The Gulf conflict (1990-1991) was the first test case for the EEC to play an original and autonomous role within the New World Order after the end of the Cold War and to affirm its own peculiarity with respect to the US policy. Although the EEC supported the American decision of military intervention, since the outbreak of the crisis, it always tried to keep the dialogue open with the Arab world in order to reach a diplomatic solution to the conflict. In this contest, the Italian rotating presidency of the EEC, with its ‘diplomacy of friendship’ with Arab leaders, had a significant influence on the external action of the Community. The proposal for a ministerial conference in Venice and the idea of the CSCM once the war was over were clear attempts to show the Arabs that Europe and Italy, unlike the United States, could be considered privileged interlocutors as they had always defended the Palestinian cause. Despite the ongoing changes in the international system and the initiatives of the Italian Presidency, the European Community failed to play an important political role in the Middle East. The political differences between the Member States within the EPC did not allow Europe to ‘speak with a single voice’, undermining its external effectiveness on the world stage. The opposition of the USA and Israel to grant a full involvement in the regional questions to an openly pro-Arab Europe also limited the EEC actorness during and after the conflict. The Gulf War therefore showed that time for progress in the process of European integration at the political and security level came.

Ferrara R (2023). Tra vincoli atlantici, ambizioni europee ed echi mediterranei: la CEE, l'Italia e la prima guerra del Golfo (1990-1991)

Roberta Ferrara
2023-01-01

Abstract

The Gulf conflict (1990-1991) was the first test case for the EEC to play an original and autonomous role within the New World Order after the end of the Cold War and to affirm its own peculiarity with respect to the US policy. Although the EEC supported the American decision of military intervention, since the outbreak of the crisis, it always tried to keep the dialogue open with the Arab world in order to reach a diplomatic solution to the conflict. In this contest, the Italian rotating presidency of the EEC, with its ‘diplomacy of friendship’ with Arab leaders, had a significant influence on the external action of the Community. The proposal for a ministerial conference in Venice and the idea of the CSCM once the war was over were clear attempts to show the Arabs that Europe and Italy, unlike the United States, could be considered privileged interlocutors as they had always defended the Palestinian cause. Despite the ongoing changes in the international system and the initiatives of the Italian Presidency, the European Community failed to play an important political role in the Middle East. The political differences between the Member States within the EPC did not allow Europe to ‘speak with a single voice’, undermining its external effectiveness on the world stage. The opposition of the USA and Israel to grant a full involvement in the regional questions to an openly pro-Arab Europe also limited the EEC actorness during and after the conflict. The Gulf War therefore showed that time for progress in the process of European integration at the political and security level came.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11574/232620
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