

## CHAPTER 27

---

# ALLIES AND FOES (II)

## *Politicians without transmitted speeches*

---

LUIGI GALLO

THERE is no doubt that in fourth-century Athens a professionalization of politics took shape: the politically active, the so-called *rhêtores*, were a rather small group of wealthy citizens who frequently took the initiative of promoting laws and decrees, initiated legal proceedings against rivals, and were equipped with the adequate rhetorical skills to convince the *dêmos* in the Assembly or with specific expertise in the financial field (Hansen 1991: 268–87, 2014). And yet, in the period of Demosthenes' activity, from the 350s, Athenian politicians are, as Cawkwell (1963: 47) said, 'a shadowy lot', and the references we find in Demosthenes' and Aeschines' speeches are often the sole evidence in our possession. Therefore, unsurprisingly, the political action of these politicians and the composition and orientation of the respective groups are often subject to conflicting interpretations. As regards the characteristics of these groups and their definition, there is a lively debate among scholars, but it is widely recognized that they were not political parties in the modern sense: they can be better understood if we refer to them as pressure or interest groups, that form around an influential leader and are often based on family relationship and friendship but are also characterized by fluid ties and by the lack of an organizational structure (Strauss 1986: 15–31; Mitchell 1996: 11–21; Hansen 1991: 277–87). Consequently, the reconstructions based on too schematic modern categories (like the presumed opposition between 'radicals' or 'patriots', pursuing a policy of military engagement, and 'moderates' or 'pacifists', promoters of a conservative and peaceful policy) do not always prove to be sufficiently substantiated.

## EUBULUS AND HIS ALLIES

---

At least, we have some more information on one of these politicians, Eubulus: he was surely among the protagonists of the political scene of the 350s and 340s, as is already

clear from Demosthenes' frequent and often inimical hints (especially in the speeches *Against Meidias* and *On the False Embassy*), and as is suggested by Theopompus, who includes him among the most distinguished Athenian *dêmagôgoi* (*FGrH* 115 F 99). The beginnings of his activity are not well known (we know only that he was one of the nine archons in 370/69: *SEG* 19:133.4) and it is not certain whether he was close to Isocrates and to Callistratus, one of the chief politicians of this period, as a widespread opinion suggests, nor if he took part in the signing of the peace of 355.<sup>1</sup>

On the other hand, there is no doubt about his pre-eminence in Athenian politics from the mid-350s onwards, and it is also certain that his pivotal position was related to the role he played in the administration of the *theôrikon*. From a certain point this fund started, perhaps on his initiative, giving leverage over the control of Athenian finances. By virtue of his role, which he held for quite a long period and in which he put forward initiatives that have a lot in common with the ones Xenophon suggests in the *Poroi*, Eubulus contributed significantly to the recovery of the financial situation and also initiated a challenging programme of public works. The mocking allusion by Demosthenes (3.29) suggests that this programme must have helped to further enhance his prestige among the *dêmos*. His policies, marked by prudence and pragmatism, but also focused on the defence of Athens' vital interests, do not lend themselves to a too strict definition. On the one hand, his opposition to an 'imperialistic' policy seems beyond doubt; on the other hand, it is true that Eubulus, as Cawkwell and others have pointed out, cannot be classified as a 'pacifist' in the same way as, for example, the orator Isocrates—given the part he played in the intervention in Euboea in 348 (the protagonists of which were his friend Phocion and his cousin Hegesileos). Moreover, the net increase in the Athenian naval power that occurred in the period in question can be considered a result of his initiatives (the creation of the *skeuothêkê*, the arsenal for the rigging of the fleet, is significant in this context). As regards one presumed proof of his pacifism, that is, a law laying down the death penalty for those who proposed to use money from the theoric fund for military purposes, Harris has convincingly shown that the existence of this law is far from certain: in fact, it is inferred only from a reference in Libanius' *hypothesis* to the *First Olynthiac* (*Arg.D.* 1.10), which, in addition, is contradicted by contemporary sources (Harris 2006: 121–39). But judging from his stand against Philip II of Macedon, the label of philo-Macedonism that is often assigned to him seems equally inadequate: in fact, soon after the fall of Olynthus in 348/7 (or in 347/6 at the latest) he tried to forge a coalition of Greek states to oppose the king (a proposal referred to by Demosthenes at 19.304 with sarcasm, which, as Buckler 2000: 117 observed, suggests 'envy because the idea was not his'). It is again Demosthenes (19.292) who throws light on a speech Eubulus delivered in 346, in which he cursed Philip, and on a decree he proposed in 340 in response to the capture of Athenian grain-ships by the Macedonian king (18.73, an indication that he must still have been quite influential at that time).

From Demosthenes' statements, as well as those of Aeschines, we can also infer the existence of a fairly coherent and committed group of friends and supporters of

<sup>1</sup> For the political events see also Chapter 10 this volume.

Eubulus. In addition to Aeschines (who in the trial of 343 states that Demosthenes had made the policies of Eubulus, *Euboulou politeumata*, his actual charge: Aeschin. 2.8); Phocion, Hegesileos, and Meidias are part of that group. Eubulus apparently did not shrink from defending Meidias against Demosthenes' prosecution in 348 (21.205-7), and he did not fail to intervene after Hegesileos was convicted in court (19.290). This confirms the existence of bonds of solidarity within the group. Another member of this group may have been Cephisophon of Aphidna, who is known as a general in a military expedition to Sciathus (a particular which has been viewed as a proof of his activity in a presumed 'patriotic' party: Glotz 1932). He was also the administrator of the *theôrikon* in 343/2 (IG ii<sup>2</sup> 223), at a time when (judging from the references in Demosthenes' and Aeschines' *Embassy* speeches) Eubulus certainly had an important role in the political scene of Athens.

## DIOPHANTUS

---

Another prominent politician often associated with Eubulus is Diophantus of Sphettus, whose claim to political importance is supported both by his role in the expedition to Thermopylae in 352 (19.84, 86) and, in particular, by Demosthenes' reference identifying him as one of the powerful (*ischyroi*) citizens, along with Callistratus and Aristophon (19.297). However, there is in fact more doubt than certainty: it is not entirely sure whether he belonged to the group of Callistratus, a fact which is usually assumed on the basis of his identification with the proposer of two honorary decrees (IG ii<sup>2</sup> 106, 107.7-34 = Tod 135 and RO 31.i, from 367; moreover, in the first the name is restored). As regards the link with Eubulus, nothing can be inferred from the often-cited joint mention of the two in Dem. 20.137, which does not seem to imply political collaboration (Canevaro 2009: 130-3). It is true that he was administrator of the *theôrikon* (perhaps as Eubulus' immediate predecessor, judging by the order of schol. Aeschin. 3.24) and this might suggest a political affinity; but it is also possible, as pointed out by Sealey (1993: 118), that Diophantus was rather 'a leading figure in his own right than a mere associate of Eubulus'. In fact, if there is an affiliation that we can identify with some likelihood, it is rather with the group of Androtion. For we learn from Harpocration (μ18) that Diophantus was related by marriage to Melanopus; Melanopus was part of Androtion's group and he is also, it should be remembered, a known opponent of Callistratus (Arist. *Rh.* 1374b25-6; Plut. *Dem.* 13.3).

## ANDROTION

---

The said Androtion, the famous atthidographer, but also an orator and politician (the *Suda* even calls him *rhêtôr kai dêmagôgos*), is another prominent figure. In 355/4 he was

the target of Demosthenes' first *graphê* (Dem. 22), though later they apparently worked together. He was already active in the early 380s and still quite influential in the period in question (cf. e.g. Demosthenes' affirmation that he, with others, had the *boulê* under his control: 22.38). The lively modern debate on, and the broad range of proposed interpretations of, his political alliances demonstrates that in his case, too, little is certain: some think that Androtion was a follower of the 'radical' Aristophon, because he would support those financial austerity measures issued after the Social War (such as Leptines' law), which Schaefer called 'klägliche Auskünfte' ('meagre measures', Schaefer 1885–7: I.179); others consider him a member of a moderate faction of the Isocratean type and regard the mentioned link with Diophantus as evidence of his affiliation with Eubulus' group (Harding 1976: 186–200, 1994: 18–25). As has been demonstrated, each of these reconstructions is subject to serious objections: it is highly doubtful that Androtion studied at Isocrates' school and, as Harding has persuasively argued, the rivalry with Aeschines speaks against his membership in the group of Eubulus. His alleged political activity in the wake of Aristophon has rightly been pointed out to be barely reconcilable with the fact that Androtion's prosecution as a public debtor was based on a decree proposed by Aristophon (cf. 24.11). Hence the view that Androtion himself was the head of a group without any ideological colouring seems much more likely, as is the theory that the policy of 'klägliche Auskünfte' ought to be considered a choice shared by a heterogeneous coalition in order to overcome the economic crisis triggered by the Social War. We hear from Plutarch (*De exil.* 605c) about Androtion being exiled, but Jacoby's assumption that it was provoked by the hostility of Demosthenes' faction for his alleged anti-Persian stand appears to rest on very weak grounds.

## ARISTOPHON AND HIS ALLIES

---

Aristophon of Azenia also had a relevant role in the 350s and 340s. His long and intense political activity started already around the end of the fifth century and most likely continued, despite a gap of documentation until the 360s (Whitehead 1986: 313–19), through the following decades. The various decrees he moved (ten are known) are significant proof of this activity, as are the numerous *graphai paranomôn* in which he was always acquitted (Aeschin. 3.193, where the figure of 75 may just signal a great quantity). Moreover, Demosthenes includes him among the 'esteemed great orators' (*rhêtôres endoxoi kai megaloi*) who preceded him (18.219) and Hyperides, mentioning an accusation he had launched against him, does not hesitate to qualify him as 'most powerful in the state' (*ischyrotatos en têi politeiai*: Eux. 28).

His political position, again, does not lend itself to a too strict definition, and his frequent classification among the so-called 'radicals' does not appear well founded. No doubt he was an opponent of Callistratus and his philo-Spartan policies, for he was a supporter of the alliance with Thebes (the most distinctive aspect of his political activity). He surely also was Eubulus' rival, as we know from Demosthenes' references

(from 18.162, in particular, we know that the two, 'while often disagreeing on other matters', both agreed about the opportunity of friendship with Thebes). Starting from Schaefer, it has been widely held that his opposition to the 'pacifists' Callistratus and Eubulus was grounded in an imperialistic stance, but this is far from certain: his prosecution of Timotheus, Iphicrates, and Menestheus after the defeat at Embata in the Social War (in 356; cf. Din. 1.14; Nep. *Timoth.* 3.5), probably aimed at saving his friend Chares, does not amount to a proof; moreover, although it is likely that he advocated financial emergency measures—the abovementioned 'klägliche Auskünfte'—after the end of the Social War (as his presence among the *syndikoi* of Leptines' law and the decree mentioned in 24.11 suggest), there is no reason to think that these measures had as their ultimate purpose the resumption of the war rather than the restoration of the devastated Athenian finances (Sealey 1955: 77–9). It is indeed true that Aristophon was opposed to the Peace of Philocrates in 346: he made a speech in which he deplored the surrender of Amphipolis and highlighted that Athens, 'the greatest of the Greek cities' (*megistê polis tôn Hellênidôn*), was able to fight with its military and financial sources (Theopompus *FGrH* 115 F 166). However, his opinion in that case was not so isolated: Aeschines (2.74) states that all the *rhêtores* who participated in the discussion were only able to stress the glorious past of the polis.

About the composition of the group he headed there are many uncertainties. It is likely that Leodamas of Acharnae, member of a rich family and a respected orator (Aeschin. 3.139 claims that he was not inferior to Demosthenes), belonged to that group, because his philo-Theban stance and his opposition to Callistratus brought him close to Aristophon. By contrast, there are many doubts about Cephisodotus of Ceramicus, another famous orator mentioned among the *syndikoi* of Leptines' law, because of his friendly stance towards Sparta and his hostility towards Chares. The same point may be made also in the case of Leptines, who is known for his position in favour of Sparta in 369 (Arist. *Rh.* 1411a.5–6; Plut. *Prae.ger.reip.* 803A). As regards Demosthenes' remark that Aeschines was a follower and flatterer of both Eubulus and Aristophon (18.162), it seems not very credible, as it is clearly inspired by the aim of vilifying the rival. It is worth noting that a probable follower of Aristophon, Leodamas of Acharnae, is mentioned among Isocrates' pupils ([Plut.] *X orat.* 837D): this underlines, in a very incisive manner, that the affiliation with this school was of no political significance.

## OTHER ALLIES OF DEMOSTHENES

---

Other politically active men can be classified as Demosthenes' friends or supporters, but for us they are often no more than names. Among the few who are better known there is, firstly, Hegesippus, nicknamed Crobylus ('top-knot'), member of a rich family from the deme Sounion (Davies 1971: 209) and author, as is generally believed, of *On Halonnesus* ([Dem.] 7). Beloch, among many others, claims that he was originally a member of Aristophon's group (hence his frequent classification among the

so-called 'radicals'), but this is far from certain: in fact, this assumption is not in line with either the position in favour of the Phocians (and against Thebes) that he took in 355 (Aeschin. 3.118; *IG ii*<sup>2</sup> 125 = RO 69) or the conflict between his brother Hegesander and Aristophon that Aeschines hints at (1.64). There are no doubts about his position in the 340s, when he was one of the protagonists of the anti-Macedonian front (he is in fact called *misophilippos* in schol. Aeschin. 1.147): he was opposed to the Peace of Philocrates in 346, and in the following years, as we read in his own oration, he had an important role in making the Athenians demand a revision of the peace treaty and also in persuading them of the inadequacy of Philip's offers. Moreover, he was at the forefront in the negotiations with the Macedonian king (to whom he went as an ambassador in 343, without success: 19.331) and in the attempt of creating a coalition to oppose him, sent in a delegation together with Demosthenes and Polyeuctus to the Peloponnese in 342 to make alliances (9.72). Hegesippus was politically active also after Chaeronea, as we infer from a decree he proposed in honour of two Acarnanians in 338/7 (*IG ii*<sup>2</sup> 237 = RO 77) and still alive in 325/4, as proved by epigraphic evidence about the payment of a debt in that year (*IG ii*<sup>2</sup> 1629.543). Unlike Demosthenes, however, he was not among the anti-Macedonian politicians requested for surrender by Alexander after the destruction of Thebes. This suggests that he did not have a relevant role in the Athenian political scene anymore.

Another member of Demosthenes' circle, Timarchus of Sphettus, had close links to Hegesippus' brother Hegesander: the information we possess derives mainly from Aeschines' speech in the trial against Timarchus in 346/5 (in which both Hegesander and his brother joined the defence: Aeschin. 1.68–9, 71). While obviously characterized by a partial and malevolent stance, the oration is a significant testimony to the political importance of the man. In the first *hypothesis* we read that he proposed more than 100 decrees (and is named 'distinguished in the state', *diasêmos en têi politeiai*), and Aeschines states (1.106) that he truly collected political offices: he was twice a member of the *boulê*, in 361/0 and 347/6 (Aeschin. 1.109; *Arg.* 1.1.2), *logistês* (auditor) of the island of Andros (§107), *exetastês* (inspector of troops) in Eretria (§113), and in addition a member of several delegations sent to other Greek states (§120). From Demosthenes (19.286) we also know about the proposal he made when as *bouleutês* in 347/6 (maybe inspired by Hegesippus' group) to lay down the death penalty for those who gave arms and furniture to Philip. We do not have much information about his relationship with Demosthenes, alongside whom he accused Aeschines of treason and corruption in 346 but who mentions him only in the speech *On the False Embassy*. It has been claimed that the two characters became allied because they were both related to Hegesippus' group (Pecorella Longo 1971: 116), but this is quite unlikely, because when the two prosecuted Aeschines Demosthenes was not against the peace treaty, whereas Hegesippus was. It is more likely that Timarchus, who in 347 served on the Council together with Demosthenes, was the channel through which Demosthenes approached Hegesippus' group, with which he closely collaborated later on.

Polyeuctus of Sphettus is called a famous *rhêtôr* by Plutarch (*Dem.* 13.6). He definitely had a political relationship with Demosthenes, though possibly not from the very beginning of their political activity (in 348 Demosthenes mentions a person of this name among the followers of his enemy Meidias: 21.139). What we know about him allows us to count him among the strictly anti-Macedonian politicians: in 342 he is attested to have been part of the delegation to Peloponnese, together with Demosthenes and Hegesippus, and in 335 he was among the politicians whose surrender was requested by Alexander (Plut. *Dem.* 23.4; Arr. *An.* 1.10.4); moreover, we know that he moved a *graphê paranomôn* against a proposal of honours to Demades (Apsines, Spengel *Rhet.* 1.387) and that he was also active in 323, collaborating with Demosthenes in the attempt to find allies in Arcadia for the war against Macedonia ([Plut.] *X orat.* 846C–D).

There are more doubts about two other politicians also among those requested by Alexander in 335, Callisthenes and Moerocles, who, like Polyeuctus, share with Demosthenes the involvement in the Harpalus affair. Callisthenes' political importance is suggested both by the comedians' attention (Ath. 8,338F, 341E–F) and by a reference by Lycurgus (fr. V 2), according to which he was honoured by the Athenians with a crown worth 100 minae. He could be considered an early anti-Macedonian, because in 356/5 the people voted for his proposal of a *symmachia* with some monarchs hostile to Philip (IG ii<sup>2</sup> 127 = RO 53). Demosthenes also mentions him with regard to two occasions: for a financial role in 357 (20.33) and for the emergency measures he proposed in 346, when the news of the Phocian defeat spread in Athens (18.37).

It is not possible to state much about Moerocles of Eleusis, who is mentioned by Plutarch (*Dem.* 13.6) among the most important *rhêtôres* and is known for proposing a decree on the protection of merchants from pirates ([Dem.] 58.53, 56). Demosthenes seems to be sympathetic to him when referring critically to an action moved against him by Eubulus for some supplementary taxes imposed on mining entrepreneurs (19.293).

Philocrates of Hagnus is sometimes—for example by Beloch (1884: 190; cf. also Mitchell 1996: 16–17)—classed among Demosthenes' friends, but one may say that his political stance is really a mystery: in fact, we know nothing about him before 348, when he proposed to allow Philip to negotiate about peace (Aeschin. 2.13); he became the scapegoat for the peace that bears his name and was disavowed by all politicians, so that he was forced to go into exile in 343, after Hyperides had charged him with corruption (Hyp. *Eux.* 29). Of the different opinions on him—one that associates him with Demosthenes and another that sees him as Eubulus' follower (Pecorella Longo 1971: 100)—the first one surely appears more likely: we may, for example, refer to Demosthenes' defence of Philocrates against a *graphê paranomôn* in 348 (Aeschin. 2.14) or their close collaboration for the peace treaty of 346—not without reason Cawkwell suggested to call it the Peace of Demosthenes rather than the Peace of Philocrates (1963: 50 n.27). Moreover, it is worth keeping in mind that Philocrates' proposal in 348 was not in line with Eubulus' objective at that time, viz. the creation of a coalition against Philip.

## POLITICIANS AFTER CHAERONEA

In the period after Chaeronea new figures appear on the political scene alongside those already known: the group to which most of them belong, the one headed by Lycurgus, is very diverse and includes both philo-Macedonians and old anti-Macedonians (Faraguna 1992: 211–43). Among them, Xenocles of Sphettus and Demades of Paeania surely have key roles. The former is probably the same as the Xenocles *rhêtor* mentioned in Ath. 4,134E (as suggested by the connection with Stratocles of Diomea) and can be considered the main collaborator of Lycurgus (Ampolo 1979: 167–79). We have substantial epigraphic evidence about him (while literary sources are curiously silent). It allows us to infer not only that was he a very rich man, with many liturgies (among which the trierarchy) and various expenditures for the benefit of the community; according to a decree of the Ceryces of about 330 (*SEG* 20:115); moreover—this is the most interesting piece of information—he was also in charge of the *dioikêsis*, thus holding a very important financial office. This piece of evidence allows us to identify him as the friend and placeholder to whom Lycurgus entrusted the responsibility of financial administration after his first four years (336/5–332/1 according to the most probable chronology), when the law did not permit him an immediate second term ([Plut.] *X orat.* 841C; Chapter 26 this volume). Also active as an *epimelêtês* of the Eleusinian mysteries under the archonship of Archippus (321/0 or 318/7: *IG* ii<sup>2</sup> 1191), Xenocles disappears from the scene in the decade of Demetrius of Phaleron (whose opponent he may have been) but reappears after the restoration of democracy: in 307 he was *agônothetês* (*IG* ii<sup>2</sup> 3073, 3077) and in the following year he had the task of bringing to Athens money that had been offered by Antigonus (*IG* ii<sup>2</sup> 1492). Thus he is likely to have become an influential agent in Athenian political life again.

It is now widely recognized (Mitchel 1970; Faraguna 1992) that even an important philo-Macedonian such as Demades could be a member of Lycurgus' group. We do not have much information about him before 338. We can, however, state that he was not of low birth (as a malevolent tradition has it, which claims that his wealth derived from his political activity), that he had been politically active before that year (maybe as a *bouleutês*, if *SEG* 19:149.144 is to be dated before 341/0 rather than in 336/5, as has been proposed), and that by that time he did surely not hold philo-Macedonian positions: an inscription of 341 (*IG* ii<sup>2</sup> 1623) attests that he served alongside Demosthenes, Lycurgus, and Hegesippus as guarantor for warships in support of the Chalcidians against Philip (Brun 2000: 44–8). In any case, immediately after Chaeronea, he became the privileged negotiating partner of Philip (a story not very accurately but rather fictionally described by the sources): from then on, he was politically highly influential and distinguished himself by his philo-Macedonian zeal. After his decisive role in the peace signed by Athens and Macedonia (justly called 'Peace of Demades') he ensured that the relationship with the new hegemonic power was reinforced through a series of decrees providing honours to Philip and members of his circle; then in 335, after the



Theban revolt, he was able to use his credit and convinced Alexander to give up his request that a group of anti-Macedonian politicians be surrendered to him. Later, in 331, he was again at the forefront of politics, when he acted as treasurer of the military fund and was instrumental in preventing Athenian involvement in Agis III's failed rebellion; he apparently had an important role next in 324, as he probably contributed to Athens not having to suffer the consequences of the exiles' decree by losing Samos (the island Demades described as a 'piece broken off' of Athens: Ath. 3,99D), proposing divine honours to Alexander (a proposal that was supported by Demosthenes: Din. 1.94). Demades was brought down by the Harpalus affair—as were most of the leading Athenian politicians of the time—but he was to play a relevant role in Athens' politics again. Apparently he opposed Athens' rebellion in 322 (although according to an inscription he was *syntelês* for a trierarchy together with Leosthenes, who was one of the protagonists of the Lamian War: *IG ii<sup>2</sup> 1631*); yet he accepted the Athenians' commission of negotiating with Antipater after the defeat of Crannon in 322 and, together with Phocion, was given the role of leading the oligarchic regime imposed on the polis by the Macedonian conquerors; he also moved the decree determining the death penalty for Demosthenes and his followers (Plut. *Dem.* 28.2). He was thus the most important leader of the polis until 319, when he was murdered on Cassander's order because he was no longer considered reliable enough.

Starting from Hyperides and Dinarchus, Demades has been generally represented by the ancient tradition as a cynical and corrupt opportunist, a servant of the Macedonians: in reality, he appears deserving of a more nuanced evaluation, as has been persuasively highlighted by some 'revisionist' studies (Mitchel 1970; Brun 2000). His policy, based on realism and prudence, is not, in fact, very different from that pursued after Chaeronea by Demosthenes and by Lycurgus himself, with whom he seems to have actively collaborated—in this context it may be significant that we have three decrees, approved on the same day, each proposed by one of them (*SEG* 21:274, 275, 276). Moreover, as is recognized even by the critical Dinarchus (2.15), on various occasions his policy has proved effective in protecting the interests of the polis and in avoiding more serious consequences that she might have suffered. The same can also be said for the last and most controversial period of his political activity, his leadership of the oligarchy imposed by Antipater: with regard to this time he said in one of his famous aphorisms that he deserved lenient judgement because he administered a shipwrecked polis (Plut. *Phoc.* 1.1).

## SUGGESTED READING

The politicians of Demosthenes' Era are all treated in Sealey 1993, Harris 1995, and Worthington 2013. Faraguna 1992 gives an overview of the main agents in the Lycurgan period. Detailed assessments of individual politicians are given by Cawkwell 1963 (Eubulus), Harding 1994 (Androtion), and Brun 2000 (Demades). Hansen 2014 now reviews the evidence for political 'parties' and groups.

## REFERENCES

- Ampolo, C. 1979. 'Un politico evergete del IV secolo a. C. Xenocles, figlio di Xeinis, del demo di Sphettos'. *PP* 34, 167–79.
- Beloch, K. J. 1884. *Die Attische Politik seit Perikles*, Leipzig.
- Brun, P. 2000. *L'orateur Démosthène. Essai d'histoire et d'historiographie*, Bordeaux.
- Buckler, J. 2000. 'Demosthenes and Aeschines'. In *Demosthenes: Statesman and Orator*, edited by I. Worthington, London, 114–58.
- Canevaro, M. 2009. 'L'accusa contro Leptine: crisi economica e consenso post-bellico'. *Quaderni del Dipartimento di filologia linguistica e tradizione classica n.s.* 8, 117–41.
- Cawkwell, G. W. 1963. 'Eubulus'. *JHS* 83, 47–67.
- Davies, J. K. 1971. *Athenian Propertied Families, 600–300 B.C.*, Oxford.
- Faraguna, M. 1992. *Atene nell'età di Alessandro. Problemi politici, economici, finanziari*, Rome.
- Glötz, G. 1932. 'Démosthène et les finances athéniennes de 346 à 339'. *Revue historique* 170, 385–97.
- Hansen, M. H. 1991. *The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes: Structure, Principles, Ideology*, Oxford & Cambridge, MA.
- Hansen, M. H. 2014. 'Political Parties in Democratic Athens?'. *GRBS* 54, 379–403.
- Harding, P. 1976. 'Androtion's political Career'. *Historia* 25, 186–200.
- Harding, P. 1994. *Androtion and the Atthis*, Oxford.
- Harris, E. M. 1995. *Aeschines and Athenian Politics*, Oxford.
- Harris, E. M. 2006. 'Demosthenes and the Theoric Fund'. In *Democracy and the Rule of Law in Classical Athens: Essays on Law, Society and Politics*, edited by E. M. Harris, Cambridge, 121–39 (originally in *Transitions to Empire: Essays in Greco-Roman History, 360–146 B.C. in Honor of E. Badian*, edited by R. Wallace and E. M. Harris, Norman OK & London, 1996, 57–76).
- Mitchel, F. 1970. *Lykurgan Athens: 338–322*, Cincinnati.
- Mitchell, L. G. 1996. 'Friends and Enemies in Athenian Politics'. *G&R* 43, 11–21.
- Pecorella Longo, C. 1971. *'Eterie' e gruppi politici nell'Atene del IV sec. a.C.*, Florence.
- Schaefer, A. 1885–7. *Demosthenes und seine Zeit*. 2nd ed., Leipzig.
- Sealey, R. 1955. 'Athens after the Social War'. *JHS* 75, 74–81.
- Sealey, R. 1993. *Demosthenes and His Time: A Study in Defeat*, Oxford.
- Strauss, B. S. 1986. *Athens After the Peloponnesian War: Class, Faction and Policy 403–386 BC*, London.
- Whitehead, D. 1986. 'The Political Career of Aristophon'. *CPh* 81, 313–19.
- Worthington, I. 2013. *Demosthenes of Athens and the Fall of Classical Greece*, New York.