavyaḥ. yathā cānayos tathādharottaradakṣiṇottaraparamāṇupra-
tyāsannānām svabhāvānām bheda iti ṣaḍaṃśataiva paramāṇor balād ā-
patati. tad āha —

*ṣaṭkena yugapad yogāt paramāṇoh ṣaḍaṃśatā |
ṣaṇṇām samānadeśatvāt piṇḍaḥ syād aṇumātrakah ||ⁱⁱ*

iti.

114.3 na caikāsiddhāv anekasya siddhir iti na santi paramāṇavaḥ.

⁷³°ādharo°] *em.*, °ādhāro° Ms; *cf.* Tib. *steng dang 'og.*

⁷⁴na sa evāparaparamāṇupratyāsanno] *conj.*, omitted in Ms (eye-skip); *cf.* Tib. gang
zhig rdul phra rab gzhan (!) dang nye ba de nyid du rdul phra rab de las gzhan dang nye bar ni
mi 'byor te.

⁷⁵pratyāsattyaabhāve] *em.*, pratyāsattyaābhāve Ms; *cf.* Tib. *nyer bar gnas pa med pa na.*

⁷⁶yadi] *em.*, pari° Ms; *cf.* Tib. *gal te.*

⁷⁷avaśyaṃ tayoh] *em.* (Sferra), avaśyan tayā tayoh Ms (*ditto-graphy*)

ⁱTattvasaṃgraha 1989–1990 or *Madhyamakālaṃkārikā 11–12.

ⁱⁱVimśikā 12.

114.4 {no Tib.}

mīmāṃsakaiś ca nāvaśyam iśyante paramāṇavaḥ |ⁱ

iti na paramāṇunirākaraṇamātreṇa nirākṛtaḥ syād avayavīti nāsyā vyārthaṃ dūṣaṇam.

[The Madhyamaka Perspective]

3.3.2 Refutation of Vijñaptimātratā

114.5 astu tarhi vijñānamātrasvabhāvaṃ jagat. tad apy ekam anekaṃ vā rūpaṃ⁷⁸ prāgyan na kṣamata iti gaganābjam iva na sadvyavahāram arhatī. vastusato gatyantarābhāvād ekānekayor anyatareṇa⁷⁹ tena bhāvvyam. na ca tat tathā ghaṭata iti katham idaṃ sadvyavahāraṇiṣaya⁸⁰ iti na jānīmaḥ.

3.3.2.1 Refutation of the (Vijñānavāda-)*Satyākāravāda or Sākāravāda

athaikānekasvabhāvā[28r]yogo vijñāne na saṃbhavatīti syāt. tad asat,⁸¹ sākārajñāne bāhyata ivaikānekarūpavirahasya spaṣṭatvāt. yatra hi lokasya bāhyārthavyavahāras tad eva sākāravādino jñānam. tato yat tasya bahirbhāve⁸² bādhakaṃ tad evāntarbhāve 'pi. bādhakena hi sthūlam ekam anekaṃ ca paramāṇurūpam apākriyate. vijñānātmabhūtaś cāyam ākāro yady ekaḥ sthūlo yadi vānekaḥ paramāṇuśo bhinna ubhayathāpi bahir⁸³ arthabhāvi dūṣaṇam aśakyam apagantum. na hi tad vijñānabahirbhāvanibandhanaṃ⁸⁴ dūṣaṇam⁸⁵ yena tadbhāve na bhavet.

⁷⁸ rūpaṃ] *em.*, rūpa Ms; *cf.* Tib. rang bzhin du.

⁷⁹ anyatareṇa] *em.*, anyantareṇa Ms^{p.c.}, anantareṇa Ms^{a.c.}; *cf.* Tib. gcig dang du ma dag las gang yang rung ba gcig 'gyur dgos na.

⁸⁰ viṣaya] *em.*, °viṣayam Ms; *cf.* Tib. yod pa'i tha snyad kyi yul du 'gyur.

⁸¹ tad asat,] *conj.*, omitted in Ms (eye-skip); *cf.* Tib. de ni mi bden te.

⁸² bhāve] *em.*, °bhāva° Ms; *cf.* Tib. phyi rol gyi don (!) yin pa la.

⁸³ bahir°] *em.*, barahir° Ms; *cf.* Tib. phyi rol gyi don la.

⁸⁴ nibandhanaṃ] *em.*, °nibandhana° Ms; *contra* Tib. rgyu mtshan gyi.

⁸⁵ dūṣaṇam] *em.*, dūṣaṇa Ms; *cf.* Tib. sun 'byin pa.

ⁱ Ślokaṛtika, Anumānapariccheda 183ab.

mūrtinibandhanam⁸⁶ bādhakam nāmūrte vijñānātmanīty apy asāram, nilādyākāratāyām vijñānasyāpi mūrtatvāt. ayam eva hi deśavitānavān ākāro mūrṭiḥ. tad asya bāhyatve mūrtisaṃjñā na tu jñānatva⁸⁷ iti na vidmaḥ.

3.3.2.2 Refutation of the (Vijñānavāda-)*Alīkāravāda or Nirākāravāda

114.6 syān matam — yeṣāṃ sākāram vijñānam teṣāṃ ayam astu doṣaḥ. yeṣāṃ tu nirākāram sukhādirūpaṃ tāttvikam iti pakṣas teṣāṃ ayam ekānekaviyogaḥ kathaṃ saṃgaccheta? atrābhīdhīyate. iha prakāśātma-kaṃ vijñānam, na ca prakāśamānanīlādivyatiriktas teṣāṃ prakāśaḥ svapne 'pi saṃvidyate, na ca sukhādivat prakāśamānasya nilāder alīkatā yujyate.

bādhakasadbhāvād iti cet, tad etad bādhakam sukhādau kena bādhyate? sukhāder amūrtatvāt tadabhāva iti cet, naitad asti, tasyāpi deśavitānena prakāśamānasya śakyāpahnnavatvāt. śrāntasya hi yāvanty aṅgāni payasi viśanti tāvatāṃ vyāpakam sukham upajāyamānam anubhūyate. nāpi tathānubhūyamānam adeśavitānam nāma, śarīrasyāpi tadbhāvaprasaṅgāt, deśavitāne ca śarīravād asyāpi mūrtatvāt. tad etad ākāra-vaṅ nirākāram⁸⁸ vā vijñānam bahirbhāvavihita⁸⁹ dūṣaṇam nātikrāmatīti na pṛthag dūṣaṇam āhitam⁹⁰ ācāryeṇeti pratipattavyam.

3.3.3 Conventional Reality of Cognition (vijñāna)

114.7 tat sthitam etat — etad⁹¹ vijñānam api na sadvyavahāram arhatīti. tarhi jñānajñeyayor⁹² asattvād asadrūpaṃ tattvam iti syāt. na. saṃvṛtyā⁹³ syād⁹⁴ vijñānam,⁹⁵ saṃvṛter aśakyāpahnnavatvāt⁹⁶.

⁸⁶ nibandhanam] *em.*, °nibandhana° Ms; *contra* Tib. *rgyu mtshan gyi*.

⁸⁷ na tu jñānatva] *diag. conj.*, na tva Ms; not reflected in the Tib.

⁸⁸ nirākāram] *em.*, nikārām Ms; *cf.* Tib. *rnam par med pa*.

⁸⁹ vihita°] *em.*, °virahita° Ms; *cf.* Tib. *phyi rol gyi don (!) gyi sun dbyung ba las*.

⁹⁰ āhitam] *em.*, ādritam Ms; *cf.* Tib. *logs shig tu sun dbyung ba lhur ma byas so*.

⁹¹ etat — etad] *em.*, etānetad Ms; *cf.* Tib. *des na rnam par shes pa de yang ... 'di gnas pa yin no*.

⁹² jñeyayor] *em.*, °jñeyor Ms; *cf.* Tib. *shes pa dang shes bya dag*.

⁹³ saṃvṛtyā] *em.*, saṃvṛtyā Ms; *cf.* Tib. *kun rdzob tu*.

⁹⁴ syād] *em.*, d Ms^{p.c.}, yād Ms^{a.c.}; or syād etad?; Tib. suggests *syād etad, de ... yod pa yin te.

⁹⁵ vijñānam,] *em.*, vijñāna° Ms; *cf.* Tib. *rnam par shes pa*.

⁹⁶ aśakyāpahnnavatvāt] *em.*, aśakyāpahnnavatvāt Ms; *cf.* Tib. *bsnyon par mi nus pa yin pa'i phyir ro*.

astitvaniṣedhān nāstitvaṃ balād āyātam iti cet, na, astitvapūrvaka-
tvān nāstitvasya, tadasiddhau tasyāpy asiddheḥ. yad āha —

*astitvapūrvakaṃ nāsti asti nāstitvapūrvakaṃ |
ato nāsti na vaktavyam astitvaṃ na ca kalpayet ||*ⁱ

iti.

nāpi sadasadātmatayobhaya rūpaṃ sadasator⁹⁷ virodhāt. nāpi sada-
sadbhyām anyad evānubhayaśvabhāvam, ubhayabahirbhūtasya paryu-
dastasyāyogāt⁹⁸.

na kiṃcit tarhi tattvam iti prāptam. nanv etad eva⁹⁹ tattvaṃ yad u-
ta¹⁰⁰ tattvarahitvaṃ nāma. tat sthitam etat —

*catuḥkoṭivinirmuktaṃ vijñānaṃ pratibhāsate |
iti tattvavidāṃ tattvaṃ na tattvam api tattvataḥ ||*

iti.

3.3.4 Quotation from the *Ātmasādhanāvatāra*

114.8 {no Tib.} tad uktaṃ Jñānapādaiḥ —

astu tarhi vijñaptimātrasvabhāvam anaśvarātmakaṃ jagad

ityādy upakramya,

*na, vijñānasyāpy ekāneka¹⁰¹ svabhāvavaidhuryāt. tathā hi na tad ekam, nīlā-
dībhedenopalambhavaicitryāt, ekavarṇasyāpi dhavalāder ādimadhyāntabhe-
dena pratibhāsanāt, arthakriyo¹⁰² payogabhedāc ca; anekatvasya caitāvanmā-
tralakṣaṇatvāt. nāpy anekam, paramāṇukalpānām¹⁰³ sitādīpratibhāsabhā-
gānām apratīteḥ¹⁰⁴. na caikānekavyatirekeṇa prakārantaram asti, anyor a-
nyonyābhāvasvabhāvatvena [28v] virodhāt.*

⁹⁷ sadasator] *em.*, sado sadasator Ms; *cf.* Tib. *yod pa dang med pa dag ni.*

⁹⁸ paryudastasyāyogāt] *em.*, paryudastasya yogāt Ms; *cf.* Tib. *gzhan ni mi 'thad pa'i phyir.*

⁹⁹ etad eva] *em.*, etatved eva Ms; *cf.* Tib. *'di nyid.*

¹⁰⁰ yad uta] *em.*, yad u Ms; *cf.* Tib. *'di lta ste.*

¹⁰¹ vijñānasyāpy ekāneka] *em.*, vijñānasyānekāneka^o Ms; *cf.* Tib. *rnam par shes pa yang
gcig dang du mā'i.*

¹⁰² kriyo] *em.*, °kriyo^o Ms; *cf.* Tib. *don byed pa'i.*

¹⁰³ kalpānām] *em.* (Kataoka), °kalpanām Ms; *contra* Tib. *rdul phra rab kyi rnam par rtog
pas.*

¹⁰⁴ bhāgānām apratīteḥ] *em.*, °bhāgo nāma pratīteḥ Ms; *cf.* Tib. *cha rnam rtogs pa med
pa'i phyir ro.*

ⁱ *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* 3.83.

nanu sarvathā nirātmakatve bhāvānām kuto 'yam anubhūyamāno 'rthakriyā-
bheda iti cet, avicārītaikātmanah pūrvapūrvakalpanāmātrād eva tadanyasyā-
pratīter ity āveditam.

astu tarhi bhāvata eva sattvaṃ sarvabhāvānām vastutvasyārthakriyālakṣaṇa-
tvād iti cet.

tan na, pratibhāsamātreṇa sattābhyupagame 'virodhāt. yathoktakrameṇa la-
kṣaṇavivekād eva nairātmīyaṃ vyavasthāpyate, na tu pratibhāsamātratayā-
py apahnavād iti. yathāha — na hi Subhūte 'nyad rūpam anyā śūnyatā,
api tu rūpam eva śūnyam rūpalakṣaṇeneti vistarah.ⁱ ata eva pūrvāparabhe-
dena samastasāmṛtavastupratibhāsamānatvān na nīyatvam āśānānīyam.
yat tu vijñaptimātram bho jīnaputrā yad uta traidhātukam ity uktaṃⁱⁱ tad a-
tyanta¹⁰⁵ bhāvābhīniveśinām bahīrarthādhyavasāyanīrāsārtham, tasmin sati
sukhenaiḥ cittamātrādhyavasāyasyāpi nīrākaranaśambhavāt. tad evāha¹⁰⁶

cittamātram samāśrītya jñeyā bāhyāsvabhāvātā |
tathatālabane¹⁰⁷ sthītvā cittamātram vyatikramet | |ⁱⁱⁱ

iti.

114.9 tad iyatā bādhakapramāṇasadbhāvo darśitaḥ.

3.4 Statement of the Madhyamaka Standpoint on Reality

115.0 tataś ca sādḥaka¹⁰⁸pramāṇābhāvād bādhakasadbhāvāc¹⁰⁹ ca
jñeyādisamastavastunairātmīyā¹¹⁰ jagad idaṃ kalpanāmātranirmitasva-
bhāvam ity upasaṃharann āha — **tad grāhakādītyādi.**

***tad grāhakādivirahāt**
***svatantrarūpādikalpanārūpam |**
gandharvanagarasaṃnibham
akhilam sacarācaram vastu | | 115

¹⁰⁵atyanta°] *em.*, utyantar° Ms; *cf.* Tib. *shin tu.*

¹⁰⁶tad evāha] *em.*, tadāvāha Ms; *cf.* Tib. *de ltar yang ... zhes gsungs pa yin no.*

¹⁰⁷°ālabane] *em.*, °ārambaṇe Ms; *cf.* Tib. (?) *dmigs nas ni.*

¹⁰⁸sādḥaka°] *em.*, bādḥaka° Ms; *cf.* Tib. *sgrub byed kyī.*

¹⁰⁹°sadbhāvāc] *em.*, °sadbhāvāc Ms; *cf.* Tib. *gnod byed kyī tshad ma yod pa'i phyir.*

¹¹⁰°nairātmīyā] *em.*, °nairātmīyā Ms; Tib. different phrasing or not reflected.

ⁱ*Prajñāpāramitā*, untraced.

ⁱⁱ*Daśabhūmikasūtra*, ed. p. 49, 9.

ⁱⁱⁱ*Laṅkāvatārasūtra* 10.256 (different *pāda b*).

115.1 **tad** ity anantarokto¹¹¹ papattisāmarthyato **grāhakādivira-**
hād gandharvanagarasam̐nibham, paramārthasannimittarahita-
tvena ca kalpanāsantatirūpatayā **svatantrarūpādikalpanārūpaṃ**
sthāvarajaṅgamaṃ **vastu**.

116.0 nanu yady evaṃ tattvaṃ tadā śuddham eveti kathaṃ saṃsāraḥ,
tadabhāvād¹¹² vyavadānaṃ ca kathaṃ bhaved iti śaṅkāyāṃ āha — **ā-**
tmetyādi.

***ātmātmīyāropād**
***vikalpasantāna eṣa saṃsāraḥ |**
***śuddhis tadviparīta-**
***svarūpamātrā tu vijñeyā || 116**

116.1 tatraiva catuḥkoṭīrahite cetasy **ātmādy** āropya **vikalpasantā-**
nākāraḥ saṃsāraḥ, śuddhis tu mokṣaḥ punar ātmādyāropaviparī-
tanairātmīyasvarūpamātraniṣṭhatvena vijñeyā. ata evoktam — *kalpa-*
nāśuddhau yatitavyam.¹ tathā hi bahirarthādhyavasāyī vikalpo bhrāntatvād
bhavānukūlaḥ¹¹³ prākṛtaḥ, svarūpamātraniṣṭhatvenābhrāntatvenā¹¹⁴ vi-
kalpatvāt pratyakṣarūpaḥ pariśuddhaḥ. tad uktam —

*kalpanāpi svasamvittāv iṣṭā nārthe vikalpanāt |*ⁱⁱ

iti.

116.2 {no Tib.} rāgādayo 'py āropayanto duṣṭacittasvarūpaniṣṭhāḥ.
tad uktam Śrīparamādye —

rāgo dveṣaś ca mohaś ca traya ete viṣatāṃ gatāḥ |
viṣatvam upayānty ete viṣameṇa tu sevītāḥ |
*amṛtatvaṃ punar yānti amṛtato'ya sevītāḥ |*ⁱⁱⁱ

iti. tato vikalpaṃ bahirarthādhyavasāyadoṣād vyāvartya svarūpe 'vasthā-
payituṃ yogibhir yatitavyam.

¹¹¹ anantarokto°] *em.*, antaro° Ms; *cf.* Tib. *brjod ma thag pa'i*.

¹¹² tadabhāvād] *em.*, tadbhāvāt Ms; *cf.* Tib. *de med pa'i phyir*.

¹¹³ bhavānukūlaḥ] *em.*, bhāvānukūlaḥ Ms; *cf.* Tib. *srid pa dang rjes su mthun pas*.

¹¹⁴ niṣṭhatvenābhrāntatvenā°] *em.*, °niṣṭhatvena bhrāntatvenā° Ms; *cf.* Tib. *gnas pa nyid kyis rtog pa med cing ma 'khrul pa'i phyir*.

ⁱ *Locus classicus* untraced.

ⁱⁱ *Pramāṇasamuccaya* 1.7ab.

ⁱⁱⁱ *Paramādya* D 220v4-5.

117.0 tasmād vikalpo 'pi svarūpe nirvikalpa eveti svabhāvaśuddhāḥ sarvadharmāḥ. tad āha — **na ca**¹¹⁵ **kaścīd** ityādi.

***na ca kaścīd atra bhedo**
***dharmatayā śamabhavasvabhāvānām |**
***grāhyādyākṛtīvirahaḥ**
***sarvatra yataḥ sadā siddhaḥ || 117**

117.1 **kaścīd** iti nirvāṇam idaṃ saṃsāras tv ayam, iyaṃ samalāvastheyam tu nirmalāvasthā, heyam idam upādeyam idam ityādir **bhedo** viśeṣo **na ca** naiva yukto **dharmatayeti** tattvataḥ. atropapattim āha — **grāhyetyādi**. ata evārya Nāgārjunapādair apy uktam —

*nirvāṇam ca bhavaś caiva dvayam etan na vidyate |
parijñānam bhavasyaiva nirvāṇam iti kathyate ||ⁱ*

*na saṃsārasya nirvāṇāt kiṃci[29r]d asti viśeṣaṇam |
na nirvāṇasya saṃsārāt kiṃcid asti viśeṣaṇam ||ⁱⁱ*

iti.

117.2 {no Tib.} bhagavatāpy uktam —

yā Subhūte prthagjanatathatā yā ca tathāgatatahataikaiva.

ityādi¹¹⁶vistarāḥ.ⁱⁱⁱ

118.0 atha yadi tattvataḥ **śamabhavasvabhāvānām na bhedaḥ** (see 117ab), kathaṃ tarhi **grāhyādyākṛtīvirahaḥ sarvatrety** (see 117cd) abhidhīyate? sarvaśabdaḥ kilānekārthaviśayaḥ, sa ca bhedaḥ bhāve prayogaṃ nārhatīty āśaṅkyāha — **sarvaṃ na cetyādi**.

***sarvaṃ na cāpi kiṃcit**
***tatpratibhāsasvabhāvasaṃkalpāt |**
***na ca cittād anyah syād**
***aham iti kaścīd ata ātmādiḥ || 118**

¹¹⁵na ca] *em.*, na Ms (unmetrical).

¹¹⁶tathataikaiva. ityādi°] *em.*, °tathatā ekaivaityatyādi° Ms

ⁱ*Yuktiṣaṣṭikā* 6.

ⁱⁱ*Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* 25.19.

ⁱⁱⁱ*Prajñāpāramitā*, untraced.

118.1 samvṛtyā¹¹⁷ tu **śamabhavasvabhāvānām** (see 117b) **bhedo** (see 117a) 'sty eva¹¹⁸, tataḥ sāmṛtavastupratibhāsasvabhāvo yaḥ **samkalpas** tato 'nyan **na kimcit sarvaṃ** nāma. vikalpāropitabhedaviṣayaḥ sarvaśabdaḥ. tad evaṃ¹¹⁹ bhūte **sarvatra** (see 117d) tāttvika¹²⁰ - bhedanīṣedhaḥ pratipādyata ity arthaḥ. evaṃ carācaram api **na tatpratibhāsasvabhāvasamkalpād** anyat.

3.5 Refutation of the View of the Self (ātmadarśana)

118.2 nanv¹²¹ ātmadarśanasya satyārthatve nairātmyābhāvena bhavasadbhāvād **bhavaśama**¹²² **svabhāvānām** (see 117b) kathaṃ bhedābhāva itī cet, tad asat. ātmadarśanaṃ hi dvividham, ābhisamskārikaṃ sahajaṃ ceti. tatra śārīrādivyatiriktaḥ śubhāśubhakarmakartā tatphalopabhoktā nityo vibhuś cātmety ātmābhīdhāyakaKaṇāda¹²³ śāstrādyabhyāso pājanitasamskārabhavam ābhisamskārikaṃ Vaiśeṣikādīnām. anādyavidyāvāsanāvaśād vijñāna¹²⁴ santateḥ sthira grāhakādirūpādhyavasāyī yo 'hampratyayas tadrūpaṃ tu sahajaṃ satkāyadarśanaṃ sādharāṇaṃ pṛthagjanānām.

3.5.1 Refutation of the Conceptually Formed (ābhisamskārika) View of the Self

3.5.1.1 Absence of Sādhakapramāṇas

tatra prathame pakṣe na tāvad ātmanaḥ sādha kaṃ pramāṇam asti. na hi pratyakṣeṇātmā pratīyate, cakṣurādivijñānānām rūpādīviṣayapañcakaniyatatvāt. nāpy anumānena pratīyate, kāryasvabhāvāliṅgābhāvāt, nityaparokṣeṇa¹²⁵ deśakālavatyātrekavikalēnātmanā saha kasyacid anvayavyatīrekātmakajanyajanakabhāvāsiddheḥ kāryāliṅgābhāvāt, dharmisa-

¹¹⁷ samvṛtyā] *em.*, samvṛtyā Ms; *cf.* Tib. *kun rdzob tu.*

¹¹⁸ sty eva] *em.*, 'syeva Ms; *cf.* Tib. *yod pa kho na.*

¹¹⁹ evaṃ] *em.*, eva Ms; *cf.* Tib. *de lta bur gyur pa.*

¹²⁰ tāttvika] *em.*, tatvika^o Ms; *de kho na nyid dang ldan pa'i.*

¹²¹ nanv] *em.*, na tv Ms; Tib. missing.

¹²² śama] *em.*, śama^o Ms; *cf.* Tib. *srid pa dang zhi ba'i.*

¹²³ Kaṇāda] *em.*, °raṇāda^o Ms; *cf.* Tib. *Gzeg zan pa.*

¹²⁴ vijñāna] *em.*, vijñānaṃ Ms; *cf.* Tib. *rnam par shes pa'i rgyun.*

¹²⁵ parokṣeṇa] *em.*, °parokṣaṇa^o Ms; *cf.* Tib. *rtag tu lkog tu gyur pa.*

ttāyāś cāsiddhatvāt svabhāvaliṅgāyogāt. na cānyad vidhisāadhanam liṅgam saṁbhavati yenānumānam asya syāt. anyena ca liṅgena bhavatā sādhyavyāptena¹²⁶ bhāvyaṁ. sādhyasyā¹²⁷ tmanas ca kvacid asiddher¹²⁸ vyāpakatvānīscayān¹²⁹ na tadvyāptatvaṁ¹³⁰ kasyacin niścetuṁ śakyata itī nāsyā kiṁcil liṅgam upapadyate.

118.3 nanu mā bhūc caṣurādivijñānam anumānam vā sādhakam, mānasam ahaṁpratyayarūpam adhyakṣam tv ātmano niścāyakam asty evety āśaṅkyāha — **na ca cittād anya** ityādi. **na ca cittād anyah kaścid ātmādir aham ity** ahaṁpratyayaviśayaḥ **syāt** saṁbhavet, ahaṁpratyayasya śarīrādiviśayatvāt. kṣṇo 'haṁ sthūlo 'haṁ gacchāmy aham ityādinā hy ākāreṇā¹³¹ haṁpratyaya utpadyate. na cāsyā śarīravatirikta-sya taddharmaḥ kṣṇatvaṁ sthūlatvaṁ vā, nāpi vibhor amūrtasya mūrtadravānuvidhāyiniṁ gamanakriyopapannā.

118.4 {no Tib.} na cāyam māṇavake siṁhapratyaya iva bhāktō¹³² yuktaḥ, skhalanābhāvāt. na cāsati skhalane bhaktiparikalpanā yukta, mukhyavyavahārāstaṁgamaprasaṅgāt.

118.5 tataḥ sthitam etat — ātmanaḥ sādhakam pramāṇam nāstūti sadyavahārayogyatāstaṁgataiva.

3.5.1.2 Presence of Bādhakapramāṇas

bādhakapramāṇasadbhāvena tv asyāsattvam eva yuktam. [29v] ātmā hi bhavan bodharūpo vā syād abodharūpo vā. tatrādye pakṣe caṣurādivai-phalyaprasaṅgo 'nivāryaḥ. na hi nitye rūpādyupalambhātmany ātmani caṣurādīnām asti sāphalyam.

abodharūpasyāpy ātmanaḥ sadbhāvam anupalambho bādhatē.

¹²⁶vyāptena] *em.*, °vāptena Ms; *cf.* Tib. bsgrub byas khyab par 'gyur dgos na.

¹²⁷sādhyasyā°] *em.*, sādhasyā° Ms; *cf.* Tib. bsgrub par bya ba bdag ni.

¹²⁸asiddher] *em.*, asiddhe Ms; *cf.* Tib. ma grub pa'i phyir.

¹²⁹vyāpakatvānīscayān] *em.*, vyāpakatvānīscayān Ms; *cf.* Tib. khyab par byed pa nyid du gtan la ma phebs pas.

¹³⁰tadvyāptatvaṁ] *em.*, tadvyāptitvaṁ Ms; *cf.* Tib. des khyab par.

¹³¹ityādinā hy ākāreṇā°] *em.* (Sanderson), ityādinā bāhyākāreṇā° Ms; *cf.* Tib. zhes bya ba la sogs pa'i rnam par

¹³²bhāktō] *em.*, bhokto Ms

118.6 {no Tib.} tathā hi yasya yatropalabdihlakṣaṇaprāptasyānupalambhaḥ, tasya tatrābhāvo vyavahartavyaḥ, yathāśvaśirasi viṣṇasya. upalabdihlakṣaṇaprāptasya tv ātmano 'nupalambhaḥ śarīrādāv iti.

118.7 {no Tib.} nanu śarīrādyadhikaraṇatvam ātmanas tadvādinām aniṣṭam eva. yad āha — *kasya vā śarīra ātmeti*¹³³.ⁱ tathābhūtasya ca tasya niṣedhe na kiṃcid aniṣṭam.

satyam. nāsmābhir apy atrādheyasya niṣedhaḥ kriyate, kiṃ tu saṃsargiṇaḥ.¹³⁴ saṃsargiṇa eva hi¹³⁵ niṣedhaḥ sarvatrānupalambhena kriyate, ghaṭāder api niṣedhyasya¹³⁶ saṃsargitvāt.¹³⁷ na cādheya eva saṃsargī bhavati, anyathā hy ātmanā¹³⁸ nādheyena saṃsargābhāvāt sātmakatvam api śarīrāder na syāt. na ceha niṣedhyasya śarīrādikam adhikaraṇatvenopāttam, api tv anupalambhaniṣedhavyavahārayor iti na doṣaḥ.

nanv ayam anupalambho na tāvad upalambhābhāvaḥ, tasya sādhanatvāyogāt. nāpy ekajñānasamṣargivastvantaropalambhasvabhāvaḥ, kasyacid ātmanā sahaikajñānasamṣargābhāvāt. na ca bhinnajñānaviṣaya vastūpalabdhirūpaḥ, tasyābhāvasiddhāv anupayogāt, upayoge śabdopalabdher¹³⁹ api rūpābhāvasādhakatvaprasaṅgāt. na ca gatyantaram asti. tat kimātmāyam anupalambha iti na jānīmaḥ.¹⁴⁰

ucyate — madhyama evātra pakṣo 'smākam abhimataḥ. ahaṃpratyayo hy ātmaviṣayatvena paraiḥ parikalpyate. sa ca śarīrādikam ālambamānaḥ sphuṭataram anubhūyate. ataḥ¹⁴¹ śarīrādikam evātmanā

¹³³ātmeti] *em.*, ātmiti Ms

¹³⁴saṃsargiṇaḥ.] *em.* (Isaacson), saṃsargeṇa Ms

¹³⁵saṃsargiṇa eva hi] *conj.*, evaṃ hi Ms; *cf.* Jitāri's **Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhāṣya: ldan pa kho na dgag par bya ba.*

¹³⁶niṣedhyasya] *em.* (Kellner), niṣedhasya Ms

¹³⁷saṃsargitvāt] *em.*, ca saṃsargitvāt Ms

¹³⁸hy ātmanā] *em.*, bāhyātmanā^o Ms; *cf.* Jitāri's **Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhāṣya: brten pa ma yin pa'i bdag dang.*

¹³⁹opalabdher] *em.*, °opalabdhir Ms

¹⁴⁰jānīmaḥ.] *em.*, jāma Ms; *cf.* Jitāri's **Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhāṣya: mi shes so.*

¹⁴¹ataḥ] *em.*, ata Ms

ⁱ*Nyāyavārttika ad 3.1.1; p. 320, 8–9 (or p. 325, 23).*

sahaikajñānasamṣargi bhavati, na ca tadvyatiriktam aparam ahaṃ¹⁴²-
pratyayaṅṣayabhūtam anubhūtam astīti tadupalambha eva tadanupa-
lambhaḥ.¹⁴³

nanu yadi śārīrādivyatirikto 'smadarthaḥ¹⁴⁴ praṭīviṣayo na syāt,¹⁴⁵
mama śārīram itī na syāt. asti caiṣa pratyayaḥ. tasmād asmadarthaḥ śārī-
rādivyatiriktaḥ praṭīyamāna eva draṣṭavyaḥ. tat kim ucyate nopalabhya-
ta iti?

asad etat. asantam api hi bhedaṃ abhimanyamānaḥ pratyayo jāya-
te, yathā śīlāputrakasya śārīram itī. na ca pratyayamātram atro¹⁴⁶ pala-
mbhaḥ, kiṃ tarhi pratyakṣābhimataḥ pratyayaḥ. na cāyam eva pratyak-
ṣapratyayaḥ, śīlāputrakaśārīravyatirekapratyayād apratyakṣād aviśeṣāt,
tadaviśiṣṭasya cāsyā pratyakṣatāyāṃ tasyāpi pratyakṣatāprasaṅgāt, pra-
tyakṣatāyāṃ¹⁴⁷ ca vyatiriktavastuvyavasthāṅgatāsaṅgāt. yathā ca mama
śārīrādikam itī praṭītiḥ, tathā mamātmety api bhavaty eva. tad ayaṃ de-
vānāṃ priyo 'smadarthavyatirekapratyayam anyam pramāṇayann aviśe-
ṣād imam api pramāṇayitum arhati, pramāṇayamś cāparam apy ātmā-
nam vyavasthāpayitum. athāmuṃ pratyayam śīlāpu[30r]trakaśārīravya-
tīrekapratyayapakṣe nikṣipati mama śārīrādikam ity evamātmānam api
nikṣipet. ity alam¹⁴⁸ bahunā. tasmād avasthitam etat — abodhātmānam
ātmānam¹⁴⁹ anupalambho na sahata iti.

118.8 tato 'sattvam evāsyā yuktam itī sthitam.

3.5.2 Refutation of the Innate (sahaja) View of the Self

118.9 atha sahajaṃ¹⁵⁰ satkāyadarśanam¹⁵¹ sakalalokasiddham ka-
tham apahnotuṃ¹⁵² śakyam¹⁵³ ity āśaṅkyāha — **na ca cittād** ityādi.

¹⁴² ahaṃ°] *em.*, aha° Ms

¹⁴³ tadanupalambhaḥ] *em.* (Isaacson), tadupalambhaḥ Ms; *cf.* Jitāri's **Sugatamatavibha-
ṅgabhāṣya: de mi dmigs pa yin no.*

¹⁴⁴ 'smadarthaḥ] *em.* (Watson), 'smady arthaḥ Ms

¹⁴⁵ na syāt.] *em.*, na sāte Ms

¹⁴⁶ atro°] *em.*, ato° Ms

¹⁴⁷ pratyakṣatāyāṃ] *em.*, pratyakṣato yā Ms

¹⁴⁸ alam] *em.*, a Ms

¹⁴⁹ ātmānam] *em.*, ātmanam Ms

¹⁵⁰ sahajaṃ] *em.*, sahaja° Ms

¹⁵¹ °darśanam] *em.*, °darśana Ms; *cf.* Tib. *ñig tshogs su lta ba.*

¹⁵² apahnotuṃ] *em.*, apahnetuṃ Ms; *cf.* Tib. *bsnyon par.*

¹⁵³ śakyam] *em.*, satyam Ms; *cf.* Tib. *nus.*

ayam abhiprāyaḥ. yathoktakrameṇa jñātrjñeyādirūpasakalabhāvābhāvān **na ca cittād** yathoktarūpād **anyah**¹⁵⁴ **kaścit** sthira-grāhakādirūpo **'ham** ity ahaṃkāra-ṣayaḥ **syāt** sambhavet. **ataḥ** kāraṇāt prāgu-ktacittam evāhaṃkāra-ṣayaḥ. tasmāt sarvathātmano 'bhāvāt keśādivi-jñānasyevātmadarśanasyāsatyārthatā. tato nāpi nairātmyābhāve bhava-sadbhāvād **bhavaśamasvabhāvānām** (see 117b) bhedanīṣedhābhāva iti.

3.6 Conclusion

119.0 abhedam eva yathoktam upapādayann āha — **yad rūpaṃ** ityādi.

***yad rūpaṃ pratipannaṃ**
***tasya tad eva nijam eva rūpaṃ yat |**
***tat tasyābhedamater**
***abhinnatā sarvabhāvānām || 119**

119.1 {no Tib.} tena ca cittena **yad rūpaṃ** yad vastu **pratipannaṃ** tac cittād anantarokta¹⁵⁵ yukter bahir asiddham. atas **tasya nijarūpaṃ** kiṃ bhavatu cittapratītarūpād anyābhāvāt? **tad eva rūpaṃ yac** citta-na **pratipannaṃ**. tataś ca vicāraṇam — bhedāprasiddhau **yac** cittam abhedam manyate **tac** cittasyā**bhedamatir** yā mananakriyā tato he-toḥ **sarvabhāvānām** abhedena cetasā pratipannānām abhinnaṃ eva nijam rūpaṃ. ity abhinnatvam eva teṣāṃ yuktisiddham bhavati.

119.2 athavā — **yat** sāṃvṛtaṃ¹⁵⁶ bālaiḥ **pratipannaṃ tasya yan nijam** tāttvikam¹⁵⁷ **rūpaṃ** abhrāntair dhīmadbhiḥ **pratipannaṃ, tasya tad eva nijam eva rūpaṃ. yad** yasmād evam **tat**¹⁵⁸ tasmāt sarveṣāṃ śamabhavasvabhāvānām **abhedasya** śūnyataikarūpatvena bhe-dābhāvasya **mater** avabodhād **abhinnatā sarvabhāvānām**.

¹⁵⁴anyah] *em.*, anya Ms; *cf.* Tib. *gzhan pa*.

¹⁵⁵anantarokta] *em.*, anantara° Ms

¹⁵⁶sāṃvṛtaṃ] *em.*, sāśvataṃ Ms; *cf.* Tib. *kun rdzob pa*.

¹⁵⁷tāttvikam] *em.*, tātvika° Ms; *cf.* Tib. *de kho na nyid kyī*.

¹⁵⁸tat] *em.*, tan Ms

119.3 {no Tib.} tad uktam —

eko bhāvaḥ sarvabhāvasvabhāvaḥ¹⁵⁹
sarve bhāvā ekabhāvasvabhāvāḥ |
eko bhāvas tattvato yena dṛṣṭaḥ
sarve bhāvās tattvatas tena dṛṣṭāḥ ||ⁱ

iti. Nāgārjunapādair apy uktam —

saṃvṛtivyatirekeṇa na tattvam upalabhyate |
saṃvṛtiḥ¹⁶⁰ śūnyatā proktā śūnyataiva hi saṃvṛtiḥ ||ⁱⁱ

iti.

120.0 **sarvaṃ na cāpi kiṃcid** (see 118a) ity etat sphuṭayann āha —
ābhātītyādi¹⁶¹.

***ābhāti yaś ca viśayo**
***yaś cānyaḥ kalpanāspadam kaścit |**
***tattadviyogavirahād**
***anyo'nyam ataś ca no sarvam || 120**

120.1 **ābhātī**ti grāhyatayā pratibhāsate **yaś ca** rūpādirūpo **viśayaḥ**,
yaś cānyaḥ kaścid ahaṃkāraṇaviśayo grāhakarūpaḥ **kalpanāyā āspa-**
dam āśrayaḥ, **tasya tasya** grāhyasya grāhakasya ca yo **viyogo** viyukta-
tvaṃ nānātvam tasya **virahān no sarvam anyo'nyam¹⁶²** vibhidyate.
ataś ca no sarvaṃ sarvaṃ nāma na kiṃcit, paramārthataḥ śūnyatā-
mātrarūpatvāt. nānātvam tu kālpanikam eveti bhāvaḥ.

¹⁵⁹°svabhāvaḥ] *em.*, °svābhāvaḥ Ms

¹⁶⁰saṃvṛtiḥ] *em.*, saṃvṛti Ms

¹⁶¹ābhātītyādi] *em.*, ābhād ityādi Ms

¹⁶²anyo'nyam] *em.*, anyo'nyaḥ Ms; *cf.* Tib. *phan tshun*.

ⁱ*Locus classicus* untraced. See Sferra 2003: 69.

ⁱⁱ*Bodhicittavivaraṇa* 67cd–68ab, D 40v7–41r1.

120.2 {no Tib.} ata evācāryaDignāgenoktam —

*prthagjanānām yaj¹⁶³ jñānam prakṛtivyavadānikam |
uktam tad buddhasabdena bodhisattvo¹⁶⁴ yathā jinaḥ ||ⁱ*

iti. ata eva ca Paramādye 'pi sarvasattvās tathāgatagarbhāḥ Samantabhadramahābodhisattvasarvātmatayety uktam.ⁱⁱ

120.3 tasmāt tattvato buddhābuddhatvasamatvād buddhān na bhedāḥ sattvānām¹⁶⁵, saṃvṛtyaiva¹⁶⁶ bhedāt. evaṃ ca yat **saṃbuddhīkṛtam akhilam jagad** (see 109cd) ity uktam tad yuktam¹⁶⁷ iti boddhavyam, svabhāvaśuddhatvāj jagataḥ. paramārthābhyāsāt tu¹⁶⁸ vikalpo viśodhyaḥ kalpanāvaśād buddhādi[30v]bhedādhyāropadoṣāt. evam eva saṃbuddhīkṛtanikhilajagadantarbhāvanaṃ **nijamantre** (see 109d), tadbindau ca viśvasvabhāvamaṇḍalacakravibhāvanam upapannam eve-ti vijñeyam, jñeyādyabhāve svapratibhāsasyaiva tathotpādāt. iti sarvaṃ sustham.

¹⁶³yaj] *em.*, ya Ms

¹⁶⁴°sattvo] *em.*, °satvā Ms

¹⁶⁵sattvānām] *em.*, satvānā Ms; *cf.* Tib. *sems can rnam ni.*

¹⁶⁶saṃvṛtyaiva] *em.*, saṃvṛtṭyaiva Ms; *cf.* Tib. *kun rdzob kho nar.*

¹⁶⁷yuktam] *em.*, uktam Ms; *cf.* Tib. *de 'thad pa nyid do.*

¹⁶⁸°ābhyāsāt tu] *em.*, °ābhyāsānte Ms; *cf.* Tib. *don dam pa goms pas ni.*

ⁱ*Prajñāpāramitāpīṇḍārthasaṃgraha* 37.

ⁱⁱ*Adhyardhasatikā Prajñāpāramitā*, ed. p. 97, 13–14.

Nāgarī Study Text

We give here Samantabhadra's commentary with the reconstructed root-text stripped of all notes and section headings in *Nāgarī* script.

109.0 अधुना परित इत्याद्यापूरयन् विश्वमित्यन्तेन बिन्दुयोगमाह ।

परितो निरस्तविभ्रममनन्तहृद्रश्मिनिर्मितमुनीन्द्रैः ।
संबुद्धीकृतमखिलं जगदन्तर्भाव्य निजमन्त्रे ॥ १०९ ॥

109.1 अनन्ता ये ज्ञानसत्त्वहृद्रश्मिनिर्मितमुनीन्द्रास्तैः संबुद्धीकृतमत एव परितो निरस्तविभ्रमं जगदखिलं निजमन्त्रे ज्ञानसत्त्वहृन्मन्त्रे ऽन्तर्भाव्य रूपाद्याकृतिमुक्तमित्याद्यर्थमाकलय्य सन्मन्त्रबिन्दुरूपं स्वमनः परिभावयेदिति संबन्धः ।

110.0 ननु बाह्यार्थसद्भावे कथं ज्ञानसत्त्वहृदयवर्तिकरवालस्थितबीजतनौ संबुद्धीकृतनिखिलजगदन्तर्भावनं तद्विन्दौ च विश्वस्वभावमण्डलचक्रविभावनमुपपत्तिमनुभवति ।

इति मन्यमानो ऽर्थसत्तासाधकप्रमाणाभावमेव तावत् कथयति — रूपाद्याकृतीत्यादि ।

रूपाद्याकृतिमुक्तं प्रत्यक्षेणोक्ष्यते न तद्ग्राहि ।
ग्राह्यं न चापि किञ्चित् संबन्धानीक्षणान्न चान्येन ॥ ११० ॥

110.1 रूपाद्याकृतिमुक्तमिति रूपाद्याकाररहितं तद्ग्राहीति तस्य रूपादेर्ग्राहकं न प्रत्यक्षेणोक्ष्यते । ग्राह्यं न चापि किञ्चित् प्रत्यक्षेणोक्ष्यते ।

किं तु रूपाद्याकारमेव स्वसंविद्रूपमविकल्पकमभ्रान्तं प्रत्यक्षं प्रकाशते । ग्राह्यादिरूपं तु विकल्पशिल्पिकल्पितमेवेति भावः । यदुक्तम् —

नान्यो ऽनुभाव्यो बुद्ध्यास्ति तस्या नानुभवो ऽपरः ।
ग्राह्यग्राहकवैधुर्यात् स्वयं सैव प्रकाशते ॥

तथा —

अविभागो ऽपि बुद्ध्यात्मा विपर्यासितदर्शनैः ।
ग्राह्यग्राहकसंवित्तिभेदवानिव लक्ष्यते ॥

इति ।

नन्वर्थज्ञानं संवेदनं धर्मः । तत् कथं संवेदकमन्तरेण भवेत् । धर्मा हि धर्मितन्त्रा
दृश्यन्ते, यथा पाकादयः । तस्मादवश्यमस्याः संवेदनक्रियायाः कर्त्रा संवेदकेनाश्र-
यभूतेन धर्मिणा भाव्यम् । स एव च ग्राहक उच्यते । तस्य रूपादिविषयत्वाद्ग्राह्यमपि
सिद्धम् । ततो ऽनुमानादर्थापत्तेर्वा ग्राह्यग्राहकसिद्धिरिति, कथं तन्निषेधः ।

इति शङ्कायामाह — संबन्धानीक्षणान्न चान्येनेति । रूपाद्याकृतिमुक्तं ग्राहकं ग्राह्यं
चेक्ष्यत इति संबन्धः ।

अयमभिप्रायः । अनुमानेनार्थापत्त्या परोपकल्पितप्रमाणान्तरेण वा परोक्षार्थस्य
न स्वतो ऽधिगतिः, प्रत्यक्षतापत्तेः । परतो ऽपि न, असंबन्धात्, सर्वतः सर्वप्रतिप-
त्तिप्रसङ्गात् । संबन्धो ऽपि तादात्म्यतदुत्पत्तिभ्यां नान्यो ऽव्यभिचारी संभवति । तत्र

तादात्म्यप्रतिबन्धाभ्युपगमे धर्मधर्मिणोरेकत्वमेव वास्तवमिति रूपाद्याकारसंवे-
दनमेव केवलमस्ति । ग्राहकादिभेदस्तु प्रतिपत्तध्ववसायवशेन व्यावृत्तिनिमित्तत्वात्
कल्पित एवेति संप्रतिपत्तिरेव ।

तदुत्पत्तिप्रतिबन्धाभ्युपगमे तु तन्निश्चायकयोः प्रत्यक्षानुपलम्भयोरसंभवः । न हि
परोक्षे ग्राहके धर्मिणि तौ भवितुमर्हतः । ततस्तदुत्पत्तिरप्यसंभाविनी ।

नापि रूपादिज्ञानानुपपत्त्या चक्षुरादिवद्ग्राहको ऽनुमेयः, पूर्वपूर्वकारणकलापमा-
त्राद्रूपाद्याकारज्ञानस्योत्पत्तेः । तथापि निमित्तान्तराङ्गीकारे ऽनवस्थाप्रसङ्गो दुरुत्तरः ।
ततो न वास्तवो ग्राह्यग्राहकसंवित्तिभेदः । पाकादयस्तु परमार्थतस्तथातथोत्पद्यमान-
पदार्थरूपा एव व्यावृत्तिमात्रकल्पितभेदाः, न तु तत्रापि वस्तुतः क्रियाकारकभेदो ध-
र्मधर्मिरूपः ।

111.0 ननु मा भूत् संवित्तेरन्यो ग्रहः, सैव तु सातादिरूपेणान्तःसंविदिता बहिर्दे-
शस्थरूपाद्याकारग्राहिणी संवेद्यते । तत्कथमद्वयसिद्धिरित्याशङ्कायामाह — व्यापार
इत्यादि ।

व्यापारः सातादेर्न कश्चिदेतत्परिग्रहे दृष्टः ।
युगपत्प्रतीयमानं रूपादिवदेव न ग्राही ॥ १११ ॥

111.1 तस्य रूपादेः परिग्रहे सातादिसंवेदनस्य व्यापारो न कश्चिद्दृष्टः, यतो रूपादिना सह युगपत्प्रतीयमानमेतत्सातादि वर्तते, ततो रूपादिवदेवाग्राहकं युक्तम् । यथा रूपादि सातादेरग्राहकं युगपत्प्रतीयमानत्वेनोपकार्योपकारकभावाभावात्सव्येतरविषाणवत्, तथा साताद्यपि रूपादेरग्राहकम् । अभिन्नमेव हि सहोपलम्भनियमात्, भेदस्तु विपर्यासितदर्शनैरीक्ष्यते, अभिन्नशशिनीवेति भावः । यदुक्तम् —

परिच्छेदोऽन्तरन्योऽयं भागो बहिरिव स्थितः ।
ज्ञानस्याभेदिनो भेदप्रतिभासो ह्युपप्लवः ॥

ननु ज्ञानजनकत्वेन रूपादिकं प्राक् संनिधत्ते पश्चात्सातादिसंविद्युत्पत्तिः । तत्कथं युगपत्प्रतीयमानता । अत्राभिधीयते —

यदि तावद्वैभाषिकमतेन निराकारं विज्ञानं तदुत्पत्तिप्रतिबन्धेनाकारवतोऽर्थस्य ग्राहकमिष्यते, तदा प्रतीतिमात्रस्य सर्वार्थसाधारणत्वेन नीलस्येयं प्रतीतिः पीतस्य वेति प्रतीतिप्रतिनियमाभावाद्भ्रजनाद्यर्थक्रियार्थिनो नियमेन नीलादौ प्रवृत्तिर्न स्यात् । ततः सुतरां नार्थवेदनम् ।

अथ सौत्रान्तिकनयेनाकारवद्विज्ञानं प्राग्भाविनो जनकस्यार्थक्षणस्य तदुत्पत्त्या ग्राहकमिष्यते, तदा ज्ञानकाले जनकस्यार्थक्षणस्य क्षणिकत्वेनासत्त्वादाकारद्वयसंवेदनाभावाच्च ज्ञानाकार एव केवलं संवेद्यत इत्यर्थरूपं खपुष्पं नातिशेतेति कथमर्थाङ्गीकारः ।

111.2 अर्थाभावे देशकालाकारार्थक्रियानियमेनोपलम्भो नोपपद्यत इत्यर्थापत्त्या नित्यपरोक्षस्यार्थस्य सिद्धिरिति चेत्, न, असत्यपि देशादिनियते बाह्ये वस्तुनि वासनानियमात्स्वप्नादिवन्नियतदेशाद्युपलम्भो भविष्यतीति किमनर्थकल्पनयात्मानं विप्रलभेमहि ।

111.3 अथ स्यात्स्वप्नादावपि देशान्तरदृष्टं बाह्यमेव निमित्तम् । यदाह —

स्वप्नादिप्रत्यये बाह्यं सर्वथा न हि नेष्यते ।
सर्वत्रालम्बनं बाह्यं देशकालान्यथात्मकम् ॥

इति । तत्कथं स्वप्नादिदृष्टान्तेन जाग्रद्दशाभाविविज्ञानस्य देशादिनियमो वर्णयत इति । तदसत्, स्वप्नादिज्ञानस्यालम्बनानुपपत्तेः । तद्धि ग्रहणरूपं वा स्यात् स्मरणरूपं वा । तत्र न तावद्ग्रहणम्, ग्रहणस्य हि पूर्वग्रहणानपेक्षत्वान्न पूर्वदर्शनविषयग्राहिताप्रतिनियमः स्यात्, दर्शनान्तरवत् । स्मरणरूपताप्यस्य निर्विकल्पत्वात्, वर्तमानविषयत्वात्, स्फुटाभत्वाच्च नोपपद्यते । ततः कथमस्य देशान्तरादिदृष्टवस्तुविषयत्वमिति न प्रतीमः ।

111.4 अथास्तु तन् निमित्तम् । देशादिनियमस्तु तन्निमित्तो न शक्यते समर्थयितुम् । यत्रैव हि देशादौ संनिहितं बाह्यं स्वप्ने ऽपि यदि तत्रैव प्रतिभासेत स्यादस्य तन् निमित्तम् । न चैवं संभवति, विसंवादाभावप्रसङ्गात् । तद्रहिते कुत्रचिदेव तत्प्रतिभासे तु नास्य हेतुत्वमुपपद्यते । यदि तद्रूपरहिते प्रतिभासं कुर्यात्, विशेषाभावाद्यत्र तत्र कुर्यात् ।

असत्यपि च साधारणे ऽर्थे सन्तानानियम उपलभ्यते यदा द्वयोः सदृशः स्वप्नोपलम्भो भवति, बहूनां वा भ्रान्तज्ञानिनां केशादिप्रतिभास इति ।

तथा बहिरर्थविरहे ऽप्यर्थक्रिया स्वप्ने प्रतीयत एव । यथैव जाग्रदृशायां वनिता-निमित्ताः सातादयस्तत्प्रतिबद्धाश्च विसृष्ट्यादयो ऽर्थक्रियाः साक्षादनुभूयन्ते, तथैव स्वप्नावस्थायामपि । ततो यथा स्वप्नादौ बहिरर्थमन्तरेण देशनियमादयो भवन्ति, तथा जाग्रदृशायामपि भवन्तः केनाभिभूयन्ते ।

यदुक्तम् —

कस्यचित्किंचिदेवान्तर्वासनायाः प्रबोधकम् ।
ततो धियां विनियमो न बाह्यार्थव्यपेक्षया ॥

इति । तत् संवेदनस्य बाह्यनिमित्तत्वाभावे कथं रूपादिसाताद्योः पूर्वापरभावे युगपत्प्रतीयमानताविरहदोषोपवर्णनमुपपन्नं भविष्यतीति न विद्मः ।

ननु युगपत्प्रतीयमानतायामपि रूपादिग्राहकत्वेन निश्चीयमानस्य सातादेर्ग्राहित्वमेव, अर्थस्य तु रूपादेः सकलप्रतिपत्तसाधारणत्वेन ग्राह्यत्वमेव, पूर्वपूर्वकारणकलापादेव हि विषयज्ञानक्षणानां ग्राह्यग्राहकत्वेनोत्पत्तेर्नियतत्वात् । तत् कथं ग्राह्यग्राहकसांकर्यसद्भाव इति ।

एतदप्यत्यन्तनिःसारम्, यस्मादविकल्पात्मन्यध्यक्षे न ग्राह्यग्राहकत्वाध्यवसायः साधारणत्वं वा नीलस्य प्रतिभाति । न हि नीलस्यापरप्रतिपत्तदृश्यत्वमध्यक्षगम्यम्, अपरप्रतीतेरपि प्रत्यक्षताप्रसङ्गात्; नापि लोमहर्षादिलिङ्गजानुमानगम्यम्, तस्य सामान्यविषयत्वात् । ततो ऽसाधारणरूपादियुगपत्प्रतीयमानं ज्ञानमेव, योग्यदेशकैरज्ञातस्य स्वयं ज्ञानात् ।

112.0 ननु चाक्षणिकमवयव्यादिरूपमेकमेव बाह्यं वस्तु, तस्य पूर्वापरकालस्थायित्वात्, साधारणत्वमप्यनुमानेन विज्ञायत इति नासंबद्धमित्याशङ्कायाम् आह — दृष्टं चेत्यादि ।

दृष्टं च यत् सिताद्यं तदेव कालान्तरेषु दृष्टं न ।
अन्योऽन्येन विरोधादनयोः सातादिवन्नित्यम् ॥ ११२ ॥

112.1 यत् सिताद्यं शुक्लरूपादिकमेकं दृष्टं प्रत्यक्षेण प्रतिपन्नं तदेव कालान्तरेषु पूर्व पश्चाद्वा न दृष्टम् । पूर्वापररूपरहितमेव दृष्टमित्यर्थः । हेतुमाह — अन्योऽन्येन परस्परमनयोर्दृष्टदृश्यमानयोर्दृश्यमानद्रक्ष्यमाणयोर्वा सातादिवन्नित्यं विरोधात् । संनिहितवर्तमानमात्रग्राहकं हि चक्षुरादिविज्ञानम्, अन्यथा दूरव्यवहितादेरतीतानागत-बालवृद्धादेश्च युगपद्ग्रहणप्रसङ्गो दुर्वारः स्यात् ।

112.2 उक्तं चाचार्येण बाह्यार्थनिरासार्थमात्मसाधनावतारे —

ननु ग्राह्यादिरूपेण प्रतिभासमानः कथं विकल्पमात्रात्मकः संसारो भवेदिति चेत्, न, प्रतीतिविषयस्य ग्राह्यादित्वेनाप्रसिद्धेः । न हि रूपादिप्रतिभासव्यतिरेकेणान्यद्ग्राह्यं ग्राहकं वा किञ्चिदुपलभ्यते । न चाप्रतीयमानस्वरूपं सद्यवहारविषयं नामातिप्रसङ्गात् । न च तत्संबद्धप्रतीतौ तत्प्रतीतिः, अत्यन्ताप्रत्यक्षात्मना कस्यचित् संबन्धा-प्रसिद्धेः । अन्तःप्रतिभासमानस्य सातादेर्ग्राहकत्वं नीलादेस्तु तद्वहीरूपतया प्रतीत-लक्षणस्य ग्राह्यत्वमिति चेत्, न, सुखादेर्नीलादौ व्यापारासिद्धेः । न चाप्रतीतव्यापारं ग्राहकं नाम, तथा सति बाह्यस्यापि रूपादेर्ग्राहकत्वप्रसङ्गात् । न हि युगपत्स्वातन्त्र्येण प्रतिभासमानयोः किञ्चिद्ग्राह्यं किञ्चिद्ग्राहकमिति प्रतिनियमकारणं पश्यामः । अहं नी-लादिकं वेद्वीत्यपि कल्पनामात्रमेव, स्वातन्त्र्येणान्तर्बहिःप्रतिभासमानानां प्रतीतेः । स्वतन्त्रानुभवप्रकाशनपरो वा सर्व एवायं ग्राहकादिविकल्पप्रबन्धः, परस्परपरिग्रह-व्यापाररहितेष्वेव प्रतिभासमानेषु भावात् । तन्न किञ्चित्कस्यचिद्ग्राहकं नाम । तथा चाह — न हि सुभूते धर्मो धर्मं जानातीति विस्तरः । यत्तूक्तम् — इत्यपि रूपाणि द्वाभ्यां विज्ञानाभ्यां विज्ञायन्त इत्यादि, तत् तद्रूपाध्यवसायमात्रापेक्षया क्वचित्युद्ग्ला-दिदेशनावदित्यदोषः ।

इति ।

112.3 तदियता ग्राह्यग्राहकसाधकप्रमाणनिरासो दर्शितः ।

113.0 इदानीं बाधकप्रमाणेनार्थानामसत्त्वाद्धिज्ञप्तिमात्रतां ख्यापयन्नाह — एकं न चेत्यादि ।

एकं न च रूपादेराद्यन्तादिप्रभेदतो दृष्टेः ।
परमाणुशोऽप्यदृष्टेरनेकरूपं न भवति तद्वच्च ॥ ११३ ॥

113.1 अयमभिप्रायः । बाह्यं वस्त्वर्थो गुणद्रव्यादिभेदेन बहुप्रकारः परैरुपवर्ण्यते । तत्र गुणादीनां धर्माणामाश्रयो द्रव्यम्, तन्निषेधेनैव ते समूलमुन्मूलिता भवन्तीति न पृथग्दूषणमभिधीयते । न चासति समवायिनि समवाय इति तद्दूषणमपि नाख्यायते ।

द्रव्यं च पृथिव्यसेजो वायुराकाशं कालो दिगात्मा मन इति नवविधम् । तत्रात्मानन्तरं निराकर्तव्यः । आकाशं तु शब्दगुणमिष्टम्, तच्चैकमिति समानदेशत्वात्सर्वशब्दानां भेदेन श्रुतिर्न स्यात् । ततश्च समीपदेश इव व्यवहितदेशाभिमतो ऽपि शब्दः श्रूयेत, न वान्यो ऽपीत्येकान्तः । दिक्कालयोश्चैकत्वात्पूर्वापरादिप्रत्ययायोगः ।

स्यादेतदुपाधीनां भेदेनायं प्रत्ययविभाग इति । किमुपाधीनां स्वतः पौर्वापर्यमुत परतः । तत्राद्ये पक्षे तत एव तत्रतीतिसिद्धेर्निःप्रयोजनावेतौ । द्वितीये तु पक्षे यदि दिक्कालाभ्यामेव तदा तदेवेदमेकत्वादनयोर्न संगच्छति । अन्यतश्चेत् तदवस्थं तयोर्वैयर्थ्यम् ।

नित्याश्रामी व्योमदिक्कालाः सहकारिसाहित्ये तद्विरहे वालब्धस्वभावभेदाः, कथं कदाचिदेव स्वकार्यं जनयेयुः । तथा हि —

तेषां शक्तिरशक्तिर्वा या स्वभावेन संस्थिता ।
नित्यत्वादचिकित्स्यानां कस्तां क्षपयितुं क्षमः ॥

अनेन मनो ऽपि निरस्तम् । युगपज्ज्ञानानुत्पत्त्या च मनोवादिनां मनो ऽनुमेयम् । अनुभूयन्त एव च नर्तकीदर्शनादौ युगपद्विज्ञानानि, न चैतन्मनसि सति कदाचिद्युज्यते । तस्मान्न सन्त्येव व्योमादयः ।

पृथिव्यादयो ऽवशिष्यन्ते । ते ऽप्यवयविपरमाणुभेदेन द्विधा कल्पिताः ।

तत्रापि नावयवी सन् नापि परमाणवः सन्तः, तदुभयत्रापि बाधकसद्भावादिति । तदेव बाधकं यथाक्रमं कथयति । एकमिति परमाणुभिर्द्विगुणादिक्रमेणारब्धमवयविरूपं प्रसिद्धं घटादिकं च नैवास्ति, रूपादेराद्यन्तमध्यादिप्रभेदेनान्योऽन्यविरोधिना धर्मण स्थूलैकरूपरहितस्यैव दृष्टेर्हेतोः । तदनेनैकज्ञानसंसर्गिवस्तूपलम्भरूपो ऽनुपलम्भो हेतुरुक्तः ।

भागा एव हि भासन्ते संनिविष्टास्तथा ।
तद्धानन्यः पुनर्नैव निर्विभागः प्रकाशते ॥

एकस्यावयवस्य रागे कम्पे वा तत्समवेतो ऽप्यवयवी रक्तः कम्पमानो वा दृश्येत । अवयवे रागः कम्पो वा नावयविनीति चेत्, स तर्ह्यरक्तो ऽकम्पमानो वा दृश्येत । एकावयवावरणे च तस्यावृतौ न स दृश्येत । तदनावरणे ऽनावृतस्य तस्योपलब्धेः प्रसङ्गो दुर्निवारः स्यादिति भेदकात्मकविरुद्धधर्माध्यासान्नैको ऽवयवी भवितुमर्हतीत्यसद्व्यवहारविषयत्वमेवास्य प्राप्तकालं पश्यामः ।

इदानीमेकनिषेधे चानेकरूपमवशिष्यते । तच्चानेकैरनेकप्रकारमुपकल्पितम् । यथा वैभाषिकैः साक्षादध्यक्षगोचराः, वैशेषिकैस्त्ववयवव्यारम्भकाः, सौत्रान्तिकैश्च नित्यपरोक्षाः पिशाचायमाना दर्शने स्वाकारसमर्पणप्रवणाः परमाणव इष्यन्ते ।

तत्र तावद्वैभाषिककल्पितपरमाणून् निराकर्तुमाह — परमाणुशो ऽपीत्यादि ।
यथा चैकं स्थूलं नास्ति तद्वदनेकं च न भवति । हेतुमाह — परमाणुशो ऽप्यदृष्टेरिति
परमाणुरूपस्य परस्परविविक्तस्यानुपलब्धेरित्यर्थः ।

114.0 अथ स्थूलान्यथानुपपत्त्या परमाण्वनुमानमित्याह — निरवयवत्व इत्यादि ।

निरवयवत्वे चाणोरनेकपरमाणुपरिकराभावात् ।
भूमण्डलादिरूपप्रचयो न हि कश्चिदत्र स्यात् ॥ ११४ ॥

114.1 अयमभिप्रायः । सावयवत्वं तावत् परमाणोर्द्रष्टव्यम्, युगपदंशैर्विरुद्धदिग्-
वर्तिभिः षड्भ्योऽङ्गादिना विरुद्धधर्मसंसर्गेण स्थूलस्येव नानात्वप्रसङ्गात् । निरवयवत्वे चां-
शलक्षणावयवरहितत्वे सत्येकस्याणोरनेकैः परमाणुभिः परिकरस्य परिवेष्टनस्याभावः
स्यात्, यतः परमाणुपरिवेष्टने तस्याधरोत्तरचतुर्दिक्परमाणुमध्यासिनो नियमेन षडं-
शतापत्तिः । यो ह्यस्य स्वभावः पूर्वपरमाणुप्रत्यासन्नो न स एवापरपरमाणुप्रत्यासन्नो
घटते, तयोरेकदेशतापत्तेः । एवं हि पूर्वपरमाणुसंनिहितः स्वभावो ऽपरं परमाणुं प्रत्या-
सीदेद्यदि, सो ऽपि तत्र स्यात् । प्रत्यासत्त्यभावे ऽप्याभिमुख्यमात्रे ऽप्ययमेव दोषः ।
ततश्च परमाणुमात्रपिण्डरूपप्रसङ्गाद्भूमण्डलादिरूपप्रचयः कश्चिदत्र न हि स्यात् । य-
दाह —

संयुक्तं दूरदेशस्थं नैरन्तर्यव्यवस्थितम् ।
एकाण्वभिमुखं रूपं यदणोर्मध्यवर्तिनः ॥
अण्वन्तराभिमुख्येन तदेव यदि कल्प्यते ।
प्रचयो भूधरादीनामेवं सति न युज्यते ॥

इति ।

114.2 तस्मादवश्यं तयोः स्वभावयोर्भेदो ऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः । यथा चानयोस्तथाधरो-
त्तरदक्षिणोत्तरपरमाणुप्रत्यासन्नानां स्वभावानां भेद इति षडंशतैव परमाणोर्बलादाप-
तति । तदाह —

षड्केन युगपद्योगात् परमाणोः षडंशता ।
षण्णां समानदेशत्वात् पिण्डः स्यादणुमात्रकः ॥

इति ।

114.3 न चैकासिद्धावनेकस्य सिद्धिरिति न सन्ति परमाणवः ।

114.4

मीमांसकैश्च नावश्यमिष्यन्ते परमाणवः ।

इति न परमाणुनिराकरणमात्रेण निराकृतः स्यादवयवीति नास्य व्यर्थं दूषणम् ।

114.5 अस्तु तर्हि विज्ञानमात्रस्वभावं जगत् । तदप्येकमनेकं वा रूपं प्राग्वन्न क्षमत इति गगनाजमिव न सद्यवहारमर्हति । वस्तुसतो गत्यन्तराभावादेकानेकयोरन्यतरेण तेन भाव्यम् । न च तत् तथा घटत इति कथमिदं सद्यवहारविषय इति न जानीमः ।

अथैकानेकस्वभावायोगो विज्ञाने न संभवतीति स्यात् । तदसत्, साकारज्ञाने बाह्यत इवैकानेकरूपविरहस्य स्पष्टत्वात् । यत्र हि लोकस्य बाह्यार्थव्यवहारस्तदेव साकारवादिनो ज्ञानम् । ततो यत् तस्य बहिर्भावे बाधकं तदेवान्तर्भावे ऽपि । बाधकेन हि स्थूलमेकमनेकं च परमाणुरूपमपाक्रियते । विज्ञानात्मभूतश्चायमाकारो यद्येकः स्थूलो यदि वानेकः परमाणुशो भिन्न उभयथापि बहिरर्थभावि दूषणमशक्यमपगन्तुम् । न हि तद् विज्ञानबहिर्भावनिबन्धनं दूषणं येन तद्भावे न भवेत् ।

मूर्तिनिबन्धनं बाधकं नामूर्ते विज्ञानात्मनीत्यप्यसारम्, नीलाद्याकारतायां विज्ञानस्यापि मूर्तत्वात् । अयमेव हि देशवितानवानाकारो मूर्तिः । तदस्य बाह्यत्वे मूर्तिसंज्ञा न तु ज्ञानत्व इति न विद्मः ।

114.6 स्यान्मतम् — येषां साकारं विज्ञानं तेषामयमस्तु दोषः । येषां तु निराकारं सुखादिरूपं तात्त्विकमिति पक्षस्तेषामयमेकानेकवियोगः कथं संगच्छेत । अत्राभिधीयते । इह प्रकाशात्मकं विज्ञानम्, न च प्रकाशमाननीलादिव्यतिरिक्तस्तेषां प्रकाशः स्वप्ने ऽपि संविद्यते, न च सुखादिवत् प्रकाशमानस्य नीलादेरलीकता युज्यते ।

बाधकसद्भावादिति चेत्, तदेतद् बाधकं सुखादौ केन बाध्यते । सुखादेरमूर्तत्वात् तदभाव इति चेत्, नैतदस्ति, तस्यापि देशवितानेन प्रकाशमानस्य शक्यापहवत्वात् । श्रान्तस्य हि यावन्त्यङ्गानि पयसि विशन्ति तावतां व्यापकं सुखमुपजायमानमनुभूयते । नापि तथानुभूयमानमदेशवितानं नाम, शरीरस्यापि तद्भावप्रसङ्गात्, देशविताने च शरीरवदस्यापि मूर्तत्वात् । तदेतदाकारवन् निराकारं वा विज्ञानं बहिर्भावविहितदूषणं नातिक्रामतीति न पृथग्दूषणमाहितमाचार्येणेति प्रतिपत्तव्यम् ।

114.7 तत्स्थितमेतत् — एतद्विज्ञानमपि न सद्यवहारमर्हतीति । तर्हि ज्ञानज्ञेययोरसत्त्वादसद्रूपं तत्त्वमिति स्यात् । न । संवृत्या स्याद्विज्ञानम्, संवृतेरशक्यापहवत्वात् ।

अस्तित्वनिषेधान्नास्तित्वं बलादायातमिति चेत्, न, अस्तित्वपूर्वकत्वान्नास्तित्वस्य, तदसिद्धौ तस्याप्यसिद्धेः । यदाह —

अस्तित्वपूर्वकं नास्ति अस्ति नास्तित्वपूर्वकम् ।
अतो नास्ति न वक्तव्यमस्तित्वं न च कल्पयेत् ॥

इति । नापि सदसदात्मतयोभयरूपं सदसतोर्विरोधात् । नापि सदसद्भ्यामन्यदेवानुभ-
यस्वभावम्, उभयबहिर्भूतस्य पर्युदस्तस्यायोगात् ।

न किञ्चित्त्विह तत्त्वमिति प्राप्तम् । नन्वेतदेव तत्त्वं यदुत तत्त्वरहितत्वं नाम । त-
त्स्थितमेतत् —

चतुःकोटिविनिर्मुक्तं विज्ञानं प्रतिभासते ।
इति तत्त्वविदां तत्त्वं न तत्त्वमपि तत्त्वतः ॥

इति ।

114.8 तदुक्तं ज्ञानपादैः —

अस्तु तर्हि विज्ञप्तिमात्रस्वभावमनश्चरात्मकं जगत्

इत्याद्युपक्रम्य,

न, विज्ञानस्याप्येकानेकस्वभाववैधुर्यात् । तथा हि न तदेकम्, नीलादिभेदेनोपल-
म्भवैचित्र्यात्, एकवर्णस्यापि धवलादेरादिमध्यान्तभेदेन प्रतिभासनात्, अर्थक्रियो-
पयोगभेदाच्च; अनेकत्वस्य चैतावन्मात्रलक्षणत्वात् । नाप्यनेकम्, परमाणुकल्पानां
सितादिप्रतिभासभागानामप्रतीतेः । न चैकानेकव्यतिरेकेण प्रकारान्तरमस्ति, अन-
योरन्योन्याभावस्वभावत्वेन विरोधात् ।

ननु सर्वथा निरात्मकत्वे भावानां कुतो ऽयमनुभूयमानो ऽर्थक्रियाभेद इति चेत्, अ-
विचारितैकात्मनः पूर्वपूर्वकल्पनामात्रादेव तदन्यस्याप्रतीतेरित्यावेदितम् ।

अस्तु तर्हि भावत एव सत्त्वं सर्वभावानां वस्तुत्वस्यार्थक्रियालक्षणत्वात् ।

इति चेत्, तन्न, प्रतिभासमात्रेण सत्ताभ्युपगमे ऽविरोधात् । यथोक्तक्रमेण लक्षणवि-
वेकादेव नैरात्म्यं व्यवस्थाप्यते, न तु प्रतिभासमात्रतयाप्यपह्नवादिति । यथाह — न
हि सुभूते ऽन्यद्रूपमन्या शून्यता, अपि तु रूपमेव शून्यं रूपलक्षणेनेति विस्तरः ।

अत एव पूर्वापरभेदेन समस्तसांवृतवस्तुप्रतिभासमानत्वान्न नित्यत्वमाशङ्कनीयम् ।
यत्तु विज्ञप्तिमात्रं भो जिनपुत्रा यदुत त्रैधातुकमित्युक्तं तदत्यन्तभावाभिनिवेशिनां ब-
हिरर्थाध्यवसायनिरासार्थम्, तस्मिन्सति सुखेनैव चित्तमात्राध्यवसायस्यापि निराक-
रणसंभवात् । तदेवाह —

चित्तमात्रं समाश्रित्य ज्ञेया बाह्यास्वभावता ।
तथतालम्बने स्थित्वा चित्तमात्रं व्यतिक्रमेत् ॥

इति ।

114.9 तदियता बाधकप्रमाणसद्भावो दर्शितः ।

115.0 ततश्च साधकप्रमाणाभावाद्बाधकसद्भावाच्च ज्ञेयादिसमस्तवस्तुनैरात्म्याज्ज-
गदिदं कल्पनामात्रनिर्मितस्वभावमित्युपसंहरन्नाह — तद्ग्राहकादीत्यादि ।

तद्ग्राहकादिविरहात् स्वतन्त्ररूपादिकल्पनारूपम् ।
गन्धर्वनगरसंनिभमखिलं सचराचरं वस्तु ॥ ११५ ॥

115.1 तदित्यनन्तरोक्तोपपत्तिसामर्थ्यतो ग्राहकादिविरहाद्गन्धर्वनगरसंनिभम्, पर-
मार्थसन्निमित्तरहितत्वेन च कल्पनासन्ततिरूपतया स्वतन्त्ररूपादिकल्पनारूपं स्थाव-
रजङ्गमं वस्तु ।

116.0 ननु यद्येवं तत्त्वं तदा शुद्धमेवेति कथं संसारः, तदभावाद्यवदानं च कथं भवे-
दिति शङ्कायामाह — आत्मेत्यादि ।

आत्मात्मीयारोपाद्विकल्पसन्तान एष संसारः ।
शुद्धिस्तद्विपरीतस्वरूपमात्रा तु विज्ञेया ॥ ११६ ॥

116.1 तत्रैव चतुःकोटिरहिते चेतस्यात्माद्यारोप्य विकल्पसन्तानाकारः संसारः,
शुद्धिस्तु मोक्षः पुनरात्माद्यारोपविपरीतनैरात्म्यस्वरूपमात्रनिष्ठत्वेन विज्ञेया । अत ए-
वोक्तम् — कल्पनाशुद्धौ यतितव्यम् । तथा हि बहिरर्थाध्यवसायी विकल्पो भ्रान्त-
त्वाद्भवानुकूलः प्राकृतः, स्वरूपमात्रनिष्ठत्वेनाभ्रान्तत्वेनाविकल्पत्वात् प्रत्यक्षरूपः प-
रिशुद्धः । तदुक्तम् —

कल्पनापि स्वसंवित्ताविष्टा नार्थे विकल्पनात् ।

इति ।

116.2 रागादयो ऽप्यारोपयन्तो दुष्टचित्तस्वरूपनिष्ठाः । तदुक्तं श्रीपरमाद्ये —

रागो द्वेषश्च मोहश्च त्रय एते विषतां गताः ।
विषत्वमुपयान्त्येते विषमेण तु सेविताः ।
अमृतत्वं पुनर्यान्ति अमृतत्वाय सेविताः ॥

इति । ततो विकल्पं बहिरर्थाध्यवसायदोषाद्यावर्त्य स्वरूपे ऽवस्थापयितुं योगिभिर्य-
तितव्यम् ।

117.0 तस्माद्विकल्पो ऽपि स्वरूपे निर्विकल्प एवेति स्वभावशुद्धाः सर्वधर्माः । त-
दाह — न च कश्चिदित्यादि ।

न च कश्चिदत्र भेदो धर्मतया शमभवस्वभावानाम् ।
ग्राह्याद्याकृतिविरहः सर्वत्र यतः सदा सिद्धः ॥ ११७ ॥

117.1 कश्चिदिति निर्वाणमिदं संसारस्त्वयम्, इयं समलावस्थेयं तु निर्मलावस्था,
हेयमिदमुपादेयमिदमित्यादिर्भेदो विशेषो न च नैव युक्तो धर्मतयेति तत्त्वतः । अत्रो-
पपत्तिमाह — ग्राह्येत्यादि । अत एवार्यनागार्जुनपादैरप्युक्तम् —

निर्वाणं च भवश्चैव द्वयमेतन्न विद्यते ।
परिज्ञानं भवस्यैव निर्वाणमिति कथ्यते ॥

न संसारस्य निर्वाणात् किञ्चिदस्ति विशेषणम् ।
न निर्वाणस्य संसारात् किञ्चिदस्ति विशेषणम् ॥

इति ।

117.2 भगवताप्युक्तम् —

या सुभूते पृथग्जनतथता या च तथागततथतैकैव ।

इत्यादिविस्तरः ।

118.0 अथ यदि तत्त्वतः शमभवस्वभावानां न भेदः, कथं तर्हि ग्राह्याद्याकृतिविरहः
सर्वत्रेत्यभिधीयते । सर्वशब्दः किलानेकार्थविषयः, स च भेदाभावे प्रयोगं नार्हतीत्या-
शङ्क्याह — सर्वं न चेत्यादि ।

सर्वं न चापि किञ्चित् तत्प्रतिभासस्वभावसंकल्पात् ।
न च चित्तादन्यः स्यादहमिति कश्चिदत आत्मादिः ॥ ११८ ॥

118.1 संवृत्या तु शमभवस्वभावानां भेदो ऽस्त्येव, ततः सांवृतवस्तुप्रतिभासस्व-
भावो यः संकल्पस्ततो ऽन्यन्न किञ्चित्सर्वं नाम । विकल्पारोपितभेदविषयः सर्वश-
ब्दः । तदेवंभूते सर्वत्र तात्त्विकभेदनिषेधः प्रतिपाद्यत इत्यर्थः । एवं चराचरमपि न
तत्प्रतिभासस्वभावसंकल्पादन्यत् ।

118.2 नन्वात्मदर्शनस्य सत्यार्थत्वे नैरात्म्याभावेन भवसद्भावाद् भवशमस्वभावानां कथं भेदाभाव इति चेत्, तदसत् । आत्मदर्शनं हि द्विविधम्, आभिसंस्कारिकं सहजं चेति । तत्र शरीरादिव्यतिरिक्तः शुभाशुभकर्मकर्ता तत्फलोपभोक्ता नित्यो विभुश्चात्मेत्यात्माभिधायककणादशास्त्राद्यभ्यासोपजनितसंस्कारभवमाभिसंस्कारिकं वैशेषिकादीनाम् । अनाद्यविद्यावासनावशाद्विज्ञानसन्ततेः स्थिरग्राहकादिरूपाध्यवसायी यो ऽहंप्रत्ययरूपं तु सहजं सत्कायदर्शनं साधारणं पृथग्जनानाम् ।

तत्र प्रथमे पक्षे न तावदात्मनः साधकं प्रमाणमस्ति । न हि प्रत्यक्षेणात्मा प्रतीयते, चक्षुरादिविज्ञानानां रूपादिविषयपञ्चकनियतत्वात् । नाप्यनुमानेन प्रतीयते, कार्यस्वभावलिङ्गाभावात्, नित्यपरोक्षेण देशकालव्यतिरेकविकलेनात्मना सह कस्यचिदन्वयव्यतिरेकात्मकजन्यजनकभावासिद्धेः कार्यलिङ्गाभावात्, धर्मिसत्तायाश्चासिद्धत्वात् स्वभावलिङ्गायोगात् । न चान्यद्विधिसाधनं लिङ्गं संभवति येनानुमानमस्य स्यात् । अन्येन च लिङ्गेन भवता साध्यव्याप्तेन भाव्यम् । साध्यस्यात्मनश्च क्वचिदसिद्धेर्व्यापकत्वानिश्चयान्न तद्याप्तत्वं कस्यचिन् निश्चेतुं शक्यत इति नास्य किंचिल्लिङ्गमुपपद्यते ।

118.3 ननु मा भूच्चक्षुरादिविज्ञानमनुमानं वा साधकम्, मानसमहंप्रत्ययरूपमध्यक्षं त्वात्मनो निश्चायकमस्त्येवेत्याशङ्क्याह — न च चित्तादन्य इत्यादि । न च चित्तादन्यः कश्चिदात्मादिरहमित्यहंप्रत्ययविषयः स्यात् संभवेत्, अहंप्रत्ययस्य शरीरादिविषयत्वात् । कृष्णो ऽहं स्थूलो ऽहं गच्छाम्यहमित्यादिना ह्याकारेणाहंप्रत्यय उत्पद्यते । न चास्य शरीरव्यतिरिक्तस्य तद्धर्मः कृष्णत्वं स्थूलत्वं वा, नापि विभोरमूर्तस्य मूर्तद्रव्यानुविधायिनी गमनक्रियोपपन्ना ।

118.4 न चायं माणवके सिंहप्रत्यय इव भाक्तो युक्तः, स्वलनाभावात् । न चासति स्वलने भक्तिपरिकल्पना युक्ता, मुख्यव्यवहारास्तंगमप्रसङ्गात् ।

118.5 ततः स्थितमेतत् — आत्मनः साधकं प्रमाणं नास्तीति सद्यवहारयोग्यतास्तंगतैव ।

बाधकप्रमाणसद्भावेन त्वस्यासत्त्वमेव युक्तम् । आत्मा हि भवन् बोधरूपो वा स्यादबोधरूपो वा । तत्राप्ये पक्षे चक्षुरादिवैफल्यप्रसङ्गो ऽनिवार्यः । न हि नित्ये रूपाद्युपलम्भात्मन्यात्मनि चक्षुरादीनामस्ति साफल्यम् ।

अबोधरूपस्याप्यात्मनः सद्भावमनुपलम्भो बाधते ।

118.6 तथा हि यस्य यत्रोपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तस्यानुपलम्भः, तस्य तत्राभावो व्यवहर्तव्यः, यथाश्वशिरसि विषाणस्य । उपलब्धिलक्षणप्राप्तस्य त्वात्मनो ऽनुपलम्भः शरीरादाविति ।

118.7 ननु शरीराद्यधिकरणत्वमात्मनस्तद्वादिनामनिष्ठमेव । यदाह — कस्य वा शरीर आत्मेति । तथाभूतस्य च तस्य निषेधे न किञ्चिदनिष्ठम् ।

सत्यम् । नास्माभिरप्यत्राधेयस्य निषेधः क्रियते, किं तु संसर्गिणः । संसर्गिण एव हि निषेधः सर्वत्रानुपलम्भेन क्रियते, घटादेरपि निषेध्यस्य संसर्गित्वात् । न चाधेय एव संसर्गी भवति, अन्यथा ह्यात्मनानाधेयेन संसर्गाभावात् सात्मकत्वमपि शरीरादेर्न स्यात् । न चेह निषेध्यस्य शरीरादिकमधिकरणत्वेनोपात्तम्, अपि त्वनुपलम्भनिषेधव्यवहारयोरिति न दोषः ।

नन्वयमनुपलम्भो न तावदुपलम्भाभावः, तस्य साधनत्वायोगात् । नाप्येकज्ञानसंसर्गिवस्त्वन्तरोपलम्भस्वभावः, कस्यचिदात्मना सहैकज्ञानसंसर्गाभावात् । न च भिन्नज्ञानविषयवस्तूपलब्धिरूपः, तस्याभावसिद्धावनुपयोगात्, उपयोगे शब्दोपलब्धेरपि रूपाभावसाधकत्वप्रसङ्गात् । न च गत्यन्तरमस्ति । तत् किमात्मायमनुपलम्भ इति न जानीमः ।

उच्यते — मध्यम एवात्र पक्षो ऽस्माकमभिमतः । अहंप्रत्ययो ह्यात्मविषयत्वेन परैः परिकल्प्यते । स च शरीरादिकमालम्बमानः स्फुटतरमनुभूयते । अतः शरीरादिकमेवात्मना सहैकज्ञानसंसर्गि भवति, न च तद्व्यतिरिक्तमपरमहं प्रत्ययविषयभूतमनुभूतमस्तीति तदुपलम्भ एव तदनुपलम्भः ।

ननु यदि शरीरादिव्यतिरिक्तो ऽस्मदर्थः प्रतीतिविषयो न स्यात्, मम शरीरमिति न स्यात् । अस्ति चैष प्रत्ययः । तस्मादस्मदर्थः शरीरादिव्यतिरिक्तः प्रतीयमान एव द्रष्टव्यः । तत् किमुच्यते नोपलभ्यत इति ।

असदेतत् । असन्तमपि हि भेदमभिमन्यमानः प्रत्ययो जायते, यथा शिलापुत्रकस्य शरीरमिति । न च प्रत्ययमात्रमत्रोपलम्भः, किं तर्हि प्रत्यक्षाभिमतः प्रत्ययः । न चायमेव प्रत्यक्षप्रत्ययः, शिलापुत्रकशरीरव्यतिरेकप्रत्ययादप्रत्यक्षादविशेषात्, तद्विशिष्टस्य चास्य प्रत्यक्षतायां तस्यापि प्रत्यक्षताप्रसङ्गात्, प्रत्यक्षतायां च व्यतिरिक्तवस्तुव्यवस्थाङ्गतासङ्गात् । यथा च मम शरीरादिकमिति प्रतीतिः, तथा ममात्मेत्यपि भवत्येव । तदयं देवानां प्रियो ऽस्मदर्थव्यतिरेकप्रत्ययमन्यं प्रमाणयन्नविशेषादिममपि प्रमाणयितुमर्हति, प्रमाणयंश्चापरमप्यात्मानं व्यवस्थापयितुम् । अथामुं प्रत्ययं शिलापुत्रकशरीरव्यतिरेकप्रत्ययपक्षे निक्षिपति मम शरीरादिकमित्येवमात्मानमपि निक्षिपेत् । इत्यलं बहुना । तस्मादेव स्थितमेतत् — अबोधात्मानमात्मानमनुपलम्भो न सहत इति ।

118.8 ततो ऽसत्त्वमेवास्य युक्तमिति स्थितम् ।

118.9 अथ सहजं सत्कायदर्शनं सकललोकसिद्धं कथमपहोतुं शक्यमित्याशङ्क्याह — न च चित्तादित्यादि । अयमभिप्रायः । यथोक्तक्रमेण ज्ञातृज्ञेयादिरूपसकलभावाभावान्न च चित्ताद्यथोक्तरूपादन्यः कश्चित् स्थिरग्राहकादिरूपो ऽहमित्यहंकारविषयः स्यात् संभवेत् । अतः कारणात् प्रागुक्तचित्तमेवाहंकारविषयः । तस्मात् सर्वथात्मनो ऽभावात् केशादिविज्ञानस्येवात्मदर्शनस्यासत्यार्थता । ततो नापि नैरात्म्याभावे भवसद्भावाद्भवशमस्वभावानां भेदनिषेधाभाव इति ।

119.0 अभेदमेव यथोक्तमुपपादयन्नाह — यद्रूपमित्यादि ।

यद्रूपं प्रतिपन्नं तस्य तदेव निजमेव रूपं यत् ।
तत्तस्याभेदमतेरभिन्नता सर्वभावानाम् ॥ ११९ ॥

119.1 तेन च चित्तेन यद्रूपं यद्वस्तु प्रतिपन्नं तच्चित्तादनन्तरोक्तयुक्तेर्बहिरसिद्धम् । अतस्तस्य निजरूपं किं भवतु चित्तप्रतीतरूपादन्याभावात् । तदेव रूपं यच्चित्तेन प्रतिपन्नम् । ततश्च विचारणम् — भेदाप्रसिद्धौ यच्चित्तमभेदं मन्यते तच्चित्तस्याभेदमतिर्या मननक्रिया ततो हेतोः सर्वभावानामभेदेन चेतसा प्रतिपन्नानामभिन्नमेव निजं रूपम् । इत्यभिन्नत्वमेव तेषां युक्तिसिद्धं भवति ।

119.2 अथवा — यत्सांवृतं बालैः प्रतिपन्नं तस्य यन्निजं तात्त्विकं रूपमभ्रान्तैर्धीमद्भिः प्रतिपन्नम्, तस्य तदेव निजमेव रूपम् । यद्यस्मादेवं तत्तस्मात्सर्वेषां शमभवस्वभावानामभेदस्य शून्यतैकरूपत्वेन भेदाभावस्य मतेरवबोधादभिन्नता सर्वभावानाम् ।

119.3 तदुक्तम् —

एको भावः सर्वभावस्वभावः सर्वे भावा एकभावस्वभावाः ।
एको भावस्तत्त्वतो येन दृष्टः सर्वे भावास्तत्त्वतस् तेन दृष्टाः ॥

इति । नागार्जुनपादैरप्युक्तम् —

संवृतिव्यतिरेकेण न तत्त्वमुपलभ्यते ।
संवृतिः शून्यता प्रोक्ता शून्यतैव हि संवृतिः ॥

इति ।

120.0 सर्वं न चापि किञ्चिदित्येतत्स्फुटयन्नाह — आभातीत्यादि ।

आभाति यश्च विषयो यश्चान्यः कल्पनास्पदं कश्चित् ।
तत्तद्वियोगविरहादन्योऽन्यमतश्च नो सर्वम् ॥ १२० ॥

120.1 आभातीति ग्राह्यतया प्रतिभासते यश्च रूपादिरूपो विषयः, यश्चान्यः कश्चि-
दहंकारविषयो ग्राहकरूपः कल्पनाया आस्पदमाश्रयः, तस्य तस्य ग्राह्यस्य ग्राहकस्य
च यो वियोगो वियुक्तत्वं नानात्वं तस्य विरहान्नो सर्वमन्योऽन्यं विभिद्यते । अतश्च नो
सर्वं सर्वं नाम न किञ्चित्, परमार्थतः शून्यतामात्ररूपत्वात् । नानात्वं तु काल्पनिकम्
एवेति भावः ।

120.2 अत एवाचार्यदिग्गणेनोक्तम् —

पृथग्जनानां यज्ज्ञानं प्रकृतिव्यवदानिकम् ।
उक्तं तद्बुद्धशब्देन बोधिसत्त्वो यथा जिनः ॥

इति । अत एव च परमाद्ये ऽपि सर्वसत्त्वास्तथागतगर्भाः समन्तभद्रमहाबोधिसत्त्व-
सर्वात्मतयेत्युक्तम् ।

120.3 तस्मात् तत्त्वतो बुद्धाबुद्धत्वसमत्वाद्बुद्धान्न भेदः सत्त्वानाम्, संवृत्यैव भेदात् ।
एवं च यत् संबुद्धीकृतमखिलं जगदित्युक्तं तद्युक्तमिति बोद्धव्यम्, स्वभावशुद्धत्वाज्ज-
गतः । परमार्थाभ्यासात्तु विकल्पो विशोध्यः कल्पनावशाद्बुद्धादिभेदाध्यारोपदोषात् ।
एवमेव संबुद्धीकृतनिखिलजगदन्तर्भावनं निजमन्त्रे, तद्विन्दौ च विश्वस्वभावमण्डल-
चक्रविभावनमुपपन्नमेवेति विज्ञेयम्, ज्ञेयाद्यभावे स्वप्रतिभासस्यैव तथोत्पादात् । इति
सर्वं सुस्थम् ।

Formatted Diplomatic Transcript of the Sanskrit

For the sake of easy reference we have formatted this transcript and have given the paragraph (but not the higher-register) headings in bold at the beginning of the paragraph. Cancelled or erased *akṣaras* or vowel signs are marked thus: {kiṃcit}. The string space is signalled with (O). Lost *akṣaras* are marked with +. The sign ø refers to a small fleuron used by scribes of the period to cancel whatever was written beneath once it had been erased or to mark unusable writing surface. The sign § marks a sign which looks like a *tha* to mark a new verse. Additions are marked thus: <kiṃcit>. Numeration is by line number and is given in square brackets.

109.0 [25r7 after fleuron] adhunā parita ityādi || āpūrayan viśvam
i(O)tyantena binduyogam āha ||

109.1 anantā ye jñānasatvahṛdrasminirmitamunīndrās taiḥ saṃbu-
ddhīkṛtam ata eva parito nira[25v1]stavibhramaṃ jagad akhilaṃ nija-
mante jñānasatvahṛnmante ṅtarbhāvya rūpādyākṛtimuktam ityādyar-
rtham ākalaḥjaḥya sanmantrabindurūpaṃ svamaṇaḥ pa(O)ribhāvayed
iti sambandhaḥ |

110.0 nanu bāhyārthasadbhāve kathaṃ jñānasatvahṛdayavarttika-
ravālasthitabījatanau saṃbuddhīkṛtyaṅtanikhilajagadantarbhāvanam |
(O) tadbindau ca viśvasvabhāvamaṇḍalacakravibhāvanam upapattim a-
nubhavatīti manyamāno ṅrthasattāsādhakapramāṇābhāvam eva tāvat
ka[25v2]thayati || § || rūpādyākṛtīyādi ||

110.1 rūpādyākṛtinirmuktam iti || rūpādyākāre rahitaṃ | tadgrāhī-
ti tasya rūpāder grāhakan na pra(O)tyakṣeṇekṣyate | grāhyan na cā-
pi kiñcit pratyakṣeṇekṣyate | kin tu rūpādyākāram eva svasaṃṣvidrū-
pam avikalpakam abhrāntaṃ pratyakṣaṃ prakāśate grāhyādi(O)rūpan
tu vikalpaśilpikalpitam eveti bhāvaḥ || yad uktam | o nānyo 'nubhāvyo
buddhyā'sti tasyā nānubhavo 'paraḥ | grāhyagrāhaka[25v3]vaidhuryāt
svayaṃ saiva prakāśate || tathā || avibhāgo 'pi buddhyātmaviparyāsi-
tadarśanaḥ | grāhyagrāhakasamvittibhedavān iva la(O)kṣyata iti | tanv
arthajñānaṃ saṃvedanaṃ dharmas tat kathaṃ saṃvedakam antareṇa
bhavet | dharmā hi dharmitantrā dr̥śyante | yathā pākādayaḥ | tasmād
avaḷāśyam asyāḥ saṃ(O)vedanakriyāyāḥ kartrā saṃvedakenāśrayabhū-
tena dharmiṇā bhāvyaṃ | sa eva ca grāhaka ucyate | tasya rūpādiviṣa-
yatvād grāhya[25v4]m̐iḥ api siddham | tato 'nupānād arśāpatter bhāyā
grāhakasiddhir iti | kathaṃ tanniṣedha iti saṃkāyāḷyāḷm āha | samban-
dhānīkṣaṇā(O)n na cānyeneti | rūpādyākṛtimuktam | grāhakaṃ grā-
hyaṃ cekṣyata iti sambandhaḥ | ayam abhiprāyaḥ | anumānenārthāpa-
tṭyā paropaka(O)lpitapramāṇāntareṇa vā | parokṣārthasya na svato 'dhi-
gatiḥ | pratyakṣatāpatteḥ | parato pi nāsambaddhāt | sarvataḥ sarvaṃ
prati[25v5]pattiprasaṅgāt | sambandho 'pi tādātmyaḷtmyaḷtadutpatti-
bhyāṃ nānyo 'vyabhicārī saṃbhavati | tatra tādātmyapratibandhābhyu-
pagame dha(O)rmadharminor ekatvam eva vāstavam iti | rūpādyākā-
rasaṃvedanam eva kevalam asti | grāhākādibhedas tu pratipattradhya-
vasāyavaśena vyā(O)vṛttinimittatvāt | kalpita eveti saṃpratipattir eva |
tadutpattipratibandhābhyupagame tu taṃ niścāyakayoḥ pratyaḷveḷkṣā-
[25v6]nupalambhayor asambhavaḥ | na hi parokṣe grāhake dharmiṇi
tau bhavitum arhataḥ | tatas tadutpattir apy asambhāvinī | nāpi rūpā-
di(O)jñānānutpattiyā cakṣurādīva grāhako 'numeyaḥ | pūrvapūrvakāra-
ṇakalāḷpamātrād rūpādyākārajñānasyotpatteḥ | tathāpi nimittā(O)nta-
rāṅgīkāre 'navasthāprasaṅgo runtaraḥ | tato na vāstavo grāhyagrāha-
kasamvittibhedāḥ | pākādayas tu paramārthata[25v7] + thātathotpa-
dyamānapadārtharūpā eva vyāvṛttimātrakalpitabhedāḥ | na tu tatrāpi
vastutaḥ kriyākārahakabhedo dharmadharmi(O)rūpaḥ |

111.0 nanu bhūt samvitter anyo grahaḥ | saiva tu sātādirūpeṇāntaḥ-
saviditā bahirdeśastharūpādyākāragrāhiṇī | saṃvedyate tat ka(O)tham
advayasiddhir ity āśaṃkāyām āha || vyāpāra ityādi ||

111.1 tasya rūpādeḥ parigrahe sātādīsaṃvedanasya vyāpāro [26r1] na kaścīd dṛṣṭaḥ | yato rūpādinā saha yugapatpratīṣṭimānam etat sātādi varṭtate | tato rūpādivad evāgrāhākam yuktam | yathā rūpādi (O) sātāder agrāhākam | yugapatpratīyamānatvenopakāryopakārahāvābhāvāt savyetaraviśāṇavat tathā sātādy api rūpāder agrāhākam | (O) abhinnam eva hi sahopalambhaniyamāt | bhedas tu viparyāsitarāsanair īkṣyate | abhinnaśāśinīveta bhāvaḥ || yad uktam | [26r2] paricchedo 'ntar anyo yaṃ bhāgo bahir iva sthitaḥ | jñānasyābhedino bhedapratībhāṣo hy upraplavaḥ | nanu jñānajanakatvena rūpādi(O)kaṃ prak sannidhatte paścāt sātādīsamvittiyutpattiḥ | tat katham yugapatpratīyamānatā | atrābhīoḍdhīyate | yadi tāvad vaibhāṣīkamatena nirākāram (O) vijñānam tadutpattipratibandhenākāravato 'rthasya grāhākam iṣyate | tadā pratītiomātrasya sarvārthasādhāraṇatvena nīlasyeyaṃ [26r3] pratītiḥ pītasya ceti | pratītiḥpratīniyamābhāvāt | rañjanādyarthakriyārthino niyamena nīlādaḥ pravṛttir na syāt | tataḥ su(O)tarāṃ nārthavedanam | artha sauṭrāntikanayenākāravat vijñānam prāgbhāvino janakasyārthakṣaṇasya tadutpattīyā grāhākam iṣyate | tadā jñānakā(O)le janasyārthakṣaṇasya | kṣaṇikatvenāsatsvād ākāradvayasamvedanābhāvāc ca jñānakāra eva kevalam saṃvedyata ity arthaḥ | [26r4] rūpaṃ khapuṣpaṃ nātiseta iti katham arthāṅgīkārah |

111.2 arthābhāve deśakālākārārthakriyāniyamenopalambho nopapadyate (O) | ity arthāpattī nityapaṭṭokṣasyārthasya siddhir iti cet | na asaty api deśādīniyate bhāye vastuni vāsanāniyamāt svapnā(O)divan niyatadeśādyupalambho bhaviṣyatīti kim anarthakalpanayā ātmānam vipralabhemahi |

111.3 atha syāt svapnādāv api deśā[26r5]ntaradrṣṭam bhāyam eva nimitam || yad āha || svapnādipratyaye bhāyam sarvathā na hi neṣyate | sarvatrālambane bhrāntam deśakālānyathā(O)tmakam iti || tat katham svapnādidṛṣṭāntena jāgraddaśābhāvīvijñānasya deśādīniyamō varṇnyata iti tad asat | svapnādījñānasyālambanānu(O)papatteḥ | tad dhi grahaṇarūpam vā syāt smaraṇarūpam vā | tata na tāvad grahaṇam grahaṇasya hi pūrvagrahaṇānapekṣatvāt | na pūrva[26r6]vadarāsanaviṣayagrāhitāpratīniyamaḥ syāt | darśanāntaravat smaraṇarūpatāpy asya nirvikalpatvāt | varttamānaviṣaya(O)tvāt | sphuṭābhatvāc ca nopapadyate | tata<h> katham asya deśāntarādīdrṣṭavastuviṣayatvam iti na pratīmaḥ |

sātād iva nityaṃ virodhāt | sa(O)nnihitavarttamānamātragrāhakaṃ hi
cakṣurādivijñānaṃ | anyathā dūravayahitāder atītānāgatabālavarḍdhā-
deś ca yuga[26v6]padgrahaṇaprasaṅgor durvāraḥ syāt ||

112.2 uktañ cacāryeṇa bāhyārthanirāsārtham ātmasāadhanāvātāre ||
nanu grāhyādi(O)rūpeṇa pratibhāsamānaḥ kathitaṃ vikalpamātrātmā-
kaḥ saṃsāro bhaved iti cet | na pratīviṣayasya grāhyāditvenāprasi(O)-
ddheḥ | na hi rūpādipratibhāsavyatirekeṇānyad grāhyaṃ grāhakaṃ vā
kiñcid upalabhyate | na cāpratīyamānasvarūpaṃ [26v7] sadvyavahā-
raviṣayaṃ nāmātiprasaṅgāt | na ca tatsambaddhāpratītau tatpratītir a-
tyantāpraḷkṣaḷtyakṣatātmanā kasyaci(O)t sambandhāprasiddheḥ | anta-
hpratibhāsamānasya sātāder grāhakatvaṃ nīlādes tu tadbahīrūpatayā
pratītalakṣaṇasya grāhyatva(O)m iti cet | na sukhāde nīlāde vyāpāra-
siddheḥ | na cāpratīvavyāpāraṃ grāhakan nāma | tathā sati bāhyasyā-
[27r1]pi rūpāder grāhakatvaprasaṅgāt | na hi yugapat svātantryeṇa pra-
tibhāsamānayoḥ kiñcid grāhyaṃ kiñcid grāhakaṃ iti pratiniyamakāra-
ṇaṃ (O) paśyāmaḥ | ahaṃ nīlādikaṃ vedmīty api kalpanāmātram eva |
svātantryeṇāntarbahihpratibhāsamānānāṃ pratīteḥ svātantrānubha-
vaprakāśanaparo (O) vā sarva evāyaṃ grāhakaḍivikalpaprabandhaḥ |
parasparaparigrahavyāpārahiteṣv eva pratibhāsamāneṣu bhāvāt | tān
na kiñcit kasya[27r2]cid grāhakan nāma || tathā cāha || na hi subhūte
dharmo dharmāṃ jñātīti vistaraḥ | yat tūktam ity api rūpeḷāṇi dvā-
bhyaṃ vijñānābhyaṃ vijñā(O)yanta ityādi || tat tadrūpādhyavasāyamā-
trāpekṣayā kvacit pudgalādideśānāvad ity adoṣa iti ||

112.3 tad iyatā grāhyagrāhakaśādhakapramā(O)ṇanirāso darśi-
taḥ || § ||

113.0 idānīm bādhakapramāṇenārthānām asatvād vijñaptimātraḷā-
tām khyāpayeḷann āha || § || ekan na [27r3] cetyādi ||

113.1 ayam abhiprāyaḥ | bāhyaṃḷḷ vastv artho guṇadravyāōdibhe-
dena bahuōprakāraḥ parair ūpavarṇṇyate | tatra guṇānān dharmā(O)-
ṇām āśrayo dravyaṃ tanniṣedhenaiva te samūlam unmulitā bhavantīti
na pṛthaḷkaḷg dūṣaṇam abhidhīyate | na cāsati samavāyini samavāya
iti (O) | taddūṣaṇam api nākhyāyate | dravyaṃ ca pṛthivy āp tejo vā-
yur ākāśaṃ kālo dig ātmā mana iti navavidhaṃ | tatrātmānantaraṃ

nirā[27r4]kartavyaḥ | ākāśaṃ tu śabdaguṇam iṣṭaṃ tac caikam iti samānadeśatvāt | sarvaśabdānāṃ bhedenā śrutir na syāt | tataś ca samīpadeśa i(O)va vyavahitadeśābhimato 'pi śabdaḥ śrūyeta | nā vānyo 'pīty ekāntaḥ | dikkaḥjalayoś caikatvāt pūrvāparādipratyayāyogaḥ | syād e(O)tad upādḥināṃ bhedenayaṃ pratyayavibhāga iti | kim upādḥināṃ svataḥ paurvāparyam uta parataḥ | tatrādye pakṣe tata eva tatpratītidhe[27r5]r ni<h>prayojanāv etau | dvitīye tu pakṣe yadi dikkalābhyām eva tadā tad evedam ekatvād anayor na saṃgacchati | anyataś cet tada va(O)sthaṃ tayo vaiyarthyaṃ | nityāś cāmī vyomadikkālāḥ sahaḥkārisāhitye tadvi\ha\rahe vālabdhasvabhāvabhedaḥ kathaṃ kadācid eva svakāryaṃ jana(O)yeyu | tathā hi || teṣāṃ śaktir aktir vā yā svabhāvena saṃsthitā | nityatvād acikitsyānāṃ kas tāṃ kṣapayitum kṣamaḥ | anena mano nira[27r6]stam | yugapajñānānutpattiyā ca manovādināṃ mano 'numeyam | anubhūyanta eva ca narṭtakīdarśanādau yugapad vijñānāni | na cai(O)tan manasi sati kadācid yujyate | tasmān na\ā\ santy eva vyomādayaḥ | pṛthivyādayo 'vaśiṣyante tapy avayaviparamāṇubhedena dvidhā ka(O)lpitāḥ | tatrāpi nāvayavī san nāpi paramāṇavaḥ | santaḥ tadubhayatrāpi vācakasadbhāvād iti | tad eva bādhakaṃ yathākramaṃ kathaya[27r7]ti || ekam iti paramāṇurbhir dvyānuḥkādikrameṇārabdham avayavirūpaṃ prasiddham | ghaṭādikaṃ \na\ ca 0000 naivāsti rūpā(O)der ādyantumadhyādiprabhedenānyonyavirodhinā dharmeṇa sthūlaikarūparahitasyaiva dṛṣṭer hetu\os tad anenaikajñānasamsargivastūpalambhārū(O)po 'nupalambho hetur uktaḥ | bhāgā eva hi bhāsante sanniviṣṭāś tathā tathā | tadvān anyāḥ punar naiva nirvibhāgaḥ prakāśate || e[27v1]kasyāvayavasya rāge kampe vā tatsamaveto py avayavī raktaḥ | kampamāno vā dṛṣyeta | avayave rāgaḥ kampo vā nāvayavinīti cet | (O) sa tarhy arakto 'kampamāno vā dṛṣyet | ekāvayavāvaraṇe ca tasyāvṛttau na sa dṛṣyeta | tadanāvaraṇe anāvṛtasya tasyopalabdheḥ prasaṅgo durvicā(O)raḥ syāt | iti bhedakātmakaṃ viruddhaṃ dharmādhyāsān naiko 'vayavī bhavitum arhatīty asadvyavahāraḥ viśaya tvam evāsyā prāptakālam pa[27v2]śyāmaḥ | idānīm ekaniṣedhe cānekarūpaṃ avaśiṣyate | tac cānekair anekaprakāram upakalpitaṃ | yathā vaibhāṣikaiḥ sāksād adhya(O)kṣagocarāḥ | vaiśeṣikais tv avayavyārambhakāḥ | sautrāntikais ca nityaparokṣāḥ piśācāyamānāḥ darśane svākārasamarppaṇapraṇāḥ pa(O)ramāṇava iṣyante | tatra tāvat | vaibhāṣikalpitaḥ paramāṇūn nirākarttum āha || § || paramāṇuśo 'pītyādi | yathā caikaṃ sthū[27v3]laṃ nāsti tadvad anekaṃ ca na bhavati |

hetum āha | paramāṇuśo 'py adṛṣṭer iri paramāṇurūpasya parasparavi-
viktasyanupalabdher i(O)ty arthaḥ |

114.0 atha sthūlām anyathā'nupapattyā paramāṇvanumānam ity ā-
ha || § || niravayavyetyādi ||

114.1 ayam abhiprāyaḥ | sāvayavatām̐vat paramāṇo(O)nair draṣṭa-
vyam | yugapad aṃśair virūddhadigvarttibhiḥ ṣaṭkayogādīḥnā viru-
ddhadharmasamsargiṇa sthūlasyeva nānāvaprasaṅgāt | nirava[27v4]-
yavatve cāṅśalakṣaṇāvayavarahitave sati ekasyākṣaṇor anekaiḥ paramā-
ṇubhiḥ parikarasya pariveṣṭanasyābhāvaḥ syāt | (O) yataḥ paramāṇupa-
riveṣṭane tasyādhārottaraçaturdikaparamāṇumadhyāsino niyamena ṣa-
ḍaṅśatā'pattiḥ | yo hy asya svabhāvaḥ pūrvaparamā(O)ṇupratyāsanno
ghaṭate | tayor ekadeśatāpatteḥ | evaṃ hi pūrvaparamāṇusannihataḥ
tsvabhāvo 'param paramāṇuṃ pratyāsided ya[27v5]di so 'pi tatra syāt |
pratyāsattiyābhāve py ābhimukhyamātre py ayam eva doṣaḥ | tataś ca
paramāṇumātrapinḍarūpaprasaṅgād bhū(O)maṇḍalādirūpapracayaḥ |
kaścid atra na hi syāt | yad āha | saṃyuktaṃ dūradeśasthaṃ naira-
ntaryavyavasthitaṃ | ekāṇvabhimukhaṃ rūpaṃ yad aṇor madhyava-
rtti(O)na<ḥ> || aṇvantarābhimukhyena tad eva parikalpyate | pracayo
bhūddharādīnāḥmḥm evaṃ sati na yujyata iti |

114.2 tasmād avāśyan tayā tayoh̐ sva[27v6]bhāvayor bhedo 'bhyupa-
gantavyaḥ | yathā cānayos tathā'dharottaradakṣiṇottaraparamāṇupra-
tyāsannānām̐ svabhāvānām̐ bheda i(O)ti | ṣaḍaṅśataiva paramāṇor ba-
lād āpatati | tadā' ṣaṭkena yugapad yogāt paramāṇoh̐ ṣaḍaṅśatā ṣaṇṇām̐
samānadeśatvāt pinḍa(O)ḥ syād aṇumātraka iti |

114.3 na caikāsiddhāv anekasya siddhir iti na santi paramāṇavaḥ |

114.4 mīmāṅsakaiś ca nāvaśyam isyante paramā[27v7]ṇava iti | na
paramāṇunirākaraṇamātreṇa nirākṛtaḥ syād avayavīti nāsyā vyartham̐
dūṣaṇam |

114.5 astu tarhi vijñānamātrasva(O)bhāvañ jagat | tad apy ekam̐ ane-
kaṃ vā rūpa prāgvan na kṣamata iti | gaganābjam̐ iva na sadvyavahā-
ram̐ arhati < | > vastusato gatyantarābhāvād ekāneka(O)yor an<y>anta-

reṇa tena bhāvyaṃ | na ca tat tathā ghaṭata iti katham idaṃ sadvyavahā-
raviṣayam iti na jānīmaḥ | athaikānekasvabhāvā[28r1]yogo vijñāne na
sambhavatīti syāt | sākārajñāne bāhyata ivaikānekarūpavirahasya spa-
ṣṭatvāt | yatra hi lokasya bāhyārthavya(O)vahāras tad eva sākāravādīno
jñānaṃ | tato 00 yat tasya bahirbhāvabādhakaṃ tad evāntarbhāve pi bā-
dhakena hi sthūlam ekam anekaṃ ca paramāṇurūpam apā(O)kriyate |
vijñānātmabhūtaś cāyam ākāro yady ekaḥ sthūlo yadi vā'nekaḥ paramā-
ṇuśo bhinna ubhayathāpi barahirarthabhāvi dūṣaṇa[28r2]m aśakyam
apagantum | na hi tad vijñānabahirbhāvanibandhanadūṣaṇa yena tad-
bhāve na bhavet | mūrttinibandhanabādhakaṃ nāmūrte vijñānātma-
nīty a(O)py asāram | nīlādyākāratāyāṃ vijñānasyāpi mūrttatvāt | ayam
eva hi deśavitānavān ākāro mūrtiliḥ | tad asya bāhyatve mūrttisaṃjñā na
tva iti na vidmaḥ |

114.6 syāt mataṃ yeṣāṃ sākāraṃ vijñānan teṣāṃ ayam astu doṣaḥ |
yeṣāṃ tu nirākāraṃ sukhādirūpaṃ tātvikam iti pakṣas teṣāṃ[28r3]m a-
yam ekānekaviyogaḥ katham saṅgaccheta | atrābhidhīyate | iha prakā-
śātmakaṃ vijñānaṃ na ca prakāśamānanīlādivyatiriktaḥ | (O) | teṣāṃ
prakāśaḥ svapne pi saṃvidyate na ca sukhādivat prakāśamānasya nīlāder
alīkatā yujyate bādhakasadbhāvād iti cet | tad etad bādhakaṃ su(O)khā-
dau kena bādhyate sukhāder amūrttatvāt tadabhāva iti cet | naitad asti |
tasyāpi deśavitānena prakāśamānasya śakyāpahnava[28r4]tvāt. śrānta-
sya hi yāvanty aṅgāni payasi viśanti tāvatāṃ vyāpakaṃ sukham upa-
jāyamānam anubhūyate | nāpi tathānubhūyamāna(O)m adeśavitānaṃ
nāma | śarīrasyāpi tadbhāvaprasaṅgāt | deśavitāne ca śarīravat asyāpi
mūrttatvāt | tad etad ākāraṇan nikārām vā vijñānaṃ bahi(O)rbhāva-
virahitadūṣaṇan nātikrāmatīti na pṛthag dūṣaṇam ādritam ācāryeṇeti |
pratipattavyaṃ |

114.7 tat sthitam etānetad vijñānaṃm api na [28r5] sadvyavahāram
arhatīti | tarhi jñānajñeyor asattvād asadrūpan tatvam iti syāt | na saṃ-
vṛtyā yād vijñāna saṃvṛter aśakyāpāhnavatvāt | (O) astitvaniṣedhān nā-
stītvam ba00lād āyātam iti cet | na astitvapūrvakatvān nāstītvasya | tad-
asiddhau tasyāpy asiddheḥ | yad āha || asti(O)tvapūrvakaṃ nāsti | asti
nāstītvapūrvakaṃ ato nāsti na vaktavyam astitvaṃ na ca kalpayed iti ||
nāpi sadasadātmatayobhayarūpaṃ sado [28r6] sadasator virodhāt | nā-
pi sadasadbhāyam anyad evānubhāyasvabhāvam | ubhayabahirbhūtasya

paryudastasya yogāt | na kiñcit tarhi (O) tattvam iti prāptam | nanv e-
tatved eva tatvaṃ yadu tatvarahitatvaṃ nāma | tat sthitam etac catuḥ-
koṭivinirmuktam | vijñānaṃ pratibhāsate | iti tatvavidāṃ (O) tatvan na
tatvam api tatvata iti |

114.8 tad uktam || jñānapādaire astu tarhi vijñaptimātrasvabhāvam
anasvarātmakam jagad ityādy upakramya | na vi[28r7]jñānasyākāne-
kasvabhāvavaidhuryāt | tathā hi na tad ekaṃ nīlādibhedenopalambha-
vaicitryāt | ekavarṇṇasyāpi dhavalāder ādi(O)madhyāntabhedena prati-
bhāsanāt | arthakriyopayogabhedāc ca | anekatvasya caitāvanmātrala-
kṣaṇatvāt | nāpy anekaṃ paramāṇukalpanāṃ (O) sitādipratibhāsabhā-
go nāma pratīteḥ | na caikānekavyatirekeṇa prakārāntaram asti | ana-
yor anyonyābhāvasvabhāvatvena [28v1] virodhāt | nanu sarvathā nirā-
tmakatve bhāvānāṃ kuto 'yam anubhūyamāno 'rthakriyābheda iti cet |
avicāritaikātmanaḥ pūrvapūrvakalpa(O)nāmātrād eva tadanyasyāprati-
ter ity āveditam | astu tarhi bhāvata eva satvaṃ sarvabhāvānāṃ va-
stutvasyārthakriyālakṣaṇatvād iti cet | tan na prati(O)bhāsamātreṇa sa-
ttābhyupagame 'virodhāt | yathoktakrameṇa lakṣaṇav<i>v<e>kād eva
nairātmyaṃ vyavasthāpyate | na tu pratibhāsamātratayā[28v2]py apa-
hnāvād iti || yathāha | na hi subhūte 'nyad rūpam | anyā śūnyatā |
api tu rūpam eva śūnyam rūpalakṣaṇeneti vistaraḥ | ata e(O)va pūrvā-
parabhedena samastasāmṃvṛtavastupratibhāsamānatvān na nityatvam ā-
saṅkanīyam | yat tu vijñaptimātraṃ bho jīnaputrā yaduta traidhātu-
kam ity u(O)ktam tad utyantarbhāvābhīniveśināṃ bahirarthādhyavasā-
yanirāsārtham | tasmin sati sukhenaiiva cittamātrādhyavasāyasyāpi ni-
rā[28v3]karaṇasambhavāt | tad āvāha | cittamātraṃ samāśritya jñeyā
bāhyāsvabhāvatā | tathatārambaṇe sthitvā cittamātraṃ vyatikrameḍ iti
(O) || § ||

114.9 tad iyatā bādhakapramāṇasadbhāvo darśitaḥ || § ||

115.0 tataś ca bādhakapramāṇābhāvād bādhakasadbhavāc ca jñeyā-
disamastavastunairātmyā (O) jagad idaṃ kalpanāmātranirmitasvabhā-
vam ity upasaṃharann āha || § || tad grāhakādītyādi ||

115.1 tad ity antarpapattisāmarthyato [28v4] grāhakādivirahād ga-
ndharvanagarasannibham | paramārthasannimittarahitavena ca ka-

ḷviḷkilḷpaḷānekārthaviṣayaḷ | (O) sa ca bhedābhāve prayogan nārhatīty
āśaṃkyāha || § || sarvan na cetyādi ||

118.1 saṃvṛtṭyā tu śamabhavasvabhāvānām bhedo 'syeva ta[29r2]taḷ
sāmvṛtavastupratibhāsasvabhāvo yaḷ saṃkalpas tato 'nyan na kiñcit sar-
van nāma | vikalpāropitabhedaviṣayaḷ sarvva(O)śabdaḷ | tad eva bhū-
te sarvatra tatvikabhedaniṣedhaḷ pratipādyata ity arthaḷ | evaṃ carā-
caram ḷiḷapi na tatpratibhāsasvabhāvasaṃkalpād anyat |

118.2 na (O) tv ātma darśanasya satyārthatve nairātmyābhāvena bha-
vasadbhāvād bhavasamasvabhāvānām kathaṃ bhedābhāva iti cet | tad
asat || ātma[29r3]darśanaṃ hi dvividham | ābhisaṃskārikaṃ | saha-
jaṃ ceti | tatra śarīrādivyatiriktaḷ śubhāśubhakarmakarttā tatphalopa-
bho(O)ktā nityo vibhuś cātmety ātmābhīdhāyakaraṇādaśāstrādyabhyā-
sopajanitasāṃskārabhavam ābhisaṃskārikam vaiśeṣikādīnām anādyavi-
(O)dyāvāsanāvāśād vijñānaṃ saṃtateḷ sthiraग्रहकādīrūpādhyavasāyī
yo 'haṃpratyayas tadrūpaṃ tu saha jaṃ satkāyadarśanaṃ sā[29r4]dhā-
raṇaṃ pṛthagjanānām | tatra prathame pakṣe na tāvad ātmanaḷ sādha-
kaṃ pramāṇam asti | na hi pratyakṣeṇātmā pratiyate cakṣurādi(O)vi-
jñānānām rūpādiviṣayapañcakanīyatatvāt | nāpy anumānena pratiya-
te | kāryasvabhāvalingābhāvāt nityaparokṣaṇadeśakālavyatire(O)kavi-
kalena ātmanā saha kasyacid anvayavyatirekātmakajanyajanakabhāvā-
siddheḷ | kāryalingābhāvāt | dharmisattāyāś cā[29r5]siddhatvāt | sva-
bhāvalingāyogāt | na cānyad vidhisādhanam ḷ liṅgaṃ ḷḷḷ sambhavati
yenānumānam asya syāt | a(O)nyena ca liṅgena bhavatā sādhyavāptena
bhāvyaṃ | sādhasyātmanaś ca kvacid asiddhe vyāpakatvān niścayān na
tadvyāptitvaṃ kasyacin niścetum śakya(O)ta iti n<ā>sya kiñcil liṅgam
upapadyate |

118.3 nanu mā bhūc cakṣurādivijñānam anumānam vā sādha kaṃ mā-
nasam ahaṃpratyayarūpam a[29r6]dhyakṣaṃ tv ānmano niścāyakam a-
sty evety āśaṃkyāha || § || na ca cittād anya ityādi || na ca cittād anyāḷ
kaścid ātmā(O)dir aham ity ahaṃpratyayaviṣayaḷ syāt | saṃbhavet | a-
haṃpratyayasya śarīrādiviṣayatvāt | kṛṣṇo 'haṃ sthūlo 'haṃ gacchāmy
ahaṃm i(O)tyādi bāhyākāreṇāhaṃpratyaya utpadyate | na cāsya śarī-
ravyatiriktasya taddharmaḷ | kṛṣṇatvaṃ sthūlatvaṃ vā nāpi vibhor a-
mū[29r7]rttasya mūrttadravyānuvidhāyini gamanakriyopannā

118.4 na cāyaṃ māṇavake siṃhapratyaya iva bhokto yuktaḥ | skha-
(O)lanābhāvāt | na cāsṽyati skhalane bhaktiparikalpanā yuktā | mu-
khyavyavahārāstaṅgamaprasaṅgāt |

118.5 tata<ḥ> sthitam etad ātmanaḥ sā(O)dhakaṃ pramāṇaṃ nāstī-
ti | sadvyavahārayogyatā'staṅgataiva bādhakapramāṇasadbhāvena tv
asyāsatvam eva yuktaṃ || [29v1] ātmā hi bhavan bodharūpo vā syād
abodharūpo vā tatrādye pakṣe cakṣurādivaiphalyprasaṅgo 'nivāryaḥ |
na hi nitye rū(O)pādyupalambhātmany ātmani cakṣurādīnām asti sāpha-
lyam | abodharūpasāpy ātmanaḥ sadbhāvam anupalambho bād hate |

118.6 tathā hi yasya (O) yatropalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasyānupala-
mbhaḥ | tasya tatrābhāvo vyavahartavyaḥ | yathā'śvaśirasi viśāṇa-
syopalabdhī[29v2]lakṣaṇaṃprāptasya tv ātmano 'nupalambha<ḥ>
śarīrādāv iti |

118.7 nanu śarīrādyadhikaraṇatvam ātmanas tadvādinām aniṣṭam e-
va || (O) yad āha | kasya vā śarīra ātmiti | tathābhūtasya ca tasya ni-
ṣedhe na kiñcid aniṣṭam | satyaṃ | nāsmābhir apy atrādheyasya ni(O)-
ṣedhaḥ kriyate | kin tu saṃsargeṇa evaṃ hi niṣedhaḥ sarvatrānupala-
mbhena kriyate | ghaṭāder api niṣedhasya ca saṃsa[29v3]rgitvāt | na
cādheya eva saṃsargī bhavati | anyathā bāhyātmanā'nādheyena saṃ-
sargābhāvāt | sātmatvatvam api śarīrā(O)der na syāt | na ceha niṣe-
dhyasya śarīrādikaṃ | adhikaraṇatvenopāttam | api tv anupalambha-
niṣedhavyavahārayor iti na doṣaḥ | (O) nanv ayam anupalambho na tā-
vad upalambhābhāvaḥ | tasya sādhanatvāyogāt | nāpy ekajñānasam-
sargivastvantaropalambhasvabhāva[29v4]ḥ kasyacid ātmanā sahaikajñā-
nasamsargābhāvāt | na ca bhinnajñānaviśayavastūpalabdirūpas tasyā-
bhāvasiddhāv anupayogā(O)t | upayoge śabdopalabdhir api rūpābhā-
vasādhakatvaprasaṅgāt | na ca gatyantaram asti | tat kimātmā'yam a-
nupalambha iti na jāma (O) ucyate | madhyama evātra pakṣo 'smākam
abhimataḥ | ahaṃpratyayo hy ātmaviśayatvena paraiḥ parikalpyate |
sa ca śarīrā[29v5]dikam ālambamānaḥ sphuṭataram anubhūyate | ata
śarīrādikam evātmanā saha ekajñānasamsargī bhavati na ca tadvyatiri-
kta(O)m aparam ahapratyayaviśayabhūtam anubhūtam astīti tadupala-
mbha eva tadupalambhaḥ | nanu yadi śarīrādivyatirikto 'smady arthaḥ
pratīviṣa(O)yo na sāte mama śarīram iti na syāt | asti caiṣa pratya-

yaḥ | tasmād asmadarthaḥ | śarīrādivyatiriktaḥ pratīyamāna eva dra-
ṣṭa[29v6]vyaḥ | tat kim ucyate | nopalabhyata iti | asad etat | asantam
api hi bhedam abhimanyamānaḥ pratyayo jāyate | ya(O)thā śīlāpu-
traḥkasya śarīram iti | na ca pratyayamātram atopalambhaḥ | kin tarhi
pratyayāḥśābhimataḥ pratyayaḥ | na cāyam e(O)va pratyakṣapra-
tyayaḥ | śīlāputrakaśarīravatirekapratyayād apratyakṣād aviśeṣāt | ta-
daviśeṣasya cāsyā pratyakṣatā[29v7]yāṃ tasyāpi pratyakṣatāprasāṅgāt |
pratyakṣato yā ca vyatiriktavastuvyavasthāṅgatāsamṅgāt | yathā ca ma-
ma śarīrādi(O)kam iti pratītiḥ | tathā | mamātmety api bhaḥālvaty eva |
tad ayam devānāṃ priyo 'smadarthavyatirekapratyayam anyam pramā-
ṇayann aviśe(O)ṣād imam apḥṛi pramāṇayitum arhati | pramāṇayamś
cāparam apy ātmānam vyavasthāpayitum | athā'muḥ pratyayam śīlā-
pu[30r1]trakaśarīravatirekapratyayapakṣe nikṣipati mama śarīrādikam
ity evamātmānam api nikṣiped ity a bahunā | tasm<ā>d avasthitam e-
tat | (O) abodhātmānam ātmanam anupalambho na sahata iti |

118.8 tato 'satvam evāsya yuktam iti sthitam |

118.9 atha sahasatkāyadarśana sakalalokasiddham ka(O)tham apa-
hnetum satyam ity āśamkyāha || § || na ca cittād ityādi || ayam abhi-
prāyaḥ | yathoktakrameṇaḥā jñātjñeyādirūpasaka[30r2]labhāvābhā-
vān na ca cittād yathoktarūpād anya kaścit sthiragrāhakādirūpo 'ham
ity ahamkāraviṣayaḥ syāt | sambhavet | ataḥ kāra(O)ṇāt prāguktacittam
evāhamkāraviṣayaḥ | tasmāt sarvathā ātmano 'bhāvāt | keśādivijñāna-
syevātmadarśanasatyārthatā | tato nāpi nai(O)rātmyābhāve bhava-
sadbhāvād bhavaśamasvabhāvānāṃ bhedanīṣedhābhāva iti |

119.0 abhedam eva yathoktam upaḥāḥpādayann āha || § || [30r3] yad
rūpam ityādi ||

119.1 tena ca cittena yad rūpam yad vastu pratipannaṃ tac cittād ana-
ntarayukter bahir asiddham atas tasya nijarūpam kiṃ bhavatu ci(O)tta-
pratītarūpād anyābhāvāt tad eva rūpam yac cittena pratipannaṃ tataś
ca vicāraṇeḥāṃ bhedā | prasiddhau yac cittam abhedam manyate tac ci-
ttasyābhedamaḥsti(O)tir yā mananakriyā tato hetoḥ sarvabhāvānām a-
bhedena cetasā pratipannānām abhinnaṃ eva nijam rūpam | iti abhi-
nna[30r4]tvam eva teṣāṃ yuktisiddham bhavati |

119.2 athavā | yat sāsvatam bālaiḥ pratipannaṃ tasya yan nijam |
tātvikarūpam abhrāntair dhīmadbhiḥ (O) pratipannaṃ tasya tad eva ni-
jam eva rūpaṃ ḷyasmāḷ | yad yasmād evan tan tasmāt | sarveṣāṃ śama-
bhavasvabhāvānām abhedasya śūnyataikarūpatvena bhe(O)dābhāvasya
mater avabodhād abhinnatā sarvabhāvānām |

119.3 tad uktam eko bhāvaḥ sarvabhāvasvabhāvaḥ sarve bhāvā eka-
bhāvasvabhāvā[30r5]ḥ | eko bhāvas tatvato yena dṛṣṭaḥ sarve bhāvās
tatvatas tena dṛṣṭā iti nāgārjunapādaire apy uktam | saṃvṛtivyāḷāḷtireke-
ṇa na tatva(O)m upalabhyate | saṃvṛti śūnyāḷāḷtā proktā śūnyataiva hi
saṃvṛtir iti |

120.0 sarvaṃ na cāpi kiṃcid ity etat sphuṭayann āha || § || ābhād
ityādi (O) ||

120.1 ābhātīti grāhyatayā pratibhāsate | yaś ca rūpādirūpo viśayaḥ |
yaś cānyaḥ kaścid ahaṃkāraviśayo grāhaka[30r6]rūpaḥ kalpanāyā āspa-
dam āśrayaḥ | tasya tasya grāhyasya grāhakasya ca yo viyogo viyukta-
tvaṃ nānātvān tasya virahā(O)t | no sarvam anyo'nyaḥ vibhidyate | ataś
ca no sarvaṃ sarvan nāma na kiñcit paramārthataḥ śūnyatāmātrarūpa-
tvāt | nānātvān tu kālpanikam e(O)veti bhāvaḥ |

120.2 ata evācāryadignāgenoktam | | pṛthagjanānām ya jñānaṃ pra-
kṛtivyavadānikam | uktan tad buddhaḷddhaḷśābdena bo[30r7]dhisatvā
yathā jina iti | ata eva ca paramādye pi sarvasatvās tathāgatagarbhāḥ
samantabhadramahābodhisatvasarvātmataye(O)ty uktam |

120.3 tasmāt tatvato buddhābuddhatvasamatvād buddhān na bhedaḥ
satvānā saṃvṛtityaiva bhedāt | evaṅ ca yat saṃbuddhikṛtam akhilaṃ ja-
gad ity uktam (O) tad uktam iti boddhavyam | svabhāvaśuddhatvāj jaga-
taḥ | paramārthābhyāsānte vikalpo viśoḷddhaḷdhyāḥ kalpanāvaśād bu-
ddhādi[30v1]bhedādhyāropadoṣāt | evam eva sambuddhikṛtanikhilaja-
gadantarbhāvanan nijamantre | tadbindau ca viśvasvabhāvamaṇḍala-
cakravibhāvana(O)m upapannaṃ eveti vijñeyam | jñeyādyabhāve sva-
pratibhāsasyaiva tathotpādād iti sarvaṃ susthaṃ | | ḷṣḷ | |

Collation of the Tibetan Translation

In this chapter we present the Tibetan evidence, which oftentimes prompted our emendations; however, we also disagree with it in almost just as many cases. As we specify in the introduction, the Tibetan translation is based on a different, most likely earlier, recension of the text. What we are trying to achieve here is to reconstruct an ‘editorial moment’, that of the manuscript which stands behind all the Canonical prints (in other words, the *Zhwa lu Bstan ’gyur* of 1334): the non-extant ’Phying ba stag rtse (mid-17th cent.) witnessed by its descendants, the Peking print (P; 1724), the Snar thang print (N; 1741–1742), and the Golden/Dga’ ldan manuscript (G; mid-18th cent.), as well as the Sde dge print (D; 1737–1744) and its offshoot, the Co ne print (C; 1753–1754). This document was almost certainly glossed, as many of the contaminations can be viewed as having been erstwhile notes which made it into the main texts in the hands of a careless editor. These glosses are not very sophisticated, but convenient aids for a student. Many of the corrupt readings can be explained in the context of the Tibetan transmission (e.g. through dictation), but it is also very likely that the Zhwa lu manuscript itself was already laden with serious errors. Moreover, the translation, while in many ways admirable and helpful, was far from perfect to begin with. We point out some of these issues in the second register. A complete assessment of the Tibetan translation is beyond the scope of this volume.

Our text here is eclectic, because where Samantabhadra is quoting two long passages from the *Ātmasādhana-vatāra*—a feature lacking in the recension behind the Tibetan—we supply the text from the Canonical Tibetan translation of that text. This, the work of Śāntibhadra and Lhas btsas of the Mgos/’Gos (ca. mid-11th cent.), is a less than mediocre trans-

lation. We also supply the two Canonical translations of the root-text. These too are very imperfect texts, essentially canonized rough drafts, and we will not discuss their many errors. Some minor differences between the prints, such as the occasional *shad*, abbreviations, or the fluctuation between *tu* and *du* are not reported.

109.0 [C 27v4–27v5, D 27v5, G 369v2, N 294r5, P 307v5] da ni **snying ga'i** zhes bya ba la sogs pa **thams cad yongs su dag par bya** zhes bya ba'i mthar thug pa 'dis thig le'i rnal 'byor brjod pa yin no ||

[(vss. 109–112 & 113–120 transmitted out of sequence) C 40v2–40v3 & 39v7–40r4, D 40v1–40v4 & 39v7–40r4, G 56r3–56r6 & 55r4–55v3, N 47r1–47r4 & 46r4–46v2, P 48r5–48r8 & 47v1–47v7]

Smṛti **kun du 'khrul pa spangs pa'i**
snying gi 'od zer las byung thub dbang mtha' yas kyi |
'gro ba ma¹ lus yang dag sangs rgyas byed pa
bzhi^a yi sngags nang thim par bya || 109

[C 33v4–34r4, D 33v5–34r5, G 46r5–47r2, N 38v1–39r2, P 39v1–40r3]

RinŚra **snying po'i 'od zer dpag med kyis sprul pa'i |**
thub pas mi shes kun du nges bsal² nas |
'gro ba ma lus rdzogs sangs rgyas byas te |
rang gi gsang sngags nang du chud par bya || 109

109.1 [C 27v5–27v7, D 27v5–27v7, G 369v2–369v5, N 294r5–294r7, P 307v5–307v8] ye shes sems dpa'i **snying ga'i 'od kyis sprul pa mtha' yas pa'i thub pa'i dbang po** gang dag yin pa de dag gis **rdzogs par sangs rgyas su byas pa dang |** de nyid kyi phyir **kun nas 'khrul pa dang bral³ bar gyur pa'i 'gro ba ma lus pa rang gi sngags te** ye shes sems dpa'i snying ga'i sngags la **bsdus te | gzugs sogs rnam**

¹ma] CDGN, omitted P

²bsal] CD, gsal GNP

³bral] CGNP, dral D

^aCorrectly: *gzhi.

**pa dag las nges⁴ grol ba^a zhes bya ba la sogs {pas brjod}^b pa'i don
dran par byas nas sngags^c kyi thig le'i rang bzhin rang gi yid
yongs su bsgom mo zhes bya ba'i don^d to ||**

110.0 [C 27v7–28r1, D 27v7–28r2, G 369v5–370r1, N 294r7–294v2,
P 307v8–308r2] gal te phyi rol gyi don yod na ye shes sems dpa'i thugs
ka na gnas pa'i ral gri la 'dug pa'i sa bon gyi lus su rdzogs pa'i sangs rgyas
su byas pa'i 'gro ba ma lus pa ji ltar nang du sdud | de grub na^e ni thams
cad kyi rang bzhin can⁵ gyi dkyil 'khor gyi 'khor lo rnam par bsgom pa
'thad par 'gyur ba yin no snyam pas don yod pa la sgrub byed kyi tshad
ma med pa nyid re zhig brjod pa ni | **gzugs sogs rnam pa** zhes bya
ba la sogs pa'o ||

gzugs la sogs pa'i rnam par grol bas Smṛti
mngon sum gyis ni mthong min de 'dzin pa |
gzung ba 'ga' yang med de
gzhan yang yod pa ma yin 'brel ba ma mthong bas || 110

gzugs la sogs pa'i rnam⁶ pa dang bral bas | RinŚra
'dzin pa de ni mngon sum mthong mi nus |
gzung ba rnams kyang cung zad yod⁷ min la |
gzhan pa'i 'brel pa yis kyang mthong ba med || 110

⁴nges] D, des CGNP

⁵rang bzhin can] GNP, rang bzhin CD

⁶rnam] CDNP, rnams G

⁷yod] CDP, yong GN

^aThis rendering (*nges* and its common corruption *des*, also see the *lemma* in 110.1) mirrors the reading found in the Ms in 110.1 (*rūpādyākṛtīnīrmuktam*), which, however, must be dismissed because it produces an unmetrical first *pāda* in the *āryā* verse.

^bThe bracketed portion was very likely an auxiliary gloss.

^cThe first element of the compound, *san*° (**dam pa'i*), is not mirrored.

^dWhile it is possible that the translators read **ity arthah* for *iti sambandhah*, the latter is obviously the correct reading.

^eThis translation possibly reveals a genuine but inferior variant, **tatsiddhau* for *tad-bindau*.

110.1 [C 28r1–28v6, D 28r2–28v6, G 370r1–371r2, N 294v2–295v1, P 308r2–309r3] **gzugs sogs rnam pa dag las nges⁸ grol ba^a** zhes bya ba ni gzugs la sogs pa'i rnam pa dang bral ba'o || **de 'dzin** zhes bya ba ni gzugs la sogs pa de 'dzin pa **mngon sum gyis mthong ba med la gzung ba 'ga' zhig kyang mngon sum gyis mthong ba med⁹** kyi¹⁰ | 'on kyang gzugs la sogs pa'i rnam pa can rang rig pa'i {mngon sum gyis}^b rang bzhin rnam par rtog pa med cing ma 'khrul pa'i mngon sum nyid rab tu gsal bar zad do || gzung ba'i rang bzhin la sogs pa'i^c rnam par rtog pas bzor byas pa^d yin no zhes 'ongs pa'o^e || ji skad du |

blo yis nyams myong bya gzhan med |
de yis^f myong ba gzhan yod min |
gzung dang 'dzin dang mi ldan phyir |
de ni de ltar rang bzhin^g gsal ||

zhes gsungs pa'o || de bzhin du |

blo bdag rnam par dbyer med kyang |
mthong ba phyin ci log rnam kyis |
gzung dang 'dzin pa myong ba rnam |
tha dad bcas bzhin rtogs 'gyur te ||

zhes gsungs so ||

gal te don shes pa'i myong ba ni chos ma yin nam | de ji ltar rig pa po med par 'gyur | chos ni chos can la ltos¹¹ par mthong ste | dper na chos pa^h la sogs pa bzhin no || des¹² na myong ba'i bya ba 'di la gdon mi za bar¹³ nyams su myong mkhan byed pa po gzhir gyur pa'i chos can

⁸nges] DGNP, des C
⁹med] CDGP, mod N
¹⁰kyi] DGNP, kyis C
¹¹ltos] CDNP, bltos G
¹²des] CD, de GNP
¹³za bar] CDGP, za ba N

^aOnce again, a mirror of an unmetrical reading, see note to the *lemma* in 109.1.

^bThe bracketed portion is a contamination. This string could have been a gloss, which at some point was inserted into the main text in the wrong place.

^cThis is a faulty translation, correctly: *gzung ba la sogs pa'i rang bzhin ni.

^dThis is a slightly free translation, more correct would have been a formulation similar to *rnam par rtog pa'i bzo mkhan gyis byas pa.

^eThis perhaps mirrors of an older formulation by Samantabhadra, which ended the sentence with *ity āyātam instead of iti bhāvāḥ.

^fPerhaps *de yi would have been more faithful to the original.

^gAgain, *rang nyid would have been a better choice.

^hThis must be an old corruption of *tshos pa.

'ga' zhig yod dgos so ||^a de gzugs la sogs pa'i yul can yin pa'i phyir na
 phyi rol^b yang 'grub bo || des na rjes su dpag pa'am don gyi go bas
 gzung ba dang 'dzin pa grub pa yin pas de ji ltar bkag snyam du dgongs
 nas **gzhan gyis kyang ma yin 'brel pa mthong ba med phyir ro**
 zhes gsungs te | **gzugs la sogs pa'i rnam pa las nges par grol ba^c**
 gzung ba dang **'dzin pa mthong ba ma yin no** zhes 'brel to ||

bsam pa ni 'di yin te rjes su dpag pa don gyi go ba'am gzhan gyis nye
 bar brtags pa'i tshad ma gzhan gyis kyang rang nyid kyis lkog tu gyur
 pa'i don rtogs pa ni ma yin te | mngon sum du gyur ba'i phyir ro ||
 'brel pa gzhan las kyang ma yin te |^d thams cad las thams cad rtogs par
 thal ba'i phyir¹⁴ ro || 'brel pa yang de'i bdag nyid dang de las byung ba
 dag las mi 'khrul pa dang ldan pa gzhan ni yod pa ma yin no || de la
 de'i bdag nyid kyi 'brel pa khas len na chos dang chos can dag dngos po
 la gcig kho na yin pa'i phyir gzugs la sogs pa'i rnam pa can gyi¹⁵ myong
 ba^e nyid 'ba' zhig yod pa yin la 'dzin par byed pa la sogs pa'i dbye ba ni
 ldog pa'i rgyu mtshan can yin pa'i phyir rtogs pa po'i zhen pa'i dbang
 gis brtags pa kho na yin pa'i phyir yang dag par rtogs pa yin no || de las
 byung ba'i 'brel pa yang^f nges par byed pa'i^g mngon sum dang mi dmigs
 pa srid pa ma yin te chos can 'dzin pa po la lkog tu gyur pa^h ni de dag
 yod par mi 'os pa des na de las byung ba'ang srid pa ma yin no || gzugs

¹⁴phyir] DGNP, phyar C

¹⁵gyi] GNP, gyis CD

^aThe sentence *sa eva ca grāhaka ucyate* is not translated. This could be an omission, but it could also be the case that the text in front of the Tibetan translators did not contain the sentence and that it was an addition in Samantabhadra's later version.

^bThis is obviously rendering a misreading/corruption, **bāhyam* for *grāhyam*. Grammatically, 'an external [object]' would make sense, but this does not fit the argument.

^cOnce again, a rendering of an unmetrical reading, already seen in 109.1 and 110.1.

^dThis seems to be a faulty translation; alternatively, there was a loss in the transmission (as **'brel pa med pa'i phyir* could make sense).

^eThis seems to be a misunderstanding of the translators: the statement 'awareness of the image, such as visual form, etc.' was interpreted as 'awareness of that which possesses the image, such as visual form, etc.'

^fThe word *°abhyupagame* is not translated.

^gThe first member of the compound, *tan*^o (**de*; spelt as *taṃ* in the Ms) is not translated.

^hThis seems to be a garbled translation; more correctly: **lkog tu gyur pa'i chos can 'dzin pa po la*.

la sogs pa'i shes pa {gzhan du}^a mi 'thad pas¹⁶ gzugs la sogs pa bzhin du^b 'dzin pa po rjes su dpag par bya ba yang ma yin te | rgyu'i tshogs snga ma snga ma¹⁷ tsam gyis gzugs la sogs pa'i rnam pa can gyi¹⁸ shes pa^c skyed pa'i^d phyir ro || de lta na yang rgyu mtshan gzhan khas len na thug pa med par thal ba'i nyes pa bsal bar dka'o || des na gzung ba dang 'dzin pa dang rig pa'i dbye ba ni dngos po ma yin no || chos^e la sogs pa ni don dam par de lta de ltar skyes pa'i don^f gyi rang bzhin nyid la ldog pa tsam gyis brtags pa'i tha dad pa yin no || de la yang dngos po nyid du bya ba dang byed pa po tha dad pa'i chos dang | chos can yod pa ni ma yin no ||

111.0 [C 28v6–28v7, D 28v7–29r1, G 371r2–371r4, N 295v1–295v2, P 309r3–309r5] myong ba las gzhan pa'i 'dzin pa po med mod | nang du yang dag par myong bar 'gyur ba'i bde ba la sogs pa de nyid ni phyi rol na gnas pa'i gzugs la sogs pa^g 'dzin pa yin par yang dag par myong ba yin pa des na ji ltar gnyis su med par 'grub snyam du dogs pa la brjod pa ni **bde sogs la ni** zhes bya ba la sogs pa'o ||

Smṛti **sim pa la sogs rang gi las kyang¹⁹**
 'ga' yang ma mthong de yongs bzung²⁰ bas na |
 dus gcig²¹ 'brel par gyur pa
 gzugs la sogs pa bzhin du de²² dag gzung 'dzin med || 111

RinŚra **bde sogs de ni yongs su 'dzin pa ni |**

¹⁶'thad pas] CDGP, 'thad pa'i N

¹⁷snga ma snga ma] GNP, snga ma CD

¹⁸gyi] CD, gyis GNP

¹⁹kyang] CD, kyī GNP

²⁰bzung] CDGP, gzung N

²¹gcig] CDNP, cig G

²²de] CDG Tn, de de P

^aThe bracketed portion seems to be a misplaced gloss. It would be more apposite for it to stand at the beginning of the sentence, as this is the opening of a new/alternative argument.

^bThis renders **rūpādivad*, not *cakṣurādivad*, and does not make good sense.

^cSee six notes above.

^dThis translation is somewhat odd; the correct one would be the non-causative **skyes pa'i*.

^eOnce again an old corruption of **tshos*.

^fWhile *don* is perhaps not impossible for *padārtha*, **dngos po* would have been a more apposite translation.

^gThe word °ākāra° within the compound is not translated.

bya ba 'ga' yang yod par ma mthong ste |
cig car shes pa'i phyir na gzugs sogs bzhin |
'di dag 'dzin pa por ni yod ma yin || 111

111.1 [C 28v7–29v1, D 29r1–29v1, G 371r4–371v6, N 295v2–296r4, P 309r5–309v7] **bde ba la sogs pa** myong ba la ni gzugs la sogs pa de dag 'dzin par byed pa la^a 'ga' yang mthong ba med do || gang gi phyir bde ba la sogs pa {rab tu 'jug pa} ni gzugs la sogs pa dang²³ **lhan cig** {gcig pa} **nyid du rtogs pa**^b de'i phyir **gzugs la sogs pa bzhin du** 'dzin pa ma yin par 'thad pa yin no || ji ltar gzugs la sogs pa cig car rtogs pa nyid kyis g.yas g.yon gyi rwa ltar phan gdags²⁴ par bya ba dang phan 'dogs par byed pa med pa'i phyir bde ba la sogs pa 'dzin pa ma yin pa bzhin du (!) bde ba la sogs pa yang gzugs la sogs pa 'dzin par byed pa ma yin te | lhan cig dmigs pa nges²⁵ pa'i phyir tha dad pa med pa kho na'o || tha dad pa ni mthong ba phyin ci log pa rnams kyis mthong ba yin te zla ba tha dad pa med pa {mthong ba}^c bzhin no zhes dgongs so || de skad du |

*nang gi yongs gcod*²⁶ *cha gzhan 'di* |
phyi rol lta bur gnas pa ste |
tha dad med can shes pa yi |
tha dad snang ba bsad pa yin ||

zhes gsungs so || gal te shes pa bskyed²⁷ par byed pa yin pa nyid kyis gzugs la sogs pa sngar nye bar gnas pa la phyis bde ba la sogs pa myong ba skye ba ma yin nam | des na ji ltar | cig car rtogs pa yin zhe na | 'di la brjod pa re zhig gal te Bye brag²⁸ tu smra ba'i 'dod pas rnam pa med

²³dang] GNP, dang | CD

²⁴gdags] CDNP, gdag G

²⁵nges] CDNP, des G

²⁶yongs gcod] GNP, longs spyod CD

²⁷bskyed] CGNP, skyed D

²⁸bye brag] CDGP, bye breg N

^aThis is a corruption in the Tibetan transmission; the correct original must have read *'dzin par byed pa'i las.

^bThe bracketed portion must have been a gloss.

^cThe bracketed word was very likely an explanatory gloss for the terse formulation.

pa'i rnam par shes pa²⁹ de las byung ba'i 'brel pa las rnam pa dang ldan
 pa'i don 'dzin par 'dod pa de'i^a rtogs pa tsam don thams cad la khyad
 par med pa³⁰ nyid kyis 'di ni sngon po'i rtogs pa'am ser po'i rtogs pa yin
 no zhes rtogs pa so sor nges pa med pa'i phyir tshon rtsi bya ba don du
 gnyer ba sngon po la sogs pa la nges par 'jug par mi 'gyur ro || des na
 don rig pa ni shin tu chos med^b do || 'on te³¹ Mdo sde pa'i lugs kyis
 rnam pa dang ldan pa'i rnam par shes pas bskyed³² par byed pa'i don
 gyi skad cig sngar yod pa de las byung ba las 'dzin par 'dod pa de'i tsho
 skad cig ma nyid kyis shes pa'i dus na skyed par byed pa'i don^c med pa'i
 phyir dang rnam pa gnyis myong ba med pa'i phyir shes pa'i rnam pa
 'ba' zhig kho na rig pa'i phyir don gyi rang bzhin ni nam mkha'i me tog
 las khyad par med pa'i phyir ji ltar don khas len |

111.2 {no Tib.}

111.3 [C 29v1–29v4, D 29v1–29v5, G 371v6–372r5, N 296r4–296v1,
 P 309v7–310r4] 'on te rmi lam la sogs par yang yul gzhan du mthong
 ba'i phyir phyi rol nyid rgyu mtshan yin te | ji skad du |

rmi sogs shes las tha dad du^d |
phyi rol don med 'dod ma yin |
kun du dmigs pa la 'khrul pa^e |
yul dang dus gzhan bdag nyid yin ||

²⁹shes pa] CD, shes pas GNP

³⁰khyad par med pa] CDGN, khyad med pa P

³¹'on te] CDGP, 'on te ma N

³²bskyed] GNP, skyed CD

^aIn light of the Sanskrit and that of the required meaning, a **tsho* must have dropped out here.

^bThis unanimous reading is a corruption of **ches med*.

^cMore correctly, **don gyi skad cig*; more likely a loss in the Tibetan transmission and not a mirror of a genuine reading.

^dThe particle *las* must be a corruption of **la*. The word choice for *bāhyam*, *tha dad du*, is unconventional and possibly even an error.

^eThis formulation mirrors the reading of the Ms (*sarvatrālabane bhvāntam*); this learned error is discussed in the translation.

zhes brjod pa yin no || des na ji ltar rmi lam la sogs pa'i dpe sad pa'i gnas
 skabs su 'byung ba'i rnam par shes pa^a yul la sogs pa nges pa³³ brjod ce
 na | de ni ma yin te | rmi lam la sogs pa'i shes pa la dmigs pa mi 'thad
 pa'i phyir ro || de ltar^b 'dzin pa'i rang bzhin nam dran pa'i rang bzhin
 zhig yin | de la re zhig 'dzin pa ni ma yin te | 'dzin pa ni sngon gyi 'dzin
 pa la mi ltos³⁴ pa'i phyir ro ||^c sngon mthong ba'i yul 'dzin pas ni so sor
 nges par mi 'gyur te mthong ba gzhan bzhin no ||^d 'di ni dran pa'i rang
 bzhin du yang mi 'thad de | rnam par rtog pa med pa'i phyir dang | Ita
 ba i^e yul can yin pa'i phyir dang | gsal bar snang ba'i phyir ro || des na
 yul gzhan du mthong ba la sogs pa i^f dngos po'i yul^g ji ltar yin pa mi shes
 so ||

111.4 [C 29v4–30r7, D 29v5–30r7, G 372r5–373r4, N 296v1–297r4,
 P 310r4–311r2] 'on te de rgyu mtshan yin du chug kyang yul la sogs pa
 nges pa ni rgyu mtshan des byed par^h mi nus so || gal te yul la sogs pa
 gang du phyi rol nye ba de nyid rmi lam du yang snang na de ni de'i rgyu
 mtshan du 'gyur ba zhig na | de ltar na mi srid de bslu³⁵ ba med par thal
 pa'i phyir ro || de dang bral ba 'ga' zhig kho nar de snang na ni 'di³⁶
 rgyur 'thad pa ma yin no || gal te de'i rang bzhin du bral bar snang bar
 byed na ni khyad par med pa'i phyir gang yang rung bar byed par 'gyur
 ro || thun mong ba i³⁷ don med kyang rgyud³⁸ nges pa med par skye

³³nges pa] GNP, nges par D, des par C

³⁴ltos] CD, bltos GNP

³⁵bslu] GNP, slu CD

³⁶'di] CDNP, 'dir G

³⁷mong ba i] DGNP, mongs pa i C

³⁸rgyud] GNP, rgyu CD

^aCorrectly: *shes pa'i or *shes pa la.

^bThis is not an apposite translation of *tad dhi*.

^cHere the translators misunderstood the logical structure of the sentence. Alternatively, a corrector added the sentence closer in error.

^dPossibly prompted by a misunderstanding of the argument (see note above), this sentence seems garbled.

^eA corruption of **da lta ba'i*.

^fPerhaps more correctly: **de'i yul gzhan la sogs par mthong ba'i*.

^gPerhaps more correctly: **dngos po'i yul can nyid?*

^hSomething must have dropped out here; we propose **go byed par*.

ba ni gang gi tshe gnyis³⁹ kyis⁴⁰ rmi lam mtshungs par dmigs pa'am |
 'khrul pa'i shes pa can mang po rnams la skra la sogs pa snang ba bzhin
 no || de bzhin du phyi rol gyi don med kyang don byed pa ni rmi lam
 du dmigs pa kho na'o || ji ltar sad pa'i gnas skabs na bud med kyi rgyu
 mtshan can gyi bde ba la sogs pa dang de dang 'brel pa {sa bon}^a 'byung
 ba la sogs pa'i don bya ba⁴¹ dngos su myong ba de kho na bzhin du rmi
 lam gyi gnas skabs su yang yin no || de'i phyr ji ltar rmi lam la sogs par
 phyi rol gyi don med par yul nges pa la sogs par 'gyur ba de bzhin du
 sad pa'i gnas skabs su yang 'gyur ba gang gis zil gyis mnan | ji skad du |

'ga' yi nang gi bag chags ni |
 'ga' zhig nyid kyis zad^b byed pa |
 de phyr blo ni rnam⁴² nges kyi⁴³ c |
 phyi rol don ltos⁴⁴ ma yin no ||

zhes gsungs pas so || des na⁴⁵ rig pa la phyi rol gyi rgyu mtshan med pa
 na⁴⁶ gzugs la sogs pa dang | bde ba la sogs pa dag snga phyr gyur pas
 cig car rtogs pa dang bral ba'i nyes pa brjod pa ji ltar 'thad par 'gyur ba
 ni mi shes so ||

gal te cig car rtogs pa yin yang | gzugs la sogs pa⁴⁷ 'dzin par byed
 par nges par byas pa'i bde ba la sogs pa'i 'dzin pa kho na yin la | gzugs
 la sogs pa'i don rtogs pa^d thams cad la thun mong⁴⁸ ma yin pa^e nyid kyis
 gzung ba kho na yin te | rgyu'i tshogs snga ma snga ma nyid las yul dang
 shes pa'i skad cig rnams gzung ba dang 'dzin pa nyid du skyed nges pa'i
 phyr ji ltar gzung ba dang 'dzin pa 'chol bar 'gyur zhe na | 'di la^f snying

³⁹gnyis] GNP, gnyid CD

⁴⁰kyis] GNP, kyi CD

⁴¹bya ba] GNP, bya ba la CD

⁴²rnam] DGNP, rnams C

⁴³kyi] NNP, kyis CD

⁴⁴ltos] CD, bltos GNP

⁴⁵des na] GNP, de na CD

⁴⁶na] GN, ni CDP

⁴⁷pa] DGNP, par C

⁴⁸thun mong] CD GP, thun mongs N

^aThe bracketed word seems to be an auxiliary gloss to disambiguate 'byung ba, which by itself has the same meaning, but this is not always clear.

^bAll Canons transmit *zad*, which must be an old corruption of *sad*.

^cCorrectly: *blo yi rnam nges ni.

^dVery likely a corruption of *rtogs pa po.

^eThis rendering mirrors *pratīpatrasādhāraṇatvena, which does not fit the argument.

^fPerhaps a corruption of *'di yang.

po ye⁴⁹ med de | gang gi phyir rnam par rtog pa med pa'i {phyir}^a bdag
nyid mngon sum la ni {sngon po la sogs pa'i rnam pa bzhin du}^b gzung
ba dang 'dzin pa nyid dam sngon po'i thun mong ba nyid ni snang ba
med do || sngon po rtogs pa po gzhan gyis blta bar bya ba nyid ni mngon
sum gyis rtogs par byed pa ma yin te | gzhan gyis rtogs pa yang mngon
sum nyid du thal ba'i phyir ro || spu langs pa la sogs pa'i rtags las skyes
pa'i rjes su dpag pas rtogs par bya ba yang ma yin te | de'i yul ni spyi yin
pa'i phyir ro || des na thun mong ma yin pa'i gzugs la sogs pa dus gcig
tu rtogs pa ni shes pa kho na yin te | yul rung ba⁵⁰ na gnas pas ma shes
pa rang gi shes pa yin pa'i phyir ro ||

112.0 [C 30r7–30v1, D 30r7–30v1, G 373r4, N 297r4–297r5, P
311r2–311r3] gal te phyi rol gyi don ni skad cig ma yin pa yan lag can la
sogs pa'i rang bzhin gcig pa kho na †...†^c ma yin nam zhes dogs pa la⁵¹
brjod pa⁵² ni **dkar po la sogs pa'o** ||

dkar po la sogs gang gis dang por mthong ba
de nyid dus gzhan mthong ba min |
de gnyis phan tshun du yang mi mthun phyir na
rtag tu sim la sogs pa bzhin || 112

Smṛti

dkar po la sogs gang zhig mthong ba rnam |
de nyid dus gzhan dag tu mthong mi 'gyur |
'di nyid rtag tu gcig la gcig 'gal ba |
yin phyir bde ba la sogs dag dang mtshungs || 112

RinŚra

⁴⁹ye] CD GP, le N

⁵⁰rung ba] GNP, rung bas CD

⁵¹dogs pa la] DGNP, dogs la C

⁵²brjod pa] CD, brjod pa brjod pa GNP (dittography)

^aThis second *phyir* does not fit the context and must be dismissed.

^bThe bracketed portion is either an auxiliary gloss or a trace of an older formulation by Samantabhadra; alternatively, it mirrors something that was lost in our Ms.

^cThere seems to be a significant omission here, corresponding to *tasya pūrvā-parakālasthāyivāḥ, sādharmaṇatvam apy anumānena vijñāyata iti*. Either some loss occurred in the Tibetan transmission or the present translation preserves an older, simpler formulation by the author.

112.1 [C 30v1–30v4, D 30v1–30v4, G 373r4–373v1, N 297r5–297v1, P 311r3–311r7] **dkar po la sogs pa** ste gzugs dkar ba la sogs pa^a **mthong ba** ste | mngon sum gyis rtogs pa **gang yin pa de nyid ni des**^b **gzhan** snga ma'am phyi ma dag tu **mthong ba med** do || snga phyi stong pa nyid^c mthong ba yin no zhes bya ba'i don to || gtan tshigs bshad pa mthong zin pa dang | mthong ba'am mthong bzhin pa dang mthong bar 'gyur ba **'di dag ni rtag tu phan tshun du** gcig la gcig **bde ba la sogs pa bzhin du 'gal ba'i phyir ro** || mig la sogs pa'i rnam par shes pa ni nye bar gnas pa da ltar ba tsam 'dzin par byed pa yin te | de lta ma yin na thag ring ba dang bar chod pa la sogs pa dang | 'das pa dang | ma 'ongs pa dang | byis ba dang | rgan pa la sogs pa yang cig car 'dzin par thal ba bzlog⁵³ dka' bar 'gyur ro ||

112.2 [No Tib.; here added from C52v3–53r3, D1860 52v3–53r4, G 74r5–75r2, N62r1–62v3, P2723 63r7–64r2] *gzugs la sogs pa'i ngo bo nyid du so sor snang bar gyur pa ma yin nam ji ltar na rnam par rtog pa tsam gyi bdag nyid 'khor bar 'gyur zhe na | ma yin te | gzugs la sogs pa rtogs*⁵⁴ *pa'i yul nyid du ma grub pa ste | gzugs la sogs pa so sor snang ba ma rtogs*⁵⁵ ^d *par gzhan gzung ba'am | de*⁵⁶ *'dzin pa cung zad kyang dmigs su med pa'i phyir ro || yul rtogs par gyur pa ma yin par yang rang gi ngo bo yod pa'i tha snyad kyi yul mi 'grub ste | shin tu thal bar 'gyur ba'i phyir ro || de dang 'brel pa'i dngos po gzhan rtogs pas*⁵⁷ *de rtogs par 'gyur ba yang ma yin te | 'ga' zhig mngon sum gyi bdag nyid las shin tu 'das pa la 'brel pa rab tu ma grub pa'i phyir ro || nang du so sor snang bar gyur pa rang gi bde ba la sogs pa'i snang ba ni 'dzin pa nyid yin la | sngon po la sogs pa de las phyi rol gyi*⁵⁸ *gzugs nyid du rtogs*⁵⁹ *pa'i mtshan nyid ni gzung ba yin no zhe na | ma yin*

⁵³bzlog] CDNP, zlog G

⁵⁴rtogs] CD, rtog GNP

⁵⁵rtogs] CDGP, rtog N

⁵⁶de] CGNP, da D

⁵⁷rtogs pas] CDNP, rtogs pa G

⁵⁸phyi rol gyi] CDGN, phyir gyi P

⁵⁹rtogs] CDGP, rtog N

^aThe word *ekam* (*eka*^o in the Ms) is not mirrored.

^bThe unanimous reading *des* must be a corruption of *dus*.

^cThis is a most unusual translation of *pūrvāpararūparahitam eva*.

^dThe reading of N is evidently a secondary corruption, whereas *rtogs* should be corrected to **gtogs*.

te | sngon po la sogs pa la⁶⁰ bde ba la sogs pa'i byed pa ma grub pa'i phyir ro ||
 rtogs⁶¹ pa'i byed pa med par yang 'dzin pa zhes bya ba de lta na ni | phyi rol gyi
 gzugs la sogs pa yang 'dzin pa nyid du thal bar 'gyur ba'i phyir ro || cig car rang
 dbang nyid⁶² du so sor snang ba dag ni | cung zhig ni gzung ba | cung zhig ni 'dzin
 pa'o⁶³ zhes so sor nges pa'i rnam pa ni ma mthong ngo || bdag ni sngon po la sogs
 pa rig pa'o zhes bya ba yang rnam par rtog pa tsam nyid de |⁶⁴ phyi dang nang nyid
 du rang dags so sor snang ba rnams khong du chud pa'i phyir ro || 'dzin pa la sogs
 pa rnam par rtog pa'i rgyun 'di thams cad nyid ni rang dbang du nyams su myong ba
 rab tu ston pa la gzhol⁶⁵ ba yin te | so sor snang ba rnams gcig la gcig yongs su 'dzin
 pa'i byed pa dang bral ba'i dngos po nyid yin pa'i phyir ro || de lta bas na 'ga' zhig
 la 'ga' zhig gis 'dzin pa zhes bya ba ni ma yin no || de ltar yang Rab 'byor chos kyis
 chos yongs su shes pa ni ma yin no || zhes bya ba rgyas par gsungs pa yin no ||
 gang yang gzung ba ni shes pa gnyis kyis shes par byed do⁶⁶ zhes bya ba la sogs pa
 gsungs pa de dang de ni gzugs la sogs pa zhen pa tsam la ltos⁶⁷ nas la lar gang zag
 la sogs pa bstan pa dang 'dra bas nyes pa med do ||

112.3 [C 30v4, D 30v4, G 373v1–373v2, N 297v1, P 311r7] de ltar 'di
 yan chad kyis ni gzung ba dang 'dzin pa sgrub pa'i tshad ma bkag pas^a
 bstan to ||

113.0 [C 30v4, D 30v4, G 373v2, N 297v1–297v2, P 311r7–311r8] da
 ni gnod pa can gyi tshad ma las don rnams med pa'i phyir rnam par rig
 pa tsam ston pas brjod pa ni **thog ma tha**^b zhes bya ba la sogs pa'o ||

gzugs la sogs pa gcig min

Smṛti

⁶⁰la sogs pa la] CD, la sogs pa GNP

⁶¹rtogs] GP, rtog CDN

⁶²nyid] DGNP, nyad C

⁶³pa'o] CD, pa'o || GNP

⁶⁴de]] CD, do || GNP

⁶⁵gzhol] CDNP, gzhal G

⁶⁶do] CDGP, pa N

⁶⁷ltos] CDP, bltos GN

^aIn light of the Skt. the instrumental is not justified, therefore this reading seems to be a corruption of *bkag pa.

^bThere seems to be a *ma* missing here. The *lemma* is cited in the correct form in paragraph 113.1.

rdul phran cha yang ma mthong |
 du ma'i gzugs kyang ma yin
 zhes pa'ang de bzhin no || 113

RinŚra

thog mtha' la sogs bye brag snang bas na |
 gzugs la sogs pa 'di dag gcig ma yin |
 phra rab rnam kyang mthong ba ma yin pas |
 du ma'i gzugs su min pa'ang de dang 'dra || 113

113.1 [C 30v4–31v7, D 30v5–31v7, G 373v2–375r5, N 297v2–298v7, P 311r8–312v8] bsam pa ni 'di yin te | phyi rol gyi don^a ni yon tan dang rdzas la sogs pa'i dbye bas rnam pa mang por⁶⁸ pha rol po rnam kyang brtags pa yin no || de la yon tan la sogs pa chos rnam kyi rten ni rdzas yin pas de bkag pa'i⁶⁹ b de dag rtsa ba dang bcas pa {du ma}^c phyung⁷⁰ bar 'gyur ro || des na logs su sun 'byin pa ma brjod de | du ma yang^d 'du ba can med par ma yin pa des na de'i lugs su⁷¹ e sun 'byin pa mi brjod do || rdzas kyang sa dang | chu dang | me dang | rlung dang | nam mkha' dang | dus dang | phyogs dang | bdag dang | yid ces bya ba rnam pa dgu yin no || de la bdag ni de ma thag⁷² tu bsam par^f bya'o ||

⁶⁸mang por] GNP, mang pos CD

⁶⁹bkag pa'i] GNP, bkag pa'i rdzas CD

⁷⁰phyung] GNP, 'byung CD

⁷¹lugs su] CD, lugs GNP

⁷²thag] CDNP, thags G

^aThe *lemma* corresponding to *vastu* is omitted, unless *don* here stands for it, in which case the gloss *artho* is missing.

^bThe readings of C and D can be dismissed, while those of N and P are very likely a corruption of **bkag pas*.

^cThe bracketed word does not make good sense in its present place. This was perhaps an erstwhile gloss to some other word or portion in the present paragraph. The most likely candidate would be the passage discussing *samavāya*, which is normally rendered with *'du ba*. However, unless we are dealing with a corruption of the standard form, it is possible that the translators did use *du ma* for rendering this concept, see the note immediately below.

^dNormally *samavāya* is *'du ba*.

^eThe original reading must have been **logs su*; this reading is therefore a corruption in the Tibetan transmission.

^fWhile this reading is not impossible and even apposite, it is more likely that it is a corruption of *bsal bar*.

sgra yang nam mkha'i {rang bzhin gyi} yon tan can du 'dod do ||^a de yang ci^b yin pas mtshungs pa'i^c phyir na sgra⁷³ thams cad tha dad par thos par mi 'gyur ro || des na {rang dang}^d nye ba'i yul bzhin du bar chod pa'i yul du mngon par 'dod par yang^e sgra grags pa⁷⁴ thos par 'gyur ba'am gzhan du yang mi 'gyur ro zhes pa ni gcig tu nges pa yin no || phyogs dang yul^f dag kyang gcig yin pa'i phyir na snga ma dang phyi ma la sogs pa'i rkyen du mi 'thad do ||

'di snyam du rnam par dbye ba 'di ni khyad par du byed pa rnam tha dad pas yin no ||^g ci khyad par du byed pa dag gi^h snga ma dang phyi ma rang las yin nam 'on te gzhan las yin | de la phyogs dang po ltar na de nyid las rtogs pa de grub pa'i phyir de dag don med do || phyogs gnyis pa ltar na yang gal te phyogs dang yulⁱ dag kho na las yin na de ni de'i tshe gcig yin pa'i phyir na {'di nyid kyi tshe 'gyur ba⁷⁵} de dag mi 'thad do ||^j gzhan yang yin no zhe na | de dag don med pa por 'jug⁷⁶ go ||

nam mkha' dang phyogs dang yul^k 'di rnam ni rtag pa yin pas lhan cig byed pa dang ldan pa'am | de dang bral ba yang rung ste | rang bzhin gyi khyad par ma thob par rang gi 'bras bu res 'ga' kho na skyed par byed par⁷⁷ ji ltar 'gyur | 'di ltar |

⁷³sgra] CDGP, sga N

⁷⁴grags pa] CD, grags par GNP

⁷⁵'gyur bas] GNP, 'gyur ba CD

⁷⁶'jug] CD, 'dug GNP

⁷⁷skyed par byed par] CD, bskyed byed par GNP

^aSurely, the other way around, i.e., *nam mkha' yang sgra'i yon tan can du 'dod do? The bracketed portion is out of place.

^bThe unanimous reading *ci* is a transmission corruption of **gcig*.

^cThis reading too is corrupt. The original may have been something similar to **yin pa na gnas mtshungs pa'i*.

^dThe bracketed portion was probably an explanatory gloss.

^eOnce again we are dealing with a corruption in the Tibetan transmission; correctly: **mngon par 'dod pa'i*.

^fThis reading is very puzzling; surely, we expect **dus* and not *yul*. Somewhat disturbingly, this occurs at least once more in the text, see note below.

^gThis sentence is slightly corrupt. First, *pratyaya*^o (**rtogs pa'i*) is not translated, but it can be understood as implied. Second, there is probably a **kyi* missing between *rnam* and *tha dad pas*.

^hThis *gi* must be a corruption of the topic marker **ni*.

ⁱOnce again *yul* for **dus*, see three notes above and two notes below.

^jThe bracketed portion was probably an explanatory gloss.

^kTogether with the instances given five notes above and two notes above, this is the third time where we have *yul* for **dus*.

Collation of the Tibetan Translation

de dag nus pa'am nus med pa |
ngo bo nyid kyis gang gnas ni |
rtag pa nyid phyir gso min na |
de zad bya phyir nus pa gang ||

zhes so || 'dis ni yid kyang bsal to || yid smra⁷⁸ ba rnams kyis yid 'di ni shes pa cig car mi skye ba las dpag par bya ba yin na | gar lta ba la sogs pa la rnam par shes pa cig car nyams su myong ba yin na | de ltar yin na ni^a nam yang mi 'thad par 'gyur ro || des na nam mkha' la sogs pa ni med pa kho na'o ||

sa la sogs pa lus pa yin na de yang yan lag can dang rdul phra rab kyi dbye bas rnam pa gnyis su brtags so || de la^b yan lag can yod pa ma yin la rdul phra rab kyang med de⁷⁹ | de gnyis ka la yang sgrub par byed pa med pa'i phyir ro || ^c de nyid la gnod par byed pa^d rim pa ji lta ba bzhin du brjod⁸⁰ par byed pa ni | **thog ma tha ma** zhes bya ba la sogs pa'o || snam bu la sogs pa dag^e ni rdul phra rab gnyis la sogs pas brtsams pa'i rim⁸¹ gyis brtsams pa yan lag can gyi rang bzhin du rab tu grags par yod pa **ma yin** no || {ci'i phyir zhe na }^f **gzugs la sogs pa ni thog ma dang tha ma** dang dbus **la sogs pa'i dbye bas**⁸² phan tshun 'gal ba'i rang bzhin rags pa gcig dang bral ba kho nar **mthong ba'i** gtan tshigs kyi **phyir ro** || de ltar 'dis ni shes pa gcig dang 'dres pa'i⁸³ {rang bzhin

⁷⁸smra] CDP, sma GN

⁷⁹de] CDGP, do N

⁸⁰brjod]

Tg Tn P, rjod CD

⁸¹rim] DGNP, rims C

⁸²dbye bas] CD, dbye ba N, dbye GP

⁸³'dres pa'i] CD, 'dre ba'i GNP

^aVery probably due to an eye-skip, the subject **yid* dropped out; correctly we should have: **de ltar yid yin na ni*.

^bMore correctly in light of the Skt.: **de la yang*. The loss of the *yang* is probably due to an eye-skip, as the next word is *yan lag*.

^cThis mirrors **sādhakābhāvāt* and not *bādhakasadbhāvāt*, possibly the formulation of an earlier draft by the author. In this recension, the latter reading is more apposite.

^dThis seems muddled; correctly: **gnod par byed pa de nyid*.

^eThis rendering is due to a misreading of the Skt. *ghaṭādikam* as **paṭādikam*.

^fThe bracketed portion was very likely an auxiliary gloss in the Tibetan.

gyi}^a dngos po dmigs pa'i⁸⁴ mtshan nyid can mi dmigs pa'i gtan tshigs
brjod do ||

de lta de ltar gnas 'gyur ba'i |
cha shas 'ba' zhig snang ba ste |
de dang ldan pa cha med pa⁸⁵ |
gzhan ni snang ba yod ma yin ||

yan lag gcig kha bsgyur ram g.yo⁸⁶ na'ang de la 'du ba'i yan lag can yang
kha bsgyur ba'am⁸⁷ g.yo ba mthong bar 'gyur ro || 'on te yan lag kha
bsgyur ba dang g.yo ba yin gyi yan lag can ni ma yin no zhe na⁸⁸ | 'o
na de kha bsgyur ba^b dang mi g.yo bar⁸⁹ mthong bar 'gyur ro || yan
lag gcig bsgrigs pa na yang de mi mthong ba kho nar 'gyur ro || de ma
bsgrigs na ni dmigs par thal bar 'gyur ba bzlog dka' bar 'gyur ro ||^c

de ltar tha dad pa'i bdag nyid can 'gal ba'i chos gnas pa'i phyir yan
lag can gcig yin par mi 'os pas na 'di ni⁹⁰ med pa'i tha snyad kyi yul du
'gyur ba'i dus la bab par mthong ngo ||

de ltar gcig bkag pas da ni **du ma'i rang bzhin** lus pa⁹¹ yin no ||
de yang du ma rnams kyis rnam pa du mar nye bar brtags te | dper na
Bye brag tu smra ba rnams kyis {dang po}^ddngos su dbang po'i spyod
yul yin pa dang | Bye brag pa rnams kyis ni yan lag can rtsom par byed
pa nyid dang | Mdo sde pa rnams kyis⁹² sha za ltar rtag tu lkog tu gyur

⁸⁴dmigs pa'i] CDNP, dmigs dmigs pa'i G (dittography)

⁸⁵med pa] CGNP, med ? D

⁸⁶g.yo] GNP, g.yon CD

⁸⁷bsgyur ba'am] CD, bsgyur 'am GNP

⁸⁸zhe na] CGNP, zhi na D

⁸⁹g.yo bar] CDNP, g.yo ba G

⁹⁰'di ni] CD, 'di na 'di ni GNP

⁹¹lus pa] CDNP, lus pa bzhan lus pa G

⁹²kyis] N, kyi CDGP

^aThe bracketed portion was an auxiliary gloss, specifying the object of the investi-
gation, the property (note that just above *dharma* was translated with *rang bzhin*).

^bCorrectly: **kha mi bsgyur bar*.

^cIn the last two sentences, *tasyāṛtau* and *āṛtasya* are not mirrored. This might possi-
bly reflect another formulation or both are omissions due to a double corruption.

^dThe bracketed word seems like an auxiliary gloss out of place. Its original position
was probably at the beginning of the sentence (alternatively, the beginning of the next
sentence) to introduce the Vaibhāṣika view as the first of the three listed.

pa rang gi rnam par^a gtod pa⁹³ nus pa yin no zhes rdul phra rab⁹⁴ 'dod pa lta bu'o || de la re zhig Bye brag tu smra bas brtags pa'i rdul phra rab bsal ba'i phyir gsungs pa ni | **phra rab rdul rnams** zhes bya ba la sogs pa'o || ji ltar rags pa gcig med pa **de bzhin du du ma nyid kyang yod pa ma yin no** || gtan tshigs brjod pa ni **phra rab rdul rnams mthong ba med pa'i phyir** zhes bya ba'o || rdul phra rab kyi rang bzhin phan tshun tha dad pa ni mi dmigs pa'i phyir ro zhes bya ba'i don to ||

114.0 [C 31v7, D 31v7–32r1, G 375r5, N 298v7, P 312v8] de ste rags pa gzhan du mi 'thad par rdul phra rab rjes su dpog go zhe na | brjod pa ni | **rdul phran cha med yin na** zhes bya ba la sogs pa'o ||

Smṛti **yan lag med pa'i rdul phran nyid la
du ma'i rdul phra rab kyi⁹⁵ rjes 'brang med phyir dang |
sa yi⁹⁶ dkyil 'khor la sogs gzugs kyi
dbye bas de la 'ga' yang mi 'gyur ro || 114**

RinŚra **rdul phran cha shas⁹⁷ med pa nyid kyang ni |
phra rab du ma 'dus pa yod⁹⁸ min pas |
sa yi dkyil 'khor la sogs rang bzhin te |
bsags pa 'ga' yang 'dir ni med par 'gyur || 114**

114.1 [C 31v7–32r6, D 32r1–32r6, G 375r5–375v5, N 298v7–299r6, P 313r1–313r8] bsam pa ni 'di yin te | re zhig rdul phra rab rnams cha shas⁹⁹ dang bcas par ni 'dod par mi bya ste | cig car 'gal ba'i yul ni^b gnas pa {bcu po rnams dang}^c drug gis sbyar ba la sogs pa 'gal ba'i chos dang

⁹³gtod pa] CD, gtong ba GNP

⁹⁴zhes rdul phra rab] CD, zhes phra rab GN, zhos phra rab P

⁹⁵kyis] GNP, kyi CD

⁹⁶yi] CDGN, yid P

⁹⁷shas] DGN, shes CP

⁹⁸yod] GNP, yin CD

⁹⁹shas] CDNP, shes G

^aCorrectly: **rnam pa*.

^bMore correctly: **phyogs la*.

^cThis seems to be a slightly misplaced erstwhile gloss. Its more natural place would have been after *la sogs pa*, as this is an alternative for the connection with six other atoms.

ldan pas rags pa bzhin du du mar thal ba'i phyir ro || {rdul phran}^a
cha med yin na ste | yan lag gi mtshan nyid cha dang bral ba yin par
gyur na {du ma'i}^b **rdul phran du ma rnams kyis bskor ba** ste |
du ma'i nang du bcug pa **med par 'gyur** ro || 'di ltar^c rdul phra rab
kyis¹⁰⁰ bskor ba yin na steng dang 'og phyogs bzhi'i rdul phra rab¹⁰¹ kyi
dbus na gnas pa de gdon mi za bar cha drug tu 'gyur te | 'di'i rang bzhin
gang zhig rdul phra rab gzhan^d dang nye ba de nyid du rdul phra rab de
las gzhan dang nye bar ni mi 'byor te¹⁰² | de dag yul gcig par 'gyur ba'i
phyir ro || gal te de yang de na yod pa de lta na | shar gyi rdul phra rab
dang nye ba'i rang bzhin nyid nub kyi rdul phra rab dang nye bar gnas
par 'gyur ro || ^e nye bar gnas pa med pa na^{103f} mngon du bltas pa tсам
la yang nyes pa¹⁰⁴ 'di nyid yin no || de'i phyir¹⁰⁵ gong bu'i rang bzhin
rdul phra rab tсам du thal ba'i phyir ro || ^g **sa'i dkyil 'khor la sogs**
rang bzhin gyis | ^h **bsags pa 'ga' yang 'di la med par 'gyur** || ji
skad du |

*'byar ba dang ni bskor ba 'am |
bar med rnams par gnas kyang rung |
dbus gnas rdul phran rdul gcig la |
bltas pa'i rang bzhin gang yin pa ||
de nyid rdul phran gzhan dag la |*

¹⁰⁰kyis] CDNP, kyi G

¹⁰¹rdul phra rab] CD, rdul ? rab N, rdul rab GP

¹⁰²te] CD, ste GNP

¹⁰³med pa na] CD, med na GNP

¹⁰⁴nyes pa] GNP, nye ba CD

¹⁰⁵de'i phyir] CD, de phyir GNP

^aClearly an explanatory gloss to aid the reader.

^bThe words *ekasyāṅor* are not translated or were lost in the transmission. The bracketed portion is a confusing gloss, as the words *du ma* also occur in the *lemma*.

^cPerhaps more apposite would have been **gang phyir*.

^dLess confusing would have been **shar gyi* (as in the next sentence) or **snga ma'i*.

^eWe can sympathize with the translators here as the syntax of the original sentence is indeed somewhat awkward.

^fThe first *api* of this sentence is not translated.

^gThe translators seem to have failed to understand that this is an argument for what follows and that therefore the sentence should not end here. Alternatively, *ro ||* was inserted by a well-meaning but inattentive corrector.

^hThe unanimous reading *gyis |* is a corruption of **gyi*.

Collation of the Tibetan Translation

gal te blltas par rtog¹⁰⁶ byed na |
de ltar yin na sa 'dzin las |
sogs pa^a rags¹⁰⁷ pa mi 'thad do ||

zhes gsungs so ||

114.2 {no Tib.}

114.3 [C 32r6, D 32r6, G 375v5–375v6, N 299r6, P 313r8] gcig ma grub na du ma mi 'grub pa'i phyir rdul phra rab dag ni med pa kho na'o ||

? [C32r6, D 32r6–32r7, G 375v5–375v6, N 299r6–299r7, P 313r8–313v1] 'dis¹⁰⁸ ni thun mong du sun phyung bas rdul phra rab tu smra ba rnam thams cad bsal ba'i phyir so sor sun phyung¹⁰⁹ bas¹¹⁰ gtan pa la thag pa gus par ma byas so ||

Cf. 114.9 & 115.0 [C 32r6–32r7, D 32r7–32v1, G 375v6–376r2, N 299r7–299v1, P 313v1–313v3] 'di yan chad kyis ni sgrub byed kyi tshad ma med pa'i phyir dang gnod byed kyi tshad ma yod pa'i phyir phyi'i don ni med do zhes bstan nas | da ni 'gro ba ma lus pa 'di rnam par rig pa tsam kho na'o zhes nye bar sdud par byed pas | **des na** zhes bya ba gsungs so ||

¹⁰⁶rtog] GNP, rtogs CD
¹⁰⁷rags] CDNP, rag G
¹⁰⁸'dis] D GN P, 'dus C
¹⁰⁹phyung] CDGN, byung P
¹¹⁰bas] GNP, bsam CD

^aDividing the standard *la sogs pa* (*las* seems to be a retained archaism) across *pādas* is noteworthy.

Cf. 115.1 [C 32r7–32v1, D 32v1–32v2, G 376r2–376r3, N 299v1–299v2, P 313v3–313v4] **des na** zhes bya ba brjod ma thag pa'i rigs pa'i mthus **'dzin pa la sogs pa dang bral ba'i phyir rang rgyud kyi gzugs la sogs pa rtog¹¹¹ pa'i phyir¹¹² rang bzhin can** gyi rgyu ba dang mi rgyu ba'i dngos po thams cad ni phyi rol gyi don dang bral bas rang gi bag chags tsam las byung ba nyid kyi **dri za'i grong khyer lta bu yin no** ||

114.4 {no Tib.}

114.5 [C 32v1–32v7, D 32v2–33r1, G 376r3–376v4, N 299v2–300r2, P 313v4–314r5] rnam par shes pa tsam yin mod^a de la^b snga ma bzhin du gcig dang du ma'i rang bzhin du mi bzod pas na nam mkha'i padma bzhin du yod pa'i tha snyad du bya bar mi 'os so || yod pa'i dngos po la ni rnam pa gzhan med pa'i phyir des ni gcig dang du ma dag las gang yang rung ba¹¹³ gcig 'gyur dgos na de lta ma yin no || des na 'di ji ltar yod pa'i tha snyad kyi yul du 'gyur zhes bya ba mi shes so ||

'on te rnam par shes pa la ni gcig¹¹⁴ dang du ma dang mi ldan pa nyid^c mi srid do zhes bya bar sems na | de ni mi bden te | shes pa rnam^d dang bcas pa la ni¹¹⁵ phyi rol bzhin du gcig dang du ma'i rang bzhin dang bral ba nyid bsal^e ba'i phyir ro || gang yang 'jig rten gyi¹¹⁶ phyi rol gyi don du tha snyad byas pa de nyid rnam pa dang bcas par smra ba'i shes pa yin no || des na phyi rol gyi don^f yin pa la gnod pa gang yin pa de

¹¹¹rtog] GNP, rtogs CD

¹¹²phyir] CDGP, <phyir> N

¹¹³rung ba] CDNP, rung G

¹¹⁴gcig] CDNP, cig G

¹¹⁵la ni] CD, la GNP

¹¹⁶gyi] GNP, gyis CD

^aThe word *jagat* is not mirrored.

^bMore correctly: **de yang*.

^cThe word °*svabhāva*° is not mirrored.

^dThis unanimous reading is a corruption of **rnam pa*.

^eMore correctly: **gsal*.

^fJudging by the translators' formulation in the second half of this sentence, *don* here confusingly stands for **dngos po*.

nyid ni nang gi dngos po yin pa la yang gnod pa kho na'o || {'di ltar}^a
 gnod pas ni rags¹¹⁷ pa gcig gam rdul phra rab ma yin pa^b sel bar byed
 do¹¹⁸ || shes pa'i rang bzhin du gyur pa'i rnam pa 'di yang gal te rags¹¹⁹
 pa gcig yin nam | gal te rdul phra rab mang po tha dad pa yin yang rung
 ste | gnyi ga ltar yang phyi rol gyi don la 'byung ba'i sun 'byin pa spangs
 par¹²⁰ mi nus so || gang gis¹²¹ de med pas med par 'gyur ba de rnam
 par shes pa las phyi rol yin pa'i rgyu mtshan gyis^c sun 'byin pa ni ma yin
 no ||

lus can gyi^d rgyu mtshan gyi¹²² gnod¹²³ par byed pa ni lus can ma
 yin pa rnam par shes pa'i bdag nyid la yod pa ma yin no zhes bya ba
 yang snying po med de | sngon po la sogs pa'i rnam pa shar ba¹²⁴ nyid
 yin na^c rnam par shes pa yang lus can nyid yin pa'i phyir ro || yul khyab
 par byed pa dang ldan pa'i rnam pa 'di nyid lus can yin la de ni 'di la yod
 pa kho na'o ||^f

114.6 [C 32v7–33r2, D 33r1–33r3, G 376v4–376v6, N 300r2–300r4,
 P 314r5–314r8] †...†^g †bde ba† la sogs pa gsal ba bsnyon par mi nus

¹¹⁷rags] CDNP, rag G

¹¹⁸do] CDNP, de G

¹¹⁹rags] CDNP, rag G

¹²⁰spangs par] CD, spang bar GNP

¹²¹gang gis] CDNP, gang gi G

¹²²gyi] GNP, gyis CD

¹²³gnod] CD, snod GNP

¹²⁴rnam pa shar ba] GNP, rnam par shes pa CD

^aVery likely an erstwhile gloss.

^bSomething must have dropped out here; we expect a sentence along the lines of:
**rdul phra rab kyi rang bzhin can gcig ma yin pa.*

^cCorrectly: *gyi.

^dThis perhaps mirrors *mūrta^o rather than mūrṭi^o.

^eIt is not at all clear how this is supposed to mirror °ākāratāyām. Perhaps shar ba is a corruption?

^fThere seems to be a different underlying Skt. text here. Also note that somewhere around this area we have the beginning of a rather substantial loss of text.

^gThis is perhaps the longest loss in the Tibetan transmission, from *syān matam* approximately up to *naitad asti, tasyāpi*, i.e., about seven lines of Skt. in our print. The loss also seems to have produced a garbled argumentation.

pa¹²⁵ nyid kyang ma yin te | 'di ltar dub pa'i lus^a ji srid chu bur zhugs pa
de srid du khyab pa'i bde ba skye bar nyams su myong ba yin la | de lta
bur gyur pa^b ni yul khyab pa ma yin pa yang ma yin te | lus kyang de ltar
yin par thal ba'i phyir ro || yul khyab par byed pa yin na¹²⁶ lus bzhin
du de las^{127c} lus can yin pa'i phyir ro || des na rnam pa gzhan du rnam
par shes pa rnam pa med pa yang^d phyi rol gyi don^e gyi sun dbyung ba
las ma 'das pa'i phyir slob dpon gyis logs¹²⁸ shig tu sun dbyung ba lhur
ma byas so zhes rtogs par bya'o ||

114.7 [C 33r2–33r7, D 33r3–33r7, G 376v6–377r6, N 300r4–300v3,
P 314r8–314v6] des na rnam par shes pa de yang yod pa'i tha snyad du
bya ba ma yin no zhes bya ba 'di gnas pa yin no ||¹²⁹ 'o na rnam par
shes pa dang shes bya dag med pa'i phyir med pa'i rang bzhin de kho na
yin no zhes bya bar 'gyur ro zhe na | ma yin te | rnam par shes pa de^f
kun rdzob tu yod pa yin¹³⁰ te | kun rdzob ni bsnyon¹³¹ par mi nus pa yin
pa'i phyir ro || yod pa nyid bkag pa'i phyir med pa nyid nan gyis byung
ba yin nam zhe na | ma yin te | med pa nyid ni yod pa nyid sngon du
'gro ba can yin pas de ma grub na de yang mi 'grub pa'i phyir ro || ji
skad du |

med pa yod pa'i zlas drangs te |
yod pa med pa'i zlas drangs yin |
de phyir med pa mi brjod la¹³² |
yod pa nyid du mi rtag go ||

¹²⁵bsnyon par mi nus pa] CD, bsnyon par nus pa GNP

¹²⁶byed pa yin na] CD, byed na GNP

¹²⁷de las] CD, de la GNP

¹²⁸logs] CDNP, log G

¹²⁹ma yin no zhes bya ba 'di gnas pa yin no ||] CDG, ma yin no || NP (eye-skip)

¹³⁰yod pa yin] CDGP, yod ma yin N

¹³¹bsnyon] CDNP, bsnyen G

¹³²la] GNP, na CD

^aInapposite rendering of *aṅgāni* (**yan lag rnam*s).

^bWe expect **de lta bur myong bar gyur pa* in light of the Skt.

^cThis must be a corruption of **de yang*.

^dThis sentence seems garbled for 'whether cognition is endowed with images or not'
(approximately **des na rnam par shes pa rnam pa dang bcas pa'am gzhan du rnam pa med pa yang*).

^ePerhaps **dnogs po'i* would have been more satisfying; also note that the word °*vihita*^o
is not mirrored.

^fThis translation suggests **etad vijñānam*. Note that the Ms is corrupt at this point.

zhes gsungs pa¹³³ yin no || yod pa dang med pa'i bdag nyid gnyi ga'i
rang bzhin yang ma yin te | yod pa dang med pa dag ni 'gal ba'i phyir
ro || yod pa dang¹³⁴ med pa dag las gzhan gnyi ga ma yin pa'i ngo bo
yang ma yin te | gzhi gang la^{135a} phyi rol du gyur pa gzhan^b ni mi 'thad
pa'i phyir ro || 'o na ni de kho na nyid 'ga' yang yod pa ma yin no zhes
bya bar 'gyur ro zhe na | 'di nyid de kho na nyid ma yin nam | 'di lta ste
de kho na nyid dang bral ba zhes bya'o || des na

mtha' bzhi las nges par grol ba'i rnam par shes pa snang ba'i phyir
ro || de kho nar de kho na med¹³⁶ pa nyid de kho na rig pa'i de
kho na yin no^c

zhes bya ba¹³⁷ 'di gnas pa yin no ||

114.8 [No Tib.; here added from C53r4–53v5, D1860 53r4–53v5, G
75r2–75v6, N62v3–63r7, P2723 64r2–64v6] *de lta yin du chug na yang 'gro
ba rnam kyang rnam par rig pa tsam gyi rang bzhin gzung ba dang 'dzin pa med
pa'i rang bzhin can yin la | de yang ldog pa med pa'i phyir gang gis de rnam¹³⁸ par
ldog pa tsam mya ngan las 'das pa¹³⁹ zhes bya zhe na | ma yin te rnam par shes pa
yang gcig dang du ma'i rang bzhin dang bral ba yin pa'i phyir ro || 'di lta de gcig
ma yin te | sngon po la sogs pa tha dad pas dmigs pa sna tshogs pa'i phyir ro || dkar
po la sogs pa kha dog gcig pa yang thog ma dang dbus dang tha ma'i cha tha dad par
snang ba'i phyir dang | don byed pa'i nye bar sbyor ba tha dad pas du ma nyid ni
de tsam gyi¹⁴⁰ mtshan nyid yin pa'i phyir ro || du ma yang ma yin te | rdul phra*

¹³³gsungs pa] CDGN, gsungs pa pa P

¹³⁴yod pa dang] CGNP, yod pa D

¹³⁵gzhi gang la] CD, bzhi gang la GNP

¹³⁶med] CD, nyid GNP

¹³⁷zhes bya ba] CD, bya ba GNP

¹³⁸rnam] CDGP, rnam N

¹³⁹mya ngan las 'das pa] CDGN, mya ngan las pa P

¹⁴⁰gyi] CDGP, gyis N

^aThe reading of N and P are secondary corruptions, whereas the reading of C and D originally must have been *gnyi ga la.

^bThis is a very simple but effective rendering of *paryudastasya*.

^cIt is extremely surprising that the otherwise competent translators did not recognize this passage as verse.

Collation of the Tibetan Translation

*rab kyi rnam par rtog*¹⁴¹ *pas dkar po la sogs pa'i rnam par snang ba'i*¹⁴² *cha rnam*
rtogs pa med pa'i phyir ro || *gcig dang du ma la ma gtogs pa rnam*¹⁴³ *pa gzhan yang*
yod pa ma yin te | *'di dag phan tshun med pa nyid pas 'gal ba'i phyir ro* ||

thams cad du bdag med pa nyid ma yin nam gang dngos po rnam nyams su
myong ba'i don byed pa'i rab tu dbye ba bya zhe na | *ma brtags gcig pu'i*¹⁴⁴ *bdag*
nyid snga ma snga ma'i rnam par rtog pa tsam nyid yin pa'i phyir de rtogs pa las
*gzhan ma yin pa'i phyir ro*¹⁴⁵ *zhes bya bas bstan to* || *de lta yin du chug na dngos*
po thams cad kyi ngo bo yod pa nyid du 'gyur te | *yod pa'i dngos po*¹⁴⁶ *ni don byed*
nus pa'i mtshan nyid yin pa'i phyir ro zhe na | *de ni ma yin te* | *so sor snang ba tsam*
du yod par khas blangs pas mi 'gal ba yin pa'i phyir dang | *ji skad du bshad pa'i*
rim pa'i mtshan nyid dang bral ba nyid kyi phyir | *bdag med par rnam par gzhag*¹⁴⁷
*pa tsam*¹⁴⁸ *yin gyi so sor snang ba tsam la bsnyon pa'i phyir ni ma yin te* | *Rab*
'byor gzugs kyang gzhan la stong pa nyid kyang gzhan ma yin te | *'on kyang gzugs ni*
gzugs kyi rang bzhin gyis stong pa nyid do zhes rgyas par gang gsungs pa yin no ||
*de nyid kyi phyir kun rdzob kyi dngos po*¹⁴⁹ *ma lus pa snga ma dang phyi ma'i dbye*
bas snang ba yin pa'i phyir | *rtag pa yin zhes dogs par mi bya'o* || *gang yang 'di*
lta ste | *kye rgyal ba'i sras khams gsum pa 'di dag ni rnam par rig pa tsam mo zhes*
gsungs pa de yang shin tu dngos po la mngon par zhen pa dag phyi rol gyi don la zhen
*pa tsam*¹⁵⁰ *bzlog pa'i phyir te* | *de las ni bde ba la sogs pa sems tsam du zhen pa*
*yang bsal*¹⁵¹ *ba srid pa'i phyir ro* || *de ltar yang* |

sems tsam la ni brten nas su |
*phyi rol don la mi brtag*¹⁵² *go* |
de bzhin nyid la dmigs nas ni |
sems tsam las kyang 'da' bar bya ||

zhes gsungs pa yin no ||

- ¹⁴¹rtog] CDGP, rtogs N
¹⁴²rnam par snang ba'i] CD, snang ba'i GNP
¹⁴³rnam] CDNP, rnam G (s possibly cancelled)
¹⁴⁴gcig pu'i] CDNP, gcig pa'i G
¹⁴⁵ro] CDGP, ro || N
¹⁴⁶yod pa'i dngos po] CD, dngos po GNP
¹⁴⁷gzhag] CD, bzhag GNP
¹⁴⁸tsam] CD, omitted GNP
¹⁴⁹dngos po] CDNP, dngos po dngos po G (dittography)
¹⁵⁰tsam] CDNP, omitted G
¹⁵¹bsal] GNP, gsal CD
¹⁵²brtag] CDNP, brtags G

114.9 [See Tib. on p. 170]

115.0 [See Tib. on p. 170]

Smṛti **de bas 'dzin pa la sogs bral bas**
rang dbang gzugs la sogs pa kun brtags ngo bo yin |
ma lus g.yo dang mi g.yo'i dngos po
dri za'i grong khyer dag dang 'dra ba yin || 115

RinŚra **de bas 'dzin po la sogs dang bral bas |**
rang rgyud gzugs sogs brtags¹⁵³ pa'i ngo bo nyid |
rgyu dang mi rgyu dngos po ma lus pa |
dri za'i grong khyer dag dang mtshungs pa yin || 115

115.1 [See Tib. on p. 171]

116.0 [C 33r7–33v1, D 33r7–33v1, G 377r6–377v1, N300v3, P 314v6–314v7] gal te de ltar yin na de'i tshe rtag tu rtag pa^a yin pa'i phyir ji ltar 'khor ba yin | de med pa'i phyir rnam par byang ba yang ji ltar 'gyur zhes dogs pa la brjod pa ni | **'di la** zhes bya ba la sogs pa'o ||

Smṛti **bdag gir^b 'dzin pa'i**
rtog pa'i rgyun¹⁵⁴ gyi¹⁵⁵ ngo bos 'khor ba 'di dag ste |
dag pa yang ni de las ldog pa'i
ngo bo tsam la rnam par shes par bya || 116

RinŚra **bdag dang bdag gi rnam rtog rgyun gyi ni |**
ngo bo dag¹⁵⁶ gis der ni 'khor ba ste |
dag pa phyin ci log de med pa yi |
ngo bo tsam gyis rnam par shes par bya || 116

¹⁵³brtags] CDGP, brtag N

¹⁵⁴rtog pa'i rgyun] CD, rgyun GNP

¹⁵⁵gyi] CDGP, gyis N

¹⁵⁶dag] GNP, bdag CD

^aA transmission corruption of *dag pa.

^bThis must be an old corruption prompted by an eye-skip; the correct reading was very likely *bdag dang bdag gir.

116.1 [C 33v1–33v3, D 33v1–33v4, G 377v1–377v4, N 300v3–300v7, P 314v7–315r3] mtha' bzhi dang bral ba'i sems 'di nyid la^a **bdag** la sogs par^b sgro 'dogs pa **rnam par rtog pa'i rgyun** gyi ngo bos ni **'khor ba**{'i rnam pa} yin la bdag la sogs par sgro 'dogs¹⁵⁷ pa las **bzlog pa** la bdag med pa'i **rang bzhin tsam** gyis (!) mthar thug par **rnam par shes pas** ni {rnam par} **dag pa** ste thar pa yin no || 'dir *rtog pa sbyang ba la 'bad par bya'o* zhes kyang (!) gsungs pa yin no || 'di ltar phyi rol gyi don du lhag par zhen pa'i rnam par rtog pa ni 'khrul pa dang bcas pa yin pa'i phyir srid pa dang rjes su mthun pas tha mal pa yin no || {gang gi} rang bzhin tsam la gnas pa nyid kyis rtog pa med cing ma 'khrul pa'i phyir mngon sum gyi rang bzhin ni yongs su dag pa yin no || ji skad du |

don la rnam par rtog pa'i phyir |
rtog pa'ang rang rig¹⁵⁸ la mi 'dod (!) ||

ces gsungs pa bzhin no ||

116.2 {no Tib.}

117.0 [C 33v3–33v4, D 33v4, G 377v4–377v5, N 300v7, P 315r3–315r4] de'i phyir rnam par rtog pa yang rang gi rang bzhin la rnam par mi rtog pa yin pa'i phyir ngo bo nyid kyis chos thams cad yongs su dag pa yin no || de nyid gsungs pa ni **'di la** zhes bya ba la sogs pa'o ||

chos nyid kyis ni srid dang zhi ba'i ngo bo
'dir ni dbye ba 'ga' yang med |
ci'i phyir 'dzin¹⁵⁹ pa la sogs rnam par bral ba
rtag tu kun la sgrub pa'i phyir || 117

Smṛti

'dir ni zhi dang srid pa'i ngo bo dag |
chos nyid kyis ni dbye ba 'ga' yang med |
gang phyir gzung ba la sogs rnam pa dang |
bral bar thams cad du¹⁶⁰ ni rtag tu grub¹⁶¹ || 117

RinŚra

¹⁵⁷'dogs] CDNP, 'dog pa G

¹⁵⁸rang rig] CD, rig GNP

¹⁵⁹'dzin] CGNP, 'jin D

¹⁶⁰du] CDGP, de N

¹⁶¹grub] CDGP, grug N

^aMore correctly: **de nyid la*.

^bMore correctly: **la sogs pa?*

117.1 [C 33v4–33v5, D 33v4–33v6, G 377v5–377v6, N 300v7–301r2, P 315r4–315r6] †...† (!) de nyid kyi phyir¹⁶² slob dpon Klu sgrub kyi zhal snga nas kyang |

mya ngan 'das dang srid pa nyid |
gnyis po 'di ni yod min te |
srid pa yongs su shes pa nyid |
mya ngan 'das pa yin par brjod ||

mya ngan 'das pa 'khor ba las |
khyad par cung zad yod min te |
'khor ba mya ngan 'das pa las |
khyad par cung zad yod ma yin ||

zhes gsungs so ||

117.2 {no Tib.}

118.0 [C 33v5–33v7, D 33v6–33v7, G 377v6–378r2, N 301r2–301r3, P 315r6–315r8] 'on te gal te de nyid du **srid pa dang zhi ba'i rang bzhin dag la dbye ba med** na 'o na ji ltar | {gang phyir}^a **gzugs sogs rnam pa dang bral ba | thams cad la** ni zhes bya ba la sogs pa brjod pa'o || thams cad kyi sgra ni don du ma'i yul can yin no zhes grag go || de yang tha dad pa med na sbyor bar 'os pa ma yin¹⁶³ no snyam pa'i dogs pa bsu nas gsungs pa ni | **thams cad nyid kyang** zhes bya ba la sogs pa'o ||

Smṛti **thams cad 'ga' yang med de**
so sor snang ba'i rang bzhin rtog pa las |
sems¹⁶⁴ las gzhan du gyur pa'i
nga zhes 'ga' yang med de de phyir bdag kyang de || 118

RinŚra **de ni snang ba'i rang bzhin kun rtog las |**
thams cad ci yang yod pa ma yin te |
sems las gzhan pa dag^b ces bya ba ni |
yod pa ma yin de phyir de bdag nyid || 118

¹⁶²phyir] CGNP, phyi D

¹⁶³'os pa ma yin] CD, 'os pa yin GNP

¹⁶⁴sems] CGNP, sams D

^aThe bracketed words were most likely a gloss to *ji ltar*, which the intruded the main text at some point in the transmission.

^bThis unanimous reading is a corruption of **bdag*.

118.1 [C 33v7–34r1, D 33v7–34r1, G 378r2–378r4, N 301r3–301r5, P 315r8–315v2] kun rdzob tu ni **zhi ba dang srid pa** la sogs pa^a **tha dad pa** yod pa kho na ste | des na kun rdzob pa'i dngos po **snang ba rang bzhin** gyi¹⁶⁵ **kun du rtog pa** gang yin pa de las gzhan pa'i **thams cad** ces bya ba ni **'ga' yang yod pa ma yin** te thams cad kyi sgra ni rnam par rtog pas sgro btags pa'i yul can yin no¹⁶⁶ || des na de lta bur gyur pa **thams cad la** de kho na nyid dang ldan pa'i tha dad pa'i¹⁶⁷ †...†^b

118.2 [C 34r1–34v1, D 34r1–34v1, G 378r4–378v6, N 301r5–301v6, P 315v2–316r4] †...†^c don bden pa yin na bdag med pa med pas¹⁶⁸ srid pa yod pa yin pa'i phyir | **srid pa dang zhi ba'i rang bzhin rnam** ji ltar tha dad pa med pa yin zhe na | de ni ma yin te | bdag tu lta ba ni rnam pa gnyis te | mngon par 'du byed pa las byung ba dang | lhan cig skyes pa'o || de la lus la sogs pas tha dad pa dge ba dang mi dge ba'i las byed pa po dang | de'i 'bras bu spyod pa po rtag pa dang khyab pa ni bdag yin no zhes bdag tu mngon par smra ba Gzeg zan pa la sogs pa'i bstan bcos la sogs pa goms pas nye bar bskyed pa 'du byed¹⁶⁹ las byung ba ni mngon par 'du byed pa¹⁷⁰ las byung ba ste | Bye brag pa la sogs pa^d yin no || thog ma med pa'i ma rig pa'i bag chags kyi dbang gis rnam par shes pa'i rgyun la brten par 'dzin pa la sogs pa'i rang bzhin du¹⁷¹ zhen¹⁷² pa bdag tu rtogs¹⁷³ pa gang yin pa de'i rang bzhin ni lhan

¹⁶⁵gyi] GNP, gyis CD

¹⁶⁶no] CDGP, na N

¹⁶⁷tha dad pa'i] CD, omitted in GNP

¹⁶⁸bdag med pa med pas] GNP, bdag med pa bdag med pas CD

¹⁶⁹'du byed] CD GP, 'du byad N

¹⁷⁰byed pa] DGNP, byed C

¹⁷¹rang bzhin du] GNP, rang bzhin CD

¹⁷²zhen] GNP, zhes CD

¹⁷³rtogs] CD, rtog GNP

^aThe last member of the compound, ^o*svabhāvānām* is replaced with *la sogs pa*. This might mirror an earlier version of Samantabhadra's text (^{*}*śamabhāvādīnām*).

^bThe last portion of this paragraph (corresponding to ^o*niśedhaḥ ... anyat*) and the beginning of the next one (corresponding to *nanv ātmadarśanasya*) are lost in the Tibetan transmission.

^cSee preceding note.

^dJudging by the parallel formulation below, *so so'i skye bo rnam kyī yin no* ||, there should be an additional ^{*}*rnam kyī* at this point.

cig skyes pa ste | {srog chags thams cad la}^a thun mong du yod pa'i so
so'i skye bo rnams kyi yin no ||

de la phyogs dang po la re zhig bdag yod pa sgrub par byed pa'i tshad
ma yod pa ma yin no || mngon sum gyis ni bdag rtogs pa ma yin te |
mig la sogs pa'i rnam par shes pa rnams kyi yul ni gzugs la sogs pa^b so
sor nges pa yin pa'i phyir ro || rjes su dpag pas rtogs pa yang ma yin te |
'bras bu dang rang bzhin gyi rtags med pa'i phyir ro || rtag tu lkog tu
gyur pa yul¹⁷⁴ dang dus su ldog pa dang bral ba'i bdag dang gzhan 'ga'
zhig lhan cig 'gro ba dang ldog pa'i bdag nyid bskyed par bya ba dang
skyed par byed pa'i dngos po ma grub pas 'bras bu'i rtags med pa'i phyir
dang | chos can yod par ma grub pa'i phyir na rang bzhin gyi¹⁷⁵ rtags
mi 'thad pa'i phyir ro || gang gis¹⁷⁶ rjes su dpogs¹⁷⁷ par 'gyur ba yod pa
sgrub pa'i rtags gzhan yang srid pa ma yin no || rtags gzhan du gyur pa
yang^c bsgrub byas khyab¹⁷⁸ par 'gyur dgos na bsgrub par bya ba bdag
ni 'ga' yang ma grub pa'i phyir khyab par byed pa nyid du gtan la ma
phebs pas 'ga' yang des khyab par nges par¹⁷⁹ mi nus pa'i phyir 'di la ni
rtags 'ga' zhig kyang 'byung ba med do ||

118.3 [C 34v1–34v4, D 34v1–34v4, G 378v6–379r3, N 301v6–302r2,
P 316r4–316r8] mig la sogs pa'i rnam par shes pa'am rjes su dpag pa
sgrub byed ma yin mod | nga zhes rtogs¹⁸⁰ pa'i rang bzhin can bdag gi
sgrub byed yin gyi mngon sum ni yod pa kho na snyam pa'i dogs pa bsu
nas gsungs pa ni | **nga** zhes bya ba la sogs pa'o ||¹⁸¹ **nga** zhes bya ba

¹⁷⁴yul] CD, omitted GNP

¹⁷⁵gyi] GNP, gyis CD

¹⁷⁶gis] GNP, gi CD

¹⁷⁷dpogs] CD, dpog GNP

¹⁷⁸khyab] GNP, khyad CD

¹⁷⁹nges par] CD, nges pa'i GNP

¹⁸⁰rtogs] CD, rtog GNP

¹⁸¹nga zhes bya ba la sogs pa'o ||] GCD, nga zhes bya ba zhes bya ba la sogs pa'o ||
NP (dittography), nga zhes bya ba la sogs pa'o || nga zhes bya ba la sogs pa'o || G
(dittography; cancelled)

^aThe bracketed portion is a contamination, perhaps an erstwhile explanatory gloss.

^bThe topic marker *ni* yields a slightly misleading translation; also note that the word
pañcaka^c is not mirrored.

^cPerhaps **gyur na/yang* would have been more apposite, cf. *bdag ces bya ba yod pa yin na*
in 118.5.

rang rtogs pa'i yul du gyur pa **sems las gzhan pa bdag la sogs pa ni**
'ga' yang yod pa **ma yin** te | srid pa ma yin no || ngar rtogs¹⁸² pa'i yul
ni gzugs la sogs pa yin pa'i phyir te | nga skem pa^a nga sbom nga 'gro'o
zhes bya ba la sogs pa'i rnam par^b nga'o snyam pa'i rtog pa skye ba yin
no || skem pa nyid^c dang sbom pa nyid de ni lus las gzhan du gyur pa'i
chos^d ma yin no || khyab dang^e lus can ma yin pa la ni lus can gyi rdzas
kyi rjes su byed pa can 'gro ba'i bya ba yang 'thad pa ma yin no ||

118.4 {no Tib.}

118.5 [C 34v4–34v6, D 34v4–34v6, G 379r3–379r6, N 302r2–302r5,
P 316r8–316v3] de nas bdag sgrub par byed pa'i tshad¹⁸³ ma med pas
yod pa'i tha snyad du byar rung ba las 'das pa dang | gnod par byed pa'i
tshad ma yod pas kyang 'di med pa kho nar 'thad do zhes bya ba 'di gnas
pa yin no || bdag ces bya ba yod pa yin na rtogs pa'i rang bzhin nam
'on te rtogs pa ma yin pa'i rang bzhin yin grang¹⁸⁴ | de la phyogs dang
po la ni mig la sogs pa 'bras bu med par thal ba bzlog dka'o || rtag tu
gzugs la sogs pa la dmigs pa'i bdag nyid can gyi bdag la ni mig la sogs
pa rnam yod pa 'bras bu dang bcas pa ma yin¹⁸⁵ no || bdag rtogs pa
med pa'i rang bzhin yin na yang¹⁸⁶ yod pa'i dngos po mi dmigs pas gnod
do ||

118.6 {no Tib.}

118.7 {no Tib.}

¹⁸²rtogs] CDNP, rtog G
¹⁸³tshad] CDGP, chad N
¹⁸⁴grang] CGNP, kyang D
¹⁸⁵ma yin] CD, yin GNP
¹⁸⁶yin na yang] GN P, yin yang CD

^aThis perhaps reflects a genuine variant, *kṛśo for kṛśno.

^bMost likely a corruption of *rnam pas.

^cSee two notes above, here *kṛśatvaṃ for kṛśnatvaṃ.

^dThe translation suggests not reading *taddharmaḥ* as a compound.

^eAll Canons have this reading, a seemingly old corruption of *khyab bdag (*vibhor*).

118.8 [C 34v6–34v7, D 34v6–34v7, G 379r6, N 302r5, P 316v3–316v4] des na¹⁸⁷ 'di ni med pa kho nar¹⁸⁸ 'thad do zhes gnas so ||

118.9 [C 34v7–35r2, D 34v7–35r3, G 379r6–379v4, N 302r5–303v1, P 316v4–316v8] yang 'jig tshogs su lta ba^a lhan cig skyes pa ni 'jig rten kun la {ji ltar}^b grub pa ji ltar bsnyon¹⁸⁹ par nus snyam du dogs pa bsu nas gsungs pa ni | **nga** zhes bya ba la sogs pa'o || dgos pa^c ni 'di yin te | ji skad brjod pa'i tshul¹⁹⁰ du shes pa po dang shes bya¹⁹¹ la sogs pa'i rang bzhin gyi dngos po thams cad med pa'i phyir | **nga zhes bya ba** ngar 'dzin pa'i yul du gyur pa brtan pa dang | ngar 'dzin pa po la sogs pa'i^d rang bzhin ji skad brjod pa'i¹⁹² rang bzhin gyi **sems las gzhan pa ni 'ga' yang yod min** te | srid pa ma yin te | †...†^e des na bdag thams cad du med pa'i¹⁹³ phyir na skra¹⁹⁴ la sogs pa'i shes pa bzhin du bdag tu lta ba ni bden pa'i don can ma yin no || de'i phyir bdag med pa med pas srid pa {dang}^f dngos por yod pa'i phyir **srid pa dang zhi ba'i dngos po rnams** tha dad pa med pa bkag pa med pa yang ma yin no (!) ||^g

¹⁸⁷des na] CD, des ni GNP

¹⁸⁸kho nar] CGNP, kho na D

¹⁸⁹bsnyon] DGNP, bsnyen C

¹⁹⁰tshul] CDGP, chul N

¹⁹¹shes bya] CD, zhes bya ba GNP

¹⁹²rang bzhin ji skad brjod pa'i] CDNP, rang bzhin ji skad brjod pa'i rang bzhin ji skad brjod pa'i G (dittography; cancelled)

¹⁹³med pa'i] CDNP, med pa pa'i G

¹⁹⁴skra] CDGN, sgra P

^aThis is a very rare form of the more usual *'jig tshogs la lta ba*; for the only other occurrence we could trace, see the Canonical translation of the *Ajātaśatrukaukṛtyavinodanasūtra* (D 217, 358r).

^bThe bracketed portion does not make good sense.

^cThe Skt. *abhiprāyaḥ* reveals that this is an old corruption of **dgongs pa*.

^dThe translation seems to be garbled here. We would expect **brtan pa'i 'dzin pa po* and a slightly different word order.

^eThe sentence *ataḥ kāraṇāt prāguktacittam evāhamkāraṇīsayāḥ* is not mirrored. The reason is very likely an old eye-skip in the Tibetan transmission, where both *ataḥ* in the missing sentence and *tasmāt* in the next were translated as **des na*. It is probably not the case that this is a sentence added later by Samantabhadra, because then *ataḥ* of the *mūla* would not be explained.

^fThe word *dang* does not make sense here.

^gThis last sentence seems garbled in translation.

119.0 [C 35r2–35r3, D 35r3, G 379v4, N 303v1–303v2, P 316v8] ji
skad du brjod pa tha mi dad pa¹⁹⁵ nyid 'chad par byed pa brjod pa ni |
gang phyir zhes bya ba ste |

gang gi ngo bo gang yin
de yi¹⁹⁶ **de nyid rtog**¹⁹⁷ **pa'i gzhi ste ci phyir dngos** |
de bas thams cad dbyer med shes te
dngos po thams cad dbyer med pa nyid yin || 119

Smṛti

gang zhig gzugs la so sor zhugs gyur pa |
de yi¹⁹⁸ **bdag nyid gang yin de nyid gzugs** |
de bas thams cad khyad¹⁹⁹ **par med par brtag** || 119

RinŚra

119.1 {no Tib.}

119.2 [C 35r3–35r4, D 35r3–35r5, G 379v4–379v6, N 303v1–303v3,
P 316v8–317r3] gtan tshigs **gang gi phyir kun rdzob pa byis pa rnam**
kyis rtogs pa'i rang bzhin **gang yin pa de'i rang gi ngo bo** ste de kho
na nyid kyi rang bzhin blo ldan ma 'khrul ba rnam kyis **rtogs pa de**
nyid de dang²⁰⁰ rang rang de nyid de'i rang bzhin no || **des na**²⁰¹ zhi
ba dang srid pa'i **rang bzhin thams cad tha dad pa med pa** stong
pa nyid du ro gcig pa nyid kyis dbyer med par **rtogs pa**²⁰² ste | **tha dad**
pa med pa khong du chud pa'i phyir **dngos po thams cad tha dad**
pa med pa nyid yin no || (!)

119.3 {no Tib.}

120.0 [C 35r4–35r5, D 35r5, G 379v6–380r1, N 303v3–303v4, P
317r3] **thams cad kyi**^a **'ga' med** ces bya ba de nyid gsal bar byed
pas brjod pa ni | **yul gang** zhes bya ba la sogs pa'o ||

kha cig yul dang kha cig gzhan du

Smṛti

¹⁹⁵tha mi dad pa] GNP, mi 'thad pa CD

¹⁹⁶de yi] GN, de yis CD, omitted in P

¹⁹⁷rtog] N, rtogs CDGP

¹⁹⁸de yi] CD, de'i GNP

¹⁹⁹khyad] CD, khyab GNP

²⁰⁰de dang] CD, de GNP

²⁰¹des na] GNP, des ni CD

²⁰²rtogs pa] GNP, rtog pa CD

^aThe particle *kyi* is perhaps a corruption of **ni*.

**snang bar rtogs pa phun sum tshogs pa gang zhig gis |
de dang de yi bral dang bral ba'i
phis te de phis thams cad ma yin no || 120**

RinŚra

**snang bar gyur pa'i yul rnam gang yin pa |
gang zhig rtog pa'i gnas su gyur pa rnam |
de de gnyis su sbyor ba dang bral bas |
des na rnam par dbye ba thams cad min || 120**

120.1 [C 35r5–35r6, D 35r5–35r7, G 380r1–380r3, N 303v4–303v6, P 317r3–317r6] gzugs la sogs pa gzung ba'i **yul gang zhig snang bar 'gyur ba** rnam²⁰³ dang | ngar 'dzin pa'i yul 'dzin pa po'i rang bzhin **gzhan gang yin pa 'ga' zhig rtog pa'i rten** du gyur pa ste | gzhir gyur pa gzung ba dang 'dzin pa po de dang de ni **dbye ba** ste so sor gyur cing bral bar gyur pa de dang **bral ba'i phyir thams cad phan tshun** dbyer med pa yin no || **des na thams cad min** te thams cad ces bya ba ni 'ga' yang yod pa ma yin no²⁰⁴ zhes bya ba ni de kho na yin no ||^a du ma nyid ni rtog pa las gyur pa yin no zhes dgongs pa'o ||

120.2 {no Tib.}

120.3 [C 35r6–35v3, D 35r7–35v3, G 380r3–380r6, N 303v6–307r3, P 317r6–317v2] de'i phyir de kho nar sangs rgyas dang sangs rgyas ma yin pa mnyam pa'i phyir sangs rgyas rnam ni tha mi dad la | sems can rnam ni kun rdzob kho nar tha dad pa yin no ||^b de ltar na yang **rdzogs pa'i sangs rgyas su byas pa'i 'gro ba ma lus pa** zhes gang brjod pa de 'thad pa nyid do zhes rtogs par bya ste | 'gro ba ni ngo bo nyid kyis rnam par dag pa'i phyir ro || don dam pa goms pas ni rnam par rtog pa rnam par dag par bya ba yin te | rtog pa'i dbang gis sangs rgyas la sogs

²⁰³[gyur ba rnam] CD, gyur pa NP

²⁰⁴[yod pa ma yin no] CGNP, yod par yin no D

^aInstead of the causal sentence *paramārthataḥ śūnyatāmātrārūpatvāt* here we have a mirror of **iti tattvam*.

^bWhile the meaning is more or less the same, this sentence is slightly differently formulated here. The plural particle *rnam* is perhaps a Tibetan gloss.

Collation of the Tibetan Translation

pa'i dbye ba sgro 'dogs par bstan pa'i phyir ro ||^a de bzhin du rdzogs
pa'i sangs rgyas su byas pa'i 'gro ba ma lus pa **rang gi sngags** de'i thig
ler bcug pa^b thams cad kyi rang bzhin gyi dkyil 'khor gyi 'khor lo'i rnam
par bsgom pa ni 'thad pa nyid do zhes shes par bya ste zhes bya ba^c la
sogs pa med na rang gi snang ba de kho na de ltar skye ba'i phyir ro ||
des na thams cad legs par gnas so ||

^aThe reading *bstan pa'i phyir* for °*doṣāt* cannot be right. Perhaps the translators thought that they saw some derivation of the root *dis*.

^bThis sentence is slightly garbled; we would expect **rang gi sngags su bcug pa dang | de'i thig ler yang*, etc.

^cIn light of the Skt. this is a corruption of **shes bya*.

English Translation

7.0 *The Meditative Context*

109.0 Now, beginning with ‘after having introduced the entire world’ [i.e., verse 109] and ending with ‘filling the universe’ [in verse 129, the author] teaches the Yoga of the Drop (*binduyoga*).

109. After having introduced the entire world, whose error has been completely cast off [on account of having been] made perfectly awakened by means of endless lords of sages fashioned from the rays of the heart, into the self-mantra (*nijamantra*), [the practitioner ‘should contemplate’ ‘his own mind’ ‘in the shape of the drop of the true mantra’].¹

109.1 ‘After having introduced the entire world’ ‘made perfectly awakened’ by means of those ‘lords of sages’ [i.e., buddhas] ‘fashioned from the rays of the heart’, which are ‘endless’, of the gnosis-being (*jñānasattva*) and for this very reason ‘whose error has been completely cast off’, ‘into the self-mantra’, i.e., the mantra in the heart of the gnosis-being, ‘after having pondered on’ (see 127a) the import [of the passage] beginning with ‘an apprehending [cognition] of the [sense objects] is not observed’ [in verse 110], [the practitioner] ‘should contemplate’ ‘his own mind’ (see 127d) ‘in the shape of the drop of the true mantra’ (see 127c). This is how the passage is [to be] construed.

¹The expression *nijamantra* is not very common. Elsewhere in the *Sāramaijārī* it is glossed as either the deity itself (Ms 3r3: *nijamantra mantradevatayor abhedāt sveṣṭadevatā*), or as the *mantra* of the deity (Ms 3r4: *athavā nijamantraḥ sveṣṭadevatāmantraḥ*), which in our case is the *bīja maṃ*. The *sādhaka* is to identify as the deity, therefore in that sense ‘self-’ is perhaps not inappropriate, but *nija* could also mean ‘private, individual, personal,’ etc.

[The Vijñānavāda (Provisional) Standpoint]

7.1 *Pūrvapakṣa*

110.0 [Objection:] If external objects really exist, how [can] one prove the inclusion of the whole world that is made perfectly awakened into the body of the seed-syllable established in the scimitar that resides in the heart of the gnosis-being and the visualization of the *maṇḍala*-circle, which has everything as [its] nature, into the drop of that [seed-syllable]?

7.2 *Absence of Positive Proof (sādhakapramāṇa)*

Thinking of this [objection], [starting with the verse] beginning with ‘an apprehending [cognition] of the [sense objects] is not observed’, first of all, he expounds precisely the absence of positive proofs regarding the existence of [external] objects.²

110. An apprehending [cognition] of the [sense objects] is not observed through direct perception as being separated from the images of visual forms and other [sense objects]; nor is anything apprehended [observed]. Moreover, [they are] not [observed] through another [means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*)], because a relation is not observed.

110.1 ‘As being separated from the images (*ākṛti*) of visual forms and other [sense objects]’ [means] devoid of the images (*ākāra*), starting from visual forms. ‘An apprehending [cognition] of those’, [i.e.] the apprehender³ of those visual forms and other [sense objects], ‘is not observed through direct perception’. ‘Nor is anything apprehended’ ‘observed’ ‘through direct perception’.

²The concept of ‘external objects’ also includes material, shaped things. However, it must be taken in the more general sense of the opposition between *sva-* and *bahis-*, that is, singularity/identity vs. otherness. According to the Dignāga-Dharmakīrtian tradition (which Samantabhadra closely follows here), a cognition is a unitary event, devoid of an external support, and independent from any other thing for its own cognition. See the following statement of self-awareness of all cognitions.

³While *grāhya* (*lit.* ‘that can be apprehended’) is well attested as a noun, the same does not apply to *grāhaka*. However, the use of *grāhaka* as a nominalized adjective, and not merely as an adjective, seems to be commonly accepted within philosophical literature. Therefore, we will treat it as both an adjective and a noun.

7.2.1 Statement of Self-Awareness (*svasaṃvedana*) of Cognitions

Rather, direct perception manifests itself just as having the images of visual forms and other [sense objects], endowed with the nature of self-awareness, devoid of conceptual constructions [and] non-erroneous.⁴ However, the forms of [something] apprehended, and so on, are only constructions by the architect that is conceptual construction. This is the intended meaning. As [Dharmakīrti] stated:

There is no other [object (*artha*), different from itself,] that can be experienced by a cognition [and] there is no experiencing of that [cognition] different [from that cognition itself]⁵; since it is devoid of apprehended and apprehender, only that [cognition] manifests by itself. (*Pramāṇaviniścaya* 1.38)⁶

Similarly:

Even though undivided, the nature of cognition is characterized as if it were endowed with [three parts, namely,] apprehended, apprehender, and awareness, by those [whose minds] have misconceptions (*viparyāsītadarśana*). (*Pramāṇavārttika* Pratyakṣa° 353)

7.2.2 Refutation of the Aspect of the 'Apprehender' (*grāhaka*)

7.2.2.1 The Apprehender Intended as a Property-Bearer (Against Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika)

[Objection⁷:] The cognition of an object, i.e., the awareness, is a property. How can it be without [a property-bearer, i.e.,] someone who is

⁴This view is a key doctrine in the Buddhist logico-epistemological school. For references in Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, and Śāntarakṣita, see Introduction n. 15.

⁵Our interpretation of the verse follows Dharmakīrti's own commentary on it: *tasmād ātmaiva buddher anubhavaḥ | sa ca nānyasya kasyacit |* (*Pramāṇaviniścaya* ad 1.38, ed. p. 35, 11–12).

⁶Dharmakīrti had already dealt with the same topic as the one found in this oft-quoted verse in the *Pramāṇavārttika* (with slight differences): *nānyo 'nubhāvyas tenāsti tasya nānubhavo 'paraḥ | tasyāpi tulyacodyatvāt svayaṃ saiva prakāśate |* (*Pramāṇavārttika* Pratyakṣa° 327). Cognition does not manifest any other object different from itself and does not need anything else to be known.

⁷This objection could be by a Naiyāyika or a Vaiśeṣika. It actually compounds arguments found in the sources of both traditions in order to prove the Self. On this, see Introduction § 3.1.

aware? For properties are observed as depending on a property-bearer, as [in the case of] cooking, etc. Therefore, [it] necessarily [follows that] the agent of that activity of being aware, i.e., someone who is aware (*samvedaka*), must be the property-bearer that is the locus [of that property of being aware]. And it is precisely that which is called ‘apprehender’. Since this has visual forms and other [sense objects] as its object, the apprehended, too, is established. Therefore, whether through inference or implication, the apprehended and the apprehender are established.⁸ How can one deny them?

Anticipating this objection, he states: ‘Moreover, [they are] not [observed] through another [means of valid cognition], because a relation is not observed.’ One has to construe this [with:] An apprehending [cognition] ‘as being separated from the images of visual forms and other [sense objects]’ ‘and’ ‘anything apprehended’ ‘are observed’.

The intended meaning is as follows: Through inference or through implication[, which is] another *pramāṇa* imagined by others,⁹ there is no cognition of an extrasensory object¹⁰ from itself, because of the undesired consequence of [its] being perceptible [and, hence, an object of direct perception]; nor from something else, since there is no [observed] relationship (*asambandhāt*), because of the undesired consequence that anything could be known from anything else. As for the relationship, if it is to be non-deviant [i.e., invariable and reliable, it] cannot possibly be

⁸The opponent argues that the inference, which is mentioned immediately above, proves the existence of an apprehender. Since awareness is a property, one needs a property-bearer, i.e., a locus of that property. That locus is the apprehender. At the same time, based on that, also the existence of something apprehended is established, because it is observed that that awareness has sense objects as its object, and it must be apprehending something else having those forms. The opponent also adds that one could prove it through implication, hereby referring perhaps to the fact that the previous argument can be interpreted also as an implication. For a discussion of this objection, see Introduction § 3.1.

⁹Implication (*arthāpatti*) is admitted as a *pramāṇa* by the Mīmāṃsakas and as a specific type of inference by the Naiyāyikas. In this case, particularly, it can be used in order to prove the existence of an apprehender. According to Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, an action cannot be seen, but it can be postulated through implication from its result. This holds true for the occurrence of an apprehending cognition as well. If an object is seen, then one can imply from it that an act of cognition has occurred, since otherwise that object would not be cognized. On this, see Introduction n. 18.

¹⁰Here, Samantabhadra is postulating the imperceptibility of the *grāhaka*, which is admitted by all parties. Accordingly, for the opponents, the only way to establish it is through inference or implication.

anything other than either identity (*tādātmya*) or production (*tadutpatti*). Between these two:

- (i) If we are to admit the relation of identity, precisely the unity between property and property-bearer [must] be [admitted as] real. Therefore, there is only the awareness of an image, starting with a visual form. However, the difference between apprehender and [apprehended] is only conceptually constructed, since it is based on exclusion (*vyāvṛtti*)¹¹ by force of the conceptual determination [of the concept] ‘cognizer’.¹² On this, there is nothing but perfect agreement.
- (ii) If, on the other hand, we were to admit the relation of production, the direct perception and non-cognition that ascertain that [type of relation] are not possible.¹³ For those two cannot occur, if the apprehender, i.e., the property-bearer, is extrasensory. Therefore, the production, too, is impossible.

Nor can it be the case that, due to the logical incongruity [otherwise] of the cognition of visual forms and other [sense objects], the apprehender is inferable as [in the case of] sense faculties, since a cognition of an image, such as visual forms, arises from nothing other than the totality of

¹¹ *Vyāvṛtti* is synonymous with *apoha*. The *apoha* theory, the ‘theory of exclusion’, was first conceived by Dignāga and further elaborated by Dharmakīrti. See *sarve bhāvāḥ svabhāvena svasvabhāvavyavasthiteḥ | svabhāvaparabhāvābhyām yasmād vyāvṛttibhāginah || tasmād yato yato ’rthānām vyāvṛttis tannibandhanāḥ | jātibhedāḥ prakalpyante tadviśeṣāvagāhinaḥ ||* (*Pramāṇavārttika Svārthānumāna*° 40–41). ‘Since all things, because [they] are, by nature, established in their own-nature, partake of the exclusion from similar and dissimilar [things], therefore, from whatever [other object] the exclusion of the objects [occurs], different universals, based on those [exclusions], are conceived [as] penetrated by those differences.’ On the *apoha* theory, see (among others) Frauwallner 1932, 1933, 1935; Katsura 1979; Hattori 1982; Katsura 1991; Hattori 2000; Dunne 2004. For more recent contributions, see Siderits–Tillemans–Chakrabarti 2011 and Eltschinger et al. 2018.

¹² Here, Samantabhadra is referring to the mental process of conceptual representation through *apoha*. One indeed conceives of an apprehender as distinct from what is apprehended. This is because there is the conceptual determination of ‘cognizer’, which is superimposed on certain mental images through the process of exclusion (*vyāvṛtti/apoha*) from everything else that does not have their specific nature.

¹³ Concerning a thing that is always, *ex hypothesi*, not perceptible, one cannot prove positive concomitance or negative concomitance with something else, since the former is never seen.

every preceding cause.¹⁴ Nevertheless, if another cause is admitted, the undesired consequence of a *regressus ad infinitum*¹⁵ is difficult to overcome (*duruttara*).¹⁶ Therefore, the difference between apprehended, apprehender, and awareness is not real.¹⁷ However, [activities] such as cooking,

¹⁴This can be regarded as the refutation of the proof of the *grāhaka* through implication. One cannot infer an apprehending cognition through implication, namely, by implying it, since otherwise there would not be an apprehended object. This is because many causes are involved in producing a single cognition. On this, see Introduction § 3.1.

¹⁵The *regressus ad infinitum* may refer here also to the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā tenet that a sense cognition is known through another cognition, which is an additional cause to explain the actual perception of objects. If one admits another cognition for the first one to be cognized, then one needs a third cognition for the second to be cognized and so on, infinitely. See *grāhyatvaṃ tu yadā teṣāṃ tadākṣaṃ grāhakaṃ matam | akṣagrahaṇakāle tu grāhikā dhīr bhaviṣyati || tasyāṃ tu grhyamānāyām anyā dhīr grāhikeṣyate | (Ślokaṃvārttika Śūnyavāda 66–67ab)*.

¹⁶Here, the text appears to be corrupt. The manuscript reading *runtarah*, which is not reflected in the Tib. translation *bsal bar dka'o* (**durvārah*/**durnivārah*), does not fit semantically. We choose the emendation *duruttarah*. The reading *durvārah*, which corresponds to the Tibetan translation, would be preferable and is used in at least one other instance in this portion of the text to define *prasaṅga* (see Critical Edition of the Sanskrit § 110.1, p. 97, n. 13). However, it is paleographically implausible.

¹⁷This final point restates the idea of self-awareness of cognitions, providing its correct interpretation. Self-awareness of cognitions must not be intended as having a separation of conditions such as apprehended, apprehender, and apprehension. This is Śāntarakṣita's (and Kamalaśīla's) perspective on *svasaṃvedana* as argued in the *Tattvasaṃgraha* (and the *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā*), likely prompted by the previous criticism from Kumāriḷa Bhaṭṭa. See *vijñānaṃ jadarūpebhyo vyāvṛttam upajāyate | iyaṃ evātmasaṃvittir asya yājadarūpatā || (Tattvasaṃgraha 1999) na hi grāhyagrāhakahāvenātmasaṃvedanam abhipretam | kiṃ tarhi svayaṃprakṛtyā prakāśātmatayā nabhastalavartyālokavat || (Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā ad Tattvasaṃgraha 1999) atha kasmād grāhyagrāhakahāvena neṣyata ity āha — kriyākārahābhāvenetyādī | kriyākārahābhāvena na svasaṃvittir asya tu | ekasyānaṃsarūpasya trairūpyānuṣaṅgataḥ || (Tattvasaṃgraha 2000) trairūpyam — vedyavedakavittibhedena || (Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā ad Tattvasaṃgraha 2000). ‘Cognition arises as distinct from [those things that are] endowed with an insentient (*jada*) nature. [Its] self-awareness (*ātmasaṃvitti*) is precisely as follows: The fact of its having a non-insentient (*ajada*) nature.’ (Tattvasaṃgraha 1999) ‘For self-awareness [of cognition] is not intended [as occurring] with the conditions of apprehended and apprehender, but rather as having, by its own nature, the nature of light, like the light abiding in the firmament.’ (Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā ad Tattvasaṃgraha 1999) ‘If [the opponent asks,] “why is [self-awareness] not admitted with the conditions of apprehended and apprehender?” then, [as a reply, Śāntarakṣita] states [the verse] beginning with “however, its self-awareness”. However, its self-awareness is not [admitted] on the basis of the relationship of *kriyā* and *kāraṇa*, since it is not logical for a single thing whose nature is devoid of parts to have three natures.’ (Tattvasaṃgraha 2000). “Three natures”, i.e., according to the distinction of cognized, cognizer and cognition’ (Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā ad Tattvasaṃgraha 2000). The two verses are found identically in **Madhyamakālaṃkārahārikā*, vv. 16, 17.*

[which] ultimately [have] the nature of things that are arising in various [diverse] manners, have differences [between agents, activities, and so on] that are conceived of through nothing other than exclusion. Nevertheless, in this case, too, ultimately, the difference between activity and agent does not have the nature of property and property-bearer.

7.2.2.2 *The Apprehender Intended as Mind and Mental States (Against the Vaiḥāṣīkas and the Sautrāntikas)*

111.0 [Objection:] Let there be no other apprehending (*graha*)¹⁸ than being aware. However, precisely this [being aware], which is brought to awareness internally in the form of pleasure,¹⁹ etc., is brought to awareness as apprehending an image of visual forms and other [sense objects] that are situated outside [of it].²⁰ Therefore, how can one establish non-duality?²¹ Anticipating this [objection], [Jñānapāda] says [the words] beginning with ‘and precisely that, which is [directly] perceived’.

111. No function of pleasure, etc., is seen with regard to the apprehending of those²² [visual forms and other sense objects]. Being cognized simultaneously, [pleasure, pain, etc.] are not the apprehender, precisely like visual forms and other [sense objects are not].

111.1 ‘With regard to the apprehending’ of those visual forms and other [sense objects], ‘no’ ‘function’ ‘of’ the awareness [in the form] of ‘pleasure, etc.’ ‘is seen.’ Since that pleasure, etc., occurs ‘being cognized simultaneously’ along with visual forms and other [sense objects],

¹⁸The Tib. has here *myong ba las gzhan pa'i 'dzin pa po [...]* ‘[...] a perceiver different from awareness’. *'Dzin pa po* suggests the presence of *grāhaka*, rather than *graha*.

¹⁹The idea that the mind and mental states are the apprehender of, respectively, the object and its differences is a Vaiḥāṣīka one. Cf. Vasubandhu’s *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya ad 2.34bcd1* and Durvekamiśra’s commentary on Dharmottara’s *Nyāyabinduṭīkā ad Nyāyabindu 1.10*; on this, see Introduction § 3.2.

²⁰This objection and the following are also found in the *Ātmasāadhanāvātāra*; cf. § 112.2 *infra*.

²¹A similar objection could be raised, for instance, by Śubhagupta. See Introduction n. 32.

²²In the reconstructed Sanskrit text of the verse, *etat°* is uncertain. However, it has been conjectured based on the metrical pattern.

therefore, ‘precisely like visual forms and other [sense objects]’, [pleasure, etc.] is tenable as non-apprehender. Just as visual forms and other [sense objects] are not the apprehender of pleasure, etc., because there is not a relationship²³ of [something] being assisted (*upakārya*) and [something else being] an assisting factor (*upakāraka*),²⁴ since they are cognized simultaneously, like a left and a right horn, similarly, [feelings] such as pleasure, too, are a non-apprehender of visual forms and other [sense objects]. For [feelings] are indeed non-different [from visual forms and other sense objects], because they are invariably perceived together (*sahopalambhaniyamāt*); however, a difference [between them] is seen by those [whose minds] have misconceptions, as in the case of the moon, which is non-different [from a second moon that is seen by those who have an ocular defect].²⁵ This is the intended meaning.

As [Dharmakīrti] says:

A part as if it were on the outside, another segment as if it were internal, the appearance of [this] difference with reference to a partless cognition is indeed a distortion. (*Pramāṇavārttika* Pratyakṣa° 212)

[Objection:] Visual forms and other [sense objects], *qua* producers of cognitions, are first found close at hand (*samnidhatte*), then the awareness [in

²³The manuscript reading is °*bhāvābhāvāt* while the Tib. reads only **abhāvāt* (*med pa'i phyir*). The Tib. reading is also plausible. In that case, the Sanskrit variant could be explained as a dittography.

²⁴At times, however, the apprehension of *upakārya* and *upakāraka* is admitted as synchronous. On their simultaneous cognition, cf. *tathā hi — upādhiṃśi gṛhīte tasyātmabhūta upakārahābhāvas tāvad gṛhītaḥ | tasmīn gṛhīta upādhiṃśi apy upakāryabhāva ātmabhūto gṛhītaḥ | tadgrahaṇanāntarīyakatvād upakārahābhāvagrahaṇasya |* (*Pramāṇavārttikāṭīkā* D 66r2/P 77v6–7 = *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttīṭīkā*, ed. p. 134, 20–22). ‘To explain: To begin with, when the property-possessor is apprehended, its being an assisting factor, which is its nature, is apprehended. This being apprehended, the properties’ being assisted, which is their nature, is apprehended, too, because apprehending [a thing’s] being an assisting factor is invariably connected with apprehending this [i.e., another thing’s being assisted].’ (trans. Eltschinger et al. 2018: 47, n. 98).

²⁵Here, Samantabhadra is referring to another key tenet of the Dharmakīrtian tradition, i.e., the so-called *sahopalambhaniyama* argument. On this, see Introduction § 3.2 and the notes therein.

7.2.2.4 Refutation of the Sautrāntika's Thesis that Cognitions are Endowed with the Image of their Object (*sākāravāda*)

If, according to the Sautrāntika doctrine, a cognition endowed with images (*ākāravat*) is admitted as the apprehender, through [the invariable relation of] production, of the instant of the object that, existing before, generates [it, i.e., the cognition], then, since, in the moment of [its] cognition, the instant of the object that generates [that cognition] does not exist [any longer] due to [its] being momentary, and since there is no awareness of two images [i.e., one of the object and the other of its image in cognition], merely [its] image in cognition alone is brought to awareness.³⁰ Therefore, the nature of an object would not be any better [than] a flower in the sky. Hence, how can one admit [the existence] of an object?

7.2.2.5 Refutation of the Proof through Implication (*arthāpatti*)

111.2 {no Tib.} If [someone argues:] One can establish an object that is always beyond the reach of the senses through implication as follows:

mitted one specific characteristic, they would admit that precisely that [cognition] has an image. There is no other distinction other than an image regarding the nature of an undifferentiated cognition that has the mere nature of awareness.' In the *Pramāṇavārttika*, from a provisional Sautrāntika standpoint, Dharmakīrti argues that object-specificity of cognitions can be explained only through their having images of objects. On this, see *Pramāṇavārttika* Pratyakṣa° 301–319 and Kellner 2017, 108–109.

³⁰A somewhat similar argument is made by Kamalaśīla in the **Vajracchedikāṭīkā*. See *don shin tu lkog tu gyur pa'i shes pa de'i rnam pa kho na yin no zhes bya ba de lta bu ga la yod | rgyu ni nges par bdag gi ngo bo bskrun pa kho nas skyed par byed pa nyid du grub pa med de 'khrul pa snang ba'i phyir ro ||* (**Vajracchedikāṭīkā*, ed. Saccone forthcoming) 'How is it possible that a cognition of objects that are utterly beyond the reach of the senses is truly endowed with their images? A cause is not necessarily established as the generator [of its image in a cognition] merely through producing [it] by means of its own nature, because [also] errors appear [in false cognitions].' In the **Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā*, Śubhagupta argues against the *sākāravādins*. He claims that a secondary cognition of an external object, which occurs merely through the image of the object in that cognition, is not a real apprehension of the external object. Based on this, one can at most prove the non-difference between an image in a cognition and its cognition. However, this does not establish the non-difference between an external object and its cognition. See *gzugs dang 'dra ba'i byed pa'i don || 'bras bu'i sgo nas myong byar 'dod || de dngos myong bya ma yin pas || tha dad min par mi 'gyur ro ||* (**Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā* 88). 'The object that causes [an image] similar to [its] form is admitted as being brought to awareness by means of [that] effect. [However,] since that [external] thing is not brought to awareness, it would not be non-different [from its cognition].'

‘If there is no [external] object, a perception [that occurs] with restrictions in terms of space, time, image, and causal efficiency [would] not be possible’,³¹ [it will be answered:] No. Even if there is no external thing restricted in terms of space, [time,] etc., a perception related to a restricted space, [time,] etc. will [nonetheless] occur due to the restriction of latent impressions, as in the case of dreams and so on. Therefore, why should we bother ourselves with this useless delusion?

7.2.2.6 *Refutation of the Objection that Restrictions Can Be Explained Only When External Objects Are Present as Well as of the “Anyākāravāda” (Mīmāṃsā)*

i. *Refuting that there is a restriction in terms of space and time only when an external object is present*

111.3 [Possible objection by a Mīmāṃsaka:] Let us assume that, also with regard to dreams and so on, precisely an external [object-support] that was seen in another place is the cause. As [Kumāriḷa Bhaṭṭa] said:

For, with regard to the cognitions of dreams, etc., it is not admitted that there is no external [object-support] at all. In every case, there is an external object-support (*ālambana*),³² different in [terms of] space and time. (*Ślokavārttika* Nirālambanavāda 107cd–108ab)³³

³¹On a similar note, cf. the objection by an unidentified opponent at the beginning of Vasubandhu’s *Vimśikā*. On this, see Introduction § 3.3. However, Vasubandhu talks about the non-restriction of an object to a specific mental continuum when that object is external. In other words, only if there is an external object can many people see the same thing. See *Vimśikāvṛtti* in Introduction § 3.3 n. 48. In the *Sāramāñjarī*, in contrast, Samantabhadra’s opponent appears to be saying that the existence of an external object must be postulated because of the occurrence of specific images (*ākāras*) in certain cognitions, but no other images. Nevertheless, in countering this, Samantabhadra is taking issue with the idea implied in the objection as found in Vasubandhu’s work. On this, see Introduction § 3.3.

³²The emendation in *pāda* c (i.e., *ālambanam* and *bāhyam*) is based on the text of *Ślokavārttika* Nirālambanavāda 107cd–108ab as well as parallels in the *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā*. See *svapnādīpratyaye bāhyam sarvathā na hi neṣyate | sarvatrālambanam bāhyam deśakālānyathātma-kam ||* (*Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā ad Tattvasaṃgraha* 250, ed. p. 129, 12–13); *sarvatrālambanam bāhyam deśakālānyathātma-kam |* (*Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā ad Tattvasaṃgraha* 1998, ed. p. 174 ,8). Instead of *bāhyam*, both the manuscript and the Tib. have *bhrāntam*. This leads us to think that the text is corrupted and the corruption must be old.

³³According to the traditional verse numbering of the Nirālambanavāda of the *Ślokavārttika*, these are indeed *pādas* c & d of 107 and *pādas* a & b of 108. An identical quotation

Therefore, how can one account for the restriction in terms of space, [time,] etc., for a cognition related to the waking state, through the example of dreams, etc.?

[Answer:] This [view of the Mīmāṃsakas] is not [correct], because of the logical incongruity (*anupapatti*) of an object-support for an [illusory] cognition, such as that related to dreams. For this [illusory cognition] must have the nature of apprehension or the nature of memory. Among these, first of all, [it does] not [have the nature of] apprehension. [This is] because, since apprehension is not dependent on a previous apprehension, there could not be the specific restriction of being the perceiver of the object of a [specific] previous perception, just as [there is not in the case of] another perception.³⁴ Also its having the nature of memory is impossible, because this [illusory cognition] is non-conceptual, because it has an object that is present, and because it has vivid images. Therefore, we do not understand how that [illusory cognition] can have as [its] object a real thing (*vastu*) that was perceived in another space, [time,] etc.

111.4 Let us admit that [external] cause [for illusory cognitions]. However, [with regard to them,] the restriction in terms of space, [time,] etc., cannot be demonstrated as having that cause. This is because, [only] if an external [object-support] appeared precisely in that space, [time,] etc., where it is at hand, even in a dream, it would be the cause of the [restriction]. And this is not possible in this way, because it would undesirably

of the two half verses is found in *Tattvasaṃgrahaṭīkā ad Tattvasaṃgraha* 250 (ed. p. 129, 12–13). Since we are not aware of any other previous occurrences of the quotation in this precise form, this could be evidence of the fact that Samantabhadra was quoting from the *Tattvasaṃgrahaṭīkā*.

³⁴Kumārila Bhaṭṭa argues that, for example, one sees a pot in their dreams since they had seen a pot in the waking state. This second pot from the waking cognition is the object-support of that dream cognition of a pot. Samantabhadra responds that, if the dream cognition is admitted as a perception, then it cannot have a necessary relation with the object-support of another perception which has occurred during a waking state. By their very nature, perceptions do not depend on other previous perceptions; they are not caused by them. Accordingly, when I dream of a pot, if that dream cognition had the nature of the perception of that pot, there would not be any necessary restriction for me to be apprehending a specific other pot that was grasped at an earlier time during my waking state. In other words, a pot that was previously apprehended is not the object-support of the cognition in my dream. This is similar in the case of any other perception with a different object-support. A cow that is apprehended through a different perception is obviously not the object-support of my cognition (whether dream or waking) of a pot.

follow that there would not be unreliability (*viśamvāda*) [of cognitions].³⁵ However, if in some cases[, such as in illusory cognitions,] the appearance of that [object cognized in those illusory cognitions] is devoid of that [i.e., an external object-support, which is right there], the [external object-support] cannot be the cause [of that illusory cognition].³⁶ If [an external object-support] could produce [its own] appearance in [a cognition that is] devoid of its form, then it could produce it everywhere [i.e., in every cognition], since there would be no specific characteristic.³⁷

ii. *Refuting that there is a restriction in terms of images (i.e., a non-restriction in terms of mental continuums) only when an external object is present*

Moreover, even though a common object is not there, a non-restriction to a [specific] mental continuum is perceived when two people have a similar dream perception, or when there is the appearance of

³⁵What distinguishes an illusory cognition from a real one is that the object is there precisely in that space and time where and when it is apprehended. A snake is not in that place and in the moment where and when someone mistakenly sees it. However, a rope is. Even if a real snake were to be admitted as the object-support of an illusory cognition, it cannot be the cause of a spatio-temporal restriction for that cognition in the same way. This is because a spatio-temporal restriction is caused by an object that appears in a specific place and time, since it is at hand, i.e., right there. If an external object were always the support of a cognition *and* the cause of a spatio-temporal restriction, then that snake, which is the object-support of an illusory cognition *and* the cause of a spatio-temporal restriction, would always be present, also in the case of that illusory cognition. Accordingly, there would be no such thing as an illusory cognition.

³⁶Samantabhadra starts with a provisional admission of the possibility that an external object-support could be the cause of an illusory cognition. However, he takes issue with the possibility that that external object-support could also be the cause of a spatio-temporal restriction, and refutes it. Based on that refutation, he continues by refuting also the first point—that an external object-support can be the cause of an illusory cognition.

³⁷If an object could bestow its image onto a cognition that does not have its form, it could bestow it onto every cognition, since it would not be the cause of the appearance of an image related to its own form. In other words, every cognition could be considered as the apprehender of every object. Cf. *anyākāram api jñānaṃ katham anyasya vedakam | sarvaḥ syāt sarvasaṃvedyo na hetuś ca nīyāmakāḥ* || (*Tattvasaṃgraha* 2039). ‘Also, being endowed with one image, how can a cognition be aware of another thing? Every [object] could [then] be brought to awareness by every [cognition], and the cause would not be restricting (*nīyāmaka*).’ This verse is part of Śāntarakṣita’s refutation of the *anyākāravāda* theory, which was exemplified earlier in *Ślokaṅkārttika* Nirālambanavāda 108. In the following, however, the target of Śāntarakṣita’s and Kamalaśīla’s refutation seems to be, once again, Śubhagupta and his **Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā*.

floaters (*lit.* a hair-net) and other [visual defects] for many people who have defective sight (*bhrāntajñānīn*).³⁸

iii. *Refuting that there is a restriction in terms of causal efficiency (arthakriyā) only when an external object is present]*

[Another argument:] Similarly, causal efficiency is indeed observed in a dream even though [it is] devoid of an external object. Exactly as [happens] in the waking state, pleasure, etc., which are caused by [the presence of] a woman, and the ejaculation, etc., which are associated with them, are experienced directly (*sākṣāt*) as having causal efficiency, in the same way, [that happens] also in the dream state.³⁹ Therefore, just as in dreams and so on, the restrictions of space, [time,] etc., occur without an external object, similarly, when they occur also in the waking state, what [could] defeat them?

As it is said [by Dharmakīrti]:

³⁸The argument seems also based on a response to Vasubandhu's opponent's example. See *yathā taimīrakasyaiva saṃtāne keśādikaṃ pratibhāsate, nānyeṣām* (*Vīṃśikāvṛtti ad 2*, ed. Ruzsa and Szegedi p. 137, 5–6). *yathā taimīrakānāṃ saṃtāne keśādyābhāsaḥ, nānyeṣām* (ed. Lévi p. 3, 11–12). *yathā taimīrikasyaiva saṃtānasya keśādayo dr̥ṣyante nānyeṣām* (ed. Silk p. 150, 24–25). This appears to be a refutation of a rather frequent statement that the presence of an external object is proven by the fact that two or more people can see it, namely, there is a non-restriction to a specific mental continuum (*santānānīyama*). This point is also refuted by Vasubandhu in the *Vīṃśikā*, for example, by bringing forward the example of *pretas*, who experience the same unreal things due to the maturation of their *karman*. However, Samantabhadra argues that some people can have the same dream or the same ocular defects and thus, even in the absence of an external object that is present for all of them, can see the same thing. This amounts to a non-restriction to a specific mental continuum also in the case of illusory cognitions or dreams. To the best of our knowledge, this argument is peculiar to this text.

³⁹Cf. *evam santānānīyamo vijñāptīnām asaty apy arthe siddhah | svapnopaghātavat kṛtya-kriyā siddheti vedītavyam | yathā svapne dvayasamāḥattim antareṇa śukravīsargalakṣaṇaḥ svapnoḥ-ghātaḥ | evam tāvad anyānyair dr̥ṣṭāntair deśakālānīyamādicatuṣṭayaṃ siddham ||* (*Vīṃśikā* 4ab1 and *Vṛtti*, ed. Lévi p. 3, 4–8). ‘Similarly, with reference to cognitions, the non-restriction of mental continuums is established, even if the object is absent. “Like in the case of a nocturnal pollution, the causal efficiency” is established, this must be understood. During a dream, without the coming together of two [people], there occurs a nocturnal pollution characterized by the release of semen. Like this (*yathā*) just similarly (*evam*), because of many different instances, the four restrictions of space, time, etc., are established.’ With reference to the translation of *vijñāpti* as ‘cognition’ in the *Vīṃśikā*, see Kellner and Taber 2014 in Introduction n. 14.

English Translation

For some [specific] person [there is] truly some [specific] thing [that] awakens an internal latent impression; due to this there is a restriction regarding cognitions. [The restriction] is not dependent on external objects. (*Pramāṇavārttika* Pratyakṣa° 336)⁴⁰

Therefore, since [it has been proven that] an awareness does not have an external cause, we do not know how one will [be able to] talk logically about the defect that visual forms and other [sense objects], and pleasure, etc., [can]not be cognized simultaneously (*yugapatpratīyamānatāviraḥa*) because they are in a temporal continuity.

[Objection:] Even though they are being cognized simultaneously, pleasure, etc., which are ascertained *qua* apprehender of visual forms and other [sense objects], are indeed the apprehender; as for the object, such as visual forms and other [sense objects], [this] is indeed the apprehended, [since it is ascertained] as being common to all cognizers [who are co-present at the same place]. This is because the instants of objects and cognitions are restricted [to each other] inasmuch as they arise *qua* apprehender and apprehended precisely due to [their being part of] a complex (*kalāpa*) of causes, each preceding the other. Therefore, how can the confusion of apprehended and apprehender be real?⁴¹

This too is utterly pointless, since, with reference to direct perception [that is] non-conceptual, there is no conceptual determination in terms of ‘apprehended’ and ‘apprehender’, nor does the being common [to all cognizers] of an indigo [thing] manifest. This is because [one cognizer] cannot comprehend through direct perception the being visible of an indigo [thing] [as experienced] by another cognizer, due to the undesired consequence of being able to directly perceive also someone else’s cognition [and not only one’s own]. Nor can it be comprehended through an inference generated by the inferential mark that is the horripilation,⁴² etc., because that has a universal for its object. Therefore, something

⁴⁰The immediately preceding verse, k. 335, contains an argument that is very close to the *sahopalambhaniyama* inference. On this, see Introduction n. 37.

⁴¹The opponent here may be Śubhagupta; see Introduction § 4.

⁴²One cannot perceive the content of another person’s perception. Moreover, it is not possible to infer it either, as, for example, by interpreting someone’s horripilation as being an inferential mark for pleasure. Inference has a universal for its object, not a particular, which is the content of a perception. Accordingly, upon seeing someone else’s horripilation, one could infer the concept of pleasure, but not perceive someone else’s actual pleasure.

that is cognized contemporaneously with a non-common form, etc., is only cognition, because something that is not known by those who stay at a place that is fit [for knowing that] is known by itself (*Pramāṇavārttika* Pratyakṣa° 16b2c).⁴³

7.2.3 Refutation of the Aspect of the 'Apprehended' (*grāhya*)

112.0 [Objection:] An external thing is permanent [and] unitary, having the form of a whole, etc., since it endures for subsequent times, also its being common is cognized through inference. Therefore, the [latter fact] is not incoherent. Anticipating this objection, [Jñānapāda] says:

112. And precisely that, which is [directly] perceived, such as white, is not perceived in other moments since there is a reciprocal contradiction between those two[, namely, between past and present moments of perception, etc.], as [it is the case with] pleasure, etc., [occurring] always.

112.1 'Which' 'is [directly] perceived', i.e., cognized through direct perception, 'such as white', i.e., one unitary thing having the form of white, etc.; 'precisely that' 'in other moments', i.e., before or after, 'is not perceived'. The meaning is: It is seen as truly devoid of the previous and following form-nature (*rūpa*). He says the logical reason [with]: 'Since there is a contradiction' [that is] 'reciprocal', i.e., one with the other; 'between those two', i.e., between what was perceived and what is being perceived or what is being perceived and what will be perceived, 'as [it is the case with] pleasure, etc.' '[occurring] always'. For a sense cognition is the apprehender of nothing [but what is close, at hand, [and] present [(i.e., in the same space and at the same time)]. Otherwise, it would be difficult to avoid the undesired consequence of grasping simultaneously what is far, separated, etc., and[, in the case of the same person,] the child from the past [or] the old person in the future, etc.

⁴³In other words, if people who are at the same place as someone else who apprehends something cannot apprehend that thing, then, that object has the nature of mere cognition; it is not external. Part of this is a quotation from a passage by Dharmakīrti where he describes objects that are experienced during the dream state. See *nīlādyapratighātān na jñānaṃ tad yogyadeśakāḥ | ajñātasya svayaṃ jñānād nāmādy etena varṇitam ||* (*Pramāṇavārttika* Pratyakṣa° 16). The context is, however, different.

112.2 {No Tib.} And, in the *Ātmasādhanaṅvatāra*, the master [Jñānapāda] said, in order to refute external objects:

If [it is argued:] How can *samsāra*, which manifests with the forms of apprehended and [apprehender], consist of mere conceptual constructions? [It will be answered:] It does not [manifest with the form of apprehended and apprehender]. This is because an object of cognition is not well-established as being an apprehended, etc. For no [nature (*rūpa* or *svarūpa*)], whether it is an apprehended or an apprehender, [that is] different, apart from the appearance of a visual form and the other [sense objects], is perceived. And a nature that is not cognized cannot be the object of a treatment as existent at all, because of an overextension. And its cognition does not occur because there is the cognition of something related to it[, namely, it cannot be inferred]. This is because a relationship of something with [another thing] that has a nature which is completely non-perceivable is not established. One could argue (*ced*) that the condition of apprehender belongs to pleasure, etc., that manifests inside. However, the condition of apprehended belongs to something that has a cognized characteristic *qua* being a form external to the [apprehender], such as an indigo [thing], etc. [i.e., something conceptually determined as being outside, like a visual form and the other sense objects].⁴⁴ [To this, it will be answered:] No, because a function [of apprehending] belonging to feelings with regard to an indigo [thing], etc., is not established. And something having no recognized function [of apprehending] cannot be an apprehender at all, since, if it were so, there would be the undesired consequence that visual forms and the other [sense objects], though being external, would have the condition of apprehender. This is because, with respect to two things that appear simultaneously [and] independently, we do not see [any] cause for a specific restriction such as ‘one thing is the apprehended, one thing is the apprehender’. Also [the cognition] ‘I am aware of an

⁴⁴This reconnects with the objection that was already refuted in v. 111. An echo of a similar position, at least regarding external objects, can be found in the **Madhyamakālamkārapañjikā* (with a parallel in Haribhadra’s *Abhisamayālamkāralokā*). That position is explicitly attributed to Śubhagupta by Kamalaśīla. Cf. *sngon po la sogs pa phyi rol gyi lta bur snang bar shes pa gang yin pa de ni shes pa’i rnam par ma yin gyi | sngon po la sogs par rig pa’i shes pa nyams su myong na sgrub pa pos sngon po la sogs pa de lta bu’i ngo bor rtogs so [...]* (**Madhyamakālamkārapañjikā*, ed. p. 163, 9–12); *yat tu nīlādi bahir iva pratibhāsamānam ālakṣyate tan na jñānākāratayā, api tu jñānam nīlādisamvedanam anubhavan pratipattā mohāt tathā bahīrūpeṇa nīlādikam adhyavasyati [...]* (*Abhisamayālamkāralokā* Tathatāparivarta, ed. p. 633, 4–6). For this point and the related passages, see Introduction § 4.

indigo [thing] and so on' is merely conceptualization, since things that appear internally and externally are cognized independently. Or else, all these connections of conceptual constructions, such as apprehender, etc., have the purpose of indicating (*prakāśana*) independent experiences. This is because of [their] presence with reference to things that are manifesting, being verily devoid of the function of comprehending each other. Therefore, nothing is the apprehender of anything at all. And thus [the Buddha] says: 'O Subhūti, a *dharma* does not know a *dharma*' and so on. As for what is said '[...] Also forms are cognized by two consciousnesses [i.e., sense consciousness and mental consciousness]'⁴⁵ and so on, [this] is [stated] in some cases in dependence on the mere conceptual determination of that form, as in the case of the teaching of the *pudgala*, etc. Accordingly, there is no logical defect.

112.3 Therefore, with this much, the refutation of the positive proofs of [the reality] of apprehended and apprehender is shown.

7.3 *Exposition of Negative Proof (bādhakapramāṇa): Things Have Neither One Nor Many Svabhāva[s]*

113.0 Now, since [external] objects are non-existent [as it is established] through the negative proofs (*bādhakapramāṇa*), proclaiming *viññāptimātratā* [Jñānapāda] states the [words] beginning with 'and [it] is not one'.

113. And [it] is not one, because one perceives a visual form, etc., differentiated into beginning, end, etc.; nor, similarly, does it have a manifold nature since one does not perceive [it as being distinguished] also atom by atom.

⁴⁵The *locus classicus* remains untraced. On a similar note, see *pañca bāhyā dvivijñeyāḥ* | rūpasabdagandharasaprasṭavyadhātavo yathāsamkhyam cakṣuḥśrotraghrāṇajihvākāyaviññānair anubhūtā manovijñānena vijñāyante | evam ete pratyekaṃ dvābhyām vijñānābhyām vijñeyā bhavanti (*Abhidharmakośa* 1.48a and *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, ed. p. 36, 24–25).

7.3.1 *Refutation of External Things: The Padārthas of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika*⁴⁶

7.3.1.1 *Sky, Time, Space and Internal Organ*

113.1 The intended meaning is as follows: An external thing i.e., an object, is described by the opponents as having many aspects with a difference of quality, substance, etc.⁴⁷ Among these, a substance is the substratum of properties, such as qualities. Precisely through the refutation of that [(i.e., substance)], those [properties] become utterly uprooted.⁴⁸ Therefore, a separate refutation is not set forth. And, if there is not something inherent, there is no inherence [either]; therefore the refutation of that [(i.e., inherence)] is not discussed.

Moreover, substance is of nine types: earth, water, fire, wind, sky, time, space, Self, internal organ.⁴⁹ Among these, the Self will be refuted subsequently. As for sky, it is admitted [by you, Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas,] as having sound as a quality⁵⁰ and it is [regarded as] unitary. Accordingly, [if this were the case,] since all words would be in the same place, they could not be heard as being different. And, therefore, a word, even though expected to be in a distant place, would be heard as if it were

⁴⁶On this tenet being treated as a shared idea by the two traditions, see Introduction n. 58.

⁴⁷Generally, the order of the categories (*padārtha*) of the Vaiśeṣika is as follows: *dravya*, *guṇa*, *karman*, *sāmānya*, *viśeṣa*, *samavāya*. Here the first and second elements are inverted. A similar structure (with other differences) is also found, for example, in the *Tattvasaṃgraha*. See *guṇadravyakriyājāṭisamavāyādyupādhibhīḥ* | (*Tattvasaṃgraha* 2ab).

⁴⁸Similarly, at the beginning of the *Guṇapadārthaparīkṣā* of the *Tattvasaṃgraha*, Śāntarākṣita states: *dravyāṇām pratisedhena sarva eva tadāśrītāḥ* | *guṇakarmādayo 'pāstā bhavanti eva tathā matāḥ* || (*Tattvasaṃgraha* 633).

⁴⁹See *prthivy āpas tejo vāyur ākāśam kālo dig ātmā mana iti dravyāṇi* | (*Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 1.1.4)

⁵⁰The *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* does not include sound (*śabda*) in the list of qualities (*guṇa*). See *rūparasagandhasparśāḥ samkhyāḥ parimāṇāni prthaktvaṃ samyogavibhāgau paratvāparatve buddhayaḥ sukhaduḥkhe icchādveṣau prayatnās ca guṇāḥ* | (*Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 1.1.5). However, *Prāśastapāda* does include it: *guṇās ca rūparasagandhasparśasamkhyāparimāṇaprthaktvasamyogavibhāgaparatvāparatvabuddhisukhaduḥkhechādveṣaprayatnās ceti kaṅthoktāḥ saptadaśa* | *caśabdasamuccitās ca gurutvadravatasnehasamskārādṛṣṭaśabdāḥ saptaivety evaṃ caturvīṃśatir guṇāḥ* || (*Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*, ed. p. 10, 11–15). He is also explicit on *śabda* being a quality of the sky (*ākāśa*). See *ta-trākāśasya guṇāḥ śabdasamkhyāparimāṇaprthaktvasamyogavibhāgāḥ* (*Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*, ed. p. 58, 7–8). The *Nyāyasūtra* introduces *śabda* as a quality of *ākāśa*: *prthivy āpas tejo vāyur ākāśam iti bhūtāni* (1.1.13), *gandharasarūpasparśaśabdāḥ prthivyādiguṇāḥ tadarthāḥ* (1.1.14).

in a nearby place;⁵¹ or else [(another argument) if this were the case,] [a word] [could] not [be heard] also somewhere else [and in other moments] (*anyatra*).⁵² This is conclusive. And with reference to space and time, since they are unitary, the [different] notions of before and after [would] be illogical.⁵³

Let the following be the case: This difference of notions occurs due to a difference of adventitious attributes.⁵⁴ [Answer:] Perhaps this priority and posteriority of the adventitious attributes is based on those [attributes] themselves or based on the other [two, namely, space and time]? Among these, in the first hypothesis, since the establishment of the notions of those [i.e., before and after] is based only on the [adventitious attributes], those two [i.e., time and space,] are useless.⁵⁵ As for the second hypothesis, if it is due indeed to space and time, then precisely that [being before and after] does not logically follow, since those two are unitary. If it is argued that it is based on something different [from the

⁵¹Cf. a similar argument in the *Tattvasaṃgrahaḥaṅgikā*: *ata eva śabdānām apy ekadeśatvaṃ bhavet | tataś ca dūrāsannataradeśabhedāvasthātipratītā yeyaṃ padārthānām keśāmcit sā virodhinī syād iti [...]* | (*Tattvasaṃgrahaḥaṅgikā ad Tattvasaṃgraha* 627, ed. p. 259, 9–10).

⁵²Here, the different arguments can be stated as follows: 1. If sounds were in one and the same place, one could not hear a distant sound as opposed to a close sound. 2. If sounds were in one and the same place, one could not hear the same sound in different places or on different occasions.

⁵³Cf. *niraṃśaikasvabhāvatvāt paurvāparyādyasambhavaḥ* | (*Tattvasaṃgraha* 629ab). ‘Since these two [i.e., space and time] have a partless and unitary nature, priority and posteriority, etc., are not possible.’ *tathā hi — na dikpadārtho nāmāsti kaṇādādikalpitaḥ | tasyaikasvarūpatvād anekarūpaḥ pūrvādipratyayo na syāt* | (*Tattvasaṃgrahaḥaṅgikā ad Tattvasaṃgraha* 1989–1991, ed. p. 168, 2–3). ‘To explain: [What is] called “category of space”, [as] imagined by Kaṇāda and other [Vaiśeṣikas], does not exist. Since[, according to them,] this [category of space] is endowed with a unitary nature, with regard to it, a manifold nature—like the concept of east, etc.—could not occur.’

⁵⁴That is to say, being before and after are properties that are conceptually determined and superimposed. These are temporary and, hence, different from the substances of space and time.

⁵⁵On a similar note, see the refutation that is advanced by Śāntarakṣita against the categories of space and time: *viśiṣṭasamayodbhūtanaskāranibandhanam | parāparādivijñānam na kālān na dīśāś ca tat* | | *niraṃśaikasvabhāvatvāt paurvāparyādyasambhavaḥ | tayoḥ sambandhūbhedāc ced evaṃ tau niṣphalau nanu* | | (*Tattvasaṃgraha* 628–629). ‘The cognition of [something being] before and after, [high and low,] etc., is based on a mental determination (*manaskāra*) arisen from specific conventions. That is not due to time or space.’ ‘Since these two [i.e., space and time] have a partless and unitary nature, priority and posteriority, etc., are not possible. If [it is argued: They are possible] because of the difference of things that are connected to them [i.e., space and time], [it will be answered:] In this way, these two are verily useless.’

previous two alternatives], [it will be answered: Then,] based on that, the inutility of those, [space and time,] is established.

And these—sky, space and time—that are permanent are devoid of a difference of natures, whether in association with cooperating causes or without them. How can they produce their effects only at a certain time [and not always]? To explain:

Since those, being unmodifiable, are permanent, who can destroy their capacity or incapacity that is established by [their] nature? (*Pramāṇavārttika* Pratyakṣa° 22)⁵⁶

With this [reasoning], also the internal organ (*manas*) is refuted. Moreover, for the [Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas who] uphold the [reality of the] internal organ, the latter is inferable through the non-arising of cognitions simultaneously.⁵⁷ However, cognitions are indeed experienced simultaneously in the case of a dancer's performance, etc. And this would not be tenable in certain cases [such as that], if the internal organ were real. Therefore, the sky and the following [(i.e., time, space, and internal organ)] do not really exist.

7.3.1.2 Physical Elements

7.3.1.2.1 The Whole (*avayavin*)

Earth and the other [physical elements] are left. As for these, the [Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas] conceive of them in two ways as [being impermanent *qua* a] whole and as [being permanent *qua*] atoms.⁵⁸

⁵⁶The original verse is slightly different. Cf. *tasya śaktir aśaktir vā yā svabhāvena samsthītā | nīyatvād acikīṣyasya kas tām kṣapayitum kṣamaḥ ||* (*Pramāṇavārttika* Pratyakṣa° 22). For a philosophical discussion of this verse, see Franco and Notake 2014: 74–75.

⁵⁷See *yugapajjñānānutpattir manaso liṅgam ||* (*Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.16). According to Nyāya, the internal organ is atomic and imperceptible; it can only be inferred. It is an instrument of the Self that connects it with each sense-organ individually in order to direct attention to the several sense data. For this reason, one cannot experience different sense perceptions at the same time. This is precisely how one can infer the existence of the *manas*, since otherwise they would be overwhelmed by sensorial data. See also *anindriyanimittāḥ smrtyādayaḥ karaṇāntaranimittā bhavitum arhantīti | yugapac ca khalu ghrāṇādīnāṃ gandhādīnāṃ ca sannikarṣeṣu satsu yugapaj jñānāni notpadyante | tenānumīyate, asti tat tad indriyasamyogi sahakāri nimittāntaram avyāpī, yasyāsannidher notpadyate jñānaṃ sannidheś cotpadyate tan manaḥ | manaḥsam-yogānapekṣasya hīndriyārthasannikarṣasya jñānaheturve yugapad utpadyeran jñānāntīti |* (*Nyāyabhāṣya ad Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.16, ed. p. 19, 5–9).

⁵⁸The Vaiśeṣikas conceive of the four physical elements as having two natures, a permanent one as atoms, and an impermanent one as their aggregates. See *sā* [= *prthivī*]

Between these, then, neither is the whole existent, nor are atoms existent, since there is a negative proof (*bādhaka*[*pramāṇa*])⁵⁹ regarding both of them. [Jñānapāda] expounds precisely this negative proof in due succession. ‘And [it] is not’ at all ‘one’, namely, a whole composed by atoms with a progression, namely, a dyad and so on, [which is] well known, such as a pot. [This is] due to [this] logical reason, that is, ‘because one perceives’ ‘a visual form, etc.’, as being ‘differentiated into beginning, end’, middle, ‘etc.’, that is to say, [one perceives a thing that is] really devoid of a coarse and unitary nature, due to properties that are mutually contradictory. Therefore, with this it is expressed the logical reason [called] non-cognition that has the nature of the perception of a thing conjunct in one cognition [with another].

For only parts appear, according to a specific composition; something different [from those parts], possessing them, however, does not manifest at all as being devoid of parts. (Dharmakīrti? Untraced)⁶⁰

In the case of the colouring or shaking of a single part, the whole, being also inherently connected with it, would be observed as coloured

tu dvividhā nityā cānityā ca | paramāṇulakṣaṇā nityā | kāryalakṣaṇā tv anityā | (Padārthadharma-saṃgraha, ed. p. 27, 17–19). Cf. also kṣīṭyādibhedato bhinnam navadhā dravyam isyate | catuṣsaṅkhyam pṛthivyādi nityānityatayā dvidhā | | (Tattvasaṃgraha 548) tatra pṛthivy āpa tejo vāyur ity etac catuṣsaṅkhyam dravyam nityānityabhedenā dviprakāram | | (Tattvasaṃgrahaṭṭhāpāñjikā ad Tattvasaṃgraha 548, ed. p. 231, 22–23)

⁵⁹Note that this is our emendation. The Tib. reads here along the lines of ‘since there are no positive proofs’ (**sādhakābhāvāt/sgrub par byed pa med pa’i phyir ro*).

⁶⁰This verse is quoted twice in the *Tarkabhāṣā* as well, with some variants in the second half. Cf. *bhāgā eva hi bhāsante sanniviṣṭās tathā tathā | tadvān naiva punaḥ kaścid vibhāgaḥ sampratīyate | | (Tarkabhāṣā, ed. Iyengar p. 22, 14–15)* The same verse, with *nirbhāgaḥ* instead of *vibhāgaḥ*, is found later (*Tarkabhāṣā, ed. Iyengar p. 66, 15–16*). A similar verse is found in Arcaṭa’s *Hetubinduṭīkā*: *bhāgā eva ca bhāsante sanniviṣṭās tathā tathā | tadvān kaścit punar naiva nirbhāgaḥ pratibhāsate | | (Hetubinduṭīkā 32, ed. p. 106, 25–26)*. As noted by Kajiyama (1998 [1966], 60 n. 140), Mokṣākaragupta ascribes this verse to the *Nyāyaparameśvara* (*Tarkabhāṣā, ed. Iyengar p. 22, 13*), an epithet used for Dharmakīrti in the *Tarkasopāna* by Vidyākaraśānti (ed. Tucci 1956 p. 304, 21–22). Kajiyama was unable to identify the verse. He notes that Arcaṭa seems to be quoting it from another work of Dharmakīrti. Accordingly, he regards the attribution to Dharmakīrti as likely. In fact, Mokṣākaragupta (*Tarkabhāṣā, ed. Iyengar p. 53, 17–18*) uses the same epithet to introduce part of a verse that, while also untraced, is attributed to Dharmakīrti by Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti. That same verse is also found in Arcaṭa (*Hetubinduṭīkā 3cd–4a, ed. p. 104, 26–27*). He appears to be ascribing it to Dharmakīrti, without explicitly mentioning his name.

or shaking.⁶¹ If it is argued that the colouring or the shaking are [admitted] regarding a part, [but] not regarding the whole, then [it will be argued that] that [(i.e., the part)] would be observed as non-coloured or non-shaking. Moreover, in the case of the covering of one part, the [whole] would not be observed, because it [would] be covered [as well]. [Also,] the undesired consequence of the perception of the [whole] being uncovered when the [part] is uncovered would be difficult to avoid. Therefore, due to the attribution of contradictory properties (*viruddhadharmādhyāsa*),⁶² [such as covered and uncovered,] which have the nature of differentiating [things], a unitary whole cannot exist. Thus, we opportunely see that this [can]not be the object of a treatment as existent.⁶³

⁶¹ Cf. *pānyādikampe sarvasya kampaprāpter virodhinaḥ | ekasmin karmaṇo 'yogāt syāt pṛthak si-ddhir anyathā || (Pramāṇavārttika Pramāṇasiddhi° 84)*. ‘There should be a separate establishment in another way, because of it being illogical that an action [occurs] within a unitary thing, since the movement of the whole [body] [would follow] when a hand, etc., moves, which is contradicted [by our experience].’ A short reference to the same argument is also found in the *Tattvasaṃgrahaṭīkā ad Tattvasaṃgraha* 1997 (ed. pp. 172, 20–173, 1).

⁶² On the concept of *viruddhadharmādhyāsa*, see, for example, Ezaki 2004.

⁶³ Here, Samantabhadra is following two main lines of argument. The existence of a unitary whole is contradicted (1) by direct perception, and (2) by inference: (1) It is contradicted by direct perception, because we see wholes as in fact having different parts. If the whole were unitary, one would never experience it as being partly covered or as being multicoloured. This is because, since the whole is admitted as unitary, i.e., devoid of parts, any nature of one part would also have to be the nature of the whole. (2) It is contradicted by inference since, due to the state of being partly covered or multicoloured, the whole follows as manifold. That is because the attribution to the whole of contradictory properties is the cause of its being differentiated. Accordingly, it cannot be unitary as being identical to itself. Quite similar reasoning regarding the whole is found in the *Dravyapadārthaparīkṣā* of the *Tattvasaṃgraha* and the *Tattvasaṃgrahaṭīkā*. See *sthūlasyaikasvabhāvatve makṣikāpadamātrataḥ | pīdhāne pīhitam sarvam āsajyetaivibhāgataḥ || rakte ca bhāga ekasmin sarvam sajyeta [em.; rajyeta Ś] raktavat | viruddhadharmabhāve vā nānātvam anusajyate || (Tattvasaṃgraha 592–593)* ‘If a coarse thing is [admitted as] having a unitary nature, [then] if there is [its] being covered, [be it] due to the [stepping on it of] just the foot of a fly, the whole thing would follow as covered, because [it] has no parts. Moreover, if one part is coloured, the whole thing would follow as being coloured, or [another argument] since [it] has contradictory properties, the manifoldness [of that coarse thing] follows.’ *yadi hi sthūlam ekaṃ syāt, tadaikadeśapīdhāne sarvasya pīdhānam, ekadeśarāge ca sarvasya rāgaḥ prasajyeta, pīhitāpīhitayo raktāraktayoś ca bhavanmatenābhedāt | na caikasya parasparaviruddhadharmādhyāso yuktaḥ, atīprasāṅgāt | evam hi viśvam ekaṃ dravyam syāt, tataś ca sahotpādādi-prasaṅgaḥ | na tv ekadeśapīdhāne sarvaṃ pīhitam iksyata iti pratyakṣavirodhaḥ | tathānumānavirodho 'pi | tathā hi — yat parasparaviruddhadharmādhyāsitaṃ na tad ekaṃ bhavati, yathā gomahīsam | upalabhyamānānupalabhyamānarūpaṃ pīhitādirūpeṇa ca viruddhadharmādhyāsitaṃ sthūlam iti vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhiḥ | sarvasyaikatvaprasaṅgo bādhakaṃ pramāṇam | (Tattvasaṃgrahaṭīkā ad*

7.3.1.2.2 Atoms

And, if now a unitary [nature] is refuted, one is left with ‘a manifold nature’. And the latter is conceived in many ways by many [thinkers]. For instance, the Vaibhāṣikas regard atoms as an object directly perceivable by the senses; the Vaiśeṣikas, in turn, regard them as composing a whole, and the Sautrāntikas view atoms as always beyond the reach of the senses, behaving like the *piśācas*, [and] disposed to bestow their image on [their] perception.

Among these, first of all, in order to refute atoms as conceived by the Vaibhāṣikas, [Jñānapāda] says, ‘also atom by atom’, etc. (see 113cd). Furthermore, just as a unitary coarse thing does not exist, ‘nor, similarly, does it have a manifold nature’. [Jñānapāda] states the logical reason [with] ‘since one does not perceive [it as being distinguished] also atom by atom’.⁶⁴ The meaning is: Because there is a non-cognition of things having the form of atoms [and] being distinct from each other.

114.0 If it is argued that atoms can be inferred since, otherwise, a coarse thing would be illogical (*anupapatti*),⁶⁵ [as a response] to this [Jñānapāda] states:

Tattvasaṃgraha 592–593, ed. p. 246, 14–21). ‘For, if a coarse thing is [admitted] as unitary, then if one part “is covered”, the whole thing is covered. Moreover, if one part is coloured, the whole thing follows as coloured, due to the non-difference, according to your view, of what is covered and uncovered or coloured and not coloured. Furthermore, it is not logical that one can attribute qualities that contradict each other (*parasparaviruddhadharmādhyāsa*) to a unitary thing, because there would be an overextension. If it were like this, everything would be one substance, and from this it would undesirably follow, for example, that [everything] would come into existence at the same time. However, it is not the case that one observes that, when one part is covered, the whole thing is covered. Therefore, there is a contradiction by direct perception. Similarly, there is also a contradiction by inference. To explain: That thing to which qualities that contradict each other are attributed is not unitary, like a cow and a buffalo. And a coarse thing, to which one attributes contradictory qualities, has a nature that is being perceived and a nature that is not being perceived, since it has the nature of being covered [and that of being uncovered], etc. Thus, there is the cognition of the contradictory of the pervader. The undesired consequence that everything would have a unitary [nature] is the negative proof.’

⁶⁴Samantabhadra explains that this argument refuting a manifold *svabhāva* as consisting of atoms is intended to oppose the Vaibhāṣika atomic view. In fact, Jñānapāda must be referring to a similar argument as found in *Vīṃśikā* 11 and *Vṛtti*. Cf. *nāpy anekam paramānūnām pratyekam agrahaṇāt* | (*Vṛtti* on *Vīṃśikā* 11, ed. Lévi pp. 6, 30–7, 1). On this, see Introduction § 5.1.

⁶⁵Cf. *Tattvasaṃgraha* 1974 in Introduction n. 72.

114. Moreover, if an atom is [admitted as] devoid of parts, since it [can]not be surrounded by many atoms, no accumulation, such as the sphere of earth, etc., would be possible at all in this case.⁶⁶

114.1 The following is the intended meaning. First of all, the fact that an atom has parts must be observed, because, due to the simultaneous union of six [atoms], etc., with parts that are situated in opposite directions, it undesirably follows that it would be manifold. [This is exactly] like [the manifoldness of] a coarse thing due to the conjunction of contradictory qualities.⁶⁷ With regard to a unitary ‘atom’, ‘moreover, if [it] is [admitted as] devoid of parts’, i.e., if it is free from parts (*avayava*) characterized as members (*aṃśā*), ‘it’ can ‘not be’ ‘surrounded’, i.e., encircled, ‘by many’ ‘atoms’. [This is] because, if it were encircled by [other] atoms, the [atom] that stays in the middle of [the other] atoms [placed] at the nadir, the zenith, and in the four directions will necessarily follow as having six parts. For that very nature (*svabhāva*) of that [atom] which is contiguous to an atom [placed] eastward cannot logically be contiguous to an atom placed westward, since those two [atoms] would follow as occupying the same space. This being the case, if the nature [of a central atom] that is next to the eastern atom can be contiguous to the western atom [in the same manner], also that [western atom] would be [placed] there [where the eastern atom is].⁶⁸ Even if there is no contiguity, even if there is merely the facing [each other without touching], there is the same logical defect.⁶⁹ And therefore, due to the undesired consequence that what consists in a conglomerate would consist of merely one atom, ‘no accumulation, such as the sphere of earth, etc., would be possible at all in this case.’ What [Śāntarakṣita] says:

⁶⁶A very similar phrase, but to prove the opposite, is provided by Śubhagupta in **Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā* 56. Jñānapāda would appear to be reversing Śubhagupta’s statement. On this, see Introduction § 5.1.

⁶⁷This most likely refers to the argument that was previously advanced by Samantabhadra against the reality of the whole.

⁶⁸Here, Samantabhadra’s reference to nature (*svabhāva*) is based on Śāntarakṣita’s and Kamalaśīla’s elaboration of the argument. See *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā ad Tattvasaṃgraha* 1989–1990 in Introduction § 5.1.

⁶⁹Samantabhadra is hinting at the idea that atoms can aggregate in various ways. However, in all cases, if they do aggregate, they face the same logical defect. See *Vimśikā* 14ab and *Vṛtti* in Introduction n. 78.

[Regardless of whether atoms are] conjoined, situated at a distance [or] placed in continuity [with other atoms], if the very nature-form (*rūpa*)—which faces [only] one atom—of an atom that is in the middle is conceived (*kalpyate*) as facing other atoms, [then,] this being the case, an accumulation [of atoms,] such as mountains, is not tenable. (*Tattvasaṃgraha* 1989–1990)⁷⁰

114.2 {No Tib.} Therefore, the difference between those two natures must be necessarily admitted. And just as [there is a difference] with regard to these two [natures, the one of being contiguous to an atom placed eastward and the one of being contiguous to an atom placed westward], there is a difference of the natures that are contiguous to atoms [that are placed] at the nadir, the zenith, the south and the north. Therefore, the atom forcibly follows as having indeed six parts. This [Vasubandhu] says:

Because of the simultaneous joining with six [atoms], an atom [would] have six parts. Because [those] six [atoms] would all be in the same spot, a conglomerate would amount to only one atom. (*Vimśikā* 12)

114.3 And, if a unitary [atom] is not established, many [atoms] are not established [either]. Therefore, atoms do not exist.⁷¹

114.4 {No Tib.} [Therefore,] the refutation of the [whole was] not useless considering that (*iti*) [according to the Mīmāṃsakas] it is not the case that, through the mere refutation of the atoms, [also] the whole would be refuted. [For Kumāriḷa Bhaṭṭa said:]

And atoms are not necessarily admitted by the Mīmāṃsakas. (*Śloka-vārttika*, Anumānapariccheda 183ab)

⁷⁰Cf., also, 'byar ba dang ni bskor ba'am || bar med rnam par gnas kyang rung || dbus gnas rdul phran rdul geig la || bltas pa'i rang bzhin gang yin pa || rdul phran gzhan la blta ba yang || de nyid gal te yin brjod na || de lta yin na de lta bu || sa chu la sogs rgyas 'gyur ram || (**Madhyamakālamkārikā* 11–12).

⁷¹For similar statements in the *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā ad Tattvasaṃgraha* 1992–1996 and other sources, see Introduction n. 80.

[The Madhyamaka Perspective]

7.3.2 Refutation of *Vijñaptimātratā*

114.5 Then let us concede that the universe has the nature of mere cognition.⁷² Also this[, i.e., cognition (*vijñāna*)], as before[, namely, in the case of the external object], cannot allow a nature [that is] one or manifold. Therefore, like a lotus in the sky, [a cognition] cannot be treated as existent. Since there is no other way for something really existent, this [cognition] must be one of the two: either one or many.⁷³ And this [cognition] is not possible like this[, i.e., either one or many], therefore, we do not know how this can be an object that is treated as being existent.

7.3.2.1 Refutation of the (*Vijñānavāda*-)**Satyākāravāda* or *Sākāravāda*

There might be this objection: The illogicality of a cognition [having] one or manifold nature is not possible. [The answer would be:] This is

⁷²This may be an intertextual reference to the subsequent quotation from the *Ātmāsādhanaśāstra* (see § 114.8 *infra*). However, in that quotation the universe is defined with the attribute ‘imperishable’ (*anasvarātmaka*).

⁷³Here the ‘neither-one-nor-many’ argument is introduced by Samantabhadra, signalling a shift to a Madhyamaka standpoint. He had previously used this argument in a *Vijñānavāda* context to prove *vijñaptimātratā* through the refutation of external objects of cognition. The statement is also very close to that of Kamalaśīla in the *Tattvasaṃgrahaṭīkā*: *yad ekānekasvabhāvarahitam tad asadvvyavahārayogyam, yathā vijyadabjam* | (*Tattvasaṃgrahaṭīkā ad Tattvasaṃgraha* 1989–1991, ed. p. 166, 19–20) ‘What is devoid of a *svabhāva*, either one or many, is apt to be treated as non-existent, such as a lotus in the sky.’ [...] *prayogaḥ — yad ekānekasvabhāvaṃ na bhavati na tat sattvena grāhyaṃ prekṣāvatā yathā vyomotpalam* | *ekānekasvabhāvarahitāś ca parābhūmatāḥ pṛthivyādaya itī vyāpakānuṣalabdhiḥ* | *ṭṭī-yarāśyantarābhāvenaikatvānekavābhyāṃ sattvasya vyāptatvād vyāpyavyāpakabhāvanūpapattiḥ* | (*Tattvasaṃgrahaṭīkā ad Tattvasaṃgraha* 1964, ed. p. 156, 9–13) ‘[...] The proof statement is [as follows]: That which is not endowed with a *svabhāva*, either one or many, cannot be apprehended—by a judicious man—as being real, such as a lotus in the sky. And earth and the other [elements], [which are] admitted by the opponents [as real], are devoid of *svabhāva*, either one or many. Therefore, [in this proof,] the non-cognition of the pervading [property] [is the logical reason]. Since, due to the absence of another third option, real existence is pervaded either by the [property of] being one or [of] being many, there is a logical incongruity in the relation between the pervaded [property] and the pervading [property] [in the case of the earth, etc.]’ See also Śāntarakṣita’s statement in the **Madhyamakālamkārikā*: *bdag dang gzhan smra’i dngos ’di dag* | | *yang dag tu na gcig pa dang* | | *du ma’i rang bzhin bral ba’i phyir* | | *rang bzhin med de gzugs brnyan bzhin* | | (**Madhyamakālamkārikā* 1). The original Sanskrit verse is quoted by Prajñākaramati: *niḥsvabhāvā amī bhāvās tattvataḥ svaparoditāḥ* | *ekānekasvabhāvena vijyogāt pratibimbavat* | | (*Bodhicaryāvatāraṭīkā*, vol. IV 1905, ed. p. 358, 1–2).

false, because a lack of one or manifold nature is evident [also] in the case of a cognition endowed with images, like externally⁷⁴ [(i.e., in the case of an external object)].⁷⁵ This is because precisely this [thing] that is treated as an external object by ordinary people is [admitted as just] a cognition for the *sākāravādin*. Therefore, precisely [the *pramāṇa*] that contradicts the external existence of that [thing, when it is admitted as an object,] will contradict also [its] internal existence[, when it is admitted as a cognition endowed with an image],⁷⁶ since the negative [proof] refutes a coarse unitary thing and something manifold having the nature of atoms. And whether this image, which is the very essence of cognition,⁷⁷ is unitary [and] coarse or manifold [and] distinct into atoms,⁷⁸ in both cases the refutation concerning the external object cannot be avoided.⁷⁹ This is because that [negative proof] is not a refutation connected to something

⁷⁴With regard to this passage, both Jitāri and Mokṣākaragupta have parallel passages in which one finds the words ‘external object’ (as opposed to ‘externally’). Cf. *phyi rol gyi don* (**Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhāṣya*, ed. Shirasaki 1985 p. 101, 15) and *bahirarthe* (*Tārkabhāṣā*, ed. Iyengar p. 70, 17). However, the Tib. appears to confirm the reading *bāhyatah*.

⁷⁵The phrasing is ambiguous here. Mokṣākaragupta makes his interpretation of the sentence clearer, rephrasing the passage as: *sākāre jñāne bahirartha iva ekānekasvabhāvāyogyatvasya pariśphuṭatvāt* | (*Tārkabhāṣā*, ed. Iyengar p. 70, 17–18); *rnam par shes pa rnam pa dang bcas pa yin na phyi rol gyi don bzhin du gcig dang du ma'i rang bzhin dang mi ldan par gsal ba'i phyir te* | (**Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhāṣya* D 46v7–47r1; ed. Shirasaki 1985 101, 14–16).

⁷⁶A similar point is made, for example, in the *Bhāvanākrama I*. Cf. *ye 'py arūpiṇas te 'pi tathāiva vicāryamāṇā niḥsvabhāvā eva* | *tathā hi — bāhyasya nīlāder arthasyābhāvāt sāmāthyād eva vijñānādayo 'rūpiṇaḥ skandhā nīlādirūpeṇa pratibhāsanta ity abhyuṣeyam* | (*Bhāvanākrama I*, ed. p. 13, 4–6). ‘Those immaterial [dharma,] too, [if] examined precisely in this way, are indeed devoid of *svabhāva*. To explain: Since there is no external object, such as an indigo [thing], indeed, by implication, the immaterial *skandhas*, such as consciousness, etc., appear in the form of an indigo [thing], etc. This must be admitted.’

⁷⁷Here, *ātmabhūta* appears to have the stronger connotation of ‘being the very nature of’. The thesis that Samantabhadra is refuting at this point is clearly the Vijñānavāda-*sākāravāda* or **satyākāravāda*. In this latter doctrine, images are regarded as the very nature of cognitions.

⁷⁸The specific way this thesis is stated may be echoing the *Tattvasaṃgrahaṭīkā*. Cf. [...] *aneko vā paramāṇuśo bhīnnaḥ* [...] (*Tattvasaṃgrahaṭīkā ad Tattvasaṃgraha* 1966, ed. p. 158, 3).

⁷⁹Samantabhadra states: [...] *dūṣaṇam aśakyam apagantum*. After *aśakyam*, one would expect a transitive verb. Mokṣākaragupta phrases it differently: [...] *dūṣaṇam aśakyam ud-dhartum* | (*Tārkabhāṣā*, ed. Iyengar p. 71, 4). In Jitāri, one finds: *sun 'byin pa bsal bar mi nus so* | (**Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhāṣya*, ed. Shirasaki 1985 p.102, 4).

existing outside of a cognition⁸⁰ by which there would not be [a refutation] regarding the [very internal] existence of that [cognition].⁸¹

The [objection:] ‘The negative [proof] connected to shaped things (*mūrti*) does not [apply] to what has the nature of a cognition, which is non-shaped’ is also worthless. This is because, since it has images, such as an indigo [thing], also a cognition is shaped. For, after all (*hi*), [it is] precisely this image which is endowed with spatial extension [that] is a shaped thing. Therefore, we do not understand how the notion of ‘shaped thing’⁸² is with reference to its[, i.e., of the form (*ākāra*),] being external, but not with reference to its[, i.e., of the image (*ākāra*),] being a cognition.⁸³

7.3.2.2 Refutation of the (*Vijñānavāda*-)**Alīkākāravāda* or *Nīrākāravāda*

114.6 The following thought might be argued: Let this [previous] logical defect [follow] for those who [admit] a cognition as endowed with im-

⁸⁰Cf. Tib. *de rnam par shes pa las phyi rol yin pa'i*.

⁸¹The Tib. differs slightly here. See *gang gis de med pas med par 'gyur ba de rnam par shes pa las phyi rol yin pa'i rgyu mtshan gyis sun 'byin pa ni ma yin no* || (**na hi tad vijñānabahirbhāvanibandhanadūṣaṇam, yena tadbhāvena bhavet*). Cf. also, *na hi tad vijñāne bahirbhāvanibandhanam dūṣaṇam, yena tadbhāvena bhavet* | (*Tarkabhāṣā*, ed. Iyengar p. 71, 4); *gang gi phyir gang gis de yod na yod par 'gyur ba rnam par shes pa de phyi rol gyi dngos po'i rgyu mtshan can gyi sun 'byin pa can ma yin te* (Tibetan translation of *Tarkabhāṣā*, D 4264, tshad ma, zhe 368v4–5); *gang gis de ma yin na mi 'byung ba sun 'byin pa ni rnam par shes pa de'i phyi rol yin pa'i rgyu mtshan can ma yin no* || (**Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhāṣya*, ed. Shirasaki 1985 p.102, 4–6).

⁸²In the objection, *mūrti*/*mūrta* has a connotation close to the meaning of *rūpa* in the sense of the *rūpaskandha*, i.e., the material aggregate. In the *Abhidharmakośa*, the latter is subdivided into objects of the senses, sense organs, and the non-informative (*avijñapti*). It is contraposed to the ‘immaterial’ *skandhas*. In the answer, *mūrti*/*mūrta* is intended more as *rūpa* with the meaning of visual forms as sense objects. In the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, Vasubandhu points out that *rūpa*, as visual form, is twofold, i.e., colour and shape. Since the context here is primarily one of visual images, the translation as ‘shaped thing’ for *mūrti*/*mūrta* seems to be the most appropriate. Note that, according to Vasubandhu, there was a disagreement on whether or not colours were to be considered as being shaped. Here, in the following, this seems to be assumed, with colours being regarded as being shaped insofar as they have different parts. Cf. *asti rūpāyatanaṃ varnato vidyate na samsthānataḥ* | *nīlāpītalohitāvadātacchāyātāpālōkāndhakārākhyam* | [...] *ātāpālōkāw eva varnato vidyete ity apare* | *drśyate hi nīlādīnām dīrghādīpariccheda iti* | (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya ad 1.10a*, ed. p. 6, 17–18; 19–20).

⁸³The diagnostic conjecture *na tu jñānavā* is based on Jitāri’s text: *shes pa yin na ni ma yin no* (**Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhāṣya* D 47r4, ed. Shirasaki 1985 p. 102, 9). The Ms. reading *tva* could be explained as an eye-skip (from the first *na* to the second). Similarly, an eye-skip could potentially justify also the diagnostic conjecture *na tv antarava* (from the first *tva* to the second) (Watson 2019; private communication).

ages. However, [there are] those who [maintain] the thesis that [awareness/cognition], which is devoid of images [and] has the form of feelings [*(vedanā)*], is real; for them, how can this lack of unity and manifoldness apply? In this respect, it shall be responded: In this doctrine [i.e., the **alīkākāravāda*], cognition has the nature of light-manifestation; and the manifestation of those [cognitions], as being separated from [images,] such as an indigo [thing], which are appearing, is not brought to awareness, even in dreams; and[, accordingly,] the falsity of [images,] such as an indigo [thing,] that are appearing is not tenable, just as [it is not tenable regarding] feelings.⁸⁴ [This is the statement of the *prasaṅga*.]

If it is argued: [The falsity of images] is [established] because there are negative [proofs], [it will be answered:] Who could prevent this negative [proof] [from being applied] to feelings? But it could be argued that, since feelings are not material (*amūrta*),⁸⁵ that [negative proof against

⁸⁴Cf. *athavā tatrālikā evāmī rūpādāya ākārāḥ pratibhāsanta ity abhyupagamyate | tadā vijñānam apy alīkam prāpnoti | vijñānasya tatsvarūpavyatirekāt | na hi samprakāśamānarūpatāvvyatirekenānyad vijñānasya rūpam asti | svayaṃ ca na nirbhāsante rūpādāyah | teṣāṃ ca vijñānasvarūpāpānnānam alīkatve, sarvam eva vijñānam alīkam abhyupetaṃ syāt | tasmān māyopamaṃ ca vijñānam ity uktaṃ bhagavatā | (Bhāvanākrama I, ed. p. 13, 11–15). ‘Or else, [a second argument is that] it is admitted that these images, such as visual forms, appear as truly false in it[, i.e., in cognition]. Then, the cognition also follows as being false, since cognition is not distinct from their[, i.e., the images’] nature. For the nature of cognition is not another apart from having the nature of manifesting itself, and visual forms and other [sense objects] do not appear by themselves. Moreover, if these [visual forms and other sense objects], having arisen with the nature of cognitions, are false, [then] indeed every cognition can be admitted as false. Therefore, the Bhagavat said, “And cognition is similar to illusion.”’*

‘On te rnam par shes pa ni gcig pu kho na yin la | rnam pa brdzun pa rnams de la snang bas sna tshogs kyi skyon du mi ’gyur ro zhe na | gal te de lta na go brdzun pa de dag ji ltar de la snang bar ’gyur | snang zhes bya ba ni gsal ba’i bdag nyid la bya ste | de ni shes pa’i bdag nyid du gtogs pa’i chos yin na, brdzun pa ri bong gi rwa la sogs pa dang ’dra bar shin tu med na go snang bar ji ltar ’gyur | de lta bas na gsal ba’i bdag nyid kyi rnam pa rnams brdzun pa nyid du khas len na khyod kyi bden par ’gyur ba gang yin pa shes pa’i ngo bo gzhan ci zhig lus te | rnam par shes pa yang gsal ba’i bdag nyid kyi mtshan nyid yin pa’i phyir la | sngon po la sogs pa yang bdag nyid kyi snang bas gsal ba’i bdag nyid yin pa’i phyir ro || (**Vajracchedikātikā*, ed. Saccone forthcoming). ‘Let the following be the case: Cognition is truly one; since [it is only] false images [that] appear in it, there cannot be the defect of [it] being manifold. If it is like this, how can these false [images] appear in it? Appearance is having the nature of light. If this is a property regarded as the nature of cognition, how can false images, if they are absolutely non-existent like a hare’s horns, etc., appear? Therefore, if the images that have the nature of light are admitted as false, what other nature of cognition which is real for you is left? [This is] because also cognition has the characteristic of having the nature of light. And because also an indigo [thing], etc., have the nature of light due to the appearance through that nature [of the cognition].’

⁸⁵As seen (n. 82), the sense of *mūrta* in the objection appears to convey the more generic idea of materiality. The answer is based on *mūrta* in the sense of ‘shaped’.

shaped things] is absent [(i.e., does not apply to them)]. [The answer would be:] That is not [true], since also those [feelings] appearing with a spatial extension can be denied [through that proof].⁸⁶ For, with regard to a tired person, the feeling of pleasure is experienced as originating as pervading as many limbs as enter the water. And it is not the case (*na ca*) at all (*nāma*) that something devoid of spatial extension can be experienced like this, because it would undesirably follow that also the body would be devoid of spatial extension. Moreover, [this is also] because, if [feelings] have spatial extension, like the body, they also [must] be shaped [(i.e., be material)].⁸⁷ Precisely this cognition, whether endowed with images or devoid of images, does not surpass the refutation meant for what exists outside. Therefore, a separate refutation is not provided by the master [Jñānapāda]. This must be understood.⁸⁸

7.3.3 Conventional Reality of Cognition (*vijñāna*)

114.7 Therefore, this is established: Also the [above-mentioned] cognition cannot be treated as existent. Then, this could be [argued:] Due to the non-existence of cognition and cognized, the reality [of cognition] has the nature of non-existence. No, [it is not like that.] Conventionally, cognition will be [real], since conventional reality cannot be denied.⁸⁹

If it is argued: Non-existence necessarily derives from the negation of existence, [the answer will be:] No. [This is] because, since non-existence

⁸⁶With reference to a similar objection and a different type of response, see **Madhyama-kālamkārapañjikā* (ed. p. 139) and the parallel in the *Abhisamayālamkāralokā* (ed. p. 627, 13–21).

⁸⁷The argument here is meant to prove that also feelings could be regarded as having spatial extension. The feeling of pleasure, for example, is experienced as originating in some parts of the body and not in others. Accordingly, like the body, if feelings have spatial extension, they must be admitted as being shaped (*mūrta*). They are then prone to being refuted like other shaped things.

⁸⁸Here, Samantabhadra is suggesting that Jñānapāda does not ultimately admit the reality of *vijñaptimātratā*. However, since the criticism addressed at cognitions is the same as the one for external objects, he does not devote a separate refutation to it.

⁸⁹Samantabhadra most likely endorses the idea that *vijñaptimātratā* is real from the point of view of conventional reality (*saṃvṛtī*). This view is also shared by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla. See Introduction § 6.

presupposes existence,⁹⁰ if the latter is unestablished, the former is not established either.⁹¹ As [the Bhagavat] said:

‘It does not exist’ is preceded by existence, ‘it exists’ is preceded by non-existence, therefore, ‘it does not exist’ cannot be said, and one cannot conceive of existence. (*Laṅkāvatārasūtra* 3.83)⁹²

⁹⁰Samantabhadra, among others, appears to advocate a logical hierarchy in which existence comes first. Existence and non-existence are not simply dependent on each other, but rather non-existence presupposes existence. The same holds true for Kamalaśīla in the *Bhāvanākrama*: *tathā hi — yadā prajñayā nirūḥayan na kiṃcid bhāvasvabhāvam upalabhate yogī, tadāsyā naiva bhāvavikalpo bhavati | abhāvavikalpo ’pi tasya nāsty eva | yadi bhāvaḥ kadācid dṛṣṭo bhavati, evaṃ sati tanniśedhenābhāvavikalpaḥ pravartate | yadā tu kālātraye ’pi bhāvo yoginā prajñācakṣuṣā nirūḥayatā nopalabdhaḥ, tadā katham tasya pratiśedhenābhāvavikalpaṃ kurvīta |* (*Bhāvanākrama I*, ed. p. 21, 10–14). ‘To explain: When, examining through insight, the yogin does not perceive any nature of existence, then he does not have any concept regarding existence at all. He does not have the concept of non-existence, either. If existence [could] be perceived at one point, then, such being the case (*evaṃ sati*), the concept of non-existence would occur through its negation. However, if, in all three times, existence is not perceived by the yogin who is examining through the eye of insight, how then could he/she adopt (*kurvīta*) the concept of non-existence through the negation of that [concept of existence]?’ For the larger context of this passage, see Introduction n. 91.

⁹¹On a similar note, see Candrakīrti’s *Prasannapadā*: *nanu ca bhāvānām svabhāvo nāstīty abhyupagacchato mā bhūd bhāvadārśanābhāvāc chāsvatadarśanam, uchedadarśanam tu nyatam prasajyata iti | naivam abhāvadārśanam bhavati | yo hi pūrvam bhāvasvabhāvam abhyupetya paścāt tannivṛtīm ālabate, tasya pūrvopalabdhasvabhāvāpavādāt syād abhāvadārśanam | yas tu taimirikopalabdhaśeṣeṣv iva vitaimiriko na kiṃcid upalabhate, sa nāstīti bruvan kiṃcin nāstīti brūyāt pratiśedhyābhāvāt | viparyastānām tu mithyābhiniśeṣanivṛtyartham ataimirikā iva vyaṅgaṃ brūmah — na santi sarvabhāvā iti | na caivam bruvatām asmākaṃ parahitavyāpāraparāyanānām uchedadarśanaprasaṅgaḥ |* (*Prasannapadā* 15.11, ed. pp. 273, 12–274, 4) ‘[Objection:] Since he does not [accept] the view of existence, let there not be the view of permanence for [that person] who admits that there is no real nature of things. However, [for him] the view of nihilism follows necessarily. [Answer:] In this way, the view of non-existence does not [follow for him]. For, the one who, having previously admitted a real nature of things, relies on its cessation afterwards, could have [such] a view of non-existence due to the negation of a real nature previously perceived. Nevertheless, [there is a person] who, being devoid of dimness of vision, does not perceive something, as in the case of hairs perceived by those who are affected by dimness of vision. This [person] saying “it is not there” could say “nothing is there”, because there is no[thing] to be denied. And (*tu*) in order to stop the false attachment of people with misconceptions, like those who are devoid of dimness of vision, we say: “All things do not exist”. And for us [who are] intent on the activity of benefitting others, and say thus, the undesired consequence of the view of nihilism does not follow.’

⁹²The *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* differs in *pāda* c. See *astitvapūrvakam nāsti asti nāstivapūrvakam | ato nāsti na gantavyam astitvam na ca kalpayet |* (*Laṅkāvatārasūtra* 3.83). The latter quotation is found, among other places, in the **Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti* (ed. p. 240, 6–9). A quotation presenting the same difference as our text in *pāda* c is found in the **Madhyamakāloka*; see *med pa yod pa’i zlas drangs te | yod pa ’ang med pa’i zlas drangs so | de phyir med par brjod mi bya | yod pa nyid du ’ang mi brtag go |* (**Madhyamakāloka* D 152v2).

Nor does [reality] have both natures as being existent and non-existent [at the same time], since existence and non-existence are contradictory. Not even does it have a nature which is neither of them, verily different from existence and non-existence, because something positively implied⁹³ that is apart from these two is illogical.

Surely, we must conclude that reality is nothing whatsoever! [The *si-ddhānta* is:] Precisely this is reality, that is to say, the fact of being altogether devoid of reality. Therefore, the following is established:

Cognition manifests as devoid of the tetralemma. This is the reality for those who really know reality [i.e., the Mādhyamikas], even though it is not reality ultimately.⁹⁴

7.3.4 Quotation from the *Ātmasāadhanāvātāra*

114.8 {No Tib.} This is stated by Jñānapāda, beginning [with the words], [objection:] ‘Let the imperishable universe have the nature of mere cognition.’⁹⁵

It is not [like this], since also a cognition lacks a nature[, whether] unitary or manifold. To explain: That [cognition] is not unitary, (i) because perceptions (*upalambha*) are varied due to a difference of an indigo [thing], etc., (ii) because also a single colour, such as white, appears with a difference of front, middle and end, and (iii) because of a different use due to [a specific] causal efficiency; and because the definition of manifoldness consists of nothing but all of the [three]. [Cognition] is not even manifold, since the parts of an image, such as white, which are similar to atoms [with respect to

⁹³This means something negated through implicative negation (*pariyudāsa*), i.e., the negative particle as excluding something and thus positively implying something else.

⁹⁴We interpret this stanza as the author’s *saṃgrahaśloka*. However, the possibility that it is a quotation remains, in which case it is untraced. A similar concept is found, among other places, in: *na san nāsan na sadasan na cāpy anubhayātmakam | catuṣkoṭivīnirmuktam tattvaṃ mādhyaṃkā viduḥ ||* (*Jñānasārasamuccaya* 28); the latter verse is found identically in *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjīkā* (ed. p. 359, 10–11) and is also quoted in the **Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhāṣya* (ed. Shirasaki 1985 p. 128, 7–10).

⁹⁵In the Tibetan translation of the *Ātmasāadhanāvātāra* this sentence is followed by a portion that is missing in this quotation: *de lta yin du chug na yang ’gro ba rnam kyang rnam par rig pa tsam gyi rang bzhin gzung ba dang ’dzin pa med pa’i rang bzhin can yin la | de yang ldog pa med pa’i phyir gang gis de rnam par ldog pa tsam mya ngan las ’das pa zhes bya zhe na | ma yin te rnam par shes pa yang gcig dang du ma’i rang bzhin dang bral ba yin pa’i phyir ro ||* (*Ātmasāadhanāvātāra* D 53r4–5).

their treatment as inexistent], are not apprehended.⁹⁶ And there is no other [third] way aside from one or many, since these two are contradictory due to their having the nature of being mutually exclusive (*anyonyābhāva*).

[Objection:] If things are absolutely devoid of Self, where does this difference of causal efficiency that is experienced [come] from?
[Answer:] [That is] because, regarding a single nature, which is not investigated (*avicārita*)⁹⁷ [i.e., is only conventionally true], there is a non-apprehension of another [difference of causal efficiency]

⁹⁶Cf. *ye tu manyante — samānajatīyāny api jñānāny ākārasamkhyāny eva bahūni citrāstarānādīsu yugapat samudbhavānty eva vijātīyarūpaśabdādījñānavad iti | tataś ca prasāṅge siddhasādhyateti | teṣāṃ citrāstarāṇe yathā nīlādāyo bahava ākārāḥ samvedyante, evam ekākāre 'pi sitādāv arvāgmadhya-parabhāgarūpā bahava ākārā iti tadātmakaṃ tatrāpi jñānam anekātmakaṃ prāpnoti | iṣyata eveti cet | kim idānīm ekaṃ jñānaṃ bhavatīti vaktavyam | yad anavayavāṇuviṣayam iti cet | tad etad anubhavaviruddham | na hi kvacid anavayavam anuvūpaṃ bhāsamānam ālakṣyate jñāne | na cāpy amūrtānām paurvāparyāvasthānaṃ deśakṛtaṃ yuktam, yena tasya satyatāprasiddhaye 'nekajñānakalpanā sādhwī syāt | (Tattvasaṃgrahaḥpañjikā ad Tattvasaṃgraha 2036–2037). ‘However, [there are] those who think: “Cognitions, albeit homogeneous, numerous, precisely according to the number of the images, arise simultaneously in the case of a multicoloured carpet, etc., as [it happens with] cognitions of visual forms and sounds, etc., which are heterogeneous [and arise simultaneously]. And therefore, regarding the undesired consequence [put forward by the opponent], there is the establishing of what is [already] established.” [Precisely] for them[, the reply will be the following]: As, with regard to a multicoloured carpet, many images—such as an indigo one—are brought to awareness, likewise, also with regard to a single image—such as a white one—there will be many images, [each] having the form of the parts [situated] below, in the middle or above. Therefore, in this case too, the cognition [of a single white image], consisting of those [i.e., images of the different parts of that white image], [will] follow as having a manifold nature. If [it is argued:] “[This] is indeed admitted”, [then the reply will be:] “One must say which one is the unitary cognition in this case.” If [it is argued that the unitary cognition is the cognition] that has the partless atom as [its] content, [the reply will be that] precisely this is contradicted by direct experience, for nowhere can the partless form of an atom be seen, as appearing, in cognition. Nor is it logical that immaterial things[, like cognitions,] are placed in continuity extending in space (*deśakṛta*), by virtue of which, in order to establish the truth of that [image], the conception of many cognitions [occurring together] could be fit.’ Cf. also *du ma rnam grangs bzhin du rnam par shes pa cig car 'byung ngo zhes brjod du yang mi rung ste | cha shas med pa dang lus med pa rnam la ni | tshu rol dang pha rol na gnas pa mi rigs pa'i phyir ro || de ltar gnas pa med na ni | de ltar snang bar mi 'gyur ro ||* (**Vajracchedikāṭikā*, ed. Saccone forthcoming) ‘Moreover, it is not logical to say that cognitions arise synchronically according to the number of the many images [that compose a variegated image], because it is illogical that things devoid of parts and incorporeal are in spatial continuity. If they do not stay like this, they cannot appear like this.’*

⁹⁷This term echoes the concept of *avicāra[eka]rajanīya*, something that is satisfying as long as no analysis is undertaken. It is related to one of the characteristics of relative truth. On this, see for example Eckel 1992, 42, 138 and Seyfort Ruegg 2010, 167–168. For the concept of relative truth in Jñānapāda, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, see Introduction § 6.1.

other than that [single one which is experienced], since this [apprehension] is based merely on [a succession] of preceding conceptual constructions [in beginningless *saṃsāra*].⁹⁸ This has been stated [already].⁹⁹

[Objection:] Let us grant that this is the case, then all things really exist, since being a real thing is characterized by causal efficiency.

[Answer:] That is not [true], because admitting [something] as [conventionally] existent by virtue of [its] mere appearance is non-contradictory. Selflessness is established based precisely on the investigation of the nature (*lakṣaṇa*) [of all things] according to the

⁹⁸Here, Jñānapāda is arguing that only a single specific nature of something, which is connected to its causal efficiency, is experienced by someone at a certain moment. This is experienced based on habituation (*abhyāsa*), which is related to previous concepts experienced also in previous lives. This idea, which is often discussed in the literature of the logico-epistemological tradition, finds a clear expression, for instance, in Dharmakīrti's *Svavṛtti* on the Svārthānumāna chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika*: *yady apy aṃsarahitaḥ sarvato bhīnnavabhāvo bhāvo 'nubhūtas tathāpi na sarvabhedeṣu tāvatā niścayo bhavati | kāraṇāntarāpekṣatvāt | anubhavo hi yathāvikalpābhyāsam niścayaḥpratyayān janayati | yathā rūpadarśanāviśeṣe 'pi kuṇapakāminībhakṣyavikalpāḥ | tatra buddhipāṭavaṃ tadvāsanābhyāsaḥ prakaraṇam ityādāyo 'nubhavad bhedanīścayotpattisahakāriṇaḥ | teṣāṃ eva ca pratyāsattitāratamyādibhedāt paurvāparyam | yathā janakatvādhyāpakatvāviśeṣe 'pi pītarān āyāntam dṛṣtvā pītā me āgacchati nopādhyāya iti | (Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti ad Pramāṇavārttika Svārthānumāna° 58, ed. p. 32, 3–11)*. 'Even though a nature different from everything [and] devoid of parts, i.e., a real thing, is experienced, nevertheless, there is not the ascertainment to such an extent regarding all the differences [(i.e., aspects)], since [that ascertainment] depends [also] on other causes. For experience generates ascertaining cognitions (*niścayaḥpratyaya*) according to the habituation to conceptual constructions. For instance, even though there is no difference in seeing a visual form [related to a woman], [there arise] the concepts of a corpse, a woman, and food. In this respect, the acuity of the cognition, the habituation to its latent impressions, the context, etc., are cooperating causes for the arising of [episodes of] ascertainment of differences [(i.e., aspects)] based on the experiencing [of some thing]. Moreover, the succession of these [different episodes of ascertainment] is, indeed, due to the difference of proximity, difference in degree, etc. For instance, even though there is no difference between [his] being a father and being a teacher, [the son,] having seen the father coming, [thinks,] "my father is coming", and not, "a teacher [is coming]."'

⁹⁹This refers back to the very beginning of the *Ātmasādhanaḥvatāra* (D 52v3), where Jñānapāda substantiates his initial thesis with an unattributed verse, the first half of which reads: *rnam rtoḡ las gzhan 'khor ba zhes | | bya ba 'ga' yang yod min te | |*. The verse is the penultimate stanza in a praise of Mañjuḥṣa attributed to Dignāga (in the Tibetan translation, D 2712), a part which is available in the original in a fragment, Kaiser Library no. 127 (see Szántó 2017a, 226), where we have: *na vikalpād rte kaścit saṃsāro nāma vidyate |*. The verse is also quoted, again without attribution, by Vilāsavajra in his *Nāmanantrārthāvalokinī* (in a still unpublished part, here we read Ms Cambridge University Library Add. 1708, 48r) *ad Mañjuśrīnāmasaṅgīti* 6.15cd (not traced in Tribe 2016, 377). The entire text of this *Mañjuḥṣastuti* has recently surfaced in China in a multiple-text manuscript from 'Bras spungs, but it is not available to us (for what can be known for now about this collection, see Matsuda 2019).

previously stated progression, but is not [established] based on the denial [of a nature] also as merely appearing. As [the Buddha] says: ‘O Subhūti, it is not the case that form is one thing and emptiness is another, but the form itself is empty of the nature of form’¹⁰⁰ and so on extensively. Therefore, indeed, permanence cannot be conjectured [for us], because all conventional things appear with a difference of [temporal] succession. And what is said[, namely,] ‘O Jinaputra, these three worlds are nothing but mere cognition (*vijñaptimātra*)’¹⁰¹ is in order to refute the conceptual determination of external objects for those who are extremely attached to things. This is because, if there this [refutation], it is possible to reject also the determination of mind-only (*cittamātra*) easily. This is precisely [what the Buddha] says:

Relying on mind-only, the absence of a nature of external [objects] should be cognized. Dwelling in [a state] that has *tathatā* as [its] support,¹⁰² he should transcend mind-only [as well]. (*Laṅkāvatārasūtra* 10.256)¹⁰³

¹⁰⁰A similar untraced quotation from a *Prajñāpāramitā* is found in certain works of Śāntarākṣita and Kamalaśīla. See *rgyal ba bskyed ma las kyang rgyal bas ji skad du mtshan nyid stong pa nyid kyi phyr rnam par shes pa'i bar du rnam par shes pa'i ngo bo nyid kyis stong ngo zhes gsungs pa lta bu'o* || (**Madhyamakālaṅkāravṛtti*, ed. p. 198, 12–15); *evaṃ ca kṛtvā, ayam api Prajñāpāramitāpāthah sunīto bhavati vijñānaṃ vijñānasvabhāvena śūnyam lakṣaṇasūnyatām upādāyēti* (*Tattvasaṃgrahaḥ* 2076–2077, ed. p. 217, 4–5); *Prajñāpāramitāyāṇ cōktaṃ — rūpaṃ Subhūte rūpasvabhāvena śūnyam yāvad vijñānaṃ vijñānasvabhāvena śūnyam iti svalakṣaṇasūnyatām upādāyēti* | (*Bhāvanākrama I*, ed. p. 10, 16–17).

¹⁰¹See *cittamātram idaṃ yad idaṃ traidhātukam* | (*Daśabhūmikasūtra*, ed. p. 49, 9). A similar quotation is also found in other texts, see, e.g., *vijñaptimātram evaitad* (*Vimśikā* 1a); *vijñaptimātram evedam* (*Vimśikā* 1a, ed. Ruzsa and Szegedi 2015); *vijñaptimātram evedam* (*Triṃśikā* 27a); *mahāyāne traidhātukam vijñaptimātram vyavasthāpyate* | *cittamātram bho jinaputrā yad uta traidhātukam iti sūtrāt* | (*Vṛtti on Vimśikā*, ed. Lévi p. 3, 1–2); *vijñaptimātram traidhātukam [...]* (*Bhāvanākrama I*, ed. p. 23, 6–7); *vijñaptimātram evedam traidhātukam* | (*Tattvasaṃgrahaḥ* 1964, ed. p. 155, 3–4); *kham gsun pa 'di ni sems tsam mo* (**Madhyamakāloka* 156b5). Schmithausen (1973, 172) discusses this passage in connection with the development of the *vijñaptimātratā* doctrine. The original quotation has *cittamātram* becoming *vijñaptimātram* in Vasubandhu, who likely influenced Kamalaśīla and then Jñānapāda.

¹⁰²Our translation follows Kamalaśīla's interpretation of the text. See *advayalakṣaṇe tathatāmbane sthītvā tad api cittamātram atikramet* | *grāhakaṃ ākāraṃ atikramet* | *dvayanirābhāsa evādvayajñāne tiṣṭhed ity arthaḥ* | (*Bhāvanākrama I*, ed. p. 19, 1–3) ‘Dwelling in [a state] that has *tathatā*, which is characterized by non-duality, as [its] support, he should transcend that mind-only as well. That is to say, he should transcend the aspect [of the] apprehender. The meaning is: He should reside in the non-dual cognition that is truly devoid of the appearance of duality.’

¹⁰³Cf. also *cittamātram samāruhya bāhyam arthaṃ na kalpayet* | *tathatāmbane sthītvā cittamātram atikramet* || (*Bhāvanākrama I*, ed. p. 18, 2–3). Regarding this verse, see Introduction § 6.1.

114.9 Therefore, with this much[, namely, the previous passages], the presence of negative proof is shown.

7.4 *Statement of the Madhyamaka Standpoint on Reality*

115.0 And therefore, due to the selflessness of all things, such as the knowable, [which is established] based on the absence of positive proofs and the presence of negative [proofs], this universe has the nature of being made out of only conceptual constructions. Summarizing this, he says [the words] beginning with ‘therefore, due to the lack of apprehender, etc.’

115. Therefore, due to the lack of apprehender, etc., all things, [be they] movable [or] immovable, are similar to the city of the Gandharvas [and] have the nature of conceptual constructions, such as independent natures.

115.1 ‘Therefore’, i.e., on account of the demonstration that was expounded immediately [before]; ‘due to the lack of apprehender, etc.’, inanimate and animate ‘things’ are ‘similar to the city of the Gandharvas’ and inasmuch as they are devoid of an ultimately existent cause, i.e., inasmuch as they have the nature of a continuum of conceptual constructions [they] ‘have the nature of conceptual constructions, such as independent natures’.

116.0 [Objection:] If reality is like this[, i.e., devoid of the tetralemma], then it is truly purified. [Answer:] How can *saṃsāra* [be possible] and, due to its[, i.e., *saṃsāra*’s] non-existence, how can purification be possible? Suspecting this objection, he says [the words] beginning with ‘due to the superimposition of Self and Self-related [things]’.

116. Due to the superimposition of Self and Self-related [things], this *saṃsāra* is a continuum of conceptual constructions. As for¹⁰⁴ purification, [it] must be known as having nothing but the nature that is the opposite of that [superimposition].

¹⁰⁴The *tu* in the verse is out of sequence (*bhinnakrama*).

116.1 Having superimposed the ‘Self’, etc., precisely on this mind that is devoid of the tetralemma, *samsāra* has the aspect of ‘a continuum of conceptual constructions’. ‘As for purification’, i.e., as for liberation, ‘must be known’ as being grounded on ‘nothing but the nature’, i.e., selflessness that is ‘the opposite’ of the superimposition of Self, etc. It is precisely for this reason that it was said: One should strive for the purification of conceptual constructions (source?).¹⁰⁵ To explain: A conceptual construction that determines (*adhyavasāyin*) an external object is conducive to worldly existence [and] is impure because it is erroneous; [a conceptual construction] that has the nature of direct perception since it is devoid of conceptual constructions, inasmuch as it is related only to its nature and inasmuch as it is non-erroneous, is purified. This has been stated [by Dignāga]:

Conceptual construction, too, is admitted [as perception] in the case of [its] self-awareness, not with reference to an object because it conceptualizes it. (*Pramāṇasamuccaya* 1.7ab)

116.2 {No Tib.} Also [the defilements (*kleśa*),] such as attachment, etc., superimposing [the Self and so on], are[, nonetheless,] based on the nature of a spoiled mind. This is said in the *Śrīparamādya*:

Attachment, aversion, and ignorance, [ordinarily] these three become poisons.

However, [if] pursued in a perverted way, these become poisonous, but they become nectar, [if] pursued in order to reach [their] being nectar. (*Paramādya* D 220v4–5).

Therefore, having averted conceptual construction from the defect of the false determination of an external object,¹⁰⁶ yogins should exert themselves to make [a conceptual construction] be established on [its] nature.

¹⁰⁵The purification of concepts, here, is tantamount to eliminating the superimposition of concepts such as ‘I’ and ‘mine’. Accordingly, this seems to go along with an idea of the path where concepts do not have to be totally eliminated, but simply purified. See Introduction § 7. This is quoted in the *Tattvātāra* with attribution to an *upadeśa*. See *rtog pa sngon du gtong ba la ’bar par bya’o zhes bya ba ni man ngag yin no* || (*Tattvātāra* D 39r6).

¹⁰⁶The main defect here is the superimposition of concepts related to the external existence of objects. This externality (*bahis*) can be also understood in terms of the opposition to one’s own identity (*sva*). In this sense, it is the conceptual determination of anything other than the nature of the purified conceptual construction itself. This is linked to the idea of a superimposition of concepts connected to the Self and Self-related objects. *Bahirartha* could be referring to any other mental contents, as opposed to *sva*-contents. In other words, it refers to anything that is outside self-awareness.

117.0 For this reason, also a conceptual construction is verily devoid of a conceptual construction [when it] concerns its nature; therefore, all *dharma*s are pure by nature. Accordingly, he says [the words] beginning with ‘and there is not any difference’.

117. And there is not any difference in this system (*ātra*) according to real nature between [things] that have the *svabhāva* of cessation and those that have the *svabhāva* of becoming, since the lack of aspects, such as apprehended, etc., is established always [and] regarding everything.

117.1 ‘Any’ ‘difference’, i.e., a distinction [of this kind], that is to say, ‘this is *nirvāṇa* and this is *samsāra*; this is an impure condition, and this is a pure condition; this is to be abandoned and this to be taken up, and so on and so forth’ ‘and’ ‘not’, i.e., is not logical at all, ‘according to real nature’, i.e., ultimately. In this respect, he states the demonstration as follows: ‘Since the lack of aspects [...]’, etc. Precisely because of this, also the Venerable Nāgārjuna says:

The pair, both *nirvāṇa* and becoming, does not exist at all. Nothing but the thorough knowledge of becoming is called *nirvāṇa*. (*Yuktisastikā* 6)

There is no differentiation of *samsāra* from *nirvāṇa*, there is no differentiation of *nirvāṇa* from *samsāra*.¹⁰⁷ (*Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* 25.19)

117.2 {No Tib.} Also the Bhagavat has stated:

O Subhūti, the true reality of ordinary beings and the true reality of the Tathāgatas are verily one and the same. (*Prajñāpāramitā*, untraced).

and so on and so forth.

¹⁰⁷There is no indication between the two verses conveying that they belong to two different works. Perhaps they were quoted together somewhere else.

118.0 [Objection:] ‘But, if ultimately “there is not” any “difference” “between [things] that have the *svabhāva* of cessation and those that have the *svabhāva* of becoming” (see 117b), how then [can] it be said that “the lack of aspects, such as apprehended, etc., [is established] regarding everything?” As it is well known (*kila*), the word “everything” has verily many objects as its content and it cannot be employed if there is no difference [between things].’ Suspecting this objection (*āśāṅkya*), he states [the words] beginning with ‘and everything cannot be something [different]’.

118. And everything cannot be something [different] from the conception that has the nature of its image. And, therefore, [also] a Self, etc., in the form [of the pronoun] ‘I’ cannot be different from the mind.

118.1 However, conventionally, ‘the difference’ ‘between [things] that have the *svabhāva* of cessation and those that have the *svabhāva* of becoming’ (see 117b) truly exists; therefore, ‘everything’ is verily ‘not’ ‘something’ different from ‘the conception’ that has ‘the nature of the image’ of a [certain] conventional thing. The word ‘every’ has as its content differences superimposed through conceptual constructions. Therefore, the denial of a real difference is demonstrated ‘regarding everything’ (see 117d) which is of that sort [as mentioned above]. This is the meaning. Thus, both movable and immovable [things] are ‘not’ different ‘from the conception that has the nature of the[ir] image’.

7.5 Refutation of the View of the Self (*ātmadarśana*)

118.2 [Objection:] It may be argued that if the view of the Self is true, since there is a true existence of becoming due to the unreality of selflessness, how [can] there be the absence of a difference ‘between [things] that have the nature of becoming and those that have the nature of cessation?’ (see 117b)’ [It will be answered that] this is false. For the view of the Self is twofold: conceptually formed and innate. Among these two, [the view of the Self] is conceptually formed for the Vaiśeṣikas and the [Naiyāyikas],¹⁰⁸ being originated by mental formations generated by the

¹⁰⁸The debate here appears to be mostly against Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika. On this, see Introduction § 8, § 8.1, § 8.2.

study of [treatises] such as the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, which describe the Self [as follows:] ‘The Self is distinct from the body, etc., the agent in the case of good and bad actions,¹⁰⁹ the experiencer of their fruits, permanent and all-pervading.’¹¹⁰ Furthermore, the innate [view of the Self], i.e., the personalistic view, is common to all ordinary people, having the form of the cognition ‘I’, which, by force of beginningless latent impressions due to ignorance, conceptually determines a nature such as that of a permanent apprehender with reference to a continuum of consciousness.

7.5.1 Refutation of the Conceptually Formed (*ābhisamkārika*) View of the Self

7.5.1.1 Absence of *Sādhakapramāṇas*

Among these, regarding the first position [(i.e., the conceptually formed view of Self)], first of all there is no positive proof of the Self. For the Self is not cognized through direct perception, because sense cognitions are restricted to [their respective] five sense objects, like visual forms, etc.¹¹¹ Nor [can] the Self be cognized through inference, because there is no logical reason, [whether] as an effect or as an essential property[, to prove it]. This is because (1) there is no logical reason as an effect, since the

¹⁰⁹At the same time, agency is not considered part of the true nature of the Self. It directs the body and the senses through an impulse called effort (*prayatna*). The latter, however, is included in the qualities, such as cognition, and is accordingly purely adventitious. On this, see n. 50

¹¹⁰For a very similar description of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika view of the Self, see the Naiyāyikavaiśeṣikaparikalpītāmaparīkṣā of the *Tattvasaṃgraha*; on this, see Introduction § 8. Cf. also *de dag ni 'di skad du lus la sogs pa las tha dad pa dge ba dang mi dge ba'i las kyis byed pa de'i bras bu'i myong ba po rtag pa dang khyab pa'i ngo bo bdag ces bya ba rdzas gzhan yod pa yin la | des sna tshogs la khyab pa yin mod kyī | 'on kyang nye bar longs spyod pa'i gnas nyid du yongs su gzung ba'i gson po'i lus gang yin pa de kho na bdag dang bcas pa zhes brjod do zhes smra'o zhe na |* (**Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhāṣya*, ed. Shirasaki 1986 p. 39, 3–7). The same passage is found in the *Tarkabhāṣā*: *tathā hi — tairthikāḥ khalv evaṃ bruvanti | śarīrādīvastuyatiriktam śubhāśubhākarmakartṛtatphalabhokṛtmityavyāpīrūpam ātmākhyam dravyāntaram asti | tena ca yadi nāma viśvaṃ vyāptam tadāpi yadupabhogāyatanatayā pareṇa pariṅghītam jīvaccharīram tad eva sātmakam abhūdījāyata iti |* (*Tarkabhāṣā*, ed. Iyengar p. 50, 5–9).

¹¹¹Cf. *'di ltar re zhiḡ bdag sgrub par byed pa'i tshad ma ni yod pa ma yin no | | mngon sum gyis ni bdag rtogs pa ma yin te | mig la sogs pa'i shes pa ni gzugs la sogs pa'i yul lgar nges pa'i phyir dang |* (**Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhāṣya*, ed. Shirasaki 1986 p. 39, 8–10); and similarly: *na hi pratyakṣeṇa ātmā pratīyate | cakṣurādījñānānām rūpādīviśayapañcakaniyatatvāt |* (*Tarkabhāṣā*, ed. Iyengar p. 50, 10–11).

relation of generated and generator—characterized by [their] positive and negative concomitance—is not established between anything and a Self that is always beyond the reach of senses [and] is devoid of negative concomitance in terms of space and time.¹¹² Moreover, this is because (2) a logical reason as an essential property is illogical, since the existence of the property-bearer [i.e., the Self] is unestablished[, namely, it is an *āśrayāsiddhahetu*]. And there is no other inferential mark, being a positive *probans*, possible by means of which there could be an inference of that [Self].¹¹³ And another inferential mark, provided it is there, must be pervaded by the *probandum*. And since the Self, which is the *probandum*, is not ascertained as pervading due to [its] being unestablished in any case, the fact of being pervaded by that [Self] cannot be ascertained with reference to anything. Therefore, for the [Self], no inferential mark is tenable.

118.3 [Objection:] Let there not be sense cognition or inference as positive [proof]. However, a mental direct perception having the form of the cognition ‘I’ indeed ascertains the Self.¹¹⁴ Having suspected this objection, [Jñānapāda] states: [118cd, that is, the half verse] beginning with: ‘And, therefore, [also] a Self, etc.’ ‘And’ [there] ‘can be’ (*syāt = sambhavet*) ‘not’ ‘a’ ‘Self, etc.’ ‘different from the mind’ ‘in the form [of the pronoun] ‘I’’, i.e., as the object of the cognition ‘I’, since the cognition ‘I’ has for its object the body, etc.: ‘I am dark’,¹¹⁵ ‘I am fat’, ‘I move’ and so on; with

¹¹²With regard to the illogicality of a logical reason for the Self, see *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti ad Pramāṇavārttika Svārthānumāna*° 22 (ed. p. 16, 11–17) in Introduction § 3.1. See also Kaṛṇakagomin’s commentary: *apratyakṣatvād evātmanas talkāryasvabhāvarūpasya līngasyāniścayān nānumānam upalambhaḥ* | (*Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttīkā*, ed. p. 72, 29–30). ‘There is no inference, i.e., cognition, [regarding the Self], since a logical reason that has the nature of its effect or of essential property is not ascertained. This is due precisely to the fact that the Self is not perceptible.’

¹¹³The inferential mark as a positive *probans* can be admitted as an effect or as an essential property. There is no other possibility. According to Dharmakīrti, there is also a negative *probans*, namely, non-cognition (*anupalabdhi*). See *te ca tādātmyatadutpattī svabhāvakāryayor eveti tābhyām eva vastusiddhiḥ* | (*Nyāyabindu* 2.24).

¹¹⁴This is most likely a reference to Uddyotakara’s *Nyāyavārttika ad* 3.1.1. See Introduction § 8.1.

¹¹⁵In the parallel passage that is found in the **Sugatamata vibhāṅgabhāṣya*, one finds ‘fair’ (Tib. *dkar sham*) instead of ‘dark’ (*kr̥ṣṇā*). In his *Tārkabhāṣā* (see n. 116), Mokṣākaragupta, who follows Jitāri, also mentions ‘fair’ (*gaura*) instead of ‘dark’. This reference to how one generally conceives of oneself is originally found in Vasubandhu, and is also mentioned by Uddyotakara, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla. Jitāri and Mokṣākaragupta probably have

such [external] aspects, the cognition ‘I’ originates. And the properties of that [body], i.e., being dark or being fat, do not belong to the [Self] as separated from the body, nor is the action of moving that conforms to the rules of a corporeal substance fit for [the Self], which is all-pervading and incorporeal.¹¹⁶

118.4 {No Tib.} And this [cognition ‘I’] is not tenable as being metaphorical,¹¹⁷ like the concept of ‘lion’ with regard to a young brahmin,¹¹⁸ since there is no stumbling [cognition/functioning (*skhaladvṛtti*) of the word].¹¹⁹ And if there is no stumbling [cognition/functioning of the word], the imagining of a metaphor is not tenable, because the cessation of the primary ordinary usage would undesirably follow.¹²⁰

118.5 Therefore, this is established: There is no positive proof regarding the Self. Hence, the aptness to be treated as existent indeed vanishes.

all of these passages in mind. Vasubandhu states ‘*gaurō ’ham ahaṃ śyāmah’* (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* Pudgalavādapraṭiśedha, ed. p. 150, 8–9); see Introduction § 8.1. Uddyotakara introduces the words ‘*ahaṃ gaurō ’ham kṛṣṇa iti’* (*Nyāyavārttika* ad 3.1.1, ed. p. 324, 1); see Introduction n. 142. Śāntarakṣita talks about ‘*gauravamaṇa’* (*Tattvasaṃgraha* 214a); see Introduction § 8.1. And Kamalaśīla states ‘*gaurō ’ham’* (*Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā* ad *Tattvasaṃgraha* 213–214, ed. p. 116, 8); see Introduction § 8.1.

¹¹⁶In this paragraph (118.3 *nanu ... °opapañnā*, see Appendix B), Jitāri follows Samantabhadra literally. Mokṣākaragupta follows Jitāri (almost literally). Mokṣākaragupta changes *kṛṣṇatvam* into *gauratvam* (Tib. *dkar sham nyid*), and inserts a quotation from *Pramāṇavārttikālamkāra*: *yad āha Alaṃkārakāraḥ — aham ity api yaj jñānaṃ tac charīrendriyāṃśavīṭ | ahaṃ kāṇas sukḥī gaurah samānādhārvedanāt | |* [*Pramāṇavārttikālamkāra* st. 744 ad *Pramāṇavārttika* Pratyakṣa° 331cd–333ab] (*Tārkabhāṣā*, ed. Iyengar p. 50, 13–15).

¹¹⁷In the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* Pudgalavādapraṭiśedha, Vasubandhu mentions the metaphor of Self (*ātmopacāra*) as referring to the body. See Introduction § 8.1.

¹¹⁸Kamalaśīla discusses the same example in the *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā* ad *Tattvasaṃgraha* 213–214. See Introduction § 8.1.

¹¹⁹On this concept in Dharmakīrti, see Introduction § 8.1.

¹²⁰See ‘*dī bram ze’i khye’u la seng ge shes pa bzhin du btags par rtog pa yang mi rigs te | gyo ba med pa’i phyir ro | | gyo ba med pa la btags pa bar rtog pa yang mi rigs te | dngos kyi tha snyad rgyun chad par thal ba’i phyir ro | |* (**Sugatamata vibhaṅgabhāṣya*, ed. Shirasaki 1986 p. 40, 3–5) Cf. *na cāyaṃ māṇavake śiṃhapratyaya iva bhāktō yuktah, skhaladvṛtṭiprasaṅgāt |* (*Tārkabhāṣā*, ed. Iyengar pp. 50, 18–51, 1). Jitāri follows Samantabhadra literally. Mokṣākaragupta follows Jitāri almost literally, but does not include the last two sentences.

7.5.1.2 Presence of *Bādhaka*pramāṇas

However, due to the existence of negative proofs, precisely its non-existence is [proven as] logical. For the Self, provided it is there, can have either the nature of consciousness or the nature of non-consciousness. Among these, regarding the first thesis, the undesired consequence of the uselessness of the senses is unavoidable. This is because there is no use for the senses, if there is a permanent Self with the nature of the perception of visual forms and other [sense objects].¹²¹

As for a Self with a nature of non-consciousness, [like the one that is admitted by Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika,] non-cognition contradicts its existence.¹²²

118.6 {No Tib.} To explain: One should treat as inexistent in a certain place a thing that fulfils the conditions of perception, of which there is a non-cognition in that place,¹²³ like a horn on the head of a horse. And (*tu*) there is non-cognition of the Self that fulfils the conditions of perception in the body, etc.¹²⁴

118.7 {No Tib.} [Objection:] The fact of the body, etc., being the substratum of the Self is certainly not admitted by those who uphold the [existence of the Self]. As said [by Uddyotakara]: ‘Or who admits that the

¹²¹Jitāri uses similar arguments, but in a slightly different context. See *bdag ni srog la sogs pa'i rgyu yang ma yin la khyab par byed pa'i rang bzhin yang ma yin pa'i ngo bo zhig yin grang | de la phyogs dang po la ni mig la sogs pa 'bras bu med par thal ba bzlog par dka' ste | 'di ltar gzugs la sogs pa dmigs pa'i bdag nyid can gyi bdag rtag pa yod na | mig la sogs pa la nye bar mkho ba ci yang med la | gang la 'di dag nye bar mkho bar 'gyur ba | bdag shes pa'i ngo bor smra ba rnam la dmigs pa mi rtag pa ni srid pa ma yin no ||* (**Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhāṣya*, ed. Shirasaki 1986 p. 41, 16–21). A similar passage is also found in Mokṣākaragupta. See *kim ca kim ayam ātmā bodharūpaḥ, abodharūpo vā | yadi bodharūpo niyaś ca tadā cakṣurādīvaiphalyaḥprasaṅgo durvārah | athānityo bodharūpas tadā jñānasyaivātmēti nāma kṛtam, na vipratipattiḥ | athābodharūpo drśyaś ca tadānupalambho 'sya sattām na kṣamata iti nirātmasiddhir anavadyā* (*Tarkabhāṣā*, ed. Iyengar p. 51, 7–11).

¹²²Cf. *rtogs pa'i ngo bo ma yin pa'i bdag yod par mi dmigs pas mi bzod de |* (**Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhāṣya*, ed. Shirasaki 1986 p. 42, 33–34)

¹²³For the concept of *anupalabdhi*, see the discussion in the *Pramāṇavārtikasavvyti* in Introduction n. 149.

¹²⁴Cf. *gang zhig gang du dmigs pa'i mtshan nyid du gyur pa ma dmigs pa de ni der med pa'i tha snyad du bya ba yin te | dper na rta'i mgo la rva bzhin no || lus la sogs pa la yang dmigs pa'i mtshan nyid du gyur pa'i bdag ma dmigs pa yin no ||* (**Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhāṣya*, ed. Shirasaki 1986 pp. 42, 35–43, 3).

Self subsists in the body?’ (*Nyāyavārttika ad* 3.1.1, ed. p. 320, 8–9; p. 325, 23).¹²⁵ And, regarding a denial of the [Self] of this sort [(i.e., as subsisting in the body, etc.)], nothing is not admitted [by us Naiyāyikas].

True. We, too, are not denying [the Self as] contained in the [body, etc.], but [we are denying it as] conjunct [with it in one cognition]. For, in all cases, through non-cognition only the refutation of something conjunct¹²⁶ is made, since also a pot, etc., that is negated is conjunct (*samsar-gitvāt*) [in one cognition with an empty space,¹²⁷ and not contained in it].¹²⁸ Moreover, it is not the case that what is conjunct [with something else] is the same as [something] contained [in it]. For, otherwise, since there is not conjunction with a Self that is non-contained [(as you, Naiyāyikas, admit the Self to be)], the body, etc. could not have a Self either.¹²⁹ Furthermore, in our system, the body, etc., is not admitted as being the locus of what is to be denied, but rather [as the locus] of both non-cognition and the treatment as negated. Therefore, there is no logical defect.

[Objection:] This non-cognition [of the Self], first of all, [can]not be the absence of cognition, since the latter is illogical as a *probans* [(i.e., logical reason)]. And it is not the case that [this non-cognition of the

¹²⁵For a discussion of this quotation in the *Nyāyavārttika*, see Introduction § 8.2.

¹²⁶The conjecture *samsargīna eva* (for *evam*, which is the Ms reading) is confirmed by: *ldan pa kho na* (**Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhāṣya*, ed. Shirasaki 1986 p. 43, 7).

¹²⁷With reference to non-cognition in terms of ‘apprehension of another [thing]’ that is ‘conjunct in one cognition’ (*ekajñānasamsargin*), see Introduction § 8.2.

¹²⁸Body, cognitions, feelings, etc., are perceptible, but, in them, the Self is never seen. The theory of non-cognition implied here is such that, being two things conjunct in the same cognition, if they are both real, they should both be perceived. If one is not, then it is established as non-existent there. If the Self were existent, it would be perceived along with the body and mental phenomena. Accordingly, if it is not perceived, it is established as absent when one perceives those.

¹²⁹Here, Samantabhadra is claiming that his opponents, i.e., the Naiyāyikas, (i) must acknowledge that their objection is misplaced and (ii) are bound to admit that the Self and the body/mind are conjunct in one cognition. If the Naiyāyikas respond that they do not admit that the Self is found in the body/mind when the objection relates to their being conjunct, they are missing the point. Being conjunct and being contained cannot be regarded as being one and the same thing. If they were identical, since the Naiyāyikas deny that the Self is contained in the body, they would also have to deny their conjunction. They thus would not be able to explain how the relation between the body and the Self subsists when they say that the cognition ‘I’ has the Self as its object, even though it has the body/mind as its content. Accordingly, since their proof is based on that mental direct perception, it would be refuted that there is a Self for the body/mind. On this, see Introduction § 8.2.

Self] has the nature of the apprehension of another thing conjunct in one cognition, because nothing is conjunct in one cognition with the Self. Moreover, it does not have the nature of the cognition of a thing which is the content of a different cognition, since that would be useless for the establishment of the absence [of something else]. This is because of the undesired consequence that, if [the cognition of one thing] were useful [as proof of the absence of a different thing], [then,] the perception of a sound, too, would be the *probans* of the absence of a visual form. No other [possibility] is given. Therefore, we do not know which nature this non-cognition has.¹³⁰

It is answered: Among these [three theses], we admit only the middle[, i.e., the second,] thesis. For the cognition ‘I’ is postulated by the opponents as having the Self as its object. And that [cognition ‘I’] is experienced very vividly as apprehending the body, etc., as its object-support. Therefore, precisely the body, etc., is conjunct in one cognition with the Self, and another thing, separate from it, is not experienced as being the object of the cognition ‘I’. Hence, it is the non-cognition of the [Self] that is precisely the perception of the [body].

[Objection:] If the referent of [the pronoun] ‘I’, as distinct from the body, etc., were not the object of a cognition, there could not be the [notion] ‘my body’. And this notion does exist. Therefore, the referent of [the pronoun] ‘I’, which is distinct from the body, etc., must be accepted as being indeed cognized. Thus, why is it said ‘it is not apprehended’?¹³¹

This is false. For the notion arises by [provisionally] admitting a difference, albeit [a difference that is] not real, as [in the statement] ‘the body of a statue’.¹³² And perception (*upalambha*) in this case is not barely

¹³⁰This objection appears to be conceived by Samantabhadra as the occasion to define his understanding of non-cognition, in general, and with regard to the Self and the body/mind, in particular. On this, see Introduction § 8.2.

¹³¹Here, the opponent, likely a common Naiyāyika (who loosely refers to Uddyotakara’s words in the *Nyāyavārttika*), argues that ‘my’ in the cognition ‘my body’ is evidence of a cognition of another referent of ‘I’ that is different from the body. When people say ‘my body’, they are thinking of two different referents for two different words. Thus, this is an instance in which the two, Self and body, are cognized as being different. On this, see Introduction § 8.2.

¹³²On a similar note, cf. *yathā svasya svabhāvaḥ, śilāputrakasya śarīram ityādāv asaṅgāpi vāstave bhede buddhiparikalpitaṃ bhedaṃ āśrīya [...]* (*Tattvasaṃgrahaḥ* ad *Tattvasaṃgraha* 389, ed. p. 179, 22–23). And *ci ste dngos po nyid du that dad pa med kyang tha dad pa gzhan spangs pas de tsam shes par ’dod pa’i phyir mchi gu’i lus zhes bya ba bzhin du tha dad par brtags pas ’dzin pas ’gal ba med do zhe na* | (**Vajracchedikāṭīkā*, ed. Saccone forthcoming).

a cognition, rather [perception] is [precisely] a cognition that is admitted as directly perceived.¹³³ And it is not the case that precisely this [cognition, such as ‘my body’,] is a directly perceived cognition, because there is not a distinction from [the case of] the cognition of the difference between the statue and the body, which is not directly perceived. And, [the latter is] (i) because of the undesired consequence that also this [cognition ‘the body of the statue’] would be directly perceived, if this [cognition ‘my body’,] which is non-distinct from it, were directly perceived [as you claim]; and, [accordingly,] (ii) because, if [the cognition ‘the body of the statue’] were directly perceived, it would undesirably follow that it would be part of establishing a separate thing [(i.e., a statue that is different from the body)]. And, just as there is the notion ‘my body, etc.’, similarly, there is also verily the notion ‘my Self’. Therefore, this ‘beloved of gods’, considering another cognition [which is a cognition] of the distinction [of the body] from the referent of the [word-pronoun] ‘I’, as a *pramāṇa*,¹³⁴ ought to regard that [notion ‘the body of a statue’] also as a *pramāṇa*, since there is no difference; and making [the latter] into a *pramāṇa*, he [ought to] establish even another Self.¹³⁵ If one puts that notion [i.e., ‘my self’] into the same group as the notion of the difference between a statue and [its] body, [then,] they ought to put also this kind of notion, i.e., ‘my body, etc.’ [in that group].¹³⁶ Enough is enough. Therefore, this is established: Non-cognition does not endure a Self with a non-sentient nature.

118.8 Therefore, it is established that its inexistence is truly tenable.

¹³³In responding to the objection, the *siddhāntin* takes issue with the assimilation between *pratyaya* and *upalambha*. He argues that they are not the same, since *upalambha* specifically means direct perception, not cognition in general. Moreover, having a notion of Self, which is not direct perception and is conceptual, is not fit for establishing the reality of a Self.

¹³⁴In other words, he considers the cognition ‘my body’ as direct perception.

¹³⁵That is to say, the Self of the Self, in the case of the cognition ‘my self’.

¹³⁶If one considers ‘my self’ as similar to ‘the body of a statue’, that is, as a cognition that arises by provisionally admitting an unreal difference as if it were real, then they should put into that group also the cognition ‘my body’. Accordingly, the latter cannot be considered as proof for the existence of a separate cognition of a referent that is the object of the pronoun ‘I’, which is different from the cognition having the body as its object.

7.5.2 *Refutation of the Innate (sahaja) View of the Self*

118.9 If it is argued: How can the innate belief of an existing person, which is established for all people, be denied? Suspecting this objection, [Jñānapāda] states [the words] beginning with: ‘And, therefore, [also] a Self, etc., in the form [of the pronoun] “I”’ (see 118c). The following is the intended meaning. ‘And’, it is ‘not’ the case, due to the inexistence of all things with the nature of cognizer, cognized, and so on, according to the above-mentioned progression, [that] ‘a [Self, etc.]’, which has the nature of an enduring apprehender, etc.—‘different from the mind’, which has the previously stated nature—‘can be’ (*syāt = sambhavet*) the object of the notion of individuality ‘in the form [of the pronoun] “I”’. ‘Therefore’ (*ataḥ kāraṇāt*), the above-said mind is the object of the sense of individuality. Hence, due to the total inexistence of the Self, there is the falsity of the doctrine of the Self, just as [in the case] of the cognition of hair [(i.e., floaters)], etc. Due to this, it is not even the case that there is no negation of the difference ‘between [things] that have the *svabhāva* of becoming and those that have the *svabhāva* of cessation’ (see 117b) due to the real existence of becoming, since there is no selflessness.

7.6 *Conclusion*

119.0 To establish precisely the above-mentioned non-difference, [Jñānapāda] says [the verse] beginning with ‘since whatever form’.

119. Since whatever form (*rūpa*) [(i.e., thing)] is cognized [by the mind] has exactly that as its own inherent nature (*rūpa*), accordingly, non-difference regarding all things is based on thinking of the non-difference of that [mind].¹³⁷

119.1 {No Tib.} And¹³⁸ ‘whatever’ ‘form’, i.e., thing, ‘is cognized’ by the mind is not established as external to that mind, based on the reasoning that was just stated. Therefore, which ‘inherent nature’ of ‘its’ can

¹³⁷The reconstruction of this verse is even more tentative than it is usually the case. Should the reconstruction turn out to be correct, we might have to emend the commentator’s *nījarūpaṃ* to *nījam eva rūpaṃ*.

¹³⁸The ‘and’ (*ca*) is used here to suggest that this verse is connected to the previous one.

there be, since there is no other [form] different from the form (*rūpa*) that is cognized by the mind? ‘Exactly that’ is the ‘nature’ (*rūpa*), [namely, the one] ‘which’ ‘is cognized’ by the mind. And, based on this, one considers [as follows]: If the difference is not established, [then,] there is the ‘thinking of the non-difference’ ‘of that’ mind ‘that’ thinks of non-difference.¹³⁹ Based on that cause, which is [this] activity of thinking [of non-difference performed by the mind,] the inherent nature is indeed non-different ‘regarding all things’ that are cognized by a mind devoid of difference. Thus, precisely the fact of non-being different for them [(i.e., for all things)] is established according to reasoning.

119.2 Or else [the second interpretation of the verse]: ‘It’ ‘has exactly that as its own inherent nature (*rūpa*)’, that is, the inherent, i.e., ultimately real, nature cognized by wise people [whose minds are] devoid of errors. [The latter nature belongs] to that [form, i.e., thing,] that is cognized conventionally by ordinary people. Since (*yat = yasmāt*), being like this (*evam*), therefore (*tat = tasmāt*), there is ‘non-difference regarding all things’ ‘based on thinking of’, i.e., based on the realization of ‘the non-difference’ for all [things] that have the nature of cessation and the nature of becoming, i.e., of the absence of difference, since they have the same single nature of emptiness.

119.3 {No Tib.} This has been stated:

A single thing has the nature of all things. All things have the nature of a single thing. The [one] who sees a single thing ultimately, ultimately sees all things. (Untraced)¹⁴⁰

The glorious Nāgārjuna, too, stated:

Ultimate reality is not perceived without conventional reality.
Conventional reality is said to be emptiness, for emptiness itself
is conventional reality. (*Bodhicittavaraṇa* 67cd–68ab)

¹³⁹The difference between forms and mind is well-established for ordinary beings because of the imprint of beginningless latent impressions. However, when one’s own mind does not perceive any difference, then there is no difference between things that have the nature of cessation and things that have the nature of becoming.

¹⁴⁰See Sferra 2003, 69.

120.0 To clarify that previous [statement]: ‘And everything cannot be something [different]’ (118a), [Jñānapāda] states [the verse] beginning with ‘since there is a lack of diversity’.

120. Since there is a lack of diversity of both the object that appears [in a cognition] and a different [object of the sense of individuality] that is the subject of conceptualization, and therefore, all [things] are not [different] from each other at all.

120.1 ‘Both’ ‘the object’, which has the nature of visual forms and other [sense objects], ‘that’ ‘appears’, i.e., manifests as the apprehended, ‘and’ ‘a’ ‘different’ object of the sense of individuality, [having] the form of the apprehender, ‘that is’ ‘the subject’, i.e., the basis, ‘of conceptualization’. With reference to both of them, that is, both the apprehended and the apprehender, ‘since there is a lack’ of that which is ‘diversity’—i.e., the fact of being distinct, [in other words,] difference—‘all [things] are not differentiated ‘from each other’. ‘And therefore’, ‘all [things,]’ ‘are not [different] at all’, that is, nothing at all [is different], since, ultimately, they have the nature of nothing but emptiness. However, the difference is only conceptual. This is the intended meaning.

120.2 {No Tib.} Precisely for this reason, the master Dignāga stated:

The mind (*jñāna*) of ordinary beings, which is naturally purified, [can] be expressed by the word ‘buddha’, just as the bodhisattva is [called] ‘the victorious [one]’. (*Prajñāpāramitāpīṇḍārthasaṃgraha* 37)

And precisely because of this, also in the *Paramādyā* it is taught:

All beings have [the nature of] *Tathāgatagarbha*, inasmuch as they are totally identical with the great bodhisattva Samantabhadra. (*Adhyardhasatikā Prajñāpāramitā*, ed. p. 97, 13–14)

120.3 Therefore, ultimately, there is no difference between [all] beings and the Buddha, since being a buddha and not being a buddha are the same; this is because the difference [all beings apprehend] occurs only conventionally. And, being such the case, what was stated, ‘the entire world [...] made perfectly awakened’ (see 109cd), must be understood as logical, because the world is pure by nature. However, due to the practice of ultimate reality (*paramārthābhyāsa*), conceptual construction should

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be purified, since the defect of superimposition of a difference between buddhas and [all beings] is by force of conceptualization. In this way, then, it must be known that the introducing of the entire world that has been made perfectly awakened 'into the self-mantra' (see 109d), and the visualization of the *maṇḍala*-circle, which has everything as [its] nature, into the drop of that are demonstrated. [This is] because, since there are no [external objects that are] cognizable and so on, it is only the own appearance [of the mind] that arises like that [(i.e., with false images of external objects)]. Thus, everything is well established.

III

Appendices

A

Traced Quotations in the Sāramañjarī

NB: (s) means silent quotation, (r) means some kind of reference is given.
For brevity's sake only the Derge print's *loci* are given.

- *Adhyardhaśatikā Prajñāpāramitā* Leumann 1912: 97 (r = *Paramādye*)
- *Abhisamayālamkāra* 5.21 (s), 8.2–6 (s), 8.1 (s), 8.33 (s)
- *Avaiartikacakrasūtra*¹ T240b27-28 (s)
- *Ātmasādhanāvatāra*² D 57v2 (r = *ācāryeṇa*), D 57v2 (s), D 57v2-3 (s), D 57v5 (r = *ātmasādhanāvatāre*), D 57v5 (r = *ācāryeṇa*), D 57v5-6 (r = *ātmasādhanāvatāre*), D 57v6 (r = *ātmasādhanāvatāre*), D 58r1 (s), D 58r1-2 (s), D 58r2-3 (s), D 58r3 (s), D 58r5 (s), D 58r5-6 (s), D 58r6 (r = *ātmasādhanāvatāre*), D 58r6-7 (r = *ācāryeṇa*), D 52v3–53r4 (r = *ātmasādhanāvatāre*), D 53r4–53v5 (r = *Ĵñānaṣādaḥ*), D 57r5 (r = *ātmasādhanāvatāre*), D 57r5-6 (r = *ātmasādhanāvatāre*), D 57r6 (r = *ātmasādhanāvatāre*), D 57r6 (r = *ātmasādhanāvatāre*), D 59r2-3 (s), D 59r3-4 (s), D 59r4-5 (s), D 59r5–60r5 (s), D 53v6–57r4 (s).
- *Guhyatilaka* [but actually *Sarvatathāgatattvasaṃgraha* 1,217,322] (r = *Guhyatilake*), ? (r = *Guhyatilake*)
- *Guhyasamājantra* p. 109, 6-7 & 18-19 (r = *Samāje & tatraiva*), 7.4c (r = *bhagavatā*), p. 5, 2-3 & 4 & 5 (r = *Samāje & tatraiva & tathā*),

¹On this quotation, see Apple 2016.

²Quotations within this work are not pointed out separately.

Traced Quotations in the Sāramañjarī

18.164cd-165ab (r = *aṣṭādaśe*), 18.40 (s), 18.41 (s), 18.42 (s), 18.43 (s), 18.44 (s), 18.50ab (s), 18.51c (s), 18.50cd (s), 18.51a (s), 18.51c (s), 18.53 (s), 18.58 (s), 18.54 (s), 18.59 (s), 18.55 (s), 18.60 (s), 18.56 (s), 18.61 (s), 18.33cd (s), 18.38cd (s), 18.150cd-151 (s), 13.13ab (r = *Śrīsamāje*), 16.32cd-33a (r = *ṣoḍaśapaṭala*°), 7.2-3, 7.8a-9b-3cd-5 (s)

- *Guhyendutilaka* D 39r6-7 (s)
- *Tattvasaṃgraha* 1989–1990 [= **Madhyamakālaṃkārikā* 11–12] (s)
- *Dhātupāṭha* 5.5 (s)
- *Nyāyavārttika* Thakur 1997a: (ad 3.1.1) 320, 8–9 or 325, 23 (s)
- *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā* p. xx (s)
- *Paramādya* D 220v4-5 (r = *Śrīparamādye*), D 242v4-5 (s)
- *Prajñāpāramitāpiṇḍārthasaṃgraha* 37 (r = *ācāryaDignāgena*)
- *Prajñāpāramitāhṛdaya* p. 150 (s)
- *Pramāṇavārttika* Pratyakṣa° 359 (r = *Vārttikakṛtā*), Pratyakṣa° 26abc (r = *ācāryaDharmakīrtinā*), Pratyakṣa° 215 (s), Pratyakṣa° 353 (s), Pratyakṣa° 212 (s), Pratyakṣa° 336 (s), Pratyakṣa° 22 (s), Pratyakṣa° 16b2c (s), *Pramāṇasiddhi*° 211-213 (s)
- *Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra* 377 (r = *Prajñākaraguptena*)
- *Pramāṇaviniścaya* 1.38 (s), 1.23 (r = *bahīrathanaye*)
- *Pramāṇasamuccaya* 1.7ab (s)
- *Bodhicaryāvatāra* 9.1abc (s)
- *Bodhicittavivaraṇa* 67cd–68ab (r = *Nāgārjunapādaiḥ*), 20 (s)
- *Bodhisattvasaṃvaraviṃśikā* 20c (s)
- *Maṇḍalavidhi* 203-204 (s), 6 (r = *Bhadrapādaiḥ*), 9ab (r = *Bhadrapādaiḥ*), 327cd (r = *Bhadrapādaiḥ*), 328 (r = *Bhadrapādaiḥ*), 329-330a (s), 330bcd (s), 331abc (s), 25cd (s), 48 (s), 51 (s), 113 (r = *Bhadrapādaiḥ*), 101a (s)

Traced Quotations in the Sāramañjarī

- *Madhyāntavibhāga* 1.13ab (s), 1.14-15 (s), 1.16 (s), 1.21 (s), 1.18b (s), 1.18c (s), 1.18d (s), 1.19a (s), 1.19b (s), 1.19cd (s), intro to 1.20 (r = *Maitreyeṇa*), 1.20cd (s), 1.17-20 (s), 2.4-8 (s), 2.9 (s), 2.10ab (s)
- *Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya* ad 1.13ab (r = *Bhāṣyam*), ad 1.14-15 (r = *Bhāṣyam*), ad 1.16 (r = *Bhāṣyam*), ad 1.21-22 (r = *Bhāṣyam*), ad 1.17 (r = *ācārya Vasubandhunā*), ad 1.17 (r = *ācārya Vasubandhunā*), ad 1.17 (s), ad 1.17-18 (r = *Bhāṣyākṛtā*), ad 1.18b (r = *Bhāṣyam*), ad 1.18c (r = *Bhāṣyam*), ad 1.18d (r = *Bhāṣyam*), ad 1.19a (r = *Bhāṣyākṛtā*), ad 1.19b (r = *Bhāṣyam*), ad 1.19cd (r = *Bhāṣyam*), ad 1.20cd (r = *Bhāṣyam*), ad 2.4-10ab (s)
- *Mahāyānalakṣaṇasamuccaya*³ §7a (s), §7b (s), §7c (s), §7d (s), §7e (s), §7f (s), §7g (s), §7h (s), §7p (s), §7r (s), §7o (s), §8g (r = *ācāryaḥ*), §7-8 (s), §8a (s), §8c (s), §8d-e (s), §8S (s), §8f (s), D 301r1-4 (s), D 301r-v1 (s), D 301v4-5 (s), §15 (r = *ācāryeṇa*), §4a (s), D 305r3-4 (r = *Mahāyānalakṣaṇasamuccaye*), D 305r4 (r = *Mahāyānalakṣaṇasamuccaye*), D 305r4 (r = *Mahāyānalakṣaṇasamuccaye*), D 305r4-5 (r = *Mahāyānalakṣaṇasamuccaye*)
- *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra* 18.39 (s), 17.39-40 (s), 17.37-38 (s), 17.36ab (s), 17.36cd (s), 18.40 (s), 9.62 (s), 9.61 (s), 9.64 (s), 9.63cd (s), 11.34 (s), 6.8 (s), 9.67-69 (r = *Sūtrālamkāre*), 9.70-71 (r = *Sūtrālamkāre*), 9.72-73 (r = *Sūtrālamkāre*), 9.74-75 (r = *Sūtrālamkāre*), 9.76 (s), 9.14 (s)
- *Mahāyānasūtrālamkārabhāṣya* ad 9.67 (s), ad 9.68-69 (s), ad 9.70-71 (s), ad 9.74-75 (s)
- *Mahāvastu* vol. 3, p. 190, 3-4 (s)
- *Mahāsamayatattva* [lost] (r = *Mahāsamayatattve*)
- *Mahāsāṅghikaprātimokṣasūtra* closing verses 10-11 (r = *āgamavākyasya*)
- *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* 1.6 (r = *pratyaya-parikṣāyām*), 16.9-10 (r = *bandhamokṣa-parikṣāyām*), 25.20 (r = *nirvāṇa-parikṣāyām*), 25.19 (r = *ārya-Nāgārjunapādaiḥ*)

³Paragraph numbers, where the Sanskrit is available, are according to Yonezawa 1998.

Traced Quotations in the Sāramañjarī

- *Yuktiśaṣṭikā* 6 (r = *āryaNāgārjunapādaiḥ*)
- *Ratnāvalī* 1.42 (r = *Ratnāvalyām*)
- *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* 3.83 (s)
- *Vajrasekhara* D 191v7 (s)
- *Vīṃśikā* 12 (s)
- *Śrāvakahūmi* p. 60 (r = *āgamoktena*) or *Samgītisūtra*, q.v.
- *Ślokaṅkārttika* Nirālambanavāda 107cd–108ab (s), Anumānapariccheda 183ab (s)
- *Sambandhaparīkṣā* 3 (s)
- *Samgītisūtra* V.19 (r = *āgamoktena*) or *Śrāvakahūmi*, q.v.
- *Sarvabuddhasamāyogadākinījālaśaṃvara* 5.66 (s)

B

Parallels with Jitāri and Mokṣākaragupta

For Jitāri's **Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhāṣya* we consulted D and Shirasaki's edition published in instalments. We noted and commented only on crucial variants, where the constituted text was not acceptable. For Mokṣākaragupta's *Tarkabhāṣā* we consulted Krishnamacharya 1942 (herein: K) and the superior edition Iyengar 1952 (herein: I); we also kept an eye on the derivative editions of Singh 1985 and Norbu Śāstrī 2004, but did not note their variants.

111.3 atha ... na pratīmaḥ]

**Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhāṣya* (D 42r5–42v2, Shirasaki 1984, 100, 5–21):

ji ste rmi lam la sogs pa'i shes pa'i yang dmigs pa dang bcas pa
kho na ste | yul gzhan la sogs par mthong ba des shes pa'i phyir
ro || de skad du |

rmi lam la sogs shes pa la |
phyi rol med par yod mi 'dod |
kun tu dmigs pa phyi rol te |
yul dus gzhan gyis bdag nyid can ||

zhes gang smras pa yin no || des na khyad par ma grub pa'i phyir
'di ma grub pa'i gtan tshigs yin zhing | dpe yang bsgrub bya sgrub
byed kyi chos ma tshang ba yin no snyam na | de ni mi bden te |
rmi lam la sogs pa shes pa'i dmigs pa mi 'thad pa'i phyir ro || 'di
ltar de 'dzin pa'i ngo bo 'am | dran pa'i ngo bo yin grang na |^a de

^aAccording to Shirasaki, this is an unidentifiable *kārikā*, but now with the source-text available (*tad dhi grahaṇarūpam vā syāt smaraṇarūpam vā*) we can see that the passage is not metrical.

la re zhiḡ 'dzin pa ni ma yin te | 'dzin pa ni sngon gzung ba la mi
ltos pa'i phyir | sngon mthong ba'i yul 'dzin pa'i nges pa med par
'gyur te | mthong ba gzhan bzhin no || rnam par rtog pa med
pa'i phyir dang | da ltar byung ba'i yul can yin pa'i phyir dang |
gsal bar snang ba'i phyir | 'di dran pa'i ngo bor yang brtag pa rigs
pa ma yin no || de'i phyir 'di ji ltar yul gzhan la sogs par mthong
ba'i dngos po'i yul can yin zhes bya ba mi shes so ||

113.1 bāhyam ... upavarṇyate]

**Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhāṣya* (D 40v3; Shirasaki 1984, 96, 5–6):

phyi rol gyi don yang gzhan gyis yon tan dang rdzas la sogs pa'i
bye brag gis rnam pa mang por brtags pa yin la |

• tatra guṇādīnām ... navavidham]

**Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhāṣya* (D 40v3-4; Shirasaki 1984, 96, 7–11):

de la yon tan la sogs pa^a chos rnam kyī rten rdzas yin te | de
bkag pa nyid kyis de dag drungs phyung bar 'gyur bas na gud du
sun dbyung bas brtag par mi bya'o || 'du ba can med na 'du ba
yod pa ma yin pas na de'i sun 'byung ba yang rjes su mi bya'o ||
rdzas kyang sa dang chu dang me dang rlung dang nam mkha'
dang dus dang phyogs dang bdag dang yid ces bya ba rnam pa
dgu yin no ||

Tārkabhāṣā (K 35, 9–13; I 64, 9–14):

na¹ punar asau bāhyo 'rtho 'vayavī, guṇādayo dharmāḥ dravyā-
śrayiṇaḥ parābhimatāḥ, navavidham dravyam paramāṇavo veti |
tatra na tāvad guṇādayaḥ, dravyaṇiṣedhenaiva teṣāṃ niṣedhāt² |
na cāsati samavāyini dravye samavāya iti taddūṣaṇam³ atra⁴ nā-
drīyate | dravyam ca pṛthivy āpas tejo vāyur ākāśam kālo dig ā-
tmā mana iti navavidham |

¹na] I, kaḥ K

²niṣedhāt] I, niṣiddhatvāt K

³taddūṣaṇam] I, dūṣaṇam K

⁴atra] I, api K

^aThis mirrors **guṇādīnām*, substantiating our emendation.

- tatra ... nirākartavyaḥ]

**Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhāṣya* (D 40v4-5; Shirasaki 1984, 96, 11):

de la bdag ni sngar nyid du^a bkag zin to ||

- ākāśaṃ tu ... ekāntaḥ]

**Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhāṣya* (D 40v5-6; Shirasaki 1984, 96, 11–14):

nam mkha' ni sgra'i yon tan can du 'dod la | de yang gcig yin pas
na yul mtshungs pa'i sgra thams cad bye brag tu thos par mi 'gyur
ro || de'i phyir yul thag nye ba bzhin du yul thag ring bar 'dod
pas kyang thos pa'am | yang na gzhan nas kyang ma yin no ||

Tarkabhāṣā (K 36, 4–7; I 66, 1–4):

parais tv ākāśaṃ śabdaguṇam⁵ iṣyate | tac caikam iti⁶ samānade-
śatvāt sarvaśabdānāṃ vibhāgena śravaṇaṃ na syāt | tataḥ saṃ-
nīhitadeśa iva dūradeśābhīmato 'pi śabdaḥ śrūyeta⁷ | na vānyo
'pity ekāntaḥ⁸ |

- dikkālayoś ... °āyogaḥ]

**Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhāṣya* (D 40v6; Shirasaki 1984, 96, 14–15):

phyogs dang dus kyang gcig yin pa'i phyir snga ma dang phyi ma
la sogs pa'i rtogs pa mi 'thad do ||

Tarkabhāṣā (K 36, 7; I 66, 4):

dikkālayoś caikatvāt pūrvāparādi⁹pratyayānupapattiḥ |

- syād etad ... vaiyarthyaṃ]

**Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhāṣya* (D 40v6-7; Shirasaki 1984, 96, 15–20):

⁵°guṇam] K, °guṇakam I

⁶iti] K, iti cet I

⁷śrūyeta] I, pratīyeta K

⁸ekāntaḥ] I, anaikāntikaḥ K

⁹°āparādi°] I, °āpara° K

^aThis is simply because *Jitāri* structured his text differently.

Parallels with Jitāri and Mokṣākaragupta

khyad par du byed pa'i bye brag gis rtogs pa'i dbye ba 'di yin no
zhe na | ci khyad par du byed pa rnam kyis snga ma dang phyi
ma rang las yin nam | 'on te gzhan las yin | phyogs dang po la de
nyid las rtogs pa de grub pa'i phyir de dag don med do || gnyis
pa la ni gal te de de dag nyid las yin na de gcig yin pa'i phyir de
dag mi srid do || gzhan las yin no zhe na | de dag don med pa
gnas skabs de nyid yin no ||

• nityāś ... *kṣamaḥ*]

**Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhāṣya* (D 41r1-2; Shirasaki 1984, 96, 21 – 97, 8):

nam mkha' dang phyogs 'di dag gcig yin zhing | lhan cig byed pa
tshang ba dang ma tshang ba dag gi tshe yang rang bzhin khyad
par med pa yin na | 'ga' zhig kho na'i tshe 'bras bu skyed par ci
ltar 'gyur | de ltar yang |

de dag nus dang nus med pa |
ngo bo nyid kyis gnas pa gang |
rtag phyir bsgyur du med pa la |
gang gis de ni dgag par nus ||

zhes so ||

• anena mano ... *vyomādayaḥ*]

**Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhāṣya* (D 41r2-3; Shirasaki 1984, 97, 8–11):

yid smra ba rnam kyid yid ni gcig shes pa mi skye bas rjes su dpag
par bya ba yin na | gar mkhan la lta ba la sogs pa'i cig car ba'i
shes pa ni nyams su myong ba kho na yin la | de yod na ni 'di
nam yang mi 'thad do || des na nam mkha' la sogs pa ni med pa
kho na'o ||

Tārkabhāṣā (K 36, 7–11; I 66, 5–9):

etena nityasyāpi manaso 'saṃbhava eva | tathā hi — yugapa-
jñānānutpattiyā mano 'numīyate tadvādibhiḥ | anubhūyanta eva
yugapad bahūni jñānāni narttakīdarśanāḍau | yadi punar mano
[nityam]¹⁰ syāt tadānīm etāni jñānāni na yujyante | tasmān nāsty
eva mano 'pi ||

¹⁰mano [nityam] I, manaḥ K

• *prthivyādayo ... prakāśate*]

**Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhāsyā* (D 41r3-5; Shirasaki 1984, 97, 11–18):

sa la sogs pa lhag lus pa yin la | de dag kyang yan lag can dang |
rdul phra rab kyī bye brag rnam pa gnyis su 'dod do || de la rdul
gnyis pa la sogs pa'i rim gyis rdul phra rab rnam kyis brtsams
pa'i bum pa la sogs pa'i yan lag can gang yin pa de ni yod min
te | med pa nyid de | de dmigs pa'i mtshan nyid du gyur pa ma
dmigs pa'i phyir ro ||

de lta de ltar bkod pa yis |
cha rnam nyid ni snang ba yin |
de dang ldan pa cha med pa |
gzhan ni snang ba ma yin nyid ||

Tarkabhāṣā (K 36, 11–17; I 66, 10–17):

prthivyādayo 'vaśiṣyante | te cāvayaviparamāṇubhedena dvidhā
iṣyante | tatra yo 'vayavī ghaṭādih paramāṇubhir dvy¹¹ aṇukādi-
krameṇā¹² rabdhaḥ prasiddhaḥ, tasyopalabdihlakṣaṇaprāptasyā-
nupalambho bādha ity uktam | yady avayavī nāsti katham tar-
hy¹³ ayam ekatvena pratibhāsata iti cet —

bhāgā eva hi bhāsante sanniviṣṭās tathā tathā |
tadvān naiva punaḥ kaścin nirbhāgaḥ sampratīya-
te ||

ity uktam |

• *ekasyāvayavasya ... durnivāraḥ syāt*]

**Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhāsyā* (D 41r5-6; Shirasaki 1984, 97, 19–23):

yan lag gcig kha bsgyur ba'am g.yo ba na | de la 'dus pa de dag
med pas na de la yang kha ma bsgyur ba dang g.yo ba med par
dmigs par 'gyur shing yod na gzhan la yang kha bsgyur ba dang
g.yo ba dang bcas par dmigs par thal ba'i phyir ro || yan lag gcig
bsgribs pa na de la yang ma bsgribs par dmigs par thal shing |
bsgribs na gzhan la yang mi dmigs par thal ba'i phyir ro ||

¹¹dvy°] I, ghy K

¹²°krameṇā°] I, °kramaṇa° K (°ma° offset, perhaps a botched correction)

¹³katham tarhy] I, katham K

• yathā ... iṣyante]

**Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhāṣya* (D 41r6-7; Shirasaki 1984, 97, 23 – 98, 2):

bye brag pa rnams kyi ltar na de dag rtsom par byed pa dang |
bye brag tu smra ba rnams kyi lta ba ltar na dngos su dbang po'i
spyod yul yin pa dang | mdo sde pa rnams kyi ltar na rang gi
rnam pa 'jog par byed pa'i rdul phran gang yin pa de dag kyang
med do ||

Tarkabhāṣā (K 36, 22–24; I 67, 2–5):

ye 'pi tadārambhakāḥ paramāṇavo Vaiśeṣikāṇām, sāksād adhya-
kṣa¹⁴gocarā Vaibhāṣikāṇām darśane, svākārasamarpaṇaprava-
ṇāḥ Sautrāntikāṇām mate, te 'pi Yogācārāṇām darśane¹⁵ na saṃ-
bhavanti |

114.1 yataḥ ... iti]

**Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhāṣya* (D 41r7–41v3, Shirasaki 1984, 98, 2–17):

rdul phra rab ni gcig tu grub pa yod pa ma yin te | steng 'og dang
phyogs bzhi dbus na gnas pa'i rdul phran de nges par cha drug
tu 'gyur ba'i phyir ro || 'di'i shar gyi rdul phran la nye ba'i rang
bzhin gang yin pa de nyid rdul phran gzhan la nye ba mi 'thad
de | de dag yul gcig tu 'gyur ba'i phyir ro || de ltar na shar gyi
rdul phran la nye ba'i rang bzhin gyis gal te rdul phran gzhan la
nye na de yang de na yod par 'gyur ro || 'byar ba med kyang
mngon du phyogs pa tsam la yang tshul 'di nyid yin no || des na
gong bu rdul phra rab tsam du 'gyur ba yin te |

'byar dang yul gzhan gnas pa dang |
bar med rnam par gnas kyang rung |
dbus gnas rdul phran rdul gcig la |
lta ba'i rang bzhin gang yin pa |
rang bzhin gzhan la lta ba yang |
gal te de nyid yin rtog na |
de lta yin na ri la sogs |
bsags pa rigs pa ma yin no ||

zhes gang bshad pa yin no ||

¹⁴adhyakṣa°] I, akṣi° K

¹⁵darśane] I, mate K

114.2 tasmād ... itī]

**Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhāṣya* (D 41v3-5, Shirasaki 1984, 98, 17 – 99, 6):

de'i phyir gdon mi za bar de dag rang bzhin tha dad par khas
blangs dgos so || de dag ji lta ba de kho na bzhin du byang dang |
lho dang | steng dang | 'og gi rdul phra rab nye ba'i rang bzhin
rnams tha dad pas na | rdul phra rab cha drug nyid nan gyis thob
bo || de skad du |

drug gis cig car sbyar ba na |
phra rab rdul cha drug tu 'gyur |
drug po go gcig yin pa'i phyir |
gong bu rdul phran tsam du 'gyur ||

zhes gsungs so ||

114.3 na ... paramāṇavaḥ]

**Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhāṣya* (D 41v5, Shirasaki 1984, 99, 6–7):

gcig ma grub pa na du ma 'grub pa ma yin pas na | rdul phra rab
rnams med pa yin no ||

114.4 *mīmāṃsakaiś* ... *dūṣaṇam*]

**Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhāṣya* (D 41v5-6, Shirasaki 1984, 99, 7–9):

spyod pa pa rnams rdul phra rab nges par 'dod pa ma yin pas na |
rdul phra rab sun phyung pa tsam gyis yan lag can bkag pa yin
pas na gud du de sun 'byin pa don med pa yin no ||^a

114.5 astu tarhi ... na vidmaḥ]

**Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhāṣya* (D 46v6–47r4; Shirasaki 1985, 101, 10 – 102,
10):

rnam par shes pa 'di ni gcig dang du ma dang bral ba yin la | des
na 'di nam mkha'i chu skyes bzhin du don dam pa yin par mi rigs
so || sbyor ba ni gang gcig dang du ma'i rang bzhin dang bral
ba de ni don dam par yod pa ma yin te | dper na nam mkha'i

^aNote that the line from the *Ślokaṅkārttika* was not recognized as metrical and that the *na* was either not translated or was lost in transmission.

padma bzhin no || rnam par shes pa 'di yang gcig dang du ma'i
rang bzhin dang bral ba yin no zhes bya ba ni khyab par byed pa
mi dmigs pa'o || gtan tshigs 'di ma grub pa ni ma yin te | rnam
par shes pa rnam pa dang bcas pa yin na phyi rol gyi don bzhin
du gcig dang du ma'i rang bzhin dang mi ldan par gsal ba'i phyir
te | gang la 'jig rten gyis phyi rol gyi don du tha snyad 'dogs pa de
kho na shes pa rnam pa dang bcas par smra ba'i shes pa yin no ||
de'i phyir de phyi rol yin na gnod byed yod pa gang yin pa de kho
na nang yin na yang yod do || gnod byed kyes ni rags pa gcig yin
pa'am | rdul phra rab kyi rang bzhin du ma yin pa sel la | rnam
par shes pa'i bdag nyid du gyur pa'i rnam pa 'di yang gal te rags
pa gcig yin pa'am | gal te rdul phran du tha dad pa'i du ma yin
grang na | rnam pa gnyi ga ltar yang phyi rol gyi don gyi phyogs
la yod pa'i sun 'byin pa bsal bar mi nus so || gang gis de ma yin
na mi 'byung ba sun 'byin pa ni rnam par shes pa de'i phyi rol
yin pa'i rgyu mtshan can ma yin no || lus kyi rgyu mtshan can
gyi gnod byed lus med pa rnam par shes pa'i bdag nyid la med do
zhes bya ba yang snying po med pa yin te | rnam pa dang bcas
pa yin na rnam par shes pa yang lus can yin pa'i phyir ro || yul
rgyas pa dang bcas pa'i rnam pa 'di nyid lus yin na | 'di phyi rol
yin na lus zhes bya'o || shes pa yin na ni ma yin no zhes bya ba'i
ming dang ming can gyi 'brel pa 'di kho bo cag gis dus 'di tsam
gyi bar du ma rig go ||

Tarkabhāṣā (K 38, 21 – 39, 2; I 70, 14 – 71, 8):

prayogaḥ punar evam — yad ekānekasvabhāvaṃ na bhavati na
tat paramārthasat, yathā vyomakamalam, ekānekasvabhāvaṃ ca
na bhavati vijñānam iti vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ | na tāvad ayam¹⁶
asiddho hetuḥ | sākāre vijñāne¹⁷ bahirartha ivaikānekasvabhā-
vāyogyatvasya¹⁸ parisphuṭatvāt | yatra hi lokasya bāhyārthavya-
vahāras tad eva sākāravādino jñānam | tato yat tasya bahirbhā-
ve bādhakaṃ¹⁹ tad evāntarbhāve 'pi²⁰ | bādhakena²¹ hi sthūlam
ekam anekaṃ ca paramāṇurūpam apohyate²² | vijñānātmakā-
nām ayam²³ ākāro yady ekaḥ sthūlo yadī vānekaḥ paramāṇuśo

¹⁶tāvad ayam] I, tāvad K

¹⁷vijñāne] K, jñāne I

¹⁸°āyogyatvasya] I, °āyogyasya K

¹⁹bādhakaṃ] I, bhāvabādhakaṃ K

²⁰'pi] I, 'pīti K

²¹bādhakena] K, bādhakam | na I

²²apohyate] K, apīṣyate I

²³vijñānātmakānām ayam] I, vijñānātmakaś cāyam K

bhinna ubhayathāpi bāhyārthabhāvi²⁴ dūṣaṇam aśakyam uddhartum | na hi tad vijñāne²⁵ bahirbhāvanibandhanaṃ dūṣaṇaṃ yena tadbhāvena²⁶ bhavet | mūrti²⁷ nimittaṃ bādhakaṃ nāmūrte vijñānātmanity api nihsāram | sākāratāyāṃ vijñānasyāpi²⁸ mūrtatvāt | ayam eva hi deśavitānavā(n ākāro)²⁹ mūrtir iti ||

114.6 syān matam ... yujyate]

**Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhāṣya* (D 47r4–47v1; Shirasaki 1985, 102, 12–103, 1):

'di snyam du gang dag gi ltar na rnam par shes pa rnam pa dang ldan pa de dag la skyon 'di yod kyi | gang dag gis phyogs rnam pa dang bral ba'i rtog pa tsam de kho na yin pa de dag la gcig dang du ma'i rang bzhin dang bral ba 'di ma grub pa'i lam la gnas par ji ltar mi 'gyur zhe na | brjod pa 'di rnam par shes pa ni gsal ba'i bdag nyid yin la | de dag gi gsal ba'i sngon po la sogs pa las ma gtogs pa'i gsal ba ni rmi lam na yang myong ba med do || sngon po la sogs pa mi bden pa yin pa^a gzhan rnam par shes pa de lhag lus pa ci yod | ji ste 'dir sngon po la sogs pa snang ba na dus mnyam du nang gi bde ba la sogs pa myong ba yin la | de la bsnyon na ni mi bsnyon pa zhes bya ba cung zad kyang med do ||

114.7 astitvaniṣedhān ... kalpayet || iti]

**Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhāṣya* (D 61r1–2; Shirasaki 1985, 129, 13–19):

yod pa bkag pa nyid kysis med par 'dod pa yin no zhe na | ma yin te | med pa ni yod pa sngon du 'gro ba yin pa'i phyir ro || de ma grub na de yang mi 'grub pa'i phyir ro || med pa yod pa'i zlas drangs te || yod pa med pa'i zlas drangs yin || de phyir med par mi brjod cing || yod par yang ni mi brtag go || zhes bcom ldan 'das kysis gang gsungs pa'o ||

²⁴bāhyārthabhāvi K, bāhyārthapakṣabhāvi° I

²⁵tad vijñāne] (or: tadvijñāne) I, tad vijñānaṃ (or: tadvijñānaṃ) K

²⁶tadbhāvena] I, tadabhāvena K

²⁷mūrti°] I, mūrta° K

²⁸vijñānasyāpi] I, jñānasyāpi K

²⁹°vitānavā(n ākāro)] I, °cittānām ākāro K

^ami bden pa yin pa] CD, mi bden na bden pa P (accepted by Shirasaki)

118.2 tatra prathame ... upapadyate]

**Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhāṣya* (D 9v7–10r1 & 10r3–6; Shirasaki 1986, 39, 8–10 & 40, 5–14):

'di ltar re zhig bdag sgrub par byed pa'i tshad ma ni yod pa ma yin no || mngon sum gyis ni bdag rtogs pa ma yin te | mig la sogs pa'i shes pa ni gzugs la sogs pa'i yul lngar nges pa'i phyir dang | [...] rjes su dpag pas rtogs pa yang ma yin te | rang bzhin dang 'bras bu'i^a rtags pa med pa'i phyir ro ||^b rtag tu lkog tu gyur cing yul dang dus su ldog pa med pa'i bdag dang 'ga' yang rjes su 'gro ba dag ldog pa'i bdag nyid can gyi rgyu dang 'bras bu'i ngo bo ma grub pas na 'bras bu'i rtags mi 'thad pa'i phyir dang | chos can yod pa nyid ma grub pas na rang bzhin gyi rtags mi 'thad pa'i phyir ro || gang gis rjes su dpog par 'gyur ba yod par sgrub par dbang ba'i rtags gzhan yang yod pa ma yin la | rtags gzhan yod na yang bsgrub byas khyab par 'gyur dgos la | de ni 'gar yang ma grub pas na khyab par byed pa nyid du ma nges pa'i phyir | gang du yang gang gis kyang gang yang des khyab par nges par mi 'gyur bas na 'di la rtags 'ga' yang med do ||

Tarkabhāṣā (K 27, 24–26 & 28, 3–9; I 50, 9–11 & 51, 1–6):

etac cāyuktam | ātmanah siddhaye pramāṇābhāvāt | na hi pratyakṣeṇātmā pratīyate, cakṣurādījñānānām rūpādiviṣayapañcaka³⁰ niyatatvāt | [...] nāpy anumānena pratīyate, kāryasvabhāvaliṅgābhāvāt, nityaparokṣeṇa³¹ deśakāla³² vyatirekavikalenātmanā saha kasyacid anvayavyatirekāt makakāryakāraṇabhāvāsiddheḥ kāryaliṅgāyogāt, dharmisattāyāś cāsiddhatvāt³³ svabhāvaliṅgānupapatteḥ | na cānyal liṅgam asti | anyenāpi liṅgena bhavatā sādhyavyāptena bhavitavyam | tasya ca sarvathāsiddheḥ katham tena³⁴ vyāptatvaṃ liṅgasya niścīyatām |

³⁰°viṣayapañcaka°] I, °pañcaviṣaya° K

³¹°parokṣeṇa] I, °parokṣeṇa ca K

³²deśakāla°] K, deśakālākāra° I

³³°sattāyāś cāsiddhatvāt] I, °sattāyā asiddhatvāt K

³⁴katham tena] I, katham K

^aIt is unclear why the compound was translated inverted.

^bThe sentence should not end here, understand **phyir dang*.

118.3 nanu ... °opapannā]

**Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhāṣya* (D 10r1-2; Shirasaki 1986, 39, 10 – 40, 3):

bdag tu rtog pa'i yid kyi shes pa'i yul yang lus la sogs pa yin pa'i
phyir ro || bdag dkar sham mo bdag sbom mo bdag 'gro'o snyam
pa la sogs pa'i rnam pas bdag tu shes pa 'byung la | lus las tha dad
pa 'di la ni lus de'i chos dkar sham nyid dang sbom pa nyid yod pa
ma yin shing | khyab byed lus can ma yin pa la lus can gyi rdzas
kyi rjes su 'brang ba'i 'gro ba'i bya ba 'thad pa dang ldan pa yang
ma yin no ||

Tarkabhāṣā (K 27, 26–28 & 28, 1–2; I 50, 11–13 & 16–17):

mānasasyāpy ahaṃpratyayasya śarīrādiviṣayatvāt | gauro 'haṃ
sthūlo 'haṃ gacchāmy aham ityādyākāreṇāhaṃpratyaya³⁵ utpa-
dyate | [...] na cāsyā śarīravatiriktasya taddharmo³⁶ gauratvaṃ
sthūlatvaṃ vā | na ca vibhor amūrtasya mūrtadravyānuvidhāyini
gamana³⁷ kriyā yuktimatī |

118.4 na cāyaṃ ... °prasaṅgāt]

**Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhāṣya* (D 10r2-3; Shirasaki 1986, 40, 3–5):

'di bram ze'i khye'u la seng ge zhes pa bzhin du btags par rtog
pa yang mi rigs te | gyo ba med pa'i phyir ro || gyo ba med pa
la btags par rtog pa yang mi rigs te | dngos kyi tha snyad rgyun
chad par thal ba'i phyir ro ||

Tarkabhāṣā (K 28, 2–3; I 50, 18 – 51, 1):

na cāyaṃ³⁸ māṇavake siṃhapratyaya iva³⁹ bhākto yuktaḥ, skha-
ladvṛttiprasaṅgāt |

³⁵ ityādyākāreṇāhaṃpratyaya] I, ityādinā kāraṇenāhaṃpratyaya K

³⁶ taddharmo] (or tad dharmo) I, dharmo K

³⁷ gamana°] I, gamanādi° K

³⁸ na cāyaṃ] I, nāpy ayaṃ K

³⁹ °pratyaya iva] I, °pratyayavat K

118.5 tataḥ ... bād hate]

Tarkabhāṣā (K 28, 9–13; I 51, 7–11):

kiṃ⁴⁰ ca, kim ayam ātmā bodharūpaḥ, abodharūpo vā | ya-
di bodharūpo nityaś ca tadā cakṣurādivaiphalyaprasaṅgo durvā-
raḥ | athānityo bodharūpas tadā⁴¹ jñānasyaivātmeti nāma kṛ-
tam, na⁴² vipratipattiḥ | athābodharūpo⁴³ dṛśyaś⁴⁴ ca tadānupa-
lambho 'sya sattāṃ na kṣamata iti nirātma⁴⁵ siddhir anavadyā |

118.6 tathā hi ... śarīrādāv iti]

**Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhāṣya* (D 11r5, Shirasaki 1986, 42, 35 – 43, 3):

gang zhig gang du dmigs pa'i mtshan nyid du gyur pa ma dmigs
pa de ni der med pa'i tha snyad du bya ba yin te | dper na rta'i
mgo la rwa bzhin no || lus la sogs pa la yang dmigs pa'i mtshan
nyid du gyur pa'i bdag ma dmigs pa yin no ||

118.7 nanu śarīrādyadhikaraṇatvam ... na sahata iti]

**Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhāṣya* (D 11r5–12v3, Shirasaki 1986, 43, 3 – 44, 3):

'o na lus la sogs pa bdag gi rten du smra ba rnam mi 'dod pa nyid
ma yin nam | gang gi lus la bdag yod min | zhes gang smras pa
yin te | de lta bur gyur pa de bkag pa na mi 'dod pa ci yang med
do zhe na | bden te | kho bo cag gis kyang 'dir brten pa yin pa
dgag par bya ba ni ma yin gyi | 'on kyang bstan pa^a yin no ||
thams cad du yang mi dmigs pas ldan pa kho na dgag par bya ba
kho na yin te | dgag par bya ba bum pa la sogs pa yang ldan pa
yin pa'i phyir ro || brten pa kho na ni ldan pa ma yin te | brten
pa ma yin pa dang de lta bu yod pa'i phyir ro || de lta ma yin
na brten pa ma yin pa'i bdag dang ldan pa'i^b phyir lus la sogs pa
bdag dang bcas par yang mi 'gyur ro || 'dir lus la sogs pa dgag

⁴⁰kiṃ] I, api K

⁴¹tadā] I, tadānīm K

⁴²na] I, na kāpi K

⁴³°rūpo] I, °svarūpo K

⁴⁴dṛśyaś] I, 'dṛśyaś K

⁴⁵nirātma°] I, nirātmaka° K

^aFor *bstan pa* read with P: *ldan pa*.

^bFor *ldan pa'i* read with P: *ldan pa med pa'i*.

bya'i rten du gzung ba ni ma yin gyi | 'on kyang dmigs pa dang
med pa'i tha snyad dag gi rten yin pas na skyon med do ||

'o na mi dmigs pa 'di re zhig dmigs pa med pa ma yin te | de sgrub
par byed pa nyid du mi 'thad pa'i phyir ro || shes pa gcig la 'dre
ba'i dngos po gzhan dmigs pa'i rang bzhin yang ma yin te | bdag
dang shes pa gcig la 'dre ba gang yang med pa'i phyir ro || shes
pa tha dad pa dmigs pa'i dngos po dmigs pa'i rang bzhin yang ma
yin te | de med par sgrub pa la mi mkho ba'i phyir ro || nye bar
mkho na ni sgra dmigs pas kyang gzugs med pa sgrub par thal
ba'i phyir ro || rnam pa gzhan yang yod pa ma yin te | de bas
na mi dmigs pa 'di ci'i bdag nyid yin pa mi shes so zhe na | brjod
pa | phyogs bar ma nyid kho bo cag gi 'dod pa yin te | bdag tu
shes pa ni bdag gi yul can du pha rol gyis btags pa yin la | de yang
lus su gtogs pa yin la dmigs bzhin du shin tu gsal bar myong ste |
de'i phyir lus la sogs pa nyid bdag dang shes pa gcig la 'dre ba yin
shing | bdag gi shes pa'i yul du gyur pa de las tha dad pa ni nyams
su myong ba med pas na lus de dmigs pa kho na de mi dmigs pa
yin no ||

gal te lus la sogs pa las tha dad pa'i bdag gi don can gyi shes pa'i
yul med pa na | bdag gi lus la sogs pa zhes bya bar mi 'gyur la |
shes pa 'di ni yod pa yin te | de bas na bdag gi don can ni lus
la sogs pa las tha dad par rtogs par blta bar bya'o || des na ma
dmigs so zhes ci'i phyir brjod ce na | de ni mi bden te | tha dad
pa med kyang mngon par zhen pa'i shes pa skye ba'i phyir te |
dper na mchi gu'i lus shes^a bya ba bzhin no || 'dir dmigs pa shes
pa tsam yang ma yin gyi | 'on kyang mngon sum du 'dod pa'i shes
pa yin la | 'di nyid kyang mngon sum gyi shes pa ma yin te | mchi
gu'i lus las gzhan pa'i shes pa mngon sum ma yin pa dang khyad
par med pa'i phyir dang | de dang khyad par med pa'i mngon
sum yin na de yang mngon sum du thal ba'i phyir ro || mngon
sum yin na yang dngos po tha dad par rnam par 'jog pa'i yan lag
tu thal ba'i phyir ro || ji ltar bdag gi lus la sogs pa'o snyam du
shes pa de bzhin du nga'i bdag go snyam du yang 'gyur ba kho
na ste | des na 'di ni lha rnam dga' ba yin no ||^b bdag gi don
can las tha dad pa'i shes pa gzhan tshad mar byed na khyad par
med pa'i phyir 'di yang tshad mar bya bar 'os la | tshad mar byed
na yang bdag gzhan yang rnam par gzhan par 'gyur ro || ji ste
nga'i lus la sogs pa'o snyam pa'i shes pa 'di mchi gu'i lus las tha
dad pa'i rtogs pa'i phyogs su 'jog na ni | de lta na bdag kyang 'jog
par 'gyur te | mangs pas bzhag go || des rtogs pa'i bdag nyid ma

^aInstead of *shes*, read with D and C: *zhes*.

^bThis sentence was completely misunderstood by the translators.

Parallels with Jitāri and Mokṣākaragupta

nyin pa'i bdag mi dmigs pas mi bzod do zhes bya ba ni gnas pa
yin no ||

C

Samantabhadrasādhana 109–129

Since Samantabhadra refers to lemmata from v. 127 in his commentary to v. 109, in this appendix we present, in addition to the *mūla* vv. 109–120 as we believe it may have looked, the reconstruction of the following nine verses for the sake of reference. We feel fairly confident about the reconstruction, save for *tasya ca* in 125b. Also note that the only way to reconstruct 128b is if *śr* does not make position, i.e. the preceding *jra* must be read as short. As in the case of vv. 109–120, our sources were the *Sāramañjarī* in the Pāla manuscript and the two Tibetan translations. Bhadrāpāda's *Maṇḍalavidhi* (vv. 102–105) was also of some help. We hope to deal with the commentary for the remainder in detail in a future publication. We also eagerly hope that the Tibet Museum manuscript (see General introduction n. 4) will become available in the near future, so that we can check whether our reconstruction was plausible.

*parito nirastavibhramam
*anantaḥdraśminirmitamunīndraih |
*saṃbuddhikṛtam akhilam
*jagad antarbhāvya nijamantre || 109

*rūpādyākṛtimuktam
*pratyakṣeṇekṣyate na tadgrāhi |
*grāhyam na cāpi kiṃcit
*saṃbandhānīkṣaṇān na cānyena || 110

*vyāpāraḥ sātāder
*na kaścid etatparigrahe dṛṣṭaḥ |
*yugapatpratīyamānam
*rūpādivad eva na grāhī || 111

*dṛṣṭam ca yat sitādyam
*tad eva kālāntareṣu dṛṣṭam na |
*anyo'nyena virodhād
*anayoḥ sātādivan nityam || 112

*ekam na ca rūpāder
*ādyantādiprabhedato dṛṣṭeḥ |
*paramānuṣo 'py adṛṣṭer
*anekarūpaṃ na bhavati tadvac ca || 113

*niravayavatve cāṇor
*anekaparamāṇuparīkarābhāvāt |
*bhūmaṇḍalādirūpa-
*pracayo na hi kaścīd atra syāt || 114

*tad grāhakādivirahāt
*svatantrarūpādikalpanārūpaṃ |
gandharvanagarasaṃnibham
akhilam sacarācaram vastu || 115

*ātmātmīyāropād
*vikalpasantāna eṣa saṃsārah |
*śuddhis tadviparīta-
*svarūpamātrā tu vijñeyā || 116

*na ca kaścīd atra bhedo
*dharimatayā śamabhavasvabhāvānām |
*grāhyādyākṛtīvirahaḥ
*sarvatra yataḥ sadā siddhaḥ || 117

*sarvaṃ na cāpi kimcit
*tatpratibhāsasvabhāvasaṃkalpāt |
*na ca cittād anyah syād
*aham iti kaścīd ata ātmādiḥ || 118

*yad rūpaṃ pratipannaṃ
*tasya tad eva nijam eva rūpaṃ yat |
*tat tasyābhedamater
*abhinnatā sarvabhāvānām || 119

*ābhāti yaś ca viśayo
*yaś cānyaḥ kalpanāspadaṃ kaścīd |
*tattadviyogavirahād
*anyo'nyam ataś ca no sarvam || 120

*śraddhāvīryaviśuddhyā
*tathā smṛtisamādhayor viśuddhyāpi |
*saddvārapālarūpa-
*prajñāśuddhyā samastaviṣayābham || 121

*animittarativiśuddheḥ
*samastadevīgaṇasvabhāvaṃ tat |
*sattvārthātmavikalpa-
*pravṛttivijñānaśuddhes tat || 122

*ādarśādimano'mala-
*rūpatvāt sarvabuddharūpaṃ ca |
*tathatāviśuddhiyogāt
*cakreśatayā vyavasthitaṃ caitat || 123

*rūpādibhramavirahād
*amalaskandhādibhāvasaṃsiddham |
*mātsaryādinivṛtteḥ
*pāramitābhūmiśukladharmamayam || 124

*avikalpasvaparodaya-
*nibandhanatvena tasya ca kramataḥ |
*gambhīrodāratayā
*prajñopāyātmakaṃ cetah || 125

*paramārthatas tv abhinnaṃ
*nābhinnaṃ kiṃcid iṣyate 'nyasmāt |
*anyagrahavinivṛttes
*tathāpratīter na citratvam || 126

*ity ākalayya nijahr̥di
*nirmalacandrasthacihnamadhyastham |
*sanmantrabindurūpaṃ
*svamanaḥ paribhāvayed bhāsvat || 127

*taccittaraśmimālāṃ
*prabodhya vākkāyavajraśreṣṭhatanum |
*punar atraiva niviṣṭāṃ
*jñānāmṛtavāhinīṃ dhyāyāt || 128

*antastanum atha sarvām
*avabhāsyā tayā samantato 'nantaiḥ |
*pratiromaṇprabhavābhā-
*vyūhair āpūrayan viśvam || 129

D

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E

Indices

The three indices contain technical terms (including schools of thought, etc.), proper names (classical and modern, including toponyms, dynasties, etc.), and titles (of scriptural and non-scriptural texts as well as exegetical categories) in English alphabetical order.

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