Inconsistent preferences are a cause of time-inconsistency in pol- icy design. This type of inconsistency entails welfare costs for allo- cations are associated with Pareto-inefficient competitive equilibria. This paper builds a general equilibrium model for the characteriza- tion of allocations induced by Nash-equilibrium taxation policies with competitive markets.
Equilibrium taxation with inconsistent preferences
Pietro Senesi
2019-01-01
Abstract
Inconsistent preferences are a cause of time-inconsistency in pol- icy design. This type of inconsistency entails welfare costs for allo- cations are associated with Pareto-inefficient competitive equilibria. This paper builds a general equilibrium model for the characteriza- tion of allocations induced by Nash-equilibrium taxation policies with competitive markets.File in questo prodotto:
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