The Economic Implications of Early Military Assistance to Western Europe under the Truman Administration, 1949-1951

My aim in this research is to frame the early years of U.S. military assistance to Western Europe within the context of economic, financial, and industrial issues. I focus on military support for the West European North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries from mid-1949 through the end of the administration of Harry S. Truman in 1952. I argue that during this period the United States changed its approach to the economic dimensions of rearmament. I trace the main features of the first military aid program, a bilateral assistance program based on a widespread fear that military aid would impair the ongoing economic recovery promoted by the Marshall Plan; and a strengthening of military security in Europe aimed at reinforcing existing military forces rather than promoting new defense industries. I also address the structure of mutual security in 1950-51 as a multilateral rearmament program, touching on the main limits of military assistance and its procedures as they affected transatlantic relations. The reorganization of military aid to Europe with offshore procurement programs after 1952 was closely linked to a new concept elaborated by the Truman administration in which rearmament could promote development and aid economic recovery.