Hannah Arendt’s recognition of the role of lie in political opinion and agency has to be connected to Arendt reformulation of the notion of Judgement throughout significant works as the Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, her controversial text Eichmann in Jerusalem and Truth and Politics. I argue that Arendt’s idea that lie retains a political relevance in its relationship to opinion and political permormative action actually prevents the occurrence of any historical negationism because of Arendt’s defence of prior claim of “truths of fact”.

Verità, menzogna e verità di fatto in Hannah Arendt

TAVANI, ELENA
2013-01-01

Abstract

Hannah Arendt’s recognition of the role of lie in political opinion and agency has to be connected to Arendt reformulation of the notion of Judgement throughout significant works as the Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, her controversial text Eichmann in Jerusalem and Truth and Politics. I argue that Arendt’s idea that lie retains a political relevance in its relationship to opinion and political permormative action actually prevents the occurrence of any historical negationism because of Arendt’s defence of prior claim of “truths of fact”.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11574/31128
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